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The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928–1947

Abd Al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi

البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي القدسي

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Dedicated to the memory of my brother

Abd Allah

البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي القدسي

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البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي القدسي

Preface

For half a century the Palestine question has claimed the attention of ordinary citizens, intellectuals, political parties and governments in the Arab and Muslim world. It is a complex and multi-dimensional issue, with important religious, social and cultural aspects in addition to the political significance which has made it one of the crucial international issues of our time. Although proposals for its solution have multiplied, the problem itself has only become more intractable with the passage of time.

Islam has contributed its own ideas to the search for a solution of the Palestine question. What follows is not a study of contemporary Islamic movements and their attitudes towards the issue, but rather a detailed study of one of these movements, namely the Muslim Brothers' Society (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin) in Egypt. Founded by Hasan al-Banna in Ismailia in 1928, the Society has been a pioneer among contemporary Islamic movements in its assertion of the comprehensive nature of Islamic thought, seeing Islam not merely in terms of religious observance but as an integral way of life, concerned with the various political, economic, social and cultural aspects of human experience. The Muslim Brothers Society was, and remain, transnational as well as national simultaneously. Although it was started in Egypt, its activities have not been confined to the Egyptian borders but have extended into most Arab countries and even to Europe and North America.

It is this that has given the Society its significance both as a political and a popular movement. Although the Society was officially dissolved in Egypt in 1954, it has remained an important factor in the religio-political development of Egypt and of the wider Arab world. For example, the Muslim Brothers have representatives in the parliaments of Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Yemen.

This book is not a history of this Society, nor is it concerned with

describing the political, economic and social conditions which led to its formation. It is a study of the movement's attitude towards the Palestine question, about which it had strong views, based on its own philosophy, concepts and aims. The year 1928, when Hasan al-Banna founded the Society, has been chosen as its starting point. The year1936 has been chosen as the turning point because it was then that the Arab Revolt broke out in Palestine; it was also in 1936 that the Muslim Brothers made their first impact on the Egyptian political scene. The book ends in 1947, the year which saw the United Nations' resolution to partition Palestine. This resolution carried the Society and the problem into a different stage – that of armed action in Palestine – which merits an independent study of its own. Initially, there was no intention of stopping at that date because it was anticipated that there would be a scarcity of material on the issue. As it turned out, however, there is in fact rich material on the pre-1947 period, most of it original and previously inaccessible to researchers.

Writers and historians of various tendencies have concerned themselves with the history and ideology of the Muslim Brothers; but the relationship between them and the Palestine question has never been subjected to any comprehensive study. Most Palestinian reference books and histories ignore it, especially during the early period. Despite the fact that Arif al-Arif, the author of *al-Nakba*, referred to the part played by the Muslim Brothers in some of the battles of 1948, the PLO has ignored their role in the Palestine question. When the author interviewed Munir Shafiq, former general director of the Palestinian Planning centre, and asked why this was so, Shafiq replied frankly that the reason lay in the radical difference between the solution of the Palestine question proposed by the Muslim Brothers and the solutions envisaged by the PLO and other Palestinian organisations. Egyptian historians for their own part have contented themselves with brief references to the role of the Muslim Brothers.

The Muslim Brothers' own historians have also ignored this area, possibly because of the continual harassment they encountered between 1948 and the death of Jamal Abd al-Nasir, whose ideas dominated political thinking in many Arab countries where the Muslim Brothers were operating. After the beginning of Sadat's regime, certain members of the Brothers did begin to write their memoirs; but they paid little attention to the Society's attitude towards the Palestine question. Only Kamil al-Sharif, a leader during the 1948 War,

who published his memoirs in 1951 under the title *The Muslim Brothers and the 1948 War*, has made a passing reference to the issue.

Likewise works in English, published and unpublished, which have dealt with the history and ideology of the Muslim Brothers, have paid scant attention to their attitude towards the Palestine question, an example being *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* by Richard Mitchell. The only article on the subject is by Thomas Mayer and was written during the preparation of his doctoral thesis 'Egypt and the Palestine Question 1936-1945.' The article is short and inadequate in most respects and ignores many aspects of the role played by the Muslim Brothers in the issue. Mayer lacked knowledge of the conceptual framework of the Muslim Brothers' attitude and it appears that most of his information was gathered incidentally in the course of his wider research. He was thus unable to gain much understanding of the history of the Muslim Brothers in general and of their attitudes in this respect particularly, which in turn influenced both his analysis and his deductions. Despite this, the author has benefited greatly from Mayer's article, especially the references on which he based his work.

In addition to the fact that the issue has not received much attention, the period from1928 to 1947 is particularly important because it was the crucible for the development of the Muslim Brothers' ideas about colonialism in the Arab countries in general and in Palestine in particular, and for their determination to give prominence to the concept of *jihad*, which had almost disappeared from Muslim thought. It was indeed one of the most significant periods for the Brothers where Palestine was concerned, in that it saw the development of their attitude to the issue, through several stages, to the culmination of armed action in Palestine. This final stage can only be properly understood through a thorough analysis of the preceding stages which identifies the factors that influenced the Muslim Brothers and evaluates the role of the Society in the context of the Palestine question.

In preparing this book, I went to some lengths to gather information. The only material available in Britain consisted of the documents in the Public Record Office, which though immensley valuable are limited. The Egyptian press of the period published very little about the activities of the Muslim Brothers. To supplement these sources, I travelled to Geneva, Cairo and Palestine to conduct personal interviews with leading members of the Muslim Brothers, and corresponded

with a wide variety of individuals and organisations in Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Germany. The Egyptian Muslim Brothers were ready to provide any information that was requested. Their archive has preserved the papers and magazines of the Society, its leaflets and statements and provides the most intimate and authoritative account of its attitudes and activities. I was also fortunate enough to be given access to the personal papers and photographs of some members of the Society I met and interviewed.

I was in this way able to collect a quantity of documents which covers the event and fill in the gaps. I believe that this material constitutes the most comprehensive collection in existence about the Muslim Brothers in general and about their relationship to the Palestine question in particular. It is available now in a special research collection at Exeter University.

In preparing the book, I have tried to organise the material in line with the course of events. After an opening chapter which sets out to explain what prompted the Muslim Brothers to concern themselves with the Palestine question, each part covers a distinct stage in the evolution of the problem. Developments which followed the adoption of the partition resolution and which culminated in open warfare in Palestine fall outside the scope of the book and are briefly outlined in the Epilogue.

Acknowledgements

I acknowledge with deep gratitude my debt to Michael Adams, without whose support this research could not have been undertaken. His constant help and encouragement, and the friendship he showed me, enabled me to overcome difficulties which may otherwise have proved insuperable.

I am greatly indebted to the late Albert Hourani, the late Sir Anthony Parsons, the late Professor M. A. Shaban, Mr H. G. Balfour Paul, and Mr B. R. Pridham for their invaluable comments and suggestions. My thanks are also due to Mr J. R. B. Vanstone of Exeter University for reading the first draft of Chapter 7, and for his helpful comments. Needless to say, none of them are responsible for the views expressed in the book. In appreciation for the help I have received, I have given the material I collected in the field to the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies at Exeter University, to be held in a special research collection.

The Egyptian Muslim Brothers I met in the course of my research provided me with invaluable information. Special thanks are due to the late Sa'id Ramadan, the late Salah Shadi, the late Abd al-Mun'in Abd al-Ra'uf, and to Abd al-Halim Mahmud. I also wish to thank the many people overseas who supplied me with information and books, and Mr Abd al-Majid Shadid and Mr Muhammad Othman who were especially generous with their time during my stay in Egypt.

The staff of the Public Record Office and of Exeter University Library were most helpful and co-operative and I owe them thanks. I am also grateful to Mr W. R. Thomas for his help in proof-reading. Finally, I would like to thank my family in Palestine who have waited patiently for this book to be completed. In particular I am indebted to my wife Aisha al-Ahlas and my children for the understanding and patience they have shown throughout. Their unselfish support enabled me to devote nearly all my time to the research and words are inadequate to express what I owe to them.

A Note on Dates, Translation and Transliteration

As most of the references to the Muslim Brothers are dated according to the Islamic Calender, B. Spuler, *Wustenfeld - Mahler'sche Vergleichungs - Tabellen Zur Muslimischen und Iranischen Zeitrechnung* (Wiesbaden: Franz Meiner, Verlag, 1961) has been used to convert them to the Western calender.

When translating from Arabic into English an attempt has been made to strike a balance between the strength of expression in the original and its exact meaning. In translating a verse from the Qur'an, the translation of the English Muslim, Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall, from his *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an* has been used.

In transliterating names of personalities, organisations and titles of newspapers and magazines, the generally accepted English form has been used. Elsewhere, the system is that advocated by the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies.*

CHAPTER ONE

Islam and the Palestine Question

Approaches to the Palestine question have varied in accordance with the beliefs and ideologies of the organisations, the political parties and the governments that have sought to engage in and resolve it. The framework of beliefs within which the Muslim Brothers approached the Palestine question during the 1930s and the 1940s is therefore of great importance. Why, it should be asked, did the Muslim Brothers concern themselves with the Palestine question, and did their view of it contain anything different from their view on other Arab and Islamic issues?

Those who have written on the ideology and history of the Muslim Brothers have paid little attention to these questions. Furthermore, the Muslim Brothers themselves have not set out their ideas about the Palestine problem in any explicit fashion. However, from their writings and pronouncements a pattern emerges which sheds light upon the issue. This 'content analysis' approach may be just as relevant to the analysis of the goals of the Muslim Brothers in the 1990s and to those of other contemporary Islamic movements in the Arab world which could be considered off-shoots of the Muslim Brothers.

Both Muslim scholars and Orientalists have tended to underestimate the relevance of the Muslim Brothers' own pronouncements, and in the case of the latter, have disregarded the relevance of the Qur'an and Hadith to their thinking, and sometimes regarded allusions to them as no more than a general piety with little direct bearing on their posture and politics vis-à-vis Palestine. In what follows our focus will be on the Muslim Brothers' own discourse and we shall quote extensively from both the Qur'an and the Hadith in order to establish the extent to which they applied these concepts in their handling of the Palestine question. We will argue that two sets of factors shaped the Muslim Brothers' interest in the Palestine question during the Hasan al-Banna period (1928–49), and led them to accord it a

primary place in their plans. The first and most fundamental of these were religious motives. The Muslim Brothers believe that religious motives are constant and invariable as they derive from the basic principles of Islam. The second set comprised nationalist and political factors which the Brothers accept as varying along with other social and historical conditions.

Fundamental Religious Motives.

The religious motives derive from two inter-related concepts involving the law and its interpretation, namely the concept of the Islamic *umma* and the concept of *jihad.*

The Concept of the Islamic Umma

The Muslim Brothers considered all Muslims to be one community linked by the bond of the Islamic belief which does not recognise racial distinctions. For them Islam affirms that all peoples share a common origin, and so it opposes racial or national prejudice. The Prophet Muhammad said, 'God has taken away from you the disgrace of pre-Islam and the pride shown in fathers and forefathers. People are from Adam and Adam was from dust ... No Arab has any advantage over or against any non-Arab, neither black nor red, except by godliness and piety.'[1]

The Muslim Brothers believed that the Islamic *umma* superseded national, geographical or racial divisions to embrace a community of principles, beliefs and higher realities. Hasan al-Banna defined the domain of the Islamic *umma* as:

> Any span of land in which there is a Muslim proclaiming that there is no God except Allah, or where the banner of God once raised becomes a trust in the hands of all Muslims to be given to God and to his prophet. They should defend its freedom with their bodies and should devote their lives and money to maintaining it.[2]

Accordingly, the Muslim Brothers' literature described Islam as a 'homeland and a nationality'.[3] This explains their motto, 'The nationality of a Muslim is his belief.' Recognising, however, that for purposes of collective action mankind is divided into peoples and

tribes, the Muslim Brothers considered the Muslim as belonging to two nations: the nation of his birth, and an Islamic spiritual nation. Both imposed obligations which Muslims should fulfil.[4] More specifically, the Muslim Brothers divided their political loyalty in three directions: loyalty to their own country, to Arabism and to Islam.[5] According to the Brothers it was possible to combine these three loyalties and achieve a unity between them.

The Muslim Brothers believed that commitment to Islam requires that every Muslim should work for the good of his country and make the greatest possible contribution to the people amongst whom he belongs. Every Muslim should defend the place where he lives.[6] Hasan al-Banna approved of patriotism, of love of country and home, *wataniyat al-hanin*, and the patriotism of freedom and strength, *wataniyat al-hurriyya wa al-izza*, which impels people to work for the liberation and independence of their country and for a patriotic society, which in turn strengthens the bonds uniting people of the same country. There was also the patriotism of conquest, *wataniyat al-fath*, which involved conquering countries and dominating them. On the other hand, al-Banna did not approve of *wataniyat al-hizbiya*, the kind of narrow loyalty to one party which leads to factionalism.[7] As for nationalism, he approved of the nationalism of glory, *qawmiyat al-majd*, which means pride of the young generation in the glories of the past, and of the nationalism of the *umma*, *qawmiyat al-umma*, a person's special loyalty to a particular community.[8] Of Egypt, for example, where the Muslim Brothers originated, they say: 'Egyptianism or nationalism has its place in our ideas and its obligations in the struggle. We were born and brought up as Egyptians.'[9]

The second loyalty was to Arabism which, for the Muslim Brothers, refers to the language community as mentioned in the prophetic tradition: 'Arabism is but the tongues.' The Qur'an itself was revealed in Arabic and Islam developed and reached other peoples initially through the Arabs. Thus the Arabs are regarded as the core and the custodians of Islam. As the Islamic traditions state, 'If the Arabs are humiliated so shall Islam be humiliated.'[10] The Muslim Brothers thought that Arab unity was a prerequisite for the revival of the glory of Islam and for achieving Islamic unity. But, in their view, the pursuit of Arab unity ought not to become an excuse for racial fanatacism.[11] Thus, in the Muslim Brothers' view, Arabism was the second vehicle for progress.

The third loyalty – to Islamic unity which binds the Islamic *umma* – explains the Muslim Brothers' emphasis on the importance of reviving the caliphate.[13] They argued that there was no distinction between Arab and Islamic unity, except in extent.[14] Their policy was gradualist: from national unity, to Arab unity and then to Islamic unity.

Loyalty to the three realms of unity was not seen as conflicting or contradictory, as each would interact with the other and reinforce it. However, the Muslim Brothers did not approve of nationalism if it were to be used as a weapon against other loyalties.[15] Al-Banna summed up the advantages to be gained from combining these loyalties when he asserted that pan-Islamism provided the firmest base for Egyptian or any other nationalism. Nationalism, he said:

> ... serves to take you from the realm of sentiments to the realm of obligations and duties. The fact that God is watching gives a renewal to the motivation of the heart ... Furthermore, you will be choosing the strongest base and the firmest feeling for the advancement of your country ... You will have satisfied your God ... and secured the support of all Muslims ... at a time when survival is only possible for broad communities of people.[16]

He further emphasised this when he called for recognition of individual countries as 'they are the nearest field to you'. Equally, however, he asked Muslims not to forget the boundaries of the Islamic *umma* and never to ignore any part of it which was threatened with conquest or extinction, and always to work for the benefit of the greater Islamic *umma*.[17]

It seems clear from this that the Muslim Brothers' concept of *umma* was one of a religious and ideological 'belonging', and not a narrow loyalty to a particular racial group. But if several peoples are to be united, an effective bond is needed to override the more narrow national or racial associations. The Muslim Brothers defined this bond as Islamic fraternity, for which the Qur'an provided the authority: 'The believers are naught else than brothers'.[18] (49/10)

Al-Banna explained the meaning of fraternity, which he placed as the ninth of his ten elements of the oath of allegiance (*bay'a*), in these words:

> It means that hearts and souls are linked by the bond of faith as the strongest and most profound of bonds. Fraternity is the brotherhood of belief. Disunity is the sister of disbelief in God. The beginning of strength is unity and there is no unity without love ... The wolf only hunts down the lonely sheep, and believers stand in relation to each other like the parts of a building, each of which supports the other.[19]

Islamic fraternity demanded from the Muslim Brothers a number of commitments, notably to mutual co-operation in all circumstances. This, they believed, was decreed by the Prophet: 'Believers in their intimacy, sincerity and sympathy are but like a single body. If one part of it is hurt the whole body becomes fevered and restless.' Thus the priniple of Islamic fraternity was considered as one aspect of faith.[21] By replacing nationalism as the primary motive for association, fraternity, for the Brothers, eliminated nationalist fanatacism and replaced it with a willingness to make sacrifices for the interest of Muslim communities and countries and to win glory through caring for other Muslims and sympathising with their problems.[22] The centrality of the principle is obvious from the name adopted by the Muslim Brothers for their movement from its inception in 1928. Al-Banna told the six founder members from whom he formed the first nucleus: 'We are brothers in the service of Islam; therefore we are Muslim Brothers.'[23]

The means of achieving Islamic fraternity were outlined by al-Banna when he said, 'If one took the Qur'an in his right hand and the prophetic tradition in his left hand; and if one put the biography of the [Muslim] ancestors before one's eyes, one would then realise that Islam is a comprehensive and total nationalism and a unity and a bond built around belief and principles'.[24] The Muslim Brothers' aim in setting out this principle was:

> To educate young people and mould the souls of the nation around a principle that ensures the good of the public, peace and working for the betterment of all people. This has all the excellence which internationalism has; and it also secures our self respect in adhering to it and defending it in addition to defending our countries and our sacred things. This has all the benefits of nationalism. [25]

There remain two further points regarding the Muslim Brothers' concept of the Islamic *umma*, which are directly related to Palestine: their attitude towards non-Muslims and the special nature of the Pal-

their attitude towards non-Muslims and the special nature of the Palestine question in comparison with other Islamic issues.

The Attitude of the Muslim Brothers to Non-Muslims:

Hasan al-Banna divided people, notably those living within the Islamic *umma*, into two categories: Muslims and non-Muslims. Of the latter he wrote: 'we leave [them] in peace as long as they leave us in peace, we wish them good so long as they refrain from hostility towards us and we believe that between us and them is the bond of the call [of Islam] ... If any one attacks us, we fend off his aggression in the best possible way'.[26] To illustrate his meaning he quoted the Qur'an: 'ALLAH forbiddeth you not those who warred not against you on account of religion and drove you not out from your homes, that ye should show them kindness and deal justly with them. Lo! ALLAH loveth the just dealers. ALLAH forbiddeth you only those who warred against you on account of religion and have driven you out of your homes and helped to drive you out that ye make friends of them. Whosoever maketh friends of them – (All) such are wrong-doers'. (60/8–9)

This definition included 'Peoples of the Book', Christians and Jews: 'For the 'People of the Book' have the same rights and duties as Muslims, provided that they do not seek to sabotage the unity of Muslims.'[27] The attitude of the Muslim Brothers towards non-Muslims can be summed up as: the obligation to safeguard the lives, property and honour of those who believe in other religions and to ensure that justice prevails amongst them. But, if they show hostility or any intention of doing harm to Muslims, then Islam decrees that Muslims should fight them.[28]

As an indication of this attitude, the Muslim Brothers appointed two Christians to sit with them on the Political Committee of the Muslim Brothers, which was founded in 1948. The two were WAHIB Dus and Akhnu Lewis Akhnu.[29] The twelve members of the Committee were charged with observing and analysing political developments at home and ABROAD in order to define the attitude which the Muslim Brothers ought to ADOPT towards them. The committee HAD also to study proposals referred to it by the General Guidance Council, which HAD the final say.[30] To emphasise this policy towards Christians, al-Banna sent a message of congratulation to Tawfiq Dus on his election to the Senate, to which the latter replied

per, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, in which he referred to the national outlook of the Muslim Brothers and its rejection of party policies, religious factionalism and racism.[31]

In many articles al-Banna asserted that the Ikhwan was not a fanatic or sectarian movement directed against any creed or religion, so that non-Muslims, especially Christians, could trust their good will.[32] With regard to Christians the Muslim Brothers have followed this policy to this day. Al-Banna, Hasan al-Hudaybi, Umar al-Tilmisani, and Muhammad Hamid Abu al-Nasir[33] used to visit Christians and Christian institutions, as does Mustafa Mashhur now. In reply to articles written by Salama Musa alleging that Muslim Brothers were inciting religious hatred and feuds, a Christian writer by the name of Tawfiq Ghali said, 'I admit that they (Muslim Brothers) are the most honourable and high-minded group.' In support of his view he mentioned that some of the branches were surrounded by Christian communities, 'which met with nothing but courtesy and appreciation from them. There was a branch in Zagazig in al-Sayyadin Quarter, adjacent to a church which was held in the highest respect.'[34]

During al-Banna's time, the Muslim Brothers did not elaborate on the rights and duties and classifications of non-Muslims. It was only later, when the Muslim Brothers began to clarify their ideas in writing that they showed such an interest in this issue.[35]

Their general attitude to the Jews was, at first no different from that towards other non-Muslim/Peoples of the Book. Since, according to al-Banna, 'their effective participation in extending all sorts of assistance to the Zionist gangs in Palestine' the second part of the statement relating to non-Muslims was applied to them, namely, 'anyone of them who attacks us we fend off his aggression in the best possible way'.[36]

The attitude of the Muslim Brothers towards the Jews was, therefore, a direct consequence of their perceived response to Zionism and the events in Palestine. They considered the resulting conflict to be of a particular nature which distinguished it from other international conflicts and which made a peaceful solution inappropriate to it. In this context the Muslim Brothers cited the historical encounter between Islam and Judaism since the inception of the first Islamic State at the time of Muhammad. They quoted the Qur'an which had declared the Christians to be closer to Muslims in affection but took a different view of the Jews: 'Thou wilt find the most vehement of

mankind in hostility to those who believe (to be) the Jews and the idolaters. And thou wilt find the nearest of them in affection to those who believe (to be) those who say: Lo, we are Christian.' (5/82) In addition, they reviewed Jewish history prior to Islam,[37] and argued that there was a continuous tradition of Jewish opposition to Islam from the period of the Caliphs to more recent times. They recalled the Islamic Assurance of Safety granted by the second caliph, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, to the people of Jerusalem on 20 Rabi' al-Awwal 15 AH (2 May 636 AD), namely that 'No Jew will live with them (the Christian) in Aelia (Jerusalem).'[38] 'So, all Muslims should consider those Qur'anic verses and incidents and should teach them to ... every Muslim regardless of age and sex in a bid to fend off the conspiracies and hatred of the Jews and make them pay for it.'[39]

It was against this background that the Muslim Brothers proclaimed that 'Jews are the historic enemies of Muslims and carry the greatest hatred for the nation of Muhammad.'[40] As such, the Muslim Brothers professed to see no difference between Judaism and Zionism. Salih Ashmawi, a leading Muslim Brother figure, said in this respect, 'Every Jew is a Zionist. This is a fact supported by past events and experiments. It is a fact as clear as the midday sun and it cannot be challenged or denied'.[41] Furthermore, 'In its truth and essence, the Zionist question is but a Jewish question with all that the word entails.'[42] Thus, the attitude of the Muslim Brothers at this time was shaped by two perspectives. Firstly, they viewed the Arab–Jewish conflict from a religious and historical viewpoint. Secondly, the Palestinian events which attracted the support of world Jewry for the Zionist Movement, prompted them to regard Judaism and Zionism as, in practice, one and the same thing.

The Special Status of Palestine

In the Muslim Brothers' concept of the Islamic *umma* Palestine was considered a province within the boundaries of the Islamic domain:

> The Palestinian people are but our brothers. So he who holds back and does not support Palestine is deemed to have held back from supporting God and his Messenger and to have deserted the faith of Islam. He who supports Palestine and gives his money for its sake is considered to be supporting God and his Messenger and defending Islam.[43]

In other words, Palestine was described as part of the general Islamic body, a brick in the general structure of the Islamic entity. 'Any part that does not feel the pain of Palestine is no part of that body, and any brick which does not shake because of the destabilisation of Palestine is not part of this structure.'[44] Furthermore, the Muslim Brothers saw support for the Palestine question as the preliminary step towards Islamic unity, which passes through Arab unity.[45] Salih Ashmawi expressed this concept when he said 'The blessing of Palestine will not stop merely at achieving Arab unity, it will also achieve Islamic unity.'[46]

According to the Muslim Brothers, Palestine had a special significance that distinguished it from the rest of the Muslim countries. It was a blessed land to which the Prophet Muhammad had travelled by night. God referred to it in the Qur'an by saying: 'Glorified be He Who Carried His servant by night from the Inviolable place of Worship (Mecca) to the Far Distant place of Worship (Jerusalem), the neighbourhood whereof we have blessed.' (Qur'an 17/1) The Muslim Brothers understood this Qur'anic verse as an indication to Muslims to gain control of that place and transform it into a mosque.

> The early Muslims had understood that and carried it out – in practice – during Umar's caliphate. Today's Muslims have to understand the meaning of this verse. It is for them to protect and guard the Aqsa Mosque in order that it remains a mosque until the day of resurrection and never becomes a Jewish temple.[47]

Palestine is where the Aqsa Mosque is situated. It is the first of two *qibla* (direction faced by the Muslims at prayer) and the Third Holy Place, where God doubled the reward of those praying in it. Muslims believe that the Prophet visited Palestine in the Miracle of the Ascension and prayed there in the presence of all the Prophets and Messengers.

Palestine was also the place of birth, residence or burial for many prophets, and was the site of famous Islamic battles. In addition, Companions and followers of the Prophet Muhammad were buried there; and a great number of Muslim scholars graduated from there. Besides the Aqsa Mosque there are numerous holy places in Palestine.[48] Al-Banna expressed the significance of Palestine for the Muslim Brothers when he said:

> In our souls, Palestine occupies a spiritual holy place which is above abstract nationalist feelings. In it we have the blessed breeze of Jerusalem and the blessings of the Prophets and their disciples and the cradle of Christ, Peace be upon Him. All of this is refreshing and nourishing for the soul.[49]

Consequently, the Muslim Brothers had a strong belief that Palestine was part of the Islamic belief. As such it was not merely the property of the Palestinians or the Arabs, but rather of all Muslims. 'Accordingly, Muslims everywhere should participate in defending it with their money and with their lives.'[50] Hamas – 'a wing of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine' – believes that the land of Palestine is 'an Islamic trust [*waqf*] upon all Muslim generations till the day of Judgement'.[51] and that 'giving up any part of Palestine is like giving up part of its religion'. [52]

The Concept of Jihad

Al-Banna said he once read an Islamic judgement to the effect that 'If a woman is led into captivity in the East of the Islamic World then it is incumbent on those of the West of the Islamic World to rescue her, even if that means spending all the money owned by the Muslims.' It seems that he was using the image of the woman here as a symbol of an Islamic country under threat. From this judgement he drew two conclusions: first, that the Islamic World is indivisible and that any aggression against a part of it is an aggression against the whole; and second, that Islam makes it a duty upon Muslims to be masters in their own house.[53] The Muslim Brothers believed that their concept of the Islamic *umma* laid upon them a binding obligation to protect the land of Islam from all aggressors and to rid it of usurpers and guard it against greedy ambitions.[54]

This religious obligation is *jihad*, the fourth of the ten elements which make up the oath of allegiance *(bay'a)* of the Muslim Brothers. It is also the first of the twenty principles of 'understanding', which is the first element of the *bay'a*. *Jihad* was defined by al-Banna as 'the obligation that continues till the Day of Resurrection'. With that he referred to the prophetic tradition which says: 'He who dies without taking part in conquest or intending to do so, dies the death of pre-Islam.'[55]

Hasan al-Banna defined the different levels of *jihad* as follows:

> The first stage of *jihad* is rejection by the heart; its ultimate stage is fighting for the cause of God. Between the two stages there is the *jihad* of the tongue, the *jihad* of the pen and the hand, and the *jihad* of telling the word of truth to an unjust ruler. The Islamic cause can only survive through *jihad*. The higher the cause, the greater the level of *jihad* for its sake and the more expensive would be the price for supporting it and the reward for those involved in it.[56]

The first objects of *jihad*, according to the Muslim Brothers, are:[57] fending off aggression, defending oneself, one's family, one's property, one's country and one's religion. On this the Qur'an says: 'How should ye not fight for the Cause of Allah and of the feeble among men and of the women and the children who are crying: Our Lord! bring us forth from out this town of which the people are oppressors! Oh, give us from Thy presence some protecting friend! Oh, give us from Thy presence some defender!' (4/75); and elsewhere: 'Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you.' (1/190) Indeed, the first of the fighting verses sanctions *jihad*: 'Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged; and Allah is indeed able to give them the victory; those who have been driven from their homes unjustly only because they said: Our Lord is Allah.' (22/39–40) According to the prophetic tradition, a man approached the Prophet Muhammad saying: 'O Messenger of Allah, what shall I do if they attack my property?' The Prophet said: 'Invoke for them the name of God.' He asked: 'And what if they refuse?' The Prophet answered, 'Invoke the name of God.' The man asked once more: 'But if they refuse?' The Prophet replied: 'Then fight them and if you are killed, you shall go to Paradise, and if you kill him, he shall go to hell.' The Prophet also said: 'He who is killed defending his property, is a martyr.'(*Sahih al-Bukkari* 3:397)

The second object of *jihad*, in the view of the Muslim Brothers, is to secure freedom of belief for Muslims whom infidels are trying to dissuade from their religion. On this matter God said: 'And fight them until persecution is no more and religion is for Allah.' (Qur'an: 1/193)

According to the Muslim Brothers, the third object of *jihad* should be to protect the message of Islam so that it can reach everyone with-

out obstruction. Until people clearly define their attitude, either as Muslims or as protected subjects, war should be waged against so that they do not obstruct the call. The Muslim Brothers here refer to the passage of the Qur'an which says: 'Fight against such of those who have been given the Scripture as believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, and forbid not that which Allah hath forbidden by His Messenger, and follow not the Religion of Truth, until they pay the tribute readily, being brought low.' (9/29). Elsewhere the Qur'an enjoins: 'Those who believe do battle for the Cause of Allah; and those who disbelieve do battle for the cause of idols. So, fight the minions of the devil. Lo! the devil's strategy is ever weak.' (3/76)

The fourth object is disciplining those who violate their undertakings whether as protected subjects, or as Muslims, committing aggression against the Islamic *umma*. The Qur'an says: 'And if they break their pledges after their treaty (hath been made with you) and assail your religion, then fight the heads of disbelief – Lo! they have no binding oaths – in order that they must desist. Will you not fight a folk who broke their solemn pledges, and purposed to drive out the messenger and did attack you first?' (9/12–13). It also says: 'And if two parties of believers fall to fighting, then make peace between them. And if one party of them doeth wrong to the other, fight ye that which doeth wrong till it return unto the ordinance of Allah: then, if it return, make peace between them justly, and act equitably. Lol Allah loveth the equitable.' (49/9)

The last object of *jihad*, according to the Muslim Brothers, is to relieve the oppressed wherever they are and support them against their oppressors. On this the Qur'an says: 'But if they seek help from you in the matter of religion, then it is your duty to help (them) except against a folk between whom you think there is a treaty.' (8/72)

The Muslim Brothers, however, did not approve of war for material or selfish aims, for the Qur'an prohibited all fighting which had any object other than those permitted. A man once said to the Prophet Muhammad: 'What about a man who undertakes *jihad* in the way of God whilst seeking a worldly benefit?' The Prophet answered: 'No heavenly reward for him.' The question was asked thrice by the same man and the Prophet's reply was the same every time. From this al-Banna concluded that Islam considered war in certain circumstances to be 'a social necessity or an unavoidable evil – pursued for the good that might come out of it'. On this the Qur'an says: 'And if Allah had

not repelled some men (peoples) by others the earth would have been corrupted. But Allah is Lord of Kindness to (His) creatures'. (1/251) Thus the Muslim Brothers believed that Muslims should not fight except when forced to do so and, having exhausted all means towards a peaceful settlement. For Islam obliges the Muslim to grab any chance of making peace: 'And if they incline to peace, incline thou also to it, and trust in Allah. Lo! He, even He, is the Hearer, the Knower.' (Qur'an: 8/61)

Regarding the legitimacy of *jihad*, the Muslim Brothers believed that if war is inevitable for a truly valid objective, then to fight is an obligation upon every Muslim:[58] 'Warfare is ordained for you, though it is hateful unto you, but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not.' (Qur'an: 1/216) In order to bring *jihad* nearer to the hearts of Muslims, the Qur'an urges and motivates them to embark on it in many Qur'anic verses:[59]

> O ye who believe! Shall I show you a commerce that will save you from a painful doom? You should believe in Allah and His Messenger, and should strive for the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives. That is better for you, if ye did not know. He will forgive you your sins and bring you into Gardens underneath which rivers flow, and pleasant dwellings in Gardens of Eden. That is the supreme triumph. And (He will give you) another (blessing) which ye love: Help from Allah and present victory. Give good tidings (O Muhammad) to believers. (61/10–13)

Regarding military preparation, al-Banna asserted that:

> Developing nations need strength. They need to bring up their children on soldiery, especially in this age in which peace is only guaranteed through preparation for war, wherefore the slogan of the day is that 'force is the surest way of establishing what is right'. But Islam does not ignore this aspect, rather making it a religious obligation indistinguishable from performing prayers and fasting. There is no system anywhere in the world which has concerned itself – at any time whatsoever – with this aspect more than Islam.[60]

The Qur'an says: 'Make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force and of horses tethered, that thereby ye may dismay the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others beside them whom ye know not.

Allah knoweth them. Whatsoever ye spend in the way of Allah it will be repaid to you in full, and ye will not be wronged.'[61] (8/60)

By reflecting on this and other verses which preach military preparation, and on their knowledge of the Prophet's life and tradition and the biographies of the Companions, as well as the views of jurists in this respect, the Muslim Brothers concluded that military preparation is divided into five parts. The first involves moral and intellectual preparation – to be achieved by education – reawakening people, instilling into them the concept of *jihad* and embodying the concept in a principle and a law. The second involves 'material preparation' – focussing on the mobilisation of men and of armaments. The third part concerns administration – creating an administrative structure for the military establishment and its commanders. The fourth is 'technical preparation', meaning training. The last is related to 'financial preparation'.[62]

The Muslim Brothers' interpretation of *jihad* meant that it became a religious obligation that could not be evaded in cases where the land of Islam was 'trampled under foot'. And as Islamic countries were, in the opinion of the Ikhwan, being subjected to aggression and occupied by colonisers, *jihad* became 'a strict obligation and a primary necessity', even at the cost of Muslim blood and money.[63] In Palestine – under Zionist and Western imperialism – the five objects of *jihad*, according to the Muslim Brothers, were combined, so that *jihad* for the sake of Palestine was an 'inescapable obligation on every Muslim'.[64] And so Palestine became 'the market where we make a bargain by winning one of the two advantages, victory or martyrdom'.[65] That is why Sayyid Sabiq, a Muslim Brother and an Islamic jurist, ruled during the 1948 Arab–Israeli war that the obligation of Pilgrimage to Mecca should be lifted for that year and that the money saved should be devoted to *jihad* in Palestine.[66]

Furthermore, the Muslim Brothers believed as early as 1936 that the Palestine issue had revived the concept of *jihad* after a long period during which, 'because of their love of life and their fear of death', Muslims had deserted it. In this way the Palestine question was instrumental in re-establishing the principle of *jihad* as a duty for Muslims, in a way unprecedented in modern times.[67] Thus, Hasan al-Banna argued that the Palestinian issue brought *jihad* once more into the real world, after Palestinians stood up and perfected once more what al-Banna called the 'industry of death'. This idea, Hasan

al-Banna added, originated with the same small Mujahidin group around the Holy Haram, and extended itself to Muslim and Arab youth in Baghdad, Damascus, Cairo and elsewhere. He also said: 'O Palestinians, even if the results of your revolt are no more than stripping the veils of humiliation and the masks of surrender from Muslim souls and then directing the people of Islam to the delight, the beauty, the excellence and the benefit of the Death Industry, then you have won a wonderful victory.'[68] The steadfastness, courage and love of martyrdom shown by Palestinians recalled, for the Muslim Brothers, the memories of the battle of Badr (the first decisive battle in Islamic history) as well as the early Islamic *jihad* for spreading Islam and Salah al-Din's liberation of Palestine.[69]

In addition, the Muslim Brothers considered the Palestinian *jihad* to have a particular characteristic distinguishing it from that of any other country. They always thought of it as confirmation of the tradition which prophesied the *jihad* that would take place in Palestine. They cited a *hadith* of the Prophet which said: 'A group of my *umma* will remain supporting what is right and defeating their enemy – neither damaged by those facing them nor with any calamity striking them until a command from God reaches them while they are engaged in it.' People asked: 'And where are they, O Messenger of God?' He said: 'In Jerusalem and around it.'(*Musnad al-Imam Ahmad*, 5: 269) There is also another prophetic tradition which says: 'The day of resurrection does not come until Muslims fight against Jews, until the Jews hide behind trees and stones and until the trees and stones shout out: 'O Muslim, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him; except for the *Ghargad* tree which is one of the Jewish trees.'[70] (*Sahih Muslim*, 4: 2239)

The Palestine question, in the view of the Muslim Brothers, combined the force of the Islamic precepts of umma and jihad. Al-Banna suggested that it was the simultaneous relevance of these Islamic principles to the solution of the question that distinguished Palestine from other Islamic causes.[71] This prompted Salih Ashmawi to wonder:

> Would Muslims learn this lesson (of Jewish enmity to Muslims and Muhammad's prophecy about what would take place in Palestine) theoretically and practically from the Prophet? Would they fight the Jews as he had fought them and eject them from the Holy Land, the site of the

Aqsa Mosque, the neighbourhood of which God had blessed, as their ancestors had ejected them from the Arab Peninsula?[72]

From this it seems that the concept of *jihad*, according to the Muslim Brothers, is both a testimony of faith and an act of survival for the Islamic *umma*. It is not only performed to serve God and to achieve personal reward, but also to relieve the oppressed and those in need of support. For the Muslim Brothers *jihad* in Palestine thus had a special significance that distinguished it from any *jihad* in the rest of the Arab and Muslim countries where the Jews have a special status.

National and Political Factors.

Though fundamental religious precepts played a major role in defining the conceptual approach of the Muslim Brothers to the question of Palestine, they also took into account the political dimension and the developments they believed would take place in Palestine within that framework: namely, the danger to Egypt and the Arab and Islamic world represented by the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Brothers thought that, after Palestine, Egypt would be the next target for Zionist invasion because the Jews held fond memories of Egypt, the birthplace of Moses and the place where he was brought up and became a Messenger of God; while Sinai was considered a Holy Land for Jews. Egypt was the land where their ancestors had wandered for forty years, where Moses talked to God on Mount Sinai and brought down the Tablets and the Commandments. It was in Sinai too that the Israelites found refuge from the tyranny of Pharaoh. Furthermore, Sinai had strategic importance, as it constituted a rocky shield protecting Egypt's eastern flank and having access to both the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. In addition to this, it was rich in mineral resources and other raw materials. For this reason al-Banna warned the Egyptian government in 1946 against the 'Jewish Threat' to Sinai, and suggested that the government should immediately move the customs point from Qantara to Rafah and set up an industrial estate on the border, in addition to establishing an Egyptian Arab university near al-Arish.[73]

The Muslim Brothers pointed out that historically the security of Egypt had always been linked to that of Palestine. Any threat to Egypt

had almost always come from beyond Sinai and Egypt's decisive battles had always been fought in al-Sham (historic Syria) and especially in Palestine.[74] It was for this reason that al-Banna warned Egyptians as far back as 1938 that 'they will be forced in the future to defend themselves against the Jewish/Zionist threat after it has established itself a stone's throw from the Egyptian borders. When that happens no efforts will help'.[75] Salih Ashmawi also made the point at about the same time, asserting that, among the reasons for the Muslim Brothers' concern with Palestine, were considerations of Egyptian national interest. He said: 'The setting up of a Jewish state on the eastern borders of Egypt is a real threat to our entity, independence, trade, morals and virtues.'[76] Al-Banna was more explicit when he told the meeting of heads of District and Jihad Centres of the Muslim Brothers on 8 September 1945, that:

> We want to secure our eastern borders by solving the Palestinian Problem in a way that meets the Arab point of view and prevents a Jewish takeover of the amenities of this country ... We demand this as it secures our borders and represents our direct interests.[77]

Furthermore, in his testimony in March 1946 before the Anglo–American Commission of Enquiry which the British and American governments jointly sent to Palestine, al-Banna explained that the Muslim Brothers were opposed to Jewish immigration into Palestine 'as it constitutes a political and economic danger and it is our right that Palestine should remain Arab.'[78]

Apart from considerations of security, the Brothers believed that the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would threaten the economic position of Egypt whose markets would be flooded with Jewish products, leading to Jewish control of them and ultimately to Egypt 'losing its economic independence'.[79]

On the wider Arab level, the Muslim Brothers considered Palestine to be 'the cornerstone of Islamic unity', because of its strategic importance as 'the first line of defence for the Arab countries'. They were convinced that a Jewish state would be an outpost of Western imperialism which would threaten the Arab world, not least because it would constitute a barrier between the Arab countries in Asia and those in Africa, obstructing contact between the two continents.[80] In addition, a Jewish state would create endless problems which would

preoccupy Arabs, diverting the attention and energy that ought to be given to the task of national revival. It would also create internal problems in every Arab country because their Jewish communities living might become a 'Zionist Fifth Column' whose allegiance would always be to that Jewish state.[81] The Muslim Brothers were particularly worried about the threat which the Jews posed to Middle Eastern markets. Since Palestine was a small country with a limited market, Jewish immigrants would seek ways of investing their money in neighbouring Arab countries leading, in al-Banna's words, to 'economic destruction and financial disturbance'.[82]

The Brothers also viewed the creation of a Jewish state as a social danger to the Arab world because they believed that Zionism would spread apostasy and permissiveness.[83] Furthermore, they did not believe that 'Jewish ambitions' were restricted to Palestine which was too small to accommodate all Jews. The Jews would look for opportunities to infiltrate and dominate neighbouring Arab countries prompted by their ambition to create a 'Greater Israel, from the Nile to the Euphrates' including Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Sinai, the Egyptian Delta, the regions of Khaibar, Banu Quraidha, Banu al-Nadir and other Saudi Arabian lands neighbouring Medina.[84]

The Muslim Brothers thus saw the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine as constituting at once a political, an economic and a social threat to the Arab countries. As regards the Islamic World, they believed that such a stat would threaten Muslim faith and beliefs, as there was a danger to the Holy Places in Palestine, especially the site of the Ascension. For the Muslim Brothers, fears concerning the 'Jewish dream' of destroying the Aqsa Mosque and building Solomon's Temple in its place represented the greatest threat and concern.[85]

Thus political and national factors, though second to religious factors, played an important part in shaping the conceptual approach of the Muslim Brothers to the Palestine question. Their attitude stemmed directly from the three loyalties of the Muslim Brothers: to Egypt, the Arab countries and the Muslim World. National and political interests, which varied with other social and historical conditions, were combined with religious motives and obligations and the Palestine question became, for the Brothers, simultaneously, a religious and a nationalist cause. It was against this background of ideas that they put the question of Palestine at the top of their programme of action.

Part One

Propaganda

البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي المقدسي

البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي القدسي

Egypt, the Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question to 1936

Egypt and the Palestine Question

In the first three decades of the twentieth century Egypt was preoccupied with domestic affairs. The idea that the country's destiny lay in a close association with the rest of the Arab world was an unpopular one with all the main political parties, most of whose members (including the nationalists) denounced 'the whole vision of Arab nationalism as anathema.'[1] Even the Nationalist Party, al-Hizb al-Watani, believed that the best way to counter the European challenge and to hasten Britain's withdrawal from Egypt was through pan-Islamic solidarity under the rule of an Ottoman caliph.[2]

Most Egyptian politicians took no interest in internal political developments in Palestine. For instance, as head of the Egyptian delegation to the peace conference in Paris in 1919 Sa'd Zaghlul insisted on a separate presentation of Egypt's demand for independence. 'Our case' he argued, 'is an Egyptian and not an Arab one.'[3] Arab unity was regarded as an illusory dream and ridiculed as an 'addition of zero to zero'.[4] When he was asked in London in 1920 to comment on the situation in Syria and Palestine, Zaghlul emphasised to a reporter that the Egyptian delegation had come to discuss only Egypt's demand for complete independence.[5]

During the 1920s when Palestinian patriots were explaining what was taking place in their country, they were aware, like the Palestinian journalist Muhammad Ali al-Tahir, then living in Egypt, of the lack of knowledge among Egyptians about Palestine and Zionism, and about what was happening there.[6] Moreover, even among Islamic scholars who were not ignorant of the situation in Palestine there was a reluctance to support the Palestinians. Even as late as 1929, Shaykh

Muhammad Abu al-Fadl al-Jizawi, the Shaykh of al-Azhar, rejected appeals to support the Palestinians, claiming that this was a political issue exceeding his authority.[7] The Muslim Brothers were faced with similar reactions to the Palestinian situation from both intellectuals and ordinary people.[8]

The Egyptian Government, which showed little interest in the Palestine question, followed a policy of strict neutrality and total non-involvement. As a result of this policy, in 1925 Isma'il Sidqi, as minister of the interior, was responsible for the arrest of Palestinian patriots who shouted slogans against Balfour while he was passing through Cairo on his way to Jerusalem to attend the opening ceremony of the Hebrew University there.[9] Moreover, Ahmad Ziwar Pasha, then prime minister, sent Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, Rector of the Egyptian University, as his representative to attend the ceremony.[10]

Al-Sayyid – the leading ideologist of the National Party, Hizb al-Umma, and the editor of *al-Jarida*, the party newspaper – elaborated the idea of Egyptian nationalism. As chief spokesman for the party, he believed that the welfare of the Egyptian nation living within the Nile valley should be the sole interest of the Egyptians.[11] And since '... an Egyptian is one who does not identify himself with any nation but Egypt ... Our nationalism directs our desires towards our nation ... and our nation alone.'[12] As for the Arab question, al-Sayyid denied its very existence, stating bluntly, 'There is no Arab question.'[13] Ziwar Pasha, for his part, whilst Governor of Alexandria, had not only permitted but even participated in pro-Zionist celebrations by the local Jewish community after the Balfour Declaration in 1917.[14]

In 1926 the Egyptian Government welcomed the visit of the Jerusalem Jewish Teachers' Association to Egypt. They were received warmly, and a programme of hospitality was drawn up for them, with the Egyptian Consul in Jerusalem offering them all the necessary facilities.[15] In the early 1930s, students of the Egyptian University paid an official visit to Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, and competed in the sports club there. The delegation was headed by Mahjub Thabet, a member of the House of Representatives at that time.[16] Fathi Radwan, who was a member of this delegation, recalled that it refused to pay heed to an appeal from Amin al-Husayni calling on them to cancel the visit. With hindsight, Radwan commented that many Egyptian public figures were ignorant of the real truth about Zionism.[17] As a further demonstration of their neutrality, the Egyptian Consuls in Jerusalem

from 1928 to 1938 continued to invite representatives of all religious communities in Palestine, as well as Arab and Zionist leaders, to receptions in honour of the Egyptian king's birthday and the anniversary of his coronation.[18]

The Egyptian press adopted different attitudes towards publishing articles written by Palestinian patriots in Egypt. According to Muhammad Ali al-Tahir, some papers would delete the word 'Jews' replacing it with 'Zionists', in order not to upset the Jews of Egypt. Other papers would refuse to publish an article unless the right of reply was given to a Jew, and his reply published alongside. Some papers would not publish any such articles on the grounds that they would not wish to interfere in sectarian issues, or for fear of losing circulation as Jewish readers would stop buying their papers, or on the pretext that the government of Palestine would ban them from entering the country. Some of these papers would not publish such articles because of their close friendship either with Qattawi Pasha, a Jewish Egyptian politician, or with the owner of the Zionist newspaper, *Israel*,[19] which appeared weekly in Egypt from January 1920 until 1939 in three languages; Arabic, Hebrew and French.[20] Other papers would not touch such articles without first showing them to their advertising departments. If there were any Jews advertising in the paper, such articles would be withdrawn. However, other papers would willingly publish articles by Jews against the Arabs.[21] None of the popular Egyptian newspapers, such as *al-Ahram* and *al-Muqattam*, joined the anti-Jewish campaign.[22]

When the revolt over the Buraq wall (the 'Wailing Wall') broke out in Palestine in 1929, Muhammad Mahmud's government opposed it and was active in suppressing support for the Palestinians. The Ministry of the Interior instructed the Press Bureau to censor anti-Zionist and anti-Jewish articles, and special police patrols were sent to protect the Jewish quarters of Cairo and Alexandria against possible rioters.[23] *Al-Siyasa*, the mouthpiece of Mahmud's government, wrote threatening the expulsion from Egypt of Palestinians who tried to explain their point of view about what was going on in Palestine. This threat was made in the name of national unity.[24] The newspaper, *Israel*, commended Muhammad Husayn Haykal for an article he wrote in the weekly paper, *al-Siyasa al-Usbu'iyya*, on June 1930, saying it was the best yet written in Arabic. In this article, Haykal appealed for a solution to the Palestine question through 'direct negotiations be-

tween the Arabs and the Jews without Britain or the League of Nations.'[25] Another Zionist paper, *Ha-Aretz*, commended two articles written in *al-Siyasa al-Usbu'iyya*, on 7 September and 21 September 1929, by Muhammad Abd Allah Inan, in which he expressed his rejection of 'Palestinian violence'. *Ha-Aretz* appealed to enlightened writers to follow this example,[26] while the Zionist paper, *al-Shams*, which appeared in Egypt from September 1934 until November 1948, [27] quoted at length articles published by the Egyptian press which were found to support its own line.[28]

In 1931, the prime minister of the day, Isma'il Sidqi, revoked the licence of the Palestinian paper, *al-Shura*, while he left the Zionist paper *Israel* unscathed.[29] *Al-Shura* had been published in Egypt since the early 1920s under the editorship of Muhammad Ali al-Tahir.[30] This paper had been closed on an earlier occasion, leading Palestinians to protest to the Egyptian government in a letter dated 3 January 1926.[31]

While in opposition, (October 1929), Mustafa al-Nahhas was reluctant to intervene in external affairs which would impose an additional burden on Egyptian nationalists. He saw his mission as being 'to promote the well-being of Egyptians alone'.[32] Accordingly, in January 1930, when he became prime minister, he refused to permit a meeting with a Palestinian delegation to Egypt. Makram Ubayd supported Nahhas's refusal, adding that 'any propaganda for the Palestinian Arabs in Arab countries is wrong'. Furthermore, he told Palestinian delegates that their call for Arab unity 'frightens the West by increasing its fear that the East seeks to create a united independent bloc', which would be 'dangerous' for Arabs and Egyptians alike.[33] The delegation was forced to leave Egypt soon after its arrival.[34]

In June 1930 Nahhas rejected a fresh plea for help made by Shaykh Abd al-Qadir Muzaffar, the personal assistant to the Mufti of Jerusalem. Nahhas was reported to have said that he did not trust 'any of the Palestinian or Syrian leaders'.[35] In December 1930, Sidqi's government expelled and sent back to Palestine dozens of Palestinian Arabs, mainly from the Hebron region, who had fled to Egypt after the Buraq Revolt.[36] On the other hand, Jewish immigration to Palestine was ignored by the Egyptian government and by the opposition. In 1933 the government permitted 1,000 new Jewish immigrants to land in Port Said on their way to Palestine.[37]

There were, however, enough indications that pan-Arab and pan-

Islamic elements in Egypt had reacted to events in Palestine. The Young Men's Muslim Association, Jam'iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin, and the Society of Islamic Guidance, Jam'iyat al-Hidaya al-Islamiyya, became active during the Buraq Revolt, sending protest telegrams to the League of Nations and the British government, and initiating special meetings in support of the Palestinians.[38] Muhammad Alluba, Ahmad Zaki and Abd al-Hamid Sa'id went to Jerusalem to assert Arab ownership of al-Buraq wall before the League of Nations Commission.[39] On his return from Jerusalem, Alluba fiercely attacked Egyptianist tendencies with their local preoccupations, and called for a pan-Arab Egypt.[40] However, the Shaykh al-Azhar, Mustafa al-Maraghi, whose position gave him a particular authority, sent a private memorandum to the British High Commissioner in Egypt urging the British goverment 'to take steps to remove the causes of dispute in the Holy Places, whether religious or secular, and to restore the people to a state of peace.'[41] British officials reported that this memorandum was 'a poor production' failing to 'inculcate sympathy with the Islamic cause' and did not reach the usual high standard of Maraghi's work.[42]

While Alluba told the commission that Palestine and Jerusalem belonged to the Arabs and Muslims,[43] Prince Muhammad Ali, who later became crown prince under King Faruq, argued in his letter to the British High Commissioner in Palestine that the Muslims:

> ... may be willing to accept a sum of money ... and, as the Jews are rich, if this thing [al-Buraq wall] is so much desired by them, there seems no reason why they should not pay for it.[44]

The British High Commissioner in Egypt reported that local public opinion followed the Buraq Revolt 'with keen, but by no means impartial interest' and was 'definitely biased in favour of the Arabs as against the Jews'.[45]

Another indication of the reaction to events in Palestine by pan-Arab and pan-Islamic elements was provided when Shaykh Rashid Rida, Alluba and Abd al-Rahman Azzam attended the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem in December 1931.[46] The only political party which publicly expressed support for the Palestinian Arabs was al-Hizb al-Watani.[47]

Among the factors which determined Egypt's attitude to Palestine were: Egyptian domestic politics, British policy and Egypt's search

for independence. Egyptian politics at this time revolved around three major elements, the Palace, the Wafd and the British. Throughout the reign of King Fu'ad the Palace remained the centre of power in Egypt but was strongly opposed by the Wafdists, who resisted the monarch's bid for autocracy. This internal political conflict between the Palace and the leading national movement 'did not leave much room for pursuing an active policy in the Arab world'.[48] Even later, the 1938–39 Wafdist campaign in support of Palestine was intended more to change the regime of the Palace and conservatives in Egypt than to obtain any genuine relief in the neighbouring countries.[49] For instance, according to Nahhas, the Wafd did not attend the parliamentary conference held in Cairo on 7 October 1938 because of 'considerations of internal politics'.[50]

British policy was opposed to any form of Egyptian affinity with the Palestinian Arabs because of the belief that their colonial policy in the East was dependent on isolating Egypt from other Arab countries.[51] Egypt's search for independence is an additional factor explaining the passive stand taken by the Egyptian nationalist movement towards the Palestine question before the 1936 Anglo–Egyptian treaty. Muhammad Husayn Haykal claimed that:

> Egyptian politicians of every colour see this passive stand as the essence of wisdom. The problem of formulating Anglo–Egyptian relations needed every effort that Egypt could exert. If any such effort was diverted to Palestine or elsewhere this would weaken its progress towards independence and sovereignty.[52]

In this way, the policy of isolating Egypt from the Arab world succeeded, leaving a deep impact on the mentality of Egyptians. In February 1931, Percy Loraine, British High Commissioner in Egypt, felt that 'Egypt is so isolated from the Arab World that it is not easily drawn into movements such as pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism',.and estimated the influence of these movements as 'inconsiderable'.Propaganda against Zionism in the Arab world, he argued, seemed unable to make 'any direct appeal in Egypt'.[53] In March 1931 an Iraqi found during his visit to Egypt that the country was utterly isolated from Arab affairs.[54] In June 1931 Loraine reported a marked 'recrudescence' of pan-Islamic and pan-Arab feeling in the Middle East, particularly in Palestine and Syria, and to 'a lesser extent', in

Egypt. This he attributed both to the local political situation and to the fact that Egypt had 'never shown any great enthusiasm for an Islamic movement'.[55] Even Fu'ad Hubaysh, editor of the Beirut cultural weekly *al-Makshaf*, gained the impression in June 1938, after spending some time in Egypt and becoming better acquainted with its writers and thinkers, that:

> One of the most prominent aspects of general life in Egypt is that the overwhelming majority of the population is almost entirely cut off from what goes on outside Egypt. At the very least they are unaware of what transpires in the Arab world ... They are almost totally ignorant of what constitutes the Arab world, where it is, and what it wants.[56]

With the outbreak of the 1936 revolt in Palestine, the line adopted by the dominant Wafd Party towards the Palestine remained passive, much influenced by the previous tactics adopted by the nationalist movement, namely the pursuit of its objective by 'legitimate peaceful means' – despite the fact that there is little scope for peaceful legitimate movements in a situation of revolt.[57] Muhammad Mahmud, prime minister of the post-Wafd government, when asked by a journalist what his policy was for the Palestine question, replied by saying, 'I am the Prime Minister of Egypt, not of Palestine.'[58] Most significant in this respect was the fact that Egypt – government, nationalist movement and majority opinion – was isolated from the events which culminated in the Palestine revolt, and had no effect on them.

One historian, commenting on the traditional outllok of Egyptian nationalism toward the Palestinian issue, argued that there was no way forward for Egypt, except within the context of Islamic thought.[59] In these circumstances the events in Palestine and the 1936 revolt in particular provided an opportunity for the Muslim Brothers to apply their principles and focus them on a real situation. This was best expressed by Hasan al-Banna, the first 'General Guide' of the Muslim Brothers, when he said:

> Political bodies and parties in Egypt were totally diverted from supporting Palestine seriously, because their nationalism had not reached the stage of developing a feeling for Arabism and for the Islamic bond. Action in defence of Palestine, or similar sisterly countries at that time, came only from Islamic bodies. So the Muslim Brothers stepped forward in support of the fighting in Palestine with all their energies. To that cause they de-

voted their abilities, financially and morally, through propaganda, speeches, publications, and fund raising ... And towards that end a number of committees and missions were formed; and they all did their best.[60]

The Early Activities of the Muslim Brothers (1928–1935)

Hasan al-Banna's link with Palestine began in the year of his graduation from Dar al-Ulum College in Cairo. In 1927, a year before the establishment of the Muslim Brothers' Society, he sent a message to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and Chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council of the city, Haj Amin al-Husayni.[61] This message was an expression of his abiding concern for Islamic fraternity and of his desire to strengthen it by taking every opportunity to maintain contact with Arab and Islamic elements.[62]

Three and a half years after the establishment of the Muslim Brothers' Society, the General Islamic Conference convened from 7–17 December 1931 in Jerusalem (coinciding with the Commemoration of the Ascension on the 27 Rajab). The conference was attended by Muslim political leaders and Islamic scholars from twenty-two countries, and was intended to draw Muslim public attention to the Palestine question, which entered an acute phase with the uprising provoked by the Jewish attempt to take over the Buraq wall. The conference was also intended as a manifestation of the solidarity of Muslims all over the world with the Palestinian Arabs. Al-Banna sent a message in the name of the Muslim Brothers of Cairo, Mahmudiyya, Shubrakhit, Port Said and Ismailia to Haj Amin al-Husayni on the occasion of the convening of the conference. This message extended greetings to the delegates and expressed appreciation for their solidarity, stating that, 'Had it not been for unforeseeable conditions, some members of the society would have been with you representing its leadership.' Hasan al-Banna himself did not specify what the 'unforeseeable conditions' were. The early history of the Muslim Brothers, especially from 1930 to 1932, shows however that as it spread very quickly in and around Ismailia antipathy and resistance to it appeared. Hostility was confined to complaints about the organisation. For instance, a petition of complaint sent to the prime minister, Isma' il Sidqi, contained twelve charges. Among these were charges that Hasan al-Banna was a communist with links with Moscow, a Wafdist work-

ing against Sidqi's government and that he was anti-monarchist in his criticism of King Fu'ad. At the request of the prime minister an enquiry was set up by the Ministry of Education into the complaints but al-Banna was cleared of all charges.[63] It is therefore possible to surmise that this hostility to the society created the 'unforeseeable conditions' and that, for Hasan al-Banna, this situation took priority over attendance at the conference. He may also have wished at this early stage to avoid drawing attention to his plans for the society.[64]

The message contained a number of proposals for defending Palestine, as the defence of Palestine and the Islamic Holy Places generally 'is an issue that concerns all Muslims'. The Muslim Brothers thought that the conference should tackle the question of land purchase by Jews in Palestine; for if the Jews were in a postion to buy land in Palestine, they would acquire rights of ownership which would lead to a strengthening of their position and an increase in their number 'and with the passage of time the matter would take a different shape'. The Muslim Brothers believed that, as the Jews had created a special fund for buying land, the conference should found 'a nucleus for an Islamic fund or company to buy Palestinian land put up for sale', and to organise the capital and the sale of shares in the company. The Society announced that it would subscribe initially a nominal sum of five Egyptian Pounds, which it would send if the conference decided that more subscriptions were to follow.

> None of you Gentlemen should laugh at this small donation. The Society does appreciate the idea and knows that it requires thousands of pounds, but it has taken this step to show its interest in highlighting this idea and in taking it from the domain of words to the realm of action.

In addition, the Society proposed the setting up of committees for the defence of the Holy Places in all Islamic countries. It also proposed that the conference should discuss the establishment of an association to be based in Jerusalem or Mecca for the defence of the Holy Places all over the world. The Society also made proposals regarding publishing, the unification and modernisation of Islamic culture and the setting up of a Palestine University along the lines of Aligarh College in India, which would combine modern subjects (Social and Physical Sciences) with religious studies. In addition they advocated the creation of another university in Mecca, the publica-

tion of a daily Islamic newspaper and closer attention to preaching and guidance. Furthermore, the Society proposed certain means for bringing Muslim peoples together and defending the Islamic faith. These included the completion of the Hijaz Railway and its recovery from foreign hands and the establishment of an Islamic information centre. Al-Husayni replied to these suggestions at the closing of the conference in a letter to al-Banna dated 24 January 1932 in which he said:

> Your message was read before the Bureau of the General Islamic Conference and was met with appreciation. The executive committee will give every attention to its contents.[65]

It seems that most of the Society's proposals were considered. Among the resolutions passed by the conference was one for establishing a university in Jerusalem to be called the Aqsa Mosque University, the compilation of an Islamic encyclopaedia, the formation of an Islamic company to rescue the land of Palestine and the transformation of the Hijaz Railway company into an Islamic company. Furthermore, there was a resolution to frame a constitution for the conference, enabling it to be a permanent organisation meeting regularly and having its own institutions throughout the Islamic world. The conference also asserted the sanctity of the Aqsa Mosque and the places adjacent to it, including al-Buraq Wall.[66]

Following the Society's move to Cairo in 1932, although it was still in its formative stage it did not remain idle in the face of Zionist designs on Palestine – and what it viewed as the resulting infringements on Palestinian rights. The Society's concern with this issue was expressed in different ways. With the outbreak, in October 1933, of the 'Revolt of Demonstrations',[67] the weekly magazine *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, the mouthpiece of the Society and a predominantly religious publication – in keeping with the nature of the Society in its first stage – published various articles about events in Palestine. The magazine asked its readers:

> Have the events in wounded Palestine reached you? Have you heard about what the tyrants have done to it? Do you know what the Noble Arab has done in defence of his usurped right and his great country?[68]

The magazine also reminded Muslims that:

> The people of the Third Holy Place in Jerusalem and the protectors of al-Aqsa Mosque, our gallant brothers, are suffering severely from the recent disturbances in which large numbers were killed and many wounded were arrested. The best way for Muslims to commemorate this blessed occasion is to offer the Palestinians all possible help.[69]

Articles and news items about Palestine were published by the Muslim Brothers in their magazine, and were read with deep interest by the Palestinian leadership.[70] Hasan al-Banna demanded a halt to Jewish immigration and the implementation of the promises made by the mandatory government regarding self-rule. He also appealed to the Islamic world to press its demands in every legitimate way possible and to consider means of offering practical aid, the most important being the making of donations to be sent to Palestine, where the disturbances had left behind a number of wounded, orphans and widows.[71]

The Society utilised religious festivals, in particular Ascension Night (which coincides with the 27 of Rajab every year), to explain aspects of the Palestine question. The celebrations on Ascension Night in 1933,[72] and in subsequent years,[73] were used as occasions to remind Muslims about their duties towards Palestine. In addition, these celebrations provided an opportunity to introduce the Society and publicise its activities.

At the Third Consultative Council Conference of the Society, which convened in March 1935, al-Banna called for the raising of funds in support of the Palestinian cause.[74] On 3 August 1935, the General Guidance Council of the Society followed up a resolution of that Conference which provided for the promotion of the Muslim Brothers outside Egypt.[75] Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati (Hasan al-Banna's brother, the controller of the General Consultative Council and of the General Guidance Council) and Muhammad Asa'd al-Hakim (the general secretary of the General Guidance Council), were nominated to visit Palestine, Syria and Lebanon to spread the call of the Muslim Brothers and to call for Arab unity and Islamic fraternity, explaining that 'Islam is a faith and a state and the earth belongs to God who may bequeath it to whomsoever he wishes.'[76] They stayed in Palestine from 3 to 6 August 1935, during which time they visited Jerusalem and the

city of Hebron. They contacted the leaders of Islamic movements, including Amin al-Husayni,[77] who welcomed them and praised their idea, asserting that the beliefs of the Muslim Brothers were comprehensive and that Egypt would only be saved through their ideas. He also expressed admiration for their magazine[78] and wrote them recommendations to some Islamic figures and organisations in Damascus. One of these was a message to the chairman of the Islamic Guidance Association in Damascus:

> We were delighted with its Islamic culture, its adherence to the value of religion and its work which is in the spirit of the traditional Islamic motto 'Believers are but Brothers'.[79]

This was the first delegation of the Muslim Brothers to carry the message outside Egypt. The choice of Palestine for their first initiative reflected the concern shown by the Society over the Palestine issue. Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati – who according to Mitchell was from the earliest days of the Society its official spokesman in Cairo and the most articulate and outspoken on the Palestine question[80] – expressed this concern. His words reflect the society's awareness of the threat posed by the Zionist Movement, not merely to Palestine but also to the Islamic World.

> If Muslims had travelled – as we did – to Palestine, had they stood before the Holy Place, walked through the streets of Jerusalem, seen the crowds of men and women and observed the organised Jewish brigades and the Jewish armies of injustice flocking to Palestine from all over the world, had Muslims seen how they gather at the Holy Place, standing by the Noble Buraq with one of them blowing a trumpet, contrary to all customs and conventions, and the Jewish crowds answering him:– 'Next year ... Israel.' Had Muslims seen all this and understood what the Jews mean by it, they would have gone without sleep and rushed to the rescue of the Holy Place before the time comes when they would want to perform their prayers there, but to no avail.[81]

In addition, the mission requested that al-Banna should spread the principles of the Society.[82] They also appealed to Egyptian thinkers to pay attention to the Palestine question and to have volunteers, money, medicines and doctors sent there.

> You will be betraying Egypt if you have no faith in Islam, and will no longer belong to it if you do not become aware of the enemy and if you do not uncover enemy intrigues and evil intentions, if you do not fight for it, if you take no refuge in God and His Glory, if you take no pride in Muhammad and his Shari' a, if you do not vie for the glory, and sanctity of the Muslim World and if you hesitate to come to the support of the Muslim neighbour, protecting him and his pride.[83]

After seeing the situation in Palestine, the mission declared: 'Next year, Palestine!'[84] Upon its return, the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers in Cairo became a meeting place for the leaders of the Palestinian resistance, who frequented it to explain their point of view and to coordinate with the Muslim Brothers the efforts they were making to help Palestine.[85]

Developments within the Society enabled the Muslim Brothers to increase their activities in response to events in Palestine. This increased activity, indicated their desire to provide more practical help and maintain close links with the Arabs of Palestine. The Muslim Brothers were not at that time in a position to become involved militarily in Palestine,[86] and had therefore to think in terms of an alternative solution to the Palestine question, one that was appropriate to their capabilities.

The Muslim Brothers and the Palestinian Revolt: 1936–1937

The Formation of the Central Committeee

The general strike initiated by the Arabs in Palestine on 19 April 1936, which was to last for six months and which was accompanied by an armed revolt, came as no surprise to the Muslim Brothers. It had become evident to them that the only effective way of resisting the colonial power was by force and mass mobilization of support. The massive increase in the number of Jewish immigrants during the preceding years (1933–35) had underlined more clearly than ever the danger of a Jewish takeover. Most important of all was the fact that the Palestinians had lost faith in the British sense of justice as a result of Britain's policy in Palestine. Ambiguous and often inconsistent as this policy was, the Palestinians saw its underlying purpose as being to deny them freedom and independence while supporting the Zionists at their expense. This was the conclusion they drew from the British government's refusal to accept the recommendations made by successive commissions of enquiry sent out to investigate the causes of unrest in Palestine.[1] Z. I. Khan concludes in his thesis that British policy in Palestine provided the Palestinians with the justification for the major revolt they staged in 1936.[2] Allush believes that the strike was aimed at paralysing economic and political life, and that the military operations were intended to strike fear into the British forces and the Jewish community by destroying British and Jewish facilities and interests wherever possible.[3]

In 1936 a number of factors combined to deepen the Muslim Brothers' involvement in the Palestine question. The most important of these were the rapidity with which the strike spread to all parts of Palestine, and the immediate effect it had of alarming the British and

the Jews. Another factor was the agreement forged among all Palestinian political parties and the formation on 24 April 1936 of the Arab Higher Committee, headed by Haj Amin al-Husayni. Added to that was an important internal development in the Muslim Brothers, namely the involvement of students from the university, from al-Azhar, and from the schools, to which al-Banna had paid close attention since he moved to Cairo. He used all possible means to contact the university students and focused his activities around them, forming a students' committee at the beginning of 1936. This consisted of students who had already begun to involve themselves in the Palestine question. One member of the committee had claimed that for the Society itself:

> The formation of the committee had important consequences ... al-Banna knew the far-reaching effects such a committee could have and placed great hopes on it. Time was to prove him right.

He added that the development of the Society, with all its activities and achievements as well as its shortcomings, was largely due to the impact of this committee. So too was the emergence of the Society on the Egyptian scene, its extension throughout the Arab and Islamic World and its confrontation of Western colonialism, 'neo-colonialism' and Communist ideology from 1936 to the present.[4] Hasan al-Banna believed the fact that a large number of university students joined the Society to be 'a great victory'.[5] Mahmud Abd al-Halim in the course of an interview in Alexandria (16 May 1984) assured the researcher that the opportunity to undertake pro-Palestinian activities only became available to the Muslim Brothers after a number of students had joined the Society in 1936.

Twenty-eight days after the Palestinian Arabs declared their general strike, a meeting of the Muslim Brothers convened in the Cairo headquarters on 16 May 1936. The meeting was called by Hasan al-Banna, who chaired it, and was attended by some sixty-four members. The purpose was to study the developments that were taking place in Palestine. Explaining that the uprising in Palestine was strongly supported and that the Arabs of Palestine had done their duty towards their country, al-Banna went on:

> I fear that if we are slow in coming to their help, their movement will not achieve what is expected of it, and consequently we will be called upon to carry the blame and burden for it before God and history.[6]

He appealed to those present, in the name of humanitarian duty and Islamic bravery, to form a committee to organise help for the people of Palestine and to take care of propaganda and fund-raising for this noble cause.[7] The meeting concluded with the formation at the Muslim Brothers' headquarters in Cairo of what was called the Central Committee for Aid to Palestine. This was composed of twenty-nine members and was headed by Hasan al-Banna himself.[8] It is noteworthy that the committee included seven out of the ten members of the General Guidance Council of the Muslim Brothers. During the second stage of the Muslim Brothers' activities, Salih Ashmawi became the chairman of the committee.[9] Alongside it was the student committee responsible for propaganda and fund-raising at the University of al-Azhar and in the secondary schools.[10] That committee was also made up of 29 members,[11] including five out of the six original members of the students' committee formed by al-Banna at the beginning of 1936.[12] The brief of the two committees was as follows:

1. To send protest telegrams to the two High Commissioners of Egypt and Syria, the British Foreign Minister and the Secretariat of the League of Nations, as well as a message to Amin al-Husayni, as Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, congratulating the Palestinian people on their brave stand and expressing support for their cause.
2. To raise funds and send them to the Arab Higher Committee.
3. To request the Abyssinian Aid Committee to direct its attention to Palestine and to transfer the balance of its funds to The Arab Higher Committee. And to appeal to Prince Umar Tusun and various Egyptian organisations to come to the aid of Palestine.
4. To remind Egyptian merchants that it was their duty to boycott Jewish merchants, and not to send exports to them.
5. To appeal to the press to help the committee and facilitate its task.
6. To organise and despatch information to mosque Imams explaining what was taking place in Palestine and urge worshippers to donate money for Palestine.

7. To remind people by writing, and other means, of their duty towards Palestine and to encourage Muslim Brothers – particularly those in Egypt – and Muslims in general, to be concerned with and to work for the Palestinian cause.[13]

These were the tactics adopted by the Society throughout the strike period and until the Peel Commission had issued its report on 7 July 1937. The General Guidance Council of the Society approved the formation and the brief of the two committees. It was decided that sub-committees should be formed from within the Society's branches to receive donations and to send them to the Central Committee.[14]

These sub-committees were formed in all branches of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. The most active of these were at Ismailia, Abu Suweir, al-Manzala, al-Mansura, Port Said, Asyut, al-Qatawiya and Suez.[15] Besides the Muslim Brothers who served on these sub-committees, there were ordinary Egyptians and also some Christians. The appeal made by the General Guidance Council was addressed to them, and it commended the position of Christian Palestinians in their joint defence with the Muslims of Palestine and the Holy Places sacred to both of them. The Christian Palestinians were addressed as representatives of world Christians,[16] which suggests that the Society wanted to enlist the sympathy of the Christians of Egypt and elsewhere on behalf of Palestine. The Society opposed the incitement of sectarian violence in Palestine, employing the slogan 'conspiracy is asleep; God curse those who awaken it'.[17]

Towards the end of May 1936 the Central Committee took part in forming the Supreme Committee for Aid to the Victims of Palestine. The Muslim Youth Society in Cairo took the initiative of calling on Islamic organisations and individuals concerned with Arab and Islamic causes to form this committee. The Society was represented by Hasan al-Banna and Hamid Abd al-Rahman. To avoid duplication, it was agreed that the sub-committees of the Central Committee should act as sub-committees for the Supreme Committee which should be contacted through the Central Committee.[18]

The Muslim Brothers participated in most of the Supreme Committee's activities. For instance, a mass meeting in aid of Palestine at the headquarters of Muslim Youth, held on 11 September1939 (the night of Ascension), was attended by about 30,000 people. Al-Banna addressed the meeting, asserting – according to Muhammad Sabri

Abidin, the secretary of the Arab Higher Committee in 1948, who attended that meeting[19] – the Islamic character of the Palestine question. They also took part in the formation of the Higher Committee for the Palestine Piastre (for the collection of donations), together with the representatives of other Islamic organisations. The Society was represented there by Hasan al-Banna and Ahmad al-Sukkari.[20]

Activities of the Central Committee

In accordance with their brief, the first act of the Central Committee was the sending of a telegram signed by its Chairman, Hasan al-Banna,to the Arab Higher Committee on 18 May 1936. The telegram expressed support for the General Strike and the revolt staged by the Palestinian people against British policy. The secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, Awni Abd al-Hadi, praised the stance of the Muslim Brothers asserting that:

> The telegram boosted our morale and increased our determination to continue until the end of our *jihad* against injustice and tyranny. The telegram created a good impression with the Palestinians who were reassured that their brothers in Egypt and elsewhere would not betray them in the time of need.[21]

The Central Committee also sent a message to Prince Umar Tusun requesting him, as chairman of the Abyssinia Aid Committee, to show his concern for Palestine by sending the remainder of the funds of that committee to the Arab Higher Committee in Palestine.[22] But Prince Umar Tusun refused, on the grounds that the funds had originally been collected not only from Muslims, but also from Christians, British, French and others:

> For this reason we are not in a position to send part of these funds, if there is any left, to the poor people of Palestine, as the present movement in Palestine is restricted to Muslims only.[23]

The Central Committe replied to this by asserting that the Palestinian issue was not merely the concern of Muslims but of humanity as a whole. 'For we request food for the hungry, medicine for the wounded and sympathy for the victims, on the grounds that Palestine is part of

the general Arab World and that its people are both Muslims and Christians.' As to the funds raised not only from Muslims, the Muslim Brothers asserted that it had all been spent on Abyssinia; and that the committee had asked for the aid of the 'Muslim' Egyptian government to cover its other expenses 'which left them with approximately three thousand pounds'.[24] A similar letter was sent to the chairman of The Abyssinia Aid Committee, Abba Yunis, but received no reply from him.[25] The Brothers raised the issue of the Egyptian aid to Abyssinia more than once. They asked repeatedly why the Muslims of Egypt, through their royal family, their press and the heads of their Islamic societies, held all sorts of meetings and raised funds for Abyssinia, while not lifting a finger for the sake of Palestine. Moreover, they demanded the transfer of the funds of that Committee to Palestine.[26]

The Central Committee also sent a number of protest telegrams to the British high commissioners in Jerusalem and in Cairo, to the British foreign secretary and to the secretary of the Mandates Committee of the League of Nations, denouncing British policy in Palestine and demanding a ban on further Jewish immigration and land sales, as well as an end to the pattern of murder and violence to which the Palestinian people were being subjected.[27]

The committee declared its support for the Palestinians, first of all inside Egypt, through the worshippers at mosques. It sent members every Friday to the mosques to tell worshippers, after the prayers, about British activities in Palestine, alleging that they and the Jews tore the Qur'an to pieces and trod it under their feet. They also explained to the worshippers the place occuped by Palestine in Islam and how the British wanted to hand over the Islamic Holy Places and the Aqsa Mosque to the Jews, who would then transform the area into a Jewish Temple. Another member of the group would then collect donations.[28] The Muslim Brothers' magazine also contributed to influencing public opinion in this way, a policy continued by *al-Nadhir*.[29]

Mustafa Sadiq al-Rafi'i reported one of these propaganda campaigns, which was mounted by Abd al-Hakim Abidin together with some other Muslim Brothers at the Mosque of Sayyid Ahmad al-Badawi in Tanta, where he was saying his prayers that day. He recorded this campaign in an article called 'The Story of the Hand which Performed the Ritual Ablution.' This was published in *al-Risala* magazine, whose

circulation greatly increased because of the articles of al-Rafi'i. These articles were collected in a three volume work entitled *The Inspiration of the Message*.[30]

The Muslim Brothers met with a lot of resistance on the part of mosque imams, who tried to stop them physically or have them taken to police stations. The imams' reaction was prompted by their desire to keep their posts and to comply with government instructions. One of them was reported to have appealed to the worshippers against a certain member of the Society by saying: 'Don't bring down the roof of my house over my head ... He abuses the British.'[31]

In furtherance of their aims, the office of the General Guidance Council drew up the text of *al-Qunut*, invocation which was to be recited during the last prostration of each prayer:

> O God succour of those calling for help, supporter of those taking refuge in you, assistant of the weak, aid the people of Palestine. O God relieve their misery, support their cause, defeat their enemies, punish those who oppose them, and make it to them like the years of Joseph ... and lift your fury and anger from us, you Lord of the Worlds and pray for Muhammad the illiterate prophet, his family and his companions and bless them.[32]

Al-Qunut, devoutness and humility before God, is recommended by Islamic law in cases of misfortunes and calamities befalling Muslims and is authorised by the Muslim scholars. It was the opinion of the Society that 'The calamity of Palestine is one of the worst to befall Muslims, and has the most serious implications for their brothers, their homes and themselves.'[33] That is why the General Guidance Council drafted this text, to teach Muslims anti-British and anti-Jewish sentiments, to get them to share and appreciate, five times daily, what was being experienced by the Arabs of Palestine and realise their responsibility towards Palestine with each prayer.

The text of a sermon to be read out on Fridays or other occasions was also drawn up in order to aid the victims of Palestine.[34] The General Guidance Council suggested that part of the 1937 grain crop collected as *zakat* (an Islamic tax payment) should be given to aid Palestinian Mujahidin. This proposal was approved by the Regional Conference of the Society in al-Bahr al-Saghir area at one of its regular monthly meetings in 1936.[35] Hasan al-Banna declared it legal under

Islamic law to pay part of cash *zakat* to the Mujahidin of Palestine.[36] In this way the Muslim Brothers tried to involve Muslims closely with the issue of Palestine, through the daily performance of basic Islamic rites. However – despite all the efforts made by the Muslim Brothers – the question of Palestine remained 'semi-unknown, except perhaps within the limits of the Mosques frequented by the Muslim Brothers on Fridays, which were no more than ten of the Cairo mosques.'[37]

At the beginning of the summer of 1936, the Central Committee decided to extend its Palestine propaganda to the provinces of Egypt. Some members of the Society were sent to explain to people what was going on in Palestine and to raise funds.[38] To this end, four committees were formed, each for a certain region, and went into action on 16 June 1936. In sending these committees the Central Committee co-ordinated its activities with the Supreme Committee for Aid to the Victims of Palestine.[39]

In addition to their brief, the four committees managed to form a number of sub-committees in places of work to ensure continuity of action afterwards. For instance, in June 1936 the Upper Egypt Committee formed sub-committees in Sohag (where it included some Copts), Jirja Tahta and Samalut. The report of the Committee said that the appeal to help Palestine was welcomed, especially in villages where people had faith, simplicity and sincerity. The Committee asked that its mission should be extended from one month to four months in order that people should be more fully informed about the Palestine question. Al-Buhaira Committee formed sub-committees in Damanhur and Abu Hims.[40] Their daily reports gave details of the positive progress of the fund-raising efforts and of the welcoming attitudes and sentiments they encountered.[41] The committees completed their tour of the regions in the last week of July 1936.[42]

In addition to these four committees, the General Guidance Council decided to send students from al-Azhar and Egyptian universities to the country regions during the summer holidays in order to promote the ideas of the Society and to urge people to aid Palestine. To realise this aim, ten committees were set up, starting in the first week of July, each committee was to work for one month.[43] The members of these ten committees were chosen from the members of the student committee set up to spread pro-Palestinian propaganda in the University at Al-Azhar, and in schools.[44]

Hasan al-Banna had originally intended to remain in Cairo throughout most of the summer 'in view of the volume of work which requires him to stay there',[45] but he changed his plans and made four trips to Upper and Lower Egypt between 17 July and 30 August 1936 to spread the Society's call and arouse sympathy for the Palestinian cause.[46] These delegations, together with Mosque Sermons and the Muslim Brothers' magazine, played a major role in explaining the Palestine question to wide sections of the Egyptian population.

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brothers followed developments in the Palestinian arena. When they came to know that a Palestinian National Committee Conference was to be held on 20 August 1936 – to discuss proposals for ending the uprising which had been submitted to the Arab Higher Committee[47] – they sent a message to Amin al-Husayni, chairman of the Arab Higher Committee, calling for the continuation of the action and the rejection of any solution that would fall short of the demands. To the Palestinians they said: 'Stay firm until your demands are realised – and know that death for the sake of pride is-better than life under the yoke of slavery.' They further explained to the chairman that if the Islamic World was showing little sympathy for Palestine 'soon it will grow stronger'. This message was actually signed by Muhammad Hilmi Nur al-Din, acting for al-Banna who was carrying out a mission in the regions.[48] Al-Husayni replied to this by thanking the Muslim Brothers for their support and told them that the British authorities had banned the conference at the last minute.[49] The Muslim Brothers condemned this and demanded that the British authorities should act with fairness as Jews 'convened their own conference with nobody banning them'.[50] Afterwards, the Muslim Brothers worked in cooperation with Palestinian leaders who came to Egypt to enlighten people about the Palestinian cause.[51]

There was a further development in Egypt when *al-Muqattam* and *al-Balagh* newspapers reported on 19 September 1936 that the British Army Command had agreed with a number of contractors to hire Egyptian labourers – Nubians and villagers – to work for the British Army in Palestine and that some troops of Sudanese origin had been hired for military operations there. Announcements were made about the movement of three groups of workers totalling 600 – and liable to be increased up to 2,000. *Al-Muqattam* quoted one of these labourers as saying: 'There is no fixed term for our work there. All we heard from the contractor about the period is that it expires when the war

between the British and the Arabs of Palestine is over.' The authorities concerned did not deny these reports, while Muhammad Tawfiq, the editor of *al-Jihad*, who was closely connected to the Nahhas government, confirmed them, but put the number of labourers involved at only 200. He added that most of them had already been in the service of British officers before going to Palestine.[52] Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati, on behalf of the Muslim Brothers, strongly criticised this development, asking: 'How can a Muslim accept such work? How can he fight his own brothers?'

> O Palestine this is the sympathy you get from Egypt, coming to you on the point of the sword ... They fight you with three forces: the power of the British, the gold of the Jews, and the hands of Egyptians. Is it possible that for a monthly wage of three pounds a Muslim denies his own faith, fights his own religion and kills his own brother ... Let him starve to death if he can find no bread except for the price of the blood of his brother.[53]

He called upon these labourers to join the ranks of the Palestinian revolt or otherwise return to Egypt. He also demanded that the government should make such employment illegal and put an end to it, and called on al-Azhar to do its duty in this respect. The General Guidance Council issued a *fatwa* (a formal legal opinion) declaring these labourers' apostasy from Islam, which meant that their wives were deemed divorced and they were denied the rights of Muslims to be washed, shrouded, prayed over or buried in Muslim cemeteries. The Society members explained this *fatwa* to people all over Cairo and the provinces.[54] According to Tariq al-Bishri, the Wafd government did not object at first to the movement of these labourers, but later banned it.[55]

When on 12 October 1936, in response to appeals from Arab kings and princes,[56] the Arab Higher Committee announced the end of the general strike and of the armed insurrection which was at its peak, the Muslim Brothers considered this as no more than 'a new British trick'. Thus Kamil al-Sharif attributed the positive response by the Arab Higher Committee to these appeals to the fact that they were misled by the rulers' promises about Palestine. For instance, Ibn Saud was quoted as saying, 'I will not let Palestine go even if I have to sacrifice all of my sons.'[57] The Brothers believed that because of the heavy losses sustained by the British forces and 'the heroism shown by the

Palestinian commanders' and as a consequence of the spread of the revolt and of Britain's inability to protect itself and the Jewish population, the British had persuaded the Arab rulers to mediate with the Palestinian leaders in order to reassure them of Britain's good intentions about securing Arab rights in Palestine.[58]

In the view of the Muslim Brothers, the key to the British government's behaviour was its preoccupation with 'the tense international situation which may exhaust all its efforts'.[59] The Muslim Brothers seem to have been right to consider the armistice as a tactical move on the part of the British, one which would put an end to operations in Palestine, allowing Britain to reduce its military commitment there in face of the international situation. The Muslim Brothers realised that the armistice would also give the Jews the opportunity to prepare themselves in Palestine.[61]

Though the Ikhwan considered the willingness of the Arab rulers to mediate in order to stop the General Strike and the insurrection as a plot against Palestine, and described these rulers as either 'agents or ignorant', they commended the stance of King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud and wrote: 'The Saudi Army is supported by angels ... go forth O faithful King.' This appears inconsistent, since the Muslim Brothers admitted in the same article that King Abd al-Aziz had been the most influential in stopping the fighting between the Palestinians and the British. Whilst, at the same time, criticizing the stance of the other Arab rulers regarding Palestine.[63]

Before the sending of the Royal Commission – known as the Peel Commission – to Palestine on 5 November 1936, the Muslim Brothers declared that they had no confidence in it, as the idea behind its formation was 'to laugh at the Arabs for the tenth time.'[64] Britain, they recalled, had sent out several previous commissions of enquiry, but as the findings pointed to 'the corruption' of Zionist policies and the necessity of giving the Arabs their rights, the Muslim Brothers believed that Britain would ignore such findings.[65] In support of this view, they cited as an example what Britain had done after the publication of the White Paper of 1930 which it backtracked from afterwards because it contained some recognition of Arab rights.[66] There was the further criticism that all those commissions were formed from people with a particular bias. 'Would a Judge be left to preside over a case involving his brother, father or son?' Those commissions were 'weak, meaningless and hold no promise whatsoever to the Ar-

abs'.[67] Besides, 'The Mandate government had been working according to a carefully laid plan towards the object for which it has been created, namely the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.'[68]

The formation of the Central Committee and the fulfilment of the objectives set out in its brief enabled the Muslim Brothers to work more effectively for the Palestine question than in the earlier stage of their existence. A significant development, compared with the early activity, was their success in persuading Egyptians, both Muslims and some Christians, to show concern for the Palestine question, and this was to influence the second stage of their development from July 1937 to September 1939.

البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي القدسي

Propaganda for Palestine: July 1937–September 1939

The report of the Peel Commission, which recommended the partition of Palestine into two separate states, was issued on 7 July 1937. This was the first occasion on which the partition of Palestine was referred to and, in its communique on the report, the British government expressed its satisfaction with the proposal and its desire to implement it. The Zionists also showed apparent approval of it as a first step towards their major goal. Soon, however, disturbances began in protest against the scheme for partition. The British government found itself forced to impose restrictions on the Arabs and to mount a wide-scale campaign of arrests which included Palestinian leaders. It besieged the Holy Place where the grand mufti had his residence, removing him from his post as chairman of the Arab Higher Committee. In face of this the Arabs took the view that they had no alternative but to resist force with force, and so a revolt broke out, directed mainly against the British administration. Despite the announcement made by Britain on 9 November 1938, disavowing the idea of partition, the revolt continued until September 1939. It was suspended at the beginning of the Second World War in the belief that the question would be looked into when the war was over.[1]

The Muslim Brothers rejected the report of the Peel Commission and, in the light of the perceived British attitude to the Palestinians, the Society put forward its views for a solution to the Palestine question. In a letter to the British ambassador in Cairo the Muslim Brothers wrote that the partition scheme as it stood would put an end to all Arab rights. 'No single Arab will ever consider, let alone accept it.' They also protested at Britain's arrest and banishment of Palestinian leaders and at the denial of democratic rights and the terrorisation of innocent citizens. They demanded a change of policy: the release of political detainees, the return of those who were in exile, security and

safety for the innocent homeless and the restoration of the full rights and powers of the Islamic Council. In the same letter they declared that the problem could be solved by 'ending Jewish immigration and granting full independence on the basis of an honest agreement, thereby securing Arab rights and treating the Jews in the same way as other national minorities all over the world.'[2] The Muslim Brothers warned the British government that the consequences of its policies would only be to hasten 'the eruption of a volcano of Islamic protest'. They added that Britain would be held responsible for destabilising world peace by its interference on behalf of minorities, using the League of Nations as a pretext.[3]

In their search for a solution, the Muslim Brothers called on Arab governments to make concerted efforts on behalf of Palestine,[4] and against the establishment of a Jewish state there, which they saw as a threat not only to Palestine but to the whole Arab and Islamic world.[5]

When Prince Abdullah, the ruler of Trans-Jordan, suggested that partition be postposed for a period of ten years in order to have time to reconcile the views of the two sides (Arabs and Jews), the Muslim Brothers called his suggestion 'the Proposal of Humiliation'. They considered it an attempt to placate the Muslims, and asked: 'Who are the people (we have) to be reconciled with: The Jews or the British?'[6] Hasan al-Banna identified the parties to the dispute when he argued:

> The Jews are not a party to the problem, they are mere thugs and usurpers who came under the shadow of spears and trickery to a land which does not belong to them. They harassed its people and stirred up these problems over there. The Arabs neither know nor recognise these Jews. The problem in Palestine is actually between the Arabs, the owners of Palestine, and the British who intruded at the time of a sudden World War. They exploited their weakness and benefitted on their account.[7]

The Muslim Brothers considered any proposal designed to prevent the achievement of the demands of the Palestinian people as despicable: 'We have had our fill of news about mediation and about efforts to be exerted. Britain cannot be convinced by words but only by force. Every Muslim should realise that fighting against the infidels is a religious duty.'[8] Abd al-Hakim Abidin, the poet of the Muslim Brothers, expressed this mood:

> Some people called for peace; so I started longing for warfare, and I said to him who calls for peace: For how long will you live in a dream?[9]

Having formed this view of British policy objectives in Palestine, the Muslim Brothers decided to treat the issue in such a way that everyone would be made aware of it, as an international issue, which would harm the British and the Jews.[10] From this time, the Palestine question became inescapable for the Muslim Brothers.

In this second stage of the evolution of their relationship to the issue, the Muslim Brothers concentrated very largely on promoting the cause of Palestine through propaganda. Whereas in the first stage their activities had been limited, they were now more successful in extending their influence and reaching a wider audience.

Al-Nadhir

The mouthpiece of the Society in the first stage of its development[11] was *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, a weekly religious magazine, first published on 21 Safar 1352/15 June 1933. Under its editor-in-chief, Tantawi Jawhar, and its editorial director, Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, with Hasan al-Banna as religious editor, it published articles on Islamic jurisprudence and on the interpretation of religious principles. It ceased publication on 4 November 1938, by which time *al-Nadhir* had replaced it as the principal outlet through which the Society asserted its views.

The policy of *al-Nadhir* as expounded in the first issue (30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938) by its editor, Salih Ashmawi, was to alert its readers by explaining public events and policies in and outside the country from the Islamic point of view. It also carried articles on the Ikhwan's concept of the ideal system of Islamic government, and of an education system based on proper Islamic foundations. As for questions of Islamic jurisprudence 'there is not enough room for them in our pages.' It became evident at once that *al-Nadhir* would adopt a revolutionary style. It prefaced this first issue by making the following appeal):

> In the name of God the one, the powerful, the strong, in the name of Muhammad the mujahid, the patient, the victorious leader, the destroyer of idols, the raiser of the banner of monotheism, in the name of Islam ...

> as a religion of strength and leadership ... in the name of the revolutionary youth, fired with enthusiasm ... ready to spill blood and thirsty for jihad and sacrifice.[12]

Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati proclaimed in the same issue:

> This is one of the first warnings with which Muslims confront the whole world. This is a warning to the nation and to the Government. O enemies of Islam, everywhere Muslim Brothers are guarding the barricades, fully armed, and you have no access. They have drawn up their plans, prepared themselves and have issued a warning before they mount the campaign.[13]

Mahmud Abd al-Halim explained the paper's strategy as follows:

> Along these lines will be the writings and sayings of the Muslim Brothers: Writings and sayings which will have their consequences and which shall be followed by a day when tongues are silenced and when blood does the talking. So after this announcement in this magazine, we hereby issue a warning to people both those of you who wish to go forward and those who prefer to stay behind.[14]

The magazine, with its revolutionary approach, had an appeal for the younger generation, who were naturally inclined to such ideas. According to Abd al-Halim it 'constituted a fiery torch' and was widely distributed, with a circulation ten times that of the previous magazine,[15] although this claim cannot be verified in the absence of statistics.

Palestine was given the lion's share of the magazine's attention and this led Muhammad Ali al-Tahir, a Palestinian journalist in Egypt, to acknowledge that Hasan al-Banna, his Society and *al-Nadhir* magazine were at the forefront of the Islamic propaganda campaign, within Egypt, over the Palestine question.[16] *Al-Nadhir's* policy towards Palestine may be summarised as one of active opposition to the policy of the British and Egyptian governments and of an all-out effort to win support for its cause in Egypt.

Al-Nadhir and British Policy in Palestine.

The Muslim Brothers considered Britain to be the source of the problem and believed that the Zionist movement was linked to it, since the Jews could not survive in Palestine without British power. They believed that Britain had created the Palestinian problem in the first place, in order to implement a carefully drawn up plan to divide the Arab–Islamic World. The Balfour Declaration was seen as a reward to the Jews for their services during the First World War. The Muslim Brothers considered that since then Britain had worked hard to create a Jewish state in Palestine, using a variety of methods. It had facilitated Jewish immigration, both secretly and openly, and had helped the Jews to build up their industrial, commercial and military power, under the pretext of protecting national minorities. 'For the sake of minorities, the majority who are the owners of the country are downtrodden.'[17] Furthermore, the Muslim Brothers believed that Britain had used legislation to facilitate the transfer of a considerable amount of Arab land to the Jews, and that British policy aimed at uprooting one people and replacing it with another.[18]

The Muslim Brothers believed that such a policy had its origins in an inherent hatred of Islam and Islamic civilisation.[19] As evidence of this they referred to the decision taken by the British Tripartite Committee – which was responsible for running the Higher Islamic Council – to transfer the offices of the Council and of the Islamic Endowment to one of Jerusalem's Jewish quarters following the removal of Amin al-Husayni from his position.[20]

The Muslim Brothers saw a parallel between Zionism as an aggressive movement and the Western concept of the Crusades, and considered that what was taking place in Palestine was 'A Jewish Crusade'. As evidence of this they cited the fact that Lord Allenby represented European feeling when on entering Jerusalem he announced, 'Today the Crusades are over.' A similar thought was expressed by the French General Gouraud when he entered Damascus and stood by the Shrine of Salah al-Din al-Ayyoubi saying, 'Here we are, back, Salah al-Din.'[21] Thus, in the view of the Ikhwan, the Palestinian Arabs had two enemies to contend with: Zionism with its money, and the British with their arms.[22]

It was against this background that *al-Nadhir* mounted its attacks on Britain's policy towards Palestine. The magazine published a series

of articles[23] under the general title 'The British and Islam' which appear to have been written with a view to exposing what the publication saw as crimes committed by the British in the Islamic World, and their role in dividing the Muslims. It also aimed to incite Egyptians generally – and Egyptian Muslims in particular – against the British and to instil in them:

> An antagonism to be passed from father to son, to be breast-fed by mothers to their children so that they may experience it from their childhood and it will grow with them, so that the older they grow the more will be their hatred for a nation which humiliated and is still humiliating them ... excessively.[24]

The articles were also intended to use this agitation to promote internal change in Egypt. After citing the measures carried out by the British against the Islamic World, one of the articles commented: 'and above these ruins, the hand of Mustafa al-Nahhas extends to Miles Lampson in order to chain us with the document of disgrace and humiliation.'[25] Referring to Egypt, the writer asked: 'has this vain self-appointed leader with his sweet empty words made you forget about friendship, friendly countries and the document of honour and independence?'[26] Again, when dealing with what was taking place in Palestine, the magazine warned Britain and its principal friend in Egypt, Mustafa al-Nahhas:

> Do the British intend by acting in this way to incite the Islamic World? Well! Let them know that it will then turn into a conflict which will burn and damage no one except the British themselves. The Mujahidin will come out victorious over the British and their criminal Jewish masters.[27]

Muslims were advised not to seek help from the British and not to waste time in trying to win the British over 'as they were known for their lack of human feelings, and could only be moved by a force which compelled and subjugated them and made them accept things as they are.'[28] The writer concluded that 'the British plot in the Islamic World is to take Muslims away from their religion and to corrupt their social life by all possible means.'[29]

In its concern with what was taking place in Palestine, *al-Nadhir* published letters from Palestinians asking for help in the face of what

had befallen them at the hands of the British troops.[30] It publicised 'reports of massacres' and 'sexual assault' committed by the British, suggesting that when 'the Mujahidin in their mountains proved to be too tough for the British beasts to devour, the latter attack innocent villagers'[31] because they refused to denounce the revolt and disdained to co-operate with the government.[32] The magazine explained that the cruelty and ruthlessness of the troops was 'part of the general cruelty typical of the British character'.[33] It also referred to miscarriages of justice against the people of Palestine,[34] and published a list of a number of women and children 'killed without committing any offence'. The magazine claimed that the motive for killing these helpless people was to 'satisfy the lust for terror and revenge'.[35]

Salih Ashmawi wrote fiery articles against British policy in Palestine. For instance:

> Have you heard the sound of bombs tearing to pieces the bodies of worshippers and the dynamite blasting the houses of the innocent? Have you heard the news of the Holy Qur'an being shredded to pieces? Have you heard of sexual assaults against Muslim women and men?[36]

Such fiery articles, which inflamed Muslim feeling, led on a number of occasions to the seizure of the magazine.[37] Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati wrote in similar vein:

> Rivers of blood ... where else except in Palestine do these rivers of blood run? Where else except in its proud height do the souls of pure martyrs cry with injustice ... What are these rivers of blood – what are these sanctities which are infringed publicly and blatantly? What are these tears pouring and pouring? [38]

Hasan al-Banna also contributed to this campaign:

> Blood pours, lives are extinguished, bullets tear bodies, terror dominates the whole country. The troops of colonialism flatten the landmarks of the country and destroy plants, animals and human beings.[39]

There was undoubtedly much exaggeration in all this, but the Muslim Brothers felt obliged to publish these articles because they were determined to bring to the attention of the Islamic World the difficulties and injustices suffered by the Palestinian people, as a result of

what they saw as the oppressive measures being enforced by the British government. The aim of their propaganda campaign was to expose Britain to the eyes of the world as an invader oppressor; as a result some of their articles were deliberately provocative. They urged Muslims and Egyptians to help to rescue the people of Palestine, on the ground that 'The British are fighting us, but on the Land of Palestine.'[40]

The magazine also warned Britain that its policy in Palestine would lead to 'the beginning of the collapse of the British Empire and its eclipse'.[41] It warned Britain against the repressed feelings of the Islamic peoples and the possibility that *jihad* might be declared against Britain.

> You lie in wait, but we will come against you with troops you cannot equal, we shall arrange against you matters you have not expected, and we shall arouse feelings against you, incite the masses. Against you we shall gather steel weapons and pour darkness from heaven upon you and stir up dust on earth against you.[42]

A historian of the Muslim Brothers' Society believes that they made the Palestinian issue 'the criterion for their relations with other countries'. He justifies this by the argument that other forms of colonialism might come and go while the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, according to the Muslim Brothers, would constitute a permanent threat.[43] That is why the Muslim Brothers praised France for its stance in the debate over the British campaign against the Arabs of Palestine before the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. They praised the French authorities in Lebanon for their treatment of Amin al-Husayni – although later the Muslim Brothers protested when the French authorities broke into the house of Amin al-Husayni in Lebanon.[44] The magazine also called upon Muslims not to depend on the League of Nations, which they criticised as 'no more than a gang of thieves who are in the business of thieving on a regular basis'.[45]

So al-Nadhir carried its hostility to the British to the point of inciting the Arabs and Muslims against them, considering this as part of *jihad*. By attacking British policy in Palestine, Egypt and the Arab–Islamic world – at one and the same time – the Muslim Brothers showed their determination to unify efforts against Britain.

Al-Nadhir's Campaign Against the Egyptian Government.

Though other Arab countries showed support for the General Strike, the Wafd government in Egypt adopted a passive position; and whereas Arab governments and Indian Muslims denounced the provisions of the Peel Commission, which were published on 7 July 1937, the Wafd government did not do so. When asked about the position of his government, al-Nahhas refused to comment.[46]

Members of the Egyptian community in Palestine sent letters to al-Nahhas and to Egypt's Consul in Jerusalem on 18 July 1937, and to the Chairman of the Egyptian Senate on 4 August 1937. These letters expressed the anxiety of Egyptians abroad about the political, economic and historical status of Egypt and its reputation among countries of the East in the light of its stance over Palestine. They conveyed their anxiety that the Arab and Islamic World, in looking for leadership, would turn away from Egypt in the direction of Iraq, where both government and people had adopted responsible attitudes towards the Palestinian cause. The Egyptian community in Palestine felt uncomfortable and vulnerable, as they enjoyed a privileged position there, which led them to identify themselves with the Palestinians. In their letters they discussed aspects of the problem of which most Egyptians were unaware, for instance, the threat which the creation of a Jewish state would – in their opinion – pose against Egypt itself. Their letter to the Egyptian Consul in Jerusalem asserted that 'members of the Egyptian community in Jerusalem are embarrassed by the position of our government towards the scheme for partitioning Palestine, and its failure to condemn it', as other Arab governments and peoples had done. In their letter to al-Nahhas they asserted that Egypt 'has not raised a voice which led people to believe that Egypt will take the same stand towards its younger sister, Palestine, as it took over the 1936 Strike.' In a bid to persuade the government to change its position, the letters emphasised the positive stance taken by Iraq.[47] They demanded that the Egyptian government act in support of Palestine because the links between Egypt and Palestine were no less close than those tying Iraq to Palestine; indeed those links were stronger in the case of Egypt, because of its proximity to Palestine and the leading role of Egypt in the region, while 'Iraq's political relations with Britain, with which the Arabs are having a dispute about Palestine, are on the same level as those of Egypt.' They said that Egypt should feel

grateful to Amin al Husayni for saving its face by finding excuses for the official position of Egypt at the beginning of the General Strike and the Revolt. Al-Husayni's excuses on behalf of the Egyptian government were that it was preoccupied by its negotiations with the British government and that political tact and wisdom required 'the avoidance of any distraction during the negotiations.' Once its treaty with Britain was signed, Egypt would be able to direct its efforts to help Palestine.[48]

These letters were included in a statement addressed to the electorate of the 1938 Parliament, which demanded the following:

1. That the Palestine question should be one of the most prominent features of the political programmes of the parties. Each political party should declare what assistance it intended to extend to the Arabs of Palestine if and when that party took power in Egypt.
2. That voters should require candidates to give a commitment to aid for Palestine, and to do their best to this end inside Parliament. Voters should elect religious candidates who subscribed to the idea of the pan-Islamic bond, 'for the homeland is the bulwark of religion and the loss of the country is a loss for religion'.
3. That it should be declared contrary to Islam for voters to elect a candidate to Parliament before ascertaining his readiness to support Palestine.
4. That the preservation of Islam in Palestine required its preservation in Egypt, because if Palestine were to become Jewish, Egypt too would be lost.[49]

On 16 August 1984, Jamal al-Banna (the younger brother of Hasan al-Banna) who, at the time of the Palestinian Revolt, was the manager of the printing press of the Muslim Brothers, relates that this document, which was probably printed in Cairo, expressed 'the wishes of a great number of Egyptians, most of whom were Muslim Brothers living in Palestine.' Jamal al-Banna's opinion is confirmed by the fact that the style of the document conforms to a great extent with the thinking of the Muslim Brothers and their style of writing at that time. However, there was a trend in Egypt, among the Muslim Brothers and their supporters, which demanded that the Palestine question should be put in the forefront of the objectives of the Egyptian nationalist movement and introduced into the fabric of Egyptian politics.

Historians of modern Egypt may wish to re-evaluate the Egyptian nationalist movement in the light of this fact.

Hasan al-Banna sent a telegram to *al-Nahhas* in 1937, on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration in which he reminded the prime minister that the Arab world looked to Egypt for a serious effort to solve the Palestine question, and hoped that the occasion of this anniversary would mark the beginning of Egypt's support for the Palestinian cause.[50]

When Muhammad Mahmud was prime minister (30 December 1937–12 August 1939), *al-Nadhir* – in its first issue – called upon the government to act 'firmly and sincerely'. Speaking in a language that differed from the one it used in addressing the people, the magazine explained to the government that its involvement in Palestine was 'a natural right and an unavoidable duty for Egypt'. Besides the obligations of neighbourhood, it was a question of 'unity between the Arabs and the Egyptians, a unity in religion, blood and marriage which does not recognise these odd and unjust divisions which have been dictated by European colonialist political whims. This has been so since the time of Ibrahim Pasha.' The magazine cited as proof of this the fact that Cairo was the capital city of the caliphate and the site of many shrines of Arab saints and imams. As far as foreign policy was concerned, 'Egypt has the right to intervene militarily to stop this partition.'[51] The establishment of a Jewish state in Egypt would threaten Egypt economically, militarily, socially and culturally.[52]

Al-Nadhir commented fiercely on Muhammad Mahmud's reply to the Shaykh of al-Azhar, who had asked his support for Palestine, saying that 'the mountain went into labour and produced a mouse.' It described the reply as:

> Full of gentleness, meekness, subjugation, vagueness and ambiguities ... Is this all that can be done by a government which took power in the name of Islam? Have you not heard, your Excellency, about the position taken by your opposite numbers in Iraq? Have you not read the protest of The Yemeni foreign minister? Are not these models good enough to follow?[53]

While in Paris, on his way to London, Muhammad Mahmud was asked about the possibility of discussing with the British government the situation in Palestine. His reply was: 'I am the Prime Minister of Egypt, not of Palestine.'[54] The Muslim Brothers condemned this state-

ment and *al-Nadhir* carried a fierce attack against it by Salih Ashmawi: 'This statement is a bomb more devastating than the bomb of Jerusalem. [A bomb there had recently killed a number of Arabs.] If the latter was delivered by a Jewish girl, the other bomb was delivered by a Muslim male.' He continued:

> Palestine, dear Pasha, is not in need of diplomatic prime ministers. It has men among its heroes, whom it will be unfair to compare with any Egyptian leader or minister, even with the Prime Minister of Egypt. They are not in the habit of bowing to High Commissioners or to ambassadors.

He reminded him of his attitude towards Palestine when he was leader of the Opposition and Chairman of the Constitutional Liberal Party. Then he had addressed the Egyptians, inciting them against the prime minister:

> And you Egypt, O miserable country: for how long are you to be exploited by leaders and ministers? You have tried their rule one after the other and you have seen nothing from them except greed. O Egypt! You are burning and dying ... and they are dancing and enjoying themselves. Are you still unaware or have events now cleared your vision?.

Wanting to relate the issue to the slogan of the Muslim Brothers, 'No! to the party system,' he reminded Egyptians that the pre-Islamic Arabs had worshipped idols which neither benefited them nor caused them harm. But now the Egyptians were worshipping idols in the shape of leaders who did the people great harm and whose sole aim was to achieve power and keep it:

> If they are out of power they seek it in all possible ways. They trade in Islam and pretend to grieve for the country and her four sisterly countries. But if they reach their goal, that is power, their programme is to remain there as long as they can ... and so they deny today what they said yesterday.

He concluded: 'It is time for us to say: O Egypt destroy your idols and purify your land.'[55] *Al-Nadhir* explained to the prime minister that if he believed that Egypt had a problem more persistent than that of Palestine, then the one was derived from the other. To say:

> What have I to do with Palestine, means what have I to do with Islam. You should know that if party-system nationalism is sacred to you, then Islam has sanctities and responsibilities which are imposed upon you by the mere fact of your religious faith; and that Islam is one nation of which Egypt is but a part. The question of Palestine is not the question of a particular geographical country, it is the question of Islam in which you believe. Palestine is no more than an infected part of the Islamic body and a loose brick in its building. Any part that does not feel the pain of Palestine is no more a part of that body. Any brick that does not move because of the destabilisation of Palestine is not part of that building. I cannot ask you to cancel this statement before asking you, without being fanatic, to renew your Islam and to get to know its limits and its ends.[56]

Ashmawi focused on criticising the prime minister's statement in his article entitled, 'O Prime Minister of Egypt, not of Palestine'.[57] Hasan al-Banna asked: 'Is it party interference or the undertaking of an Islamic obligation? O people, be objective and understand things as they really are.'[58] *Al-Nadhir* attacked Muhammad Mahmud's government as 'unsuitable for this era because it takes sides with the British, appeases them and kneels before them. All indications prove that this government is a gift from the British to the Egyptian people.'[59]

The statement of Muhammad Mahmud remained a target of writers of the Society and was later used as evidence of the failure of the party system and as a confirmation of the connection between Egyptian governments and colonialism.[60] Muhammad Mahmud's supporters tried to justify the statement by saying he had been trying to distract an English journalist from his pro-Palestinian efforts,[61] but Mahmud Abd al-Halim (one of the Muslim Brothers who witnessed these events) has recalled in an interview that the Brothers arranged for their own reporter, called Burhan, to ask Muhammad Mahmud about his opinion on Palestine and that he received the same reply: 'I am the Prime Minister of Egypt not of Palestine.'[62] Abd al-Halim adds that when that statement was published in the press the Egyptian people paid no attention to it. It was not met with any form of rejection or denunciation,[63] but the branches of the Muslim Brothers declared their condemnation of it.[64]

Al-Nadhir took every opportunity to embarrass the government and involve it in the Palestine question. Commenting on the Commemoration of Palestine Day in Iraq (which was held on 9 of Jumada al-Thani 1357/6 August 1938) when messengers were sent from Bagh-

dad to all Arab Kings except the King of Egypt, it wrote: 'This is treason to the crown of the country. Those who are ruling us and leading the country should be taken before the Courts of Law because that is their crime and that is their misdeed. All these ministries have taken part in preparing this crime.'[65] The journal also highlighted the stand taken by Iraq in support of Palestine. When the religious scholars of Iraq issued their *fatwa* of *jihad* against the British,[66] *al-Nadhir* said:

> Let the Ministers and the *ulama* of Egypt hear this. O God, if these ministers and *ulama* are idols, destroy them ... and if there is still some good in them, lead them to it. We shall see what the situation will be like for those who are fond of Britain and thankful to it following the stand of Iraq.[67]

Al-Nadhir believed that the stand taken by Egyptian governments (those of al-Nahhas and Mahmud) regarding Palestine was due to the 1936 Treaty which Egypt had signed with the British, suggesting that they did not want to annoy their ally and therefore favoured the British against the interests of their own people. 'O ye who believe! Take not the Jews and the Christians for friends. They are friends one to another. He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk.' (Qur'an: 5/51) *Al-Nadhir* urged the government to cancel the 1936 Treaty in order to be free.[68]

Al-Rafi'i believes that the reason for the conclusion of the 1936 Treaty was 'the overwhelming desire to ally with the usurper, to befriend him, and to enjoy remaining in office.'[69] Al-Banna identified another factor behind this passive stand, namely the weakness of the bond between Egypt and the Arab–Islamic countries,[70] in addition to rivalry between the political parties and their leaders.[71] For this reason *al-Nadhir* attacked the party system prevailing in Egypt, demanding the liquidation of all political parties which had originally been formed in circumstances different from the conditions then prevailing. They had become outdated, had failed to reform themselves, and were reluctant to give way to others to undertake their duties towards Egypt.[72] What is important here is that the Brothers saw the Palestine question as providing new evidence of the corruption of parties in Egypt.

When the Wafd Party announced in the summer of 1938 its deci-

sion to aid Palestine and invited oriental peoples to take part in the Wafd's conference, Hasan al-Banna sent a message to *al-Nahhas* thanking him for that aid and wondering:

> Can we take it that the Wafd is genuine in changing its past position towards Islam or are these mere political manoeuvres directed at scoring political gains against the Wafd's rivals as a prelude to returning to government, when the Party will revert to its past policy of ignoring all reforms that bear any relation whatsoever to Islam?

He demanded that the government should adopt a foreign policy which would link Egypt with other Islamic and Arab countries in preparation for the return of the caliphate and confirmation of the unity decreed by Islam.[73]

Al-Subki claims that the Palace and the Muslim Brothers tried to exploit the Palestinian Revolt to win over the Egyptian people, at a time when the Wafd, with its Egyptian nationalist traditions, was incapable of grasping the issue. In support of her argument she instances the hostility felt by the Muslim Brothers for the Wafd, the competition between the two, and the fact that the Palace used the Muslim Brothers on this occasion.[74] This overlooks the fact that the political stance of the Muslim Brothers towards the Palestine revolt was not merely a weapon they directed against the Wafd in their political rivalry with it, but a position adopted according to what they saw as the nature of the Islamic Call, together with the concepts of the Islamic *umma* and *jihad*, which they saw as antithetical to that of regionalism. This interpretation is supported by al-Banna's many articles on these aspects of the issue.[75]

In 1938 a meeting between Hasan al-Banna and Muhammad Mahmud took place after which Muhammad Mahmud said:

> In the name of God had it not been for custom and tradition, I would have appointed this man Minister of Foreign Affairs. I am convinced that within a few months, he would have given Egypt a prominent status within the ranks of the nations.[76].

The Constitutional Liberal Party, from which Muhammad Mahmud's government was formed, had supported the decision to enter political life made by the Muslim Brothers in their Fifth Con-

ference.[77] Nevertheless, the Muslim Brothers and *al-Nadhir* attacked Muhammad Mahmud's government because of its position over Palestine. This suggests that, when they declared their intention of entering political life, the Muslim Brothers were neither for nor against any party or government. Their support or opposition for a party was determined by that party's attitude to the Muslim Brothers' interpretation of Islam and the interests of the country. Whoever pursued this programme of 'Islam and the national interest' would win the support of the Muslim Brothers, and whoever deviated from it would be opposed by them.[78]

Al-Nadhir insisted that the stance of the Muslim Brothers over Palestine was not one that would alter with the change of regimes and circumstances. Such changes could not make wrong right or right wrong. The Brothers' position was ideologically based.[79] Bayumi believes that the attack launched by the Muslim Brothers against Muhammad Mahmud's government suggested 'that this step on their part, was linked with a transitional development inside the Society.'[80] This is consistent with what has been said earlier. Al-Banna referred to it in the leading article of the first issue of *al-Nadhir*. Accordingly, it seems that al-Bishri was wrong in attributing this attack merely to the fact that Ali Mahir was opposed to Muhammad Mahmud's government.[81]

Al-Nadhir's hostility to the British and the government, particularly the fiery articles written by Salih Ashmawi, often led to the confiscation of the newspaper.[82] Ashmawi himself was interrogated by the Attorney General about his articles.[83] On the other hand, according to Mahmud Abd al-Halim, the fiery approach of *al-Nadhir* to the Palestine question contributed to the wide circulation of the magazine all over Egypt. Its reputation also reached Syria, Trans-Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq.[84]

Al-Nadhir's Campaign to Mobilise Egyptian Concern for Palestine.

Besides its attacks on British policy in Palestine, its coverage of the activities of the British army against the Palestinians, and its criticism of the Egyptian government, no issue of *al-Nadhir* was without news about the Palestinian Revolt and the resistance of the Palestinian people. Indeed, *al-Nadhir* and the *Ikhwan al-Muslimun* magazine spearheaded the propaganda campaign for the Palestinian Revolt. In

these efforts *al-Nadhir* had the cooperation of the Pan-Arab Bureau in Damascus. The magazine also published news about the development of the revolt – which reached it through people arriving in Egypt – and published the communiques of the Mujahidin and of the Arab Higher Committee. Commenting on this news and published material, the magazine praised the Palestinians, warned Britain, and urged Muslims to be concerned with the issues of Palestine. It also published reports of the activities of Arab and Islamic countries in their support for Palestine.[85]

In citing the reasons which made it necessary for Muslims to be concerned with Palestine, the Muslim Brothers were drawing on their interpretation of the Qur'an, the traditions of the Prophet, his biography and the biographies of his Companions and Followers,[86] and also the ruling *fatwas* of Muslim *ulama*. *Al-Nadhir* quoted as evidence many *fatwas*, the most important of which was made by Muhammad al-Husayn al-Kashif, one of the most prominent Shi'ite scholars in Iraq.[87] This is a reminder of al-Banna's consistent ambition to achieve a rapprochement between the Sunni and the Shi'ite sects.

Al-Nadhir used more than one style in writing, and addressed each social category with appropriate language and logic.[88] It utilised every opportunity to remind the readers of their duty towards Palestine.

Even festivals and celebrations of anniversaries were used by *al-Nadhir* to stir the feelings of Egyptians in favour of Palestine. This was done by comparing the way the feast was celebrated in Palestine and in Egypt, and by discouraging such celebrations in Egypt at a time when there were troubles in Palestine. Such arguments were couched in extremely emotive terms.[89] The magazine underlined the case of Egyptian aid to Abyssinia asserting that 'Palestine is your country – all of you – before Abyssinia.'[90] The article explained that 'wrong-doing can only prevail in the absence of the truth; and what can most tempt your enemy to attack your country is your failure to help your brothers.'[91] It also asserted that the problem of Palestine remained unsolved, not because Muslims could not solve it, but because they did not want to do so; they did not have deep feelings about it because they were false Muslims.[92]

Poetry played an important role in *al-Nadhir's* campaign to incite people to support Palestine and raise funds for its victims. Abd al-Hakim Abidin, the Muslim Brothers' poet wrote:

> People of the Orient, of Islam and Arabs, disown yourselves if you do not revolt and destroy. If you do not come to the aid of your brothers, I will not call you my people, nor will I ever live with you.

> The people of Palestine are asking you to meet your obligation towards it. If you do not respond, what sort of people will you be? The Messenger of Allah disowns every Muslim who at any time denies them money.

Abidin's poem 'Palestine in Revolt' contained forty-one verses[93] in which he summed up the reasons for the interest of the Brothers in Palestine. It is clear that the poem was heavily influenced by al-Banna's articles on Palestine. The Muslim Brothers also wrote a song for Palestine, which they used to sing wherever they were holding fund-raising rallies in support of Palestine.[94]

Al-Nadhir also wanted children to be aware of the Palestinian question, so on the feast of Ramadan in 1357/24 November 1938 it appealed to Muslims not to celebrate the occasion. If children asked for presents, they should be denied to them and be informed of the reason in a manner they would understand:

> That at this Feast we are in mourning. Our sanctities are being violated in Palestine. Our brothers are being killed over there, so that the British and the Jews could violate our Holy Place and butcher our brothers. Let your child understand, if he asks for the feast piastre, that this piastre will be sent to Palestine, so that it may buy bread for a hungry orphan or clothe the body of a widow or buy a bullet to strike the enemies of God.[95]

Al-Nadhir opened its columns to women so that, it declared, by following the example of women at the dawn of Islam, they too could urge Muslims to support Palestine. One woman wrote offering to volunteer herself for *jihad*:

> Let them ask for volunteers. I shall be the first at the forefront of the ranks. I shall carry my life in my own hands and offer it as a sacrifice on the altar in defence of the Holy Place in order to win the honour of *jihad*.[96].

Another young girl wrote to Hasan al-Banna:

> I write to you hoping that our youth will know some Islamic zeal when they find a young girl like myself calling for *jihad* and sacrifice while they are unaware and uninterested. If I were a young man I would have been the leader of Egyptians along the path of God to rid the Holy Lands from the criminal barbaric British and Jews! Make public your discontent, move, fight, sacrifice and revolt.[97].

Al-Nadhir published photographs of the hostilities taking place in Palestine giving prominence to pictures showing the shredding and burning of the Qur'an. The captions under the pictures were meant to heighten their emotional impact: for instance, 'The fire of villains is harmless against believers'; 'a photograph of a noble Mujahid killed and then burnt by Jews'; 'How horrible colonialism is'; and 'O history record it.'[98] The headlines ran: 'Palestine is burning'; 'Watch out, Muslims – Palestine calls you'; 'Come to its help ... Go for the *jihad*'; 'It is time for sacrifice and ... for revolt.'[99] *Ikhwan al-Muslimun* also contributed to this campaign by publishing a number of cartoons.[100]

The Pamplet Campaign against British Policy in Palestine

The Muslim Brothers resorted to a new method of attacking the British in addition to what *al-Nadhir* was doing; for *al-Nadhir*, which had its limitations apart from the problem of distribution, was also under constant threat of confiscation. So the Brothers printed pamphlets against British policy in Palestine explaining the threat posed by the Jews. The pamphlets were distributed in universities, colleges, government offices, shops and cafes. They were not restricted to Cairo, but were also distributed in the regions.[101] From one of Lampson's dispatches in April 1939 we learn that the Ministry of the Interior in Cairo reported that the Muslim Brotherhood 'is gaining influence among both students and people. It provides the most strenuous agitators against (our) policy in Palestine.'[102]

The material for these underground pamphlets was provided by Amin al-Husayni's secretary, Ali Rushdi. At this time the Muslim Brothers' printing press was at Abu al-Hasan al-Shushari quarter in Cairo where the work was usually supervised by the manager of the printing press, Jamal al-Banna, and printed secretly after nightfall.[103] One of the most important of the publications was 'Fire and Destruction in Palestine'.[104] Mahmud Abd al-Halim mentions that this

book was printed by the Arab Higher Committee, which provided tens of thousands of copies for the Muslim Brothers.[105] But Jamal al-Banna asserted to this researcher that this pamphlet was printed on the Muslim Brothers' own printing press and under his supervision.[106] Al-Banna's version may be explained by the fact that these publications were printed underground and known only to those directly concerned, and that other Brothers were only involved in distributing them.

The pamphlet contained about eighty pages, with more than fifty photographs detailing acts of violence and torture alleged to have been committed by the British against the Arabs of Palestine. Each incident was supported by photographs and names of the people concerned. Pictures of British troops tearing the Qur'an to pieces and stamping on it with their feet were prominent.[107] The aim of publishing them was to incite Muslims for the *jihad* in defence of Palestine. The argument was that if they did not do so, then they would themselves be faced with a Jewish threat after the establishment of the Jewish state on the borders of Egypt, by which time it would be too late. They also wanted to embarrass the British before the whole world, by arguing that they were devoid of the humanity and the civilisation which they professed.[108] The Muslim Brothers distributed the publication very quickly, and within three days it had reached readers all over Egypt. The Egyptian government had to act. The police searched the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers and seized 750 copies without discovering the real source of the book or where it had been printed.[109] Hasan al-Banna was arrested for 24 hours and during the investigation admitted that he was the author and that the idea behind the publication was to attack the authorities and Britain, their ally. He admitted that he knew that the law prescribed a punishment for this offence, and said that he wished to be brought before a court of law.[110]

Al-Banna's idea was to use the court as a platform from which to explain the Palestinian cause, which would then place on the court record the Muslim Brothers' condemnation of what was taking place in Palestine. His intention was to publicise the contents of the book as a way of spreading his ideas, and as a means of undermining the government and the British.[111] The Muslim Brothers claimed at the time that the statements of Hasan al-Banna throughout the investigation were conveyed to the British ambassador, who understood why

al-Banna wanted to be taken to court. He gave instructions for the investigation to be suspended and for al-Banna to be released immediately.

It was after this that the British Embassy in Cairo began to take more interest in the Society. Mahmud Abd al-Halim claims that the British had a file on Hasan al-Banna containing his biography, and that they wrote many reports to the British government about him and his Society. Research into the British Foreign Office records confirms that information was collected concerning the Society.[112] Miles Lampson's duty was 'to keep my government fully informed as to developments and reactions in Egypt, and I felt I could claim to have done so fully.'[113] Lampson avowed that 'there is no doubt that the period in which the Ikhwan al-Muslimin were most active against us coincided with that of the Palestine rebellion, which caused some emotion among devout Muslim circles here.'[114]

The Egyptian government's hostile attitude towards the Muslim Brothers gave the Society the opportunity to denounce the government as a surrogate of the British and a toy in their hands, accusing it of seeking to appease the British by silencing those who spoke about Palestine and defended it. This belief of the Muslim Brothers seems to be confirmed by the fact that the Egyptian prime minister, on 2 June 1938, told Lampson that the Palestine question was 'causing him increasing disquiet and he was finding himself in an extremely difficult position over agitation regarding Palestine.' He hoped Lampson would agree that the Egyptian government 'were right to handle this matter through ordinary diplomatic channels' rather than following 'the bad example set by Iraq which he knew had been very embarrassing to us.' The conversation ended with the fervent hope of the prime minister that 'We would be able to help him in meeting these difficulties.'[115] Hasan al-Banna wrote to the government:

> O you who are taking the seats of Government! Is it not time for you to understand that those who seek prestige without God end up humiliated? And that for fear of being humiliated, people resort to submissiveness and, for fear of being poor, they end up in poverty. Is it not time for you to understand that people who are keen to die are granted life by God and that God says: 'Those who choose disbelievers for their friends instead of believers, do they look for power in their hands? Lo! all power appertaineth to Allah.[116]

He announced that the stand of the Muslim Brothers in support of Palestine would not change and would not be affected by the government, and that the Muslim Brothers would fulfil their obligation in every possible way. They knew full well that their enemies were colonialism, unjust governments and the aristocracy, and they called for ombat against them.

> Let us hope that this attack will be the signal that heralds the approach of victory. The Muslim Brothers' best moment is when they follow the example of the heroes of Palestine, when their blood is shed, their souls over flow the squares, when they are arrested, banished and tortured for the cause of God; for death in defence of the truth is life itself.[117]

Hasan al-Banna demanded that he should either be brought to justice or else the confiscated copies should be given back to him so that he could distribute them and acquaint people with the cruelties of the British in Palestine.[118]

The Muslim Brothers denounced the government's actions and proclaimed their solidarity with Palestine and their determination to help it through all possible means.[119] Al-Bishri is mistaken in believing that the attack launched by the Brothers against Muhammad Mahmud's government was the reason behind the confiscation of the book.[120] Moreover, besides what has been stated about the contents of the book, the attack launched by *al-Nadhir* against the government was in issue 9 (27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938) after Mahmud's statement about Palestine, and before the confiscation of the book.

From the outset the British stance over Palestine was one of the important factors behind the hostility of the Muslim Brothers towards Britain. This was reflected in *al-Nadhir's* campaign against the British and in the publication of pamphlets condemning their policy in Palestine, as well as in the speeches of al-Banna and of other leading members of the Society.

The Campaign against the Jews of Egypt

Jewish Influence in Egypt

The Muslim Brothers saw a number of factors in the Egyptian environment as facilitating Zionist activities. The most important of these were the British occupation, the attitude of the ruling authorities and the behaviour of the Egyptian political parties.

During the reign of King Fu'ad (1917–36), the Jews in Egypt came to be more closely involved in all walks of Egyptian life. A number of Jewish businessmen gained seats in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, Jews were employed in the palace; some Jewish families exercised considerable influence on the Egyptian economy.[121] In 1924 Joseph Qatawi was appointed minister of finance in Sa'ad Zaghlul's cabinet. Leon Castro in 1917 had established the Egyptian branch of the International Zionist Organisation, which attempted to use the synagogues as open platforms for Zionist propaganda.[122] Castro became private secretary to Zaghlul, and acted as the spokesman of the Wafd Party in Europe when he accompanied the prime minister to London for the Anglo–Egyptian negotiations.[123] Many Jews joined the Wafd Party and the newspaper, *La Liberté* established by Leon Castro in 1924, became the mouthpiece of the party.[124] In 1924 Castro tried to arrange a meeting between Chaim Weizmann – head of the World Zionist Organisation – and Zaghlul, to discuss collaboration between their two movements.[125]

Muhammad Mahmud, the chairman of the Constitutional Liberal Party, showed great sympathy to the Jews and considered them a useful element that would benefit the country, while Isma'il Sidqi, the founder of the Sha'ib Party, had intimate personal and business relations with them. The Jews appealed to the slogan of national unity against anyone who attempted to attack them, or to warn against alleged Zionist activities in either Egypt or Palestine. Although some Jews joined the Wafd Party the majority avoided party rivalries and tended to support whatever party was in power. In this way they generally enjoyed a favourable relationship with political leaders and had ready access to them.[126]

In 1922, Ahmad Zaki, a former secretary to the Egyptian Cabinet, who was to become an ardent sympathiser with the Palestinians, congratulated the Zionist Organisation in Palestine on the recognition of the British mandate by the League of Nations. He wrote to Dr Eder,

Secretary-General of the Zionist Executive in Palestine, that 'the victory of the Zionist idea is the turning point for the fulfilment of an ideal which is so dear to me, the revival of the Orient.' In his letter he expressed the belief that the goal of Zionism was 'to carry the torch which should illuminate the Orient'.[127] In March 1924, Frederick Kisch, Chairman of the Zionist Executive in Palestine, lunched in Cairo with Aziz al-Misri, who told him that 'he wanted the Orient for the Orientals, and further regarded the Jews as such'. Kisch noted in his diary after another meeting with al-Misri, Hasan Sabri (an Egyptian dignitary) and Sayyid Kamil Pasha (a son of Sultan Abd al-Hamid's Grand Vizier), that these three men 'were equally emphatic in their pro-Zionist declarations' and each of the three 'recognised that the progress of Zionism might help to secure the development of a new Eastern civilisation.'[128]

The Zionist movement also tried hard to prevent Egypt's support for Palestine, and managed to forge good relations with the Egyptians. If Egypt threw its weight behind the Palestinians, this would, it argued, have damaging implications for the large Jewish community of Egypt. The Zionists were well aware of Egypt's regional and international importance. For these reasons they sought ways of influencing the Egyptian perspective on the Palestine question, by sounding the call for national unity and urging that Egypt had many problems needing solutions and should not allow the Palestine question to become one of the preoccupations of the Egyptian nationalist movement. The Jewish press in Egypt encouraged economic, cultural and sporting links between Egypt and the Jews of Palestine, and exerted considerable pressure on the Egyptian papers that attacked the Jews in Palestine and supported the Arabs there. This was effected through donations and bribes, by monitoring what was written in the Egyptian press and by the penetration and creation of bases of influence inside the papers themselves.[129] In 1938 the Jewish press succeeded in influencing the Egyptian government to stop anti-Jewish propaganda. The Board of Directors of the Egyptian Broadcasting Service passed a regulation banning reporting of speeches calculated to incite religious agitation or attacking any religious sect.[130] This was yet another indication of the passive attitude of Egyptian governments and of the nationalist movement towards the Palestine question.

If government and nationalist circles in Egypt chose to ignore the perceived Zionist threat, the Muslim Brothers on the contrary warned

against it on many occasions. They were prepared to go to extreme lengths in trying to prove that the Jews of Egypt were not part of the Egyptian people.

The Newspaper Campaign against the Jews.

Articles were written about the Jewish threat addressed to the Arab and Muslim world generally, as a prelude to emphasising the threat posed by Egyptian Jews to Egypt itself.[131]

Salih Ashmawi gave the lead in a campaign against the Egyptian Jews by criticising their negative attitude to the events taking place in Palestine. He called their attitude 'the hidden apparent, the ambiguous clear'. Ashmawi argued that none of them took part with other Egyptians in meetings, conferences or rallies expressing support for the people of Palestine. None of them published any condemnation of the stand of the Jews there; nor did any of them donate any money to the Palestinians. On the contrary, he argued, the Egyptian Jews were pleased by, and supported, what was going on in Palestine. They formed an Association for Jewish Youth with the aim of raising funds and sending them to the Jews of Palestine. They also promoted anti-Palestinian propaganda and advocated the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Ashmawi challenged the Egyptian Jews to declare in clear terms where they stood as regards Zionism and the events taking place in Palestine, saying they must choose 'either allegiance or hostility'. He asked Jewish leaders in Egypt to renounce Zionism publicly, and to join with other Egyptians in demanding a satisfactory solution to the Palestinian problem. That renunciation, Ashmawi continued, should be published as a declaration in Jewish papers inside Egypt, together with other papers. It should be conveyed to the British government and to the Head Office of the international Zionist movement. They should also donate large sums of money to the Arabs of Palestine, otherwise 'we shall have the right to presume that they are Zionists who support the British and their crimes in Palestine.' The Muslim Brothers, he added, would declare *jihad* against the British and the Jews in Egypt, Palestine and other Arab and Islamic countries, and would resist the Jews in Egypt before doing so in Palestine.[132]

Al-Nadhir spearheaded this attack in the last issue of its first year of publication and during its second year, in a column headed: 'The

threat of the Jews in Egypt.' Shaykh Mustafa al-Rifa'i al-Laban and Yusif Abu Zaid wrote for that column, running items on the extent of Jewish influence over the press (through Jewish control of the Eastern Advertising Company),[133] and on the importance of the Jewish community in the Egyptian economy through interests in real estate, jewellery shops, hotels, the Stock Exchange and money changing. Such interests, they asserted, led to unemployment among Muslims and the bankruptcy of Egyptian merchants.[134] The articles in *al-Nadhir* accused certain government departments and personalities in Egypt of helping the Jewish community, including the Norwegian Consul in Cairo, a certain Mr Foot (the Director of Imperial Chemical Industries), Thabit Thabit, a fertiliser merchant, the Egyptian Agricultural Lending Bank, the Agricultural-Financial Society and a number of employees and bankers working for the government or elsewhere.[135] The magazine also saw a threat to Islamic law in the activities of Jews who ran nightclubs and brothels, and who had control over the film industry.[136]

The articles also linked international Zionism with communism which they described as a Jewish ideology. They even described the Masonic movement as a Jewish sect, adding that the aim of the Jews in spreading these subversive ideologies was to fight Islam.[137] Furthermore, the articles reminded readers of the policies of the Jews in Egypt since the reign of Muhammad Ali and of their role in getting Egypt heavily into debt since the time of Sa'id I by mortgaging whole provinces in Egypt, which ultimately led to the British occupation of the country.[138] The magazine published a warning to Muslims against this Jewish threat:

> Make no mistake that the danger to Palestine is evident. Our brothers in Palestine are resisting them, risking their lives. But the Jewish threat to Egypt is impending, so take the initiative, boycott them and cast them out, for they have corrupted Egypt and its population.[139]

Monitoring and Responding to Events

When *al-Ahram* published, on 22 August 1936, the decision of the Egyptian Cabinet to increase the number of troops stationed along the eastern frontiers in a bid to stop Jewish immigration into Egypt,

the Muslim Brothers commended this decision, commenting that the Jews were a catastrophe wherever they went.[140] When, on 10 September 1936, *al-Ahram* gave notice that a Jewish delegation was to visit the country to promote anti-Palestinian propaganda, the Muslim Brothers condemned the visit and demanded that the government should ban it as it would cause riots and conspiracy in Egypt.[141]

They also launched a fierce attack on the Egyptian government for appointing a Jew as Egypt's Consul in Paris, commenting that the Jewish population of Egypt numbered no more than 22,000 and asking how a Consul came to be recruited from within their ranks to represent the government of an Islamic country, whose population exceeded 16 millions. The Society took the view that there were plenty of Egyptians better qualified, more knowledgeable, and possessed of a better right to the post. The article concluded that the Jews were not content with their power inside Egypt, and now the government bestowed on them the right to represent Egypt abroad. It considered the appointment 'a suspicious choice' which planted a spy in the Egyptian Foreign Office.[142]

Commenting on an announcement made by the Zionist Centre of Alexandria to the effect that the Centre was working for the aim of a national Jewish state in Palestine, *al-Nadhir* said that this was an insult to Muslims on their own doorstep. It urged Muslims to react, telling them: 'You are therefore humiliated in your country and slaves in your own house.'[143]

Hamid Abu al-Ainain, the head of the branch of the Muslim Brothers in Kafar al-Hasr-Sharqia – commenting on an appeal by Dr Salih Shukri published in *al-Ahram* on 9 September 1938, to give sanctuary to the Jewish doctors expelled by Germany and Austria – referred to the consequences of Jewish immigration in Palestine. He added that the presence of Jewish doctors in a country should not be taken as evidence of medical progress in that country and that the appeal implied belittlement of Egyptian doctors who he asked to reply to it. He commented that if this scheme was implemented, 'we will surely end up where Palestine is today', adding that he would prefer to be treated by an Egyptian rather than a Jewish doctor.[144]

Al-Ahram also published an article written by Ahmad al-Sawi Muhammad, objecting to the criticism made by the Muslim Brothers of a Mansura football team playing against al-Kabi, a team of Egyptian Jews. Al-Sawi's argument was that the criticism revealed a narrow

mindedness that was inconsistent with a national spirit. But the Muslim Brothers argued that the criticism was not based on religious grounds, but on the grounds that the al-Kabi Society was a branch of a Jewish military society in Palestine which cooperated with the British against the people of Palestine. They accused the society of being anti-Islamic and using sports as a cover, adding that Egyptian Jews had proved that they did not share the sentiments of other Egyptians towards Palestine. On the contrary, they supported Zionism, supplied donations to the Jews of Palestine and raised Zionist flags on their shops and hospitals. The Muslim Brothers revealed the address of the Zionist Society as al-Khedive Building, Imad al-Din Street, Cairo.[145]

A news item about a donation of 5,000 Egyptian pounds raised in a week to aid the Jews of Palestine prompted Umar al-Tilmisani to comment that the Muslim Brothers had always warned the Jews of Egypt against being involved with Zionism: any act carried out by the Jews of Egypt to help the Jews of Palestine 'is considered as directed against the Egyptians themselves.' Those funds, he claimed: 'are sucked from the blood of Egyptians and are snatched from their livelihood.' The beneficiaries were violating the holiest of places in the eyes of Muslims. He warned the Jews that action would be taken against them if they persisted along this course.[146]

Meanwhile, *al-Nadhir* published an announcement from Palestinian Arabs to both Arabs and Muslims, appealing to them to avenge what was happening to the Palestinians, and encouraging opposition to the Jews who were living in Arab and Islamic countries. This appeal claimed that Jews abroad supported the Jews of Palestine, and therefore striking at them abroad would influence positively the situation in Palestine. The announcement warned that if they would not revolt against the Jews they would be victims of Jewish ambitions to establish a Jewish kingdom embracing several Arab countries. So Jews should be boycotted and expelled from the Muslim World.[147]

Al-Nadhir also published a reply from two Azhar scholars to an article written by Karim Thabit, entitled 'The Jews of Egypt are our brothers' and published in *al-Muqatam* on the 3 August 1939. Remarking that one of the most important ingredients of fraternity was the sharing of feelings and sentiments between one brother and another, the two scholars argued that this did not apply to the Jews of Egypt, because they had never shared the feelings of the Egyptian

people towards Palestine. On the contrary, they claimed, all the evidence – their fund-raising, flags, language, press and social clubs – indicated that the Jews were not part of the Egyptian people. The Jews of Egypt had had the opportunity to prove that they shared the attitude of the Egyptian people to the Palestine question, but had not done so. For instance, Joseph Qattawi had turned down the invitation made to him by Muhammad Alluba in the Cairo Parliamentary Conference to explain the Jewish stand on Palestine. Furthermore, Jewish members of Parliament had rejected Alluba's invitation to attend the conference. The Jews had not attended the many receptions given for the delegates by the king, the government, the political parties and the various non-Jewish organisations, nor did they arrange similar receptions. On the contrary, the Jewish press had waged a fierce attack against Alluba.

Another complaint was that, when the London Round Table Conference convened on 7 February 1939, Arab delegations had received many supportive telegrams but none of them from Jews. When Ali Mahir had asked the Jews of the East, and of Egypt especially, to accept a solution to the Palestine problem in accordance with Arab demands, he had received no replies whatsoever. They neither protested against the Jewish crimes which were alleged to have taken place daily in Palestine, nor did they make any donations to the Palestinians. For all these reasons, the two Azhar scholars considered Zionism and Judaism to be one and the same thing, 'and (we) also consider the Jews of Egypt Zionist until proved otherwise.'[148] The two Azhar scholars made the same demands of the Egyptian Jews as Ashmawi had done. The researcher believes them to have been Muslim Brothers, because their article under the title 'Now the Jews in Egypt are not Egyptian' was on the same lines as the Muslim Brothers' attacks on the Egyptian Jews. But it was likely to have more impact than one issued by the Muslim Brothers in their own name at that time.

Anti-Jewish Leaflets

The Muslim Brothers revealed and printed the real names and addresses of owners of Jewish businesses, and lists were distributed in Cairo and the regions with a call to boycott them.[149] Below the lists they wrote:

> The piastre you pay to any of these businesses you are merely putting in the pocket of the Jews of Palestine so that they may buy weapons with it and murder your Muslim Brothers in Palestine.[150]

The Muslim Brothers also compiled and distributed a small booklet with the names and addresses of owners of Jewish newspapers all over the world. They took the precaution of not having these booklets in their head office after the confiscation by the government of *Fire and Destruction in Palestine*, but of keeping them in secret locations. Copies of such booklets found their way to the desks of even high-ranking government officials and ministers.[151]

This campaign against the British and the Jews had such an effect that the *Jewish Chronicle* in London professed to see foreign influence at work, and alleged that the German government was helping Islamic organisations with the campaign.[152] On 6 September 1938, *The Times* demanded that the British government should implement the 1936 Treaty with Egypt and put an end to such propaganda. The Muslim Brothers' reply to this was that their efforts in defence of Palestine were derived from their loyalty to the Islamic world.[153] Mahmud Abd al-Halim, one of those who engineered the campaign, says:

> It was a bombshell because it touched a sensitive nerve of the Jews. It was so effective as a propaganda technique that the British press commented on it asking the Egyptian government to intervene and act against the source of these leaflets.[154]

Lampson reported that 'The Jews in Cairo were seriously disturbed by this propaganda' and that 'they, and indeed many others, fear that this anti-British and anti-Jewish campaign in Egypt is likely to cause serious trouble in the future.'[155] Hasan Rif'at Pasha, under-secretary of state for the interior, informed the Oriental secretary that he was taking a very strong line against 'agitators'.[156]

In addition to drawing attention to the threat from the growing influence of the Jews in Egypt, the Muslim Brothers and others were in effect pressing for a redefinition of Egyptian identity in terms of pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism. This created difficulties for the Jews who could no longer appeal for protection on grounds of their loyalty and patriotism to the Egyptian nation. From the mid-1930s they were

called upon, notably by the Muslim Brothers, to show practical evidence of their support for Arab-Islamic unity and the Palestinian Arabs The Brothers saw such a stance as 'the touchstone of Egyptian patriotism'.[157]

Demonstrations

In an attempt to show their solidarity with the Palestinian people more positively and to transfer the cause from the mosque into the streets, the Muslim Brothers staged the first pro-Palestinian demonstration on Tuesday 14 June 1938, at about 9.30 p.m. The fact that their own Central Committee for Aid to Palestine had asked the Muslim Brothers to postpone it – on the ground that the Committee had not been awarded a permit – did not prevent them from going ahead. They wanted to offer the government a chance to show its feelings towards Palestine, so that the voice of the government and that of the people could rise together.

The Muslim Brothers gathered at the junction of Fuad al-Awal and Imad al-Din Streets, and marched through Cairo chanting: 'Victory to Palestine -Death to Zionism. Arab Palestine must not be divided ... Glory to Islam, Victory to Islam ... Power to Islam'. The crowds were moved by the chanting and joined the demonstration. At Ibrahim Pasha Square the police attacked the demonstration and arrested forty Muslim Brothers, some of them university students. At the police investigation they all declared their conviction that 'any Egyptian who does not support the Mujahidin of Palestine is an offender deserving the wrath of God and the Angels.' After being transferred next day from al-Azbakayah police station to the Appeals Prison, they were released without being put on trial.[158]

This demonstration manifested the persistence of the Muslim Brothers in their determination to appear before the courts, as Hasan al-Banna had done after the confiscation of the book *Fire and Destruction in Palestine,* which suggests that there was an agreed plan to bring the Palestine question before a court of law. The demonstration was the first physical confrontation between the Muslim Brothers and the government over the question of Palestine, but it had been preceded by a silent demonstration that took place on Monday 13 June 1938, organised by the al-Manzala branch of the Society. The demonstration was headed by a Rovers' Group, followed by members

of the branch and student associate members and a large crowd of local people who, after marching through the streets of the town, prayed for the souls of Palestinian martyrs.[159]

After *al-Nadhir* had mobilised the Muslim Brothers against the government and the British and in support of Palestine, and had accused the government of being allied to the British, the Muslim Brothers wanted to humiliate the government in the eyes of the Egyptian people. They also wanted to inform those Egyptians who were still unaware of what was taking place in Palestine. So they decided to stage demonstrations all over Egypt on Friday, the 2 of Jumada al-Thani 1357/30 July 1938, chanting the same slogans as before. All branches of the Society took part in the day-long demonstration, in which poems and speeches were read after the Friday Prayers by branch representatives at mosques in every town or village. These explained what was taking place in Palestine and urged people to demonstrate against the actions of the British and the Jews in Palestine and against British policy there. Again, prayers were performed for the souls of Palestinian martyrs.

The demonstrations involved a wide section of ordinary Muslim Egyptian and were received sympathetically by some non-Muslim communities. Following them, telegrams of protest were sent by the Muslim Brothers' branches to the British ambassador and the chairman of the Egyptian House of Representatives, urging the Council to play its role in defending Palestine. Some branches decided to boycott Jewish goods, others headed for police stations to declare their protests and some formed committees for fund raising.[160] Ismailia witnessed the strongest demonstration of all, and the biggest in the history of the town, at which Yusif Tal'at took the podium after the prayers to condemn the Jews, the British and the Egyptian rulers, saying emotionally: 'Muslims are asleep while Palestine is burning!' This was unprecedented in the town and the Egyptian authorities arrested fourteen Muslim Brothers with Tal'at in the forefront. Twenty-five days later he was released on bail which, according to Ahmad al-Sharbasi, the people of Ismailia competed with cash offers to pay. Seeing this, the judge – who was in tears – insisted on paying it himself and announced his desire to join the Society.[161] This was not surprising, since Ismailia was the birthplace of the Society, which had firm roots there. In addition to those arrested in Ismailia, ten Muslim Brothers were arrested in Rashid and their homes searched.[162] Else-

where there were clashes with the police. Nevertheless, the police-force of Suez kept law and order, while the police-force of Beni Suef took to the streets with other demonstrators.[163] Hasan al-Banna was also summoned for investigation.[164]

The fact that these demonstrations took place on the same day and under the same slogans indicated the growing influence of the movement, and the opening of the second stage announced by al-Banna in the first issue of *al-Nadhir*: 'O Brothers! Get ready. We shall move forward from the message (*da'wa*) based on words only, to the message in which words are accompanied by struggles and deeds. I call on you for practical *jihad* now that the stage of the verbal message is over.'[165]

These demonstrations were forceful reminders to the Egyptian people of the Palestine question, and more effective than the other methods used by the Muslim Brothers. Mahmud Abd al-Halim confirmed that they were the first public rallies in the country since the demonstrations of 1919.[166] The Muslim Brothers staged mock funeral processions all over Egypt as well, which amused some people who were not familiar with this type of demonstration.[167] They also staged demonstrations every year in memory of the Balfour Declaration.[168]

As a result of their treatment at the hands of the government because of their Palestinian propaganda, the Muslim Brothers redoubled their attacks, accusing the government of weakness and inconsistency:

> Have you not been the first to support Palestine and articulate the feelings of Muslims? Why do you forget today what you had alleged? Why do you take this position which is far removed from Islam?.[169]

Once more they cited the example of Iraq, where the government had collaborated with the people to stage popular official demonstrations in defence of Palestine. 'Yes indeed, the government have heard it and more. But they were never genuine in pretending to be zealous. They were deceivers ... but actually deceiving no one except themselves. And no threat will ever dissuade Muslim Brothers from their obligations'.[170] Al-Banna also warned the government against suppressing pro-Palestinian feelings:

> If party politics has chosen to suppress these feelings in some areas and weaken their practical expression, then this will only make them stronger and more gripping so that when they explode, no effort or fear will ever contain them.[171]

It seems clear that the collision between the Muslim Brothers and the government was caused primarily by the Brothers' pro-Palestinian activities.

Palestine Week

With the reorted increase in the number of acts of violence against Arabs by Jewish groups in Palestine, the crisis intensified. In face of the growing cooperation between the British and the Jews and the severity of British measures against the Palestinians, the Revolt reached its peak in the summer of 1938.[172] The Central Committee expressed its intention of staging 'A Week for Martyred Palestine' in solidarity with the Palestinians, and in condemnation of the recent events, in order to make the Egyptian people aware of what was taking place in Palestine. The Week was to start, in all parts of the country, on Ascension Day, 27 Rajab 1357/22 September 1938. Muslim Brothers were called upon to volunteer during this week, to raise funds through the distribution of the one Piastre stamp of Palestine, and to do propaganda work.[173] Though the Muslim Brothers informed the government of their intention to stage this week, the police attacked their branch office in Port Said and seized the leaflets which were to be distributed.[174] The Rovers' Group were active during the preparation for the week in explaining the situation in Palestine, in fund-raising, and in the formation of committees for the Piastre for Palestine collection.[175]

The Central Committee offered three prizes, the first of which was to be awarded to the most active volunteer, the second to the most active branch and the third to the most active Province.[176] On this occasion *al-Nadhir* published a special Palestine issue (27 September 1938), edited by senior Brothers, in which the leading article was the famous one by Hasan al-Banna, entitled 'The Death Industry'. The activities of that week included the Celebration of Ascension Night, which provided a chance to explain the Palestinian problem. Poems and fiery speeches were recited, and prayers were performed for the souls of the martyrs. The Brothers designated the 27 Rajab as the

annual Day of Palestine.[177] On that night, al-Mansura Branch mounted a demonstration in which the local population took part.[178] Volunteers responsible for the Palestine Piastre stamp carried banners reading 'Save Palestine'. Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati explained the message of these banners by saying 'Half of it is black meaning Patience, Palestine, and Sympathy for you: the other half is red saying Arise O Egypt, Palestine is running with rivers of blood.'[179] Thirty Muslim Brothers were arrested while collecting donations and their homes were searched. The police of al-Muski were most active, which gave rise to the condemnation of the government by the Brothers, who accused it of taking sides with the British against the interests of Islam.[180] When calling for donations, Muslim Brothers used to remind fellow-Muslims of the Qur'anic verse, 'Lo! Ye are those who are called to spend in the way of Allah, yet among you there are some who hoard. And as for him who hoardeth, he hoardeth only from his soul. And Allah is the rich and ye are the poor. And if ye turn away he will exchange you for some other folk, and they will not be the likes of you.'(47/38).

Conferences

The Muslim Brothers' Conference

It has been claimed that the Muslim Brothers, taking advantage of their close relations with Arab statesmen, organised a conference to discuss the problem of Palestine at the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers at al-Ataba al-Khadra in Cairo. Among the Arab leaders said to have attended was Faris al-Khuri from Syria. According to this claim, this was the first non-governmental conference to be held in Egypt for Palestine, and a resolution was adopted calling on Arab governments to intervene and save Palestine.[181] Although there must remain some doubt as to whether in fact the conference met, Mahmud Abd al-Halim, the historian of the Muslim Brothers, still claims that, thanks to the conference, a number of Arab leaders visited the Brothers' headquarters. These included Prince Faysal Bin Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud (representing the King of Saudi Arabia) and Prince Ahmad Bin Yahya (representing the Imam of Yemen), who had come to discuss with the Egyptian government and 'with the Muslim Brothers' what was to be done to save Palestine. The talks between the Brothers and Arab leaders concluded with a decision to invite world parlia-

ments to hold a conference in Cairo on ways of solving the problem of Palestine, rather than restrict it to Arab governments which could not act freely as most Arab countries were still under colonial rule.[182]

Al-Banna personally contacted some Arab and Muslim leaders to gain their support for the holding of a conference to discuss the Palestine question. Even before the Parliamentary conference was held in Cairo, on 7 October 1938, he wrote in an article for *al-Nadhir* that:

> It is not enough that this brave Palestine demands self-determination and the implementation of promises and suffers the oppression of the Mandate and of Zionism ... without a conference convening – in Cairo or Baghdad or Medine or Damascus or elsewhere in Muslim countries – so that leaders can recognise the right of the Mu*jahidin* ... With these conferences we move towards unity and progress ... O our Mu'tassim – where is the Amir of the faithful? O Muslim people, do not waste a minute without preparation in order to be liberated and strong and to be able afterwards to choose the battlefield rather than be led like sheep ... O Muslims, you do need strength and you do need unity which is the first step towards that strength.[183]

In support of this call *al-Nadhir* published an open letter from Hasan al-Makki (a member of the Islamic Conference in Mecca and the Vice Chairman of the National Islamic Association in Beirut) to King Farouq, and another to Arab Kings and Princes.[184]

The Brothers had earlier supported Muhammad Ali Allubah when he formed a parliamentary committee from the Senate and the House of Representatives, which had drawn up a memorandum protesting against the injustices suffered by Palestine. The memorandum was signed by 170 members.[185] Haykal confirms that 'the non-officials among the Egyptians who were concerned with this movement (the 1936 Revolt) were the ones who called for this Parliamentary Conference.'[186] Mahmud Abd al-Halim claimed that it was the Muslim Brothers who called for the conference and who set it up, which in his view was proved by the fact that 'Arab country representatives to that conference made contact with the Muslim Brothers before their arrival in Cairo to arrange their accommodation.'[187] For the author this evidence is insufficient to support this claim. All that can be established with certainty from the evidence available is that the Muslim Brothers tried to gain support from Arab and Muslim leaders for a conference to discuss the Palestine question and to unify their efforts.

The Parliamentary Conference

On 7 October 1938 Cairo witnessed the holding of the Parliamentary Conference for Arab and Muslim countries. It was attended by members of parliaments from Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Delegations from France, North Africa and Yemen, and representatives of Indian, Chinese and Yugoslav Muslims. There was also a delegation from the Arabs of America. It was attended on its opening day by Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi, the Shaykh of al-Azhar, and Haj Amin al-Husayni in addition to Muhammad Alluba Pasha, and other representatives.[188]

Although the Muslim Brothers could not participate in conference discussions, they were eager to make the conference a success. The Brothers in Banha and Damanhour received the delegates while they were on their way to Cairo,[189] where they were also met at the station.

During the conference their Rovers kept order, received the delegates, checked conference invitation cards and attempted to make things easy and comfortable for those attending. Their influence was underlined when the conference started business with a verse from the Qur'an:

> Lo! Allah defendeth those who are true. Lo! Allah loveth not each treacherous ingrate. Sanction is given unto those who fight because they have been wronged; and Allah is indeed able to give them victory. Those who have been driven from their homes unjustly only because they said: Our Lord is Allah. (Qur'an: 22/38–40).

The Muslim Brothers saw to it that women were allocated a separate place from men during the conference.[190] There was a big reception for the delegates in their headquarters, at which Hasan al-Banna made a speech.[191]

Branches of the Muslim Brothers sent 13 telegrams supporting the conference and demanding decisions to solve the Palestine question in accordance with Arab demands and against partition.[192] At the end of the conference the Brothers supported its decisions and demanded that a decisive stand should be taken against the British and the Jews. They appealed to Islamic countries to unify their efforts, and they considered the conference a substantial step in this direction.[193].

Mahmud's government had not considered banning the conference and, as it was held in Egypt, decided to take part.[194] Muhammad

Mahmud invited the delegates to a banquet at which he delivered a speech supporting the Arabs of Palestine. This was the first indication of a shift in the official position of the Egyptian government towards support for Palestine. The King invited the delegates to a tea party at his palace in Alexandria.[195] As a result of this pro-Palestinian stance on the part of Mahmud's government, and other activities that followed, the Muslim Brothers stopped attacking the government and began to support its attitude over Palestine.[196]

The London Round Table Conference

On the 9 November 1938 the Palestine Partition Commission's report was published, accompanied by a statement from the British government rejecting the Peel Commission's idea of partition as impracticable. The British government expressed its desire to invite Arab countries and representatives of the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists to London to discuss an alternative solution.[197] The Muslim Brothers attributed this development to the strength and steadfastness of the Palestinian Revolt against Britain. Britain also was aware that its policy in Palestine had aroused the Arabs and Muslims and realised that Palestine, from being a local issue for Palestinians, was becoming an Arab–Islamic one. In addition, partly because of the efforts of the Muslim Brothers, Egypt had begun to move away from its position of isolation and passivity, as was shown by its willingness to act as host to the Parliamentary Conference.[198]

Hasan al-Banna, however, objected to Jewish attendance at the London conference, on the grounds that the Jews were not parties to the issue, which concerned only the Arabs and Britain. He warned Britain against 'more trickery' and appealed for Arab delegations to remain united against British manoeuvres and not to appease the British at the expense of Palestine. He emphasised the importance of the attendance of Amin al-Husayni and members of the Arab Higher Committee; failing that, he asserted, the resolutions of the conference would have no value whatsoever for the Arabs.[199] However, when the British government released the Palestinian leaders from their banishment in the Seychelles in December 1938 and announced its intention of allowing them to represent the Arabs of Palestine, al-Banna addressed Britain:

> When they represent their nation, that does not happen according to the wishes of Britain or her power, but by virtues of the sentiments of the people who trust their leaders and rely on them to represent it.[200]

He welcomed the Palestinian leaders to Egypt as Britain had not allowed them back into Palestine. 'The Islamic country they are heading for is Palestine. It is theirs. Names do not bother us nor does the geography of frontiers obstruct us.'[201] The Muslim Brothers' General Guidance Council gave a reception for the released Palestinian leaders on 11 January 1939.[202]

Hasan al-Banna commended the position of the Egyptian government, which agreed to attend the London Conference only on condition that Amin al-Husayni also attended as the representative of the Arabs of Palestine.[203] When, on 14 December 1938, the British Colonial Secretary told the House of Commons that Amin al-Husayni should not be invited, Hasan al-Banna told the British Ambassador to Cairo in a letter that this was to be expected, as the Colonial Secretary was known to have favoured Zionism in the past and to have been biased against the Arabs and their demands. Consequently, the Brothers demanded that he should not be allowed to take the Chair at the conference, which should go instead to Mr Chamberlain. Al-Banna explained that the Muslim Brothers were standing by the Arabs of Palestine, and that if the British government did not treat them fairly 'then they will devote their lives and money to keeping every inch of Palestine Arab and Islamic until God inherits the earth and all who are thereon.'[204] When the Islamic delegations met in Cairo to coordinate their policies before going to the conference, Salih Ashmawi commended Muhammad Mahmud's speech at that meeting, describing it as yet another serious step towards caring for Palestine. In it, Mahmud admitted that certain circumstances obstructed relations between Egypt and the Arab World and asserted that the meeting itself was a confirmation of Egypt's leadership and of the improved prospect for Islamic unity.[205]

In his main speech to the Fifth Annual Conference of the Muslim Brothers, which convened on 2 February 1939, al-Banna asserted that the Parliamentary Conference and the invitation to Arab countries to attend the Round Table Conference 'are two important steps forward' towards the return of the Islamic Caliphate, a matter that the Brothers placed at the top of their agenda.[206] The conference decided to

send greetings to Amin al Husayni, to the Mujahidin, to the members of the Arab Higher Committee and the Islamic Delegation on their way to London. It also decided to send telegrams to al-Husayni in Lebanon, to the Head of the Egyptian Delegation at the London Conference and to the Foreign Secretary of Britain, supporting Arab demands.[207].

Mahmud Abu al-Sa'ud attended the conference, which opened in London on 7 February 1939, as a secretary and translator for the Yemeni Delegation, which was an assignment from the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers.[208] Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Trans-Jordan and Yemen took part in the conference. When it failed to reach any decisions, and after Ali Mahir had delivered a speech in the name of the Arab delegations, the Muslim Brothers condemned Britain's consistent bias against Arab demands. Ashmawi warned Britain that Islamic bodies all over the Islamic world were quite prepared to stand against it and he reminded Britain of the *fatwa* issued by the *ulama* of Iraq to the effect that jihad would be declared against Britain. He also referred to the decision taken at Zagazig calling for volunteers for jihad in Palestine. As war was threatening and Britain was in need of Arab and Muslim friendship, Ashmawi commented: 'How sweet is the revenge of the oppressed against his executioner. The hour of salvation – no doubt – is approaching.' He also asserted that the Arab demands were actually the minimum that they could accept and that Ali Mahir had indicated in his speech that public opinion within Arab and Islamic countries compelled all Arab governments to be involved in Palestine. He concluded by saying that those governments could not regulate the feeling of their citizens. The conference offered the last chance to solve the problem peacefully and if it failed, nothing would be left except the blasts of explosives.[209]

During the London Round Table Conference the Brothers remained silent while *al-Nadhir* restricted itself to news about Palestine. Ashmawi justified this silence by saying: 'We did not wish to disturb these negotiations. Rather we chose to leave the authorities to conduct their work in peace and to entrust diplomacy with the task of persuasion.'[210] However, the author believes that with the holding of the London conference, the Muslim Brothers had reached the limited objectives which they had set themselves in this stage of their effort for Palestine. Mahmud Abd al-Halim was frank about this when he said that the Muslim Brothers never expected the conference to produce a so-

lution to the Palestine problem; it was enough for them that it would help to make the world aware of the injustice of which the Palestinians were the victims and which the British, in company with world Jewry, were trying to shield from the eyes of the world.[211]

Just as the Muslim Brothers were present at the departure for London of Ali Mahir, who, together with Abd al-Rahman Azzam, was heading the Egyptian Delegation to the Round Table Conference, so they received them warmly when they returned to Cairo in March 1939.[212] At the head of the Muslim Brothers who mounted the reception was Ahmad al-Sukkari, deputy to the General Guide, who cheered the name of Ali Mahir and asked the Brothers to do the same. Some did but others did not, protesting strongly at the suggestion. However, Hasan al-Banna quietened them, explaining that what was cheered and greeted was 'not a person but the deeds of that person for the sake of Palestine.' Thus, because the reception mounted by the Muslim Brothers for Ali Mahir was not supported unanimously, it became a source of further conflict within the Society.[213]

The MacDonald White Paper

Following the failure of The Round Table Conference, the British government, in May 1939, set out its own recommendations in what was called the MacDonald White Paper.[214] The Muslim Brothers received the White Paper with dissatisfaction and put out a statement detailing their position regarding its main provisions. As far as the Constitution was concerned, the Arabs had demanded the creation in Palestine of an independent Arab state allied to Britain, in a relationship similar to Britain's relationship with Iraq. But Chapter One of the White Paper said that the creation of such a state would require the advice and consent of The League of Nations as regarded the end of the Mandate. Jews would participate with the Arabs in the formation of the government, after a transitional period of ten years, during which time power would be invested in the High Commissioner aided by British advisers, provided that all government departments should be run by Palestinian employees (both Arabs and Jews). The Muslim Brothers' statement mentioned that government posts before the Revolt of 1936, and up to 1939, had been held by Palestinian employees. Hence there would be nothing new except the addition of some Jewish employees. But then, the statement asked, would these employees

have any real authority or would it be like the case of Egypt, where British advisers had the real power despite the presence of Egyptian Ministers? For such a state to function at all it would be essential to have cooperation between Jews and Arabs which would guarantee the security of both. Regarding Jewish immigration, the Arabs of Palestine demanded an end to it immediately, whereas part two of the White Paper recommended the admission of 75,000 Jews over a five-year period (1939–44) and stated that the High Commissioner would have ultimate authority in deciding the absorbtive capacity of the country. The Arabs could have tolerated this burden had not Britain announced that it would not allow Amin al-Husayni to return to Palestine. This 'did enough to unveil the truth for any one about the real future of British policy in Palestine.' As far as land was concerned, the statement asserted that the Arabs of Palestine demanded a complete ban on further land sales to Jews. By contrast, the section of the White Paper devoted to land divided Palestine into three regions, in one of which land sales were allowed, while in the second they were banned and in the third were only permitted subject to government approval. 'This way the British government surrendered to the Jews two-thirds of the land of Palestine and left only one third to the Arabs which is the wasteland.'[215]

For all these reasons the Muslim Brothers rejected the White Paper and concluded their statement by saying that the Muslims had given up hope of peace. They declared their total solidarity with the people of Palestine until they attained their full rights. Muslims should show Britain that their fight was firmly based and that they would support it with their lives and pay for its defence. The statement demanded that Saudi Arabia and Iraq should reject the White Paper and that Islamic peoples and governments should resume their support for Palestine in more practical terms. It urged the Muslim Brothers to resume and redouble their efforts in support of Palestine and in preparation for the next stage.[216]

Hasan al-Banna sent a message to Muhammad Mahmud, the prime minister, telling him the Muslim Brothers condemned the White Paper as constituting blatant defiance of the feelings of Muslims 'and a cruel insult' to Arab heads of state and the Egyptians, and 'indeed to your pride, personally'. Accordingly, he demanded that the Egyptian government should save its face by resigning so that it would not have to co-operate with the British. He urged all Muslims to do their duty

to save the pride of Islam and the freedom of Palestine.[217] He also sent a message to the British ambassador to Egypt reminding him that the White Paper put an end to Arab and Islamic hopes. Describing it as'a blatant act of deception and a silly game of diplomacy', he attributed the White Paper to the influence of Zionist propaganda and American threats. He warned him that there would be an explosion of anger throughout the Islamic World which would be directed against Britain as a result of its policy in Palestine.[218] The Muslim Brothers' branches sent a number of telegrams condemning the White Paper and protesting against the ban on Amin al-Husayni's return to Palestine. These were sent to the Egyptian prime minister and the British ambassador in Cairo.[219]

On the first day of October 1939, a month after the outbreak of the Second World War, al-Banna submitted a memorandum to the government of Ali Mahir, which had been formed on 18 August 1939 to replace that of Muhammad Mahmud. In the memorandum he asked the prime minister to take advantage of the conditions prevailing at the time to demand that Britain should release the political detainees in Palestine, allow the safe return of the exiles and recognise Palestinian rights in their entirety.[220] When Ali Mahir's government decided to offer aid to the victims of Palestine, al-Banna wrote to him commending this act 'which came really too late', and urged him to speed up the sending of aid to the Arab Higher Committee or the Committee of Arab Women so that it could be distributed to those who deserved it, adding that the aid should not fall into the hands of the Palestinian government and those whom he called Kharijites ('the separatists'), who were agents of the British. He also demanded that the children of martyrs should be admitted to Egyptian schools and institutes free of charge. He added that the Egyptian government should demand a solution to the problem on the basis of putting an end to legal immigration completely and punishing illegal immigrants 'so that the majority in Palestine will remain Arab'. He also repeated the demand that the exiles should be allowed a safe return. The list of demands included also that the Palestinian government should cater for the families of the emigrants by giving them aid, facilities and a secure life. He also demanded that Britain should recognise Palestine as an Arab–Islamic country, and conclude a treaty with it similar to the one it had with Egypt and Iraq. He emphasised that this would be

in the best interests of Britain since war was imminent and Britain needed the friendship of the Arab and Islamic peoples.[221]

Regarding Kharijites, as al-Banna called them in his letter, the Muslim Brothers made a fierce attack on Fakhri al-Nashashibi and his group of Palestinians because of their collaboration with the British and the Zionists. They referred to them as hypocrites and demanded that Palestinians should implement the law of God so that 'The only reward of those who make war upon Allah and his messenger and strive after corruption in the land will be that they will be killed or crucified, or have their hands and feet on alternate sides cut off, or will be expelled out of the land. Such will be their degradation in the world, and in the hereafter theirs will be an awful doom.'[222] (Qur'an: 5/33)

The Attorney General's office interrogated Salih Ashmawi because of an article he published in issue number 29 of *al-Nadhir* concerning Fakhri al-Nashashibi.[223] When al-Difa' Party, headed by Raghib al-Nashashibi, seceded from the Higher Arab Committee on 3 July 1937, the Muslim Brothers tried to mediate.[224] Mahmud Abd al-Halim asserted that Shaykh Muhammad Farghali and some Brothers who knew the Arabs of Palestine, went to Palestine to mediate but were detained by the British. This did not prevent the Muslim Brothers from sending other intermediaries for the same purpose,[225] who also took advantage of these visits to study the geography of Palestine. The Muslim Brotherhood sent expert delegations there to study access routes to Sinai, its geography and resources and the possibilities of living there, as Sinai represented an important line of defence for Egypt.[226]

Differences Among the Brothers

As the Society grew and developed, differences of opinion began to make themselves felt on certain issues. There was general agreement about aims and objectives, about the need for these to be firmly rooted in Islamic thought and practice, and about the vital importance to the Muslim World of the Palestine issue. The question was how could these objectives best be attained? Here there were divergent views, especially over the issues of volunteers and donations for the cause of Palestine

Volunteers

Since the outbreak of the Palestine Revolt in 1936, the leadership of the Muslim Brothers, *al-Nadhir* and the pro-Palestinian propaganda missions had all aimed at mobilising the membership and the public at large against the British and Zionists in Palestine, urging them to aid Palestine and to volunteer for *jihad* alongside the Palestine Mujahidin. Issues of *al-Nadhir* from the beginning, made clear that there was a tendency within the Society to stress the importance of volunteering in the conviction that words were not enough. For instance, 'It is as if this pen could stop the gun, defeat the sword! That is all we are offering to maintain our existence and entity, as if we could, through these articles, frighten and defeat Britain in this Crusade by the use of empty words'.[1] And along the same lines: 'We have no better opportunity than today. The sooner the better, let us follow the way of our pious forefathers in resorting to *jihad*'.[2] And again, 'God demands payment of a debt you owe for Palestine. He demands that you work seriously to support Palestine, not by mere empty meetings and false proclamations. God says, 'Warfare is ordained for you, thought it is hateful unto you; but it may happen that ye hate a thing which is good for you, and it may happen that ye love a thing which is bad for you. Allah knoweth, ye know not.'[3] (Qur'an: 1/216).

On 5 September 1938, the Muslim Brothers held a conference in Zagazig to discuss the Palestine question. It was attended by the leaders of the Society, including Hasan al-Banna, Salih Ashmawi (the editor of *al-Nadhir)* and Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati (Controller of the General Guidance Council) in addition to some 600 Egyptians from al-Sharqia Province. After hearing a number of speeches and poems about the attitude of the Muslim Brothers to Palestine, British policy there, and the actions committed against the Palestinian people, the conference adopted the following unanimous resolutions:

1. To extend greetings and regards to the Mujahidin of Palestine who had been banished, detained and/or imprisoned, with Amin al-Husayni at their head.
2. To protest to the French High Commissioner in Egypt over France's violation of the house of Amin al-Husayni in Lebanon.
3. To protest to the British Embassy over the attempt to usurp Palestine by the use of force and 'barbaric measures' and to hand the country over to the Jews who were scattered all over the world.
4. To protest against the Egyptian government's attempt to suppress the feelings of Egyptians towards Palestine by attacking Muslim Brothers' branches all over the country, and those of other societies such as Dar al-Taqwa in Shubra.
5. To appeal to Muslims in general, and especially to imams (prayer leaders) and preachers, to make fund-raising for the victims of Palestine a success during Palestine Week.
6. To propose a boycott of Jewish and British goods and the formation of a committee to see to the practical aspects of the boycott.
7. As the colonialist powers had recruited thousands of immigrants to Palestine from all over the world, and had used them to help fight brother Muslim Arab Mujahidin, and as those present considered the issue of Palestine to be a cause for every Muslim all over the world,to call on young Egyptians ('Shabab Muhammad') in every part of Egypt to volunteer for the jihad to defend the Aqsa Mosque and the cities and places around it which were considered holy by Muslims and Christians, and to fend off the aggression of colonialists and Zionists, in support of and in solidarity with 'our brothers', the people of Palestine, in their holy war.

8. To delegate to the Executive Committee of the conference the authority to demand that the Egyptian government should allow volunteers to go to Palestine.
9. To make contact with local branches of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, through the General Guidance Council, in order to spread their ideas in all the Egyptian villages, taking this opportunity to confirm allegiance and loyalty to the General Guide along the lines of jihad, in order that the ideas of the Muslim Brothers might be victorious 'until the shari'a (law) of God is manifested and until his word is above all words'.[4]

After the conference, plain-clothes policemen mounted a search of the Muslim Brothers' office in Zagazig, seizing the minutes of the conference and a list of the names of those who had attended it.[5]

This was the first time the Muslim Brothers decided to organise a boycott of Jewish and British goods and form a committee to further this end. Believing that such a boycott could influence the course of events in Palestine,[6] they called for the promotion of Egyptian industry and set out a comprehensive programme to achieve this.[7] They appealed to Egyptians in general and to the Muslim Brothers in particular to wear, eat and use Eastern or Islamic products, in form and manufacture.[8] They also supported the call made by the Lebanese Youth to merchants and nationalists for the boycott of Zionist products and goods.[9] They based this resolution on religious grounds, repeating that, 'He among you who taketh them for friends is (one) of them. Lo! Allah guideth not wrongdoing folk.'[10] (Qur'an: 5/51)

The most important resolution of the conference was, without doubt, the one declaring *jihad* and urging the Egyptian government to allow volunteers to go to Palestine. Hasan al-Banna in his famous article, 'The Death Industry', supported that decision, provided that the Muslim Brothers were in a position to volunteer:

> There is no room to prove the case of the Arabs. There is no place for explaining these facts, nor is there any room for speeches, oration and articles. The hour is for deeds and actions. Protest in every way, boycott the enemies of the Islamic cause, irrespective of their nationalities and races, donate money for poor families, homes that sustained loss and damages and the brave Mujahidin. If you can afford to, volunteer.[11]

The Central Committee took its decision and accepted volunteers for the first regiment, which was to have been called 'Muhammad's Regiment',[12] but, in fact, was never formed. However, a number of individual Muslim Brothers did managed to infiltrate into Palestine and join forces with the Palestinian commandos.[13] Mahmud Abu al-Sa'ud (who was a member of the Society at the time) asserts that Brothers in the university wanted to volunteer, but were denied the opportunity because of limited funds, and that they used to go back crying to al-Banna.[14] Mahmud Abdu, one of the leaders of the Muslim Brothers' brigades which later took part in the 1948 War, identified five Muslim Brothers who infiltrated Palestine in their personal capacities, including Shaykh Abd al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq, and recorded that the Muslim Brothers helped Palestinians to buy arms from the Western Desert of Egypt.[15] Another contemporary witness claimed that, as a result of the volunteers entering Palestine, the British Commander-in-Chief proclaimed martial law and the authorities began to keep a close watch on the Palestinian border to prevent the infiltration of weapons and volunteers.[16] The Egyptian government, in fact, had never sanctioned the travel of volunteers from Egypt.[17]

Hasan al-Banna was confronted by two divergent trends within the Society on this issue. The first of these emerged before the idea of volunteering had been endorsed by the conference, and was led by Muhammad Izat Hasan, one of the original Muslim Brothers in Cairo. He advocated that al-Banna should concentrate all his attention and energies on Egypt and its internal affairs, rather than direct them onto Palestine. He wondered: 'Why have the Muslim Brothers turned their backs on every party political conflict and concentrated on Palestine? What has Palestine gained from the efforts which the Brothers made for it?' He argued that those efforts were not the deeds nearest to God. They were different from the way of the prophet and the way of God. The people of Palestine were being treated in a similar way to those first Muslims who had been punished for entering Islam. The prophet encouraged them to be patient. Muhammad Hasan quoted Ali Ibn Abu Talib, the fourth caliph, as saying to his commanders: 'Do not go into battle with a wounded man among your troops, for he has not full control of himself'. He had no dispute with the Brothers about their reasons for being concerned with Palestine, but only about the means, believing that to work for Egypt first was preferable, and had a better chance of success. For these reasons he had

previously been opposed to any trip to Palestine. He reminded al-Banna of his opposition, and of their agreement to work first for Islam inside Egypt and afterwards to work in other countries. After Islam had acquired a firm foothold in one country.[18]

Hasan al-Banna replied that the Brothers' lack of interest in party political conflicts was due to the fact that they could not see any advantage to be gained from them, and that they involved a gamble whose failure might waste all their previous efforts. Moreover, the Brothers were not ready to become involved in party conflicts, as they were only at the beginning of the road.[19] Hasan al-Banna later explained his reasoning:

> In order that the Brothers may not increase the differences of those rivals and give the opportunity to usurpers and in order not to colour their call – with a colour that does not belong to it ... and so that they may not present it with an image other than its image.[20]

This was because the prevailing tendency among the public was to confuse the party system with politics. Political parties were preoccupied with subjective goals and personal interests.[21] As regards the Muslim Brothers' efforts in support of Palestine, these were inspired by their understanding of the Qur'an, which decreed that Muslims should be equipped, prepared and aware. Al-Banna added that the cause of the prophet went in stages leading from one into the other. He reminded Muhammad Izat Hasan of what happened at the battle of Uhud when the Prophet wanted the Muslims to adopt defensive tactics, but was persuaded by the Muslim youth to take the offensive.

> So please do not make it another *uhud* before its time ... wait for *badr* before *uhud* ... and know you that we gain more by patience than by being hasty ... Not everything said is to be written ... not everything that is known is to be said and for every platform there is a suitable speech ... Remember the lapse of time between the command and the implementation in *al-hudaybiya* (agreement). Nobody understood (at the time) except Abu Bakr (the first caliph) ... and so try to understand, young man.[22]

Once the idea of volunteering had been endorsed by the conference, Hasan al-Banna faced a second trend, the exact opposite of the first. This was led by Ahmad Rif'at, a member of the Students' Com-

mittee for pro-Palestinian propaganda, which believed that:

> By limiting their role to propaganda and fund-raising – in their bid to aid the Palestinian Mujahidin – the Muslim Brothers were actually defaulting in their obligations and showing an unresponsive attitude to the call for jihad. It was the duty of the Muslim Brothers to leave their jobs and volunteer for the ranks of the commandos.[23]

Ahmad Rif'at had other objections to the policy of the Brothers, but this one which related to Palestine was the most important. His objections found wide support from the Brothers. Among his most ardent supporters were two members of the Students' Committee for pro-Palestinian propaganda, Sidiq Amin and Hasan al-Sayyid Ottman. Mahmud Abd al-Halim, one of the strongest opponents of Rif'at's ideas, asserted that Rif'at's views could be attributed to the fact that al-Banna had trained the members in such a way as to make them eager to be involved in *jihad*.[24]

From the beginning of the 1936 Revolt, Hasan al-Banna had corresponded with al-Husayni on this point of volunteering. The latter had replied that the effort the Brothers were making to uphold the Palestine cause in Egypt had already reached 'the required level which we badly need and which no one else can manage. We are in no need of volunteers'.[25] Mahmud Abd al-Halim has confirmed that this was what al-Husayni explained to the Brothers at the time of the outbreak of the 1936 Revolt, when they asked about the Mujahidin's need for volunteers.[26]

Hasan al-Banna repeatedly told Palestinian leaders, and the Egyptian government, that he recognised that their efforts for the cause of Palestine were only part of their duty to it and that to perform their obligations fully would eventually require maximum volunteering.[27] But the time for this had not yet come. One may surmise that the reason for this limited approach was the stage by stage strategy which al-Banna had planned: first introduction, then preparation, and finally implementation. Al-Banna himself confirmed this in his reply to those whom he called the impatient ones:

> We are not yet through with our second stage. We are not yet prepared in a manner which permits us to reach implementation ... the troops of the

> call have got to be prepared ... We shall not go forward without preparation, however long it takes, so get ready.

He was even clearer on this matter when he said:

> Self-destruction is the same thing as oppression. No sane man may expose himself and his call to that experience. Real bravery means self-control in patience, until the right moment arrives for a particular deed or act and then it will be performed immediately, leaving the best of impressions and bearing the best of fruits.[28]

Later, al-Banna explained that another reason for restraining the Brothers had been his hope that Arab governments would achieve a peaceful settlement. But events had shown that

> The British and the Jews understand only one language, which is the language of revolt, force and blood. But we did not want to rush things so that nobody could hold it against us if we were forced by circumstances later to follow the path that satisfied our conscience'.[29]

Ahmad Rif'at split from the Muslim Brothers and went on his own account to Palestine to fight with the Palestinian guerrillas, refusing al-Banna's offer to provide him with arms and money and to put him in touch with the Palestinians, at whose hands he later died. Mahmud Abd al-Halim justifies the killing of Rif'at by the Palestinian guerrillas on the grounds that Rif'at came to them without al-Banna's recommendation, and that they mistrusted people they did not know and suspected them of being spies.[30] There is no clear evidence as to the precise reasons for Ahmad Rif'at's break with the Muslim Brothers, nor as to the circumstances in which he met his death.

The argument continued for about six months, and the activities of the headquarters came to a complete stop for a month, which ended with Ahmad Rif'at and Muhammad Izat Hasan breaking away from the Society with a number of Brothers.[31] In January 1940 some of those dissidents formed a new movement called 'Shabab Muhammad' which took *al-Nadhir* as its mouthpiece. The dissidents included the owner of the magazine, Mahmud Abu Zaid.[32]

The middle-of-the-road approach adopted by al-Banna was a model of political tact. For had he confronted the authorities openly at the stage which he called 'the introduction', and earlier than he actually

did, the movement would have perished in its infancy. How could he have sent great numbers of his followers to Palestine, thrusting them into a military operation that might have endangered the movement's survival while they were still at the beginning of the road and while they were not adequately equipped for action? The participation of the Brothers as volunteers in the 1948 War, and subsequent events, confirmed the far-sightedness of al-Banna. They showed great heroism and steadfastness in the face of the Society's dissolution and the assassination of their leader. They survived these reverses, as was shown by their involvement in the operations against the British in the Suez Canal zone in 1951. Had it not been for this middle-of-the-road approach and had it not been for the efforts of the Brothers during the thirties, they would not have been able to operate effectively in the 1948 War. If they had sustained in the introductory stage a blow similar to the one they suffered in 1948, they would have perished without leaving a trace.

This middle-of-the-road approach which al-Banna adopted towards the Palestine question achieved a number of results. Besides the psychological support given to the Palestinian Revolt, which needed this more than any other form of aid, it helped to ease Egypt out of its isolation and link it to the Arab and Islamic World. It also put the Palestine question at the centre of Egyptian nationalist goals. It showed that Egyptian nationalism was not enough, and that Egypt could only find security from the perceived Zionist threat within wider Islamic framework.[33]

The involvement of the Muslim Brothers' movement with the Palestinian cause was of great interest to Egyptian public opinion. The Muslim Brothers managed to put across to people the idea that there was a country bordering Egypt called Palestine which was threatened by Zionism. They aroused, to some extent, the Islamic spirit and the concept of Islamic fraternity among the Egyptian people, together with the urge for *jihad* and martyrdom. They also took the Egyptians' attention away from party conflicts, and made them aware that the British were the enemies of Muslims and that they were fighting them openly on the land of Palestine. They were able to frustrate what they saw as the British objective of isolating Egypt from the Palestine question, and to persuade people that the Egyptian governments of the day – whatever their political complexion – were surrogates of the British. In this way they prepared the Egyptians

psychologically for the war which took place in 1948. Mahmud Abd al-Halim, one of the Brothers who initiated the Palestine campaign at the time, admitted that the Brothers could not have achieved these results on the Egyptian scene had it not been for their use of the Palestine question.[34]

Despite the fact that the Brothers were arrested, interrogated and subjected to police searches, and despite the fact that they suffered splits within their ranks as a result of their Palestinian efforts, one can see from the evidence available in the shape of the Muslim Brothers' leaflets, that their efforts to explain the Palestine question secured it a wider hearing and contributed to the speedy growth of the Muslim Brothers' movement.

While the membership of the Society in May 1936 had been eight hundred, by August 1938 it had increased to two hundred thousand, not counting its supporters.[35] While the fifteen branches the Brothers had when they moved to Cairo in 1933 had grown by 1939 to three hundred.[36] These figures are not surprising when we realise that the propaganda for Palestine was combined with the spreading of the principles of the Society, and with gathering new recruits and opening new branches. For instance, when the General Guidance Council decided in the summer of 1936 to make use of the students' section of the Society, they sent the students to villages 'some times to advocate Islamic ideas and at other times to advocate aid for Palestine'.[37] These missions, which were 'responsible for spreading the cause everywhere in Egypt and moving it from one stage to another, led to the formation of branches in all provincial capitals and in some towns'.[38] In the same summer the Central Committee sent missions touring the country to explain the Palestinian problem and to collect donations for associate branches. These missions also spread the ideas, purposes and aims of the Society, and formed a number of branches in the regions which they toured.[39] So when demonstrations of support for the Palestinians took place they provided yet another chance for introducing the cause of the Muslim Brothers.[40] Similarly, Mahmud Abd al-Halim added that, besides being of benefit to the Palestinian cause, these demonstrations 'had done the Muslim Brothers a lot of good ... The Society benefited from the thinning out of its ranks when the branches shed some of the weaker elements who had played their role and whose membership was now no more than a burden on the organisation.'[41]

When Mahmud Abd al-Sa'ud was delivering his speech in Alexandria during the Celebration of Palestine Week, he started by introducing the Muslim Brothers, explaining who they were, their intentions, and their aims. Afterwards, he spoke about the Palestine question.[42] The Muslim Brothers' Rovers had also played a role which brought benefit to the Society. For instance, on 17 March 1939, after the Rovers of Zifti branch had urged people to donate money for Palestine – and as the Muslim Brothers were always keen not to let such an opportunity pass without explaining the Society's objectives – they made several speeches about their principles. The Mosque Imam persuaded people to form a branch for the Society. 'Brothers have not left any village neighbouring them without spreading their banner there.'[43]

The result of the Brothers' efforts in support of Palestine was to 'highlight the name of the Society in the open'.[44] It persuaded public opinion of the usefulness of the activities of the Society, which earned it a special status among the people, considering the apparent discontent caused by reports of events in Palestine. The middle-of-the-road which al-Banna followed benefited the Society inside and outside Egypt, but brought it into conflict with the government. Commenting on this, Ishaq Musa al-Husayni (the first historian of the Ikhwan) said their religious nationalism was a 'two-edged weapon'. It was this religious nationalism which implicated them with the Egyptian governments which they opposed, a matter that made them fight on two fronts, in Egypt and outside at the same time. It also brought them troubles, the least of which was 'government displeasure' and the most serious of which were 'prison and detention'. But at the same time they won 'popular support' and attracted attention on many occasions.[45]

Donations

Besides the divergence of opinion about the call for volunteers to go to Palestine, and the dispute within the Society about the airport reception given to Ali Mahir, the money raised in the form of donations for Palestine created a second controversy within the Society.

Fund-raising, in the eyes of the Muslim Brothers, was not only useful in itself but provided a valuable opportunity to talk to people and measure the impact of the pro-Palestinian propaganda and test

the state of preparedness of the people.[46] Nor were the sums raised inconsiderable. The total amount collected by the Muslim Brothers was E£1120.671, of which E£505.403 was received in donations during Palestine Week, according to *al-Nadhir* of 15 Muharram 1358/ 7 March 1939.[47] It is worth noting that donations came in from all sectors of Egyptian society.

However, the money raised in this way led to a dispute within the ranks of the Brothers. The Youth of Muhammad Shabab Muhammad, who seceded from the Society in 1939, later cited this dispute as one reason for the split; an argument which al-Banna contemptuously dismissed. A report in *al-Nadhir*, which had become the mouthpiece of Shabab Muhammad, said that, of E£570 collected for Palestine in a year, only E£465 reached Palestine in three instalments, the rest of the money being spent on the Society's affairs.[48] Some researchers have quoted al-Banna as saying in reply that to spend some of the money on the activities of the Society so as to make it more effective was not to deny it to the Palestinians; rather it was an indirect way of helping them. The members of the Society accepted his explanation and those who disagreed kept their opinion to themselves for the time being.[49]

As the Muslim Brothers no longer had a magazine of their own, Hasan al-Banna replied to these accusations in a special bulletin in February 1940, in which he said that the expenses of the General Guidance Council included the cost of the pro-Palestinian propaganda, as well as that of printing publications, sending letters and telegrams, and travel for delegates, which amounted in all to E£124 – in addition to what was spent directly on the Palestinian cause. He explained that part of the expenses of the pro-Palestinian propaganda had been covered out of the donations; the other part was met by the General Guidance Council.[50] Some sub-committees used to deduct expenses like those of printing, etc., before sending the donations to the Central Committee;[51] others used to meet such expenses from their own budgets.[52]

However, the truth about these donations was revealed only recently when Mahmud Abd al-Halim explained:

> These sums of money were never sent to the Mujahidin. The money was spent on propaganda for the Palestinian cause according to the directions of the Arab Higher Committee. Also, the Committee used to send us huge

> amounts from its own money to add to what we had to spend on this crucial issue, which was considered by the Committee more important to the cause than the armed struggle carried out by the Mujahidin in Palestine itself. Otherwise Muslim Brothers who were still in the cradle would have had no means whatsoever of conducting the task of effective propaganda that caused anxiety to the British Empire and which required considerable expenditure.[53]

Abd al-Halim added that al-Husayni used to make this last point frequently especially when questioned by those opposed to al-Banna's policy towards Palestine.[54] This leads us to conclude that al-Kayyali and Darwaza are correct in saying that the 'Mujahidin' of Palestine were not mainly dependent on the donations reaching them from abroad, and that the symbolic value of such donations was greater than their material value.[55] The situation in Palestine called for propaganda and psychological support, particularly from Egypt, because of its importance on the Arab and international scene. Putting an end to Egypt's isolation could do more for Palestine than money, a point illustrated by the letters from Egyptians living in Palestine in 1937.[56]

By 1939 the Society had grown rapidly and had achieved some of its objectives with regard to Palestine. The outbreak of the Second World War drove the Palestine question into the background, giving the Muslim Brothers a respite and an opportunity to plan for the future, in which they would have to take into account the changing international situation. Al-Banna made up his mind to use this opportunity to prepare the Muslim Brothers, both spiritually and militarily, for whatever challenge might lie ahead where Palestine was concerned.

البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي القدسي

Part Two

Military Preparations

البروفيسور الدكتور
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The Secret Apparatus and the Egyptian Army

First Military Preparations

The Society of the Muslim Brothers was so closely identified with Hasan al-Banna that for an understanding of its philosophy and organisation, account has to be taken of those aspects of his background which were to influence his leadership of the Society.

Hasan al-Banna received a traditional Islamic religious education at home and at school, which he broadened by the study of modern subjects at Dar al-Ulum College in Cairo. The importance that he attached to a broad education is reflected in the training programmes which he later devised for the para-military formations of the Muslim Brothers. As a student, al-Banna combined scholarship with a practical concern for the condition of Egypt and the cause of Islam. His strong belief in the call to *jihad* may have originated at an early age through his reading of tales of heroism and conquest, but its real development began during his student days in the period after the 1919 Revolution. The young al-Banna was associated with the setting up of three Islamic societies which preceded the formation of the Society of the Muslim Brothers, and it is not without significance – in the light of the subsequent establishment of the Special Section – that one of these early societies, Jami'yyat Man' al-Muharramat, the Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden, was a secret organisation.

After graduating in 1927, Hasan al-Banna taught in government schools in Ismailia and Cairo, gaining administrative experience; also – and this was important for the future development of the Society of the Muslim Brothers – he was able to observe at first hand the effects of the British occupation of Egypt. It was against the background of events in Egypt and in the wider Arab and Islamic world that he

developed his belief in the need for a step by step approach, from propaganda, to preparation and finally implementation, to achieve the goals of the Society.[1]

When he first founded the Society of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Banna could not openly pursue *jihad*, nor did he have the means to do so. While the Society was in its infancy it was important for him to avoid any action which might excite suspicion and threaten the movement's survival. So, putting into effect his policy of building up gradually towards military action and *jihad*, he first established the innocuous-sounding Excursion Groups, Firaq al-Rihlat (subsequently transformed into Rover Troops, Firaq al-Jawwala, like those of the Egyptian Scout movement) and only later, when the Society was firmly established, did he create the real para-military organisation known as the 'Special Section', al-Nizam al-Khass.

In addition to their training, members of the Excursion Groups were required to undertake social service in Egypt, to revive the Prophetic tradition of exchanging visits and to keep the peace at meetings called by the Society.

The internal development of the Society, and the emergence of other para-military groups in Egypt, led al-Banna to incorporate the Excursion Groups into the Egyptian Scout movement. Thus the Excursion Groups were transformed into the Rover Troops. This diverted attention from their para-military character, which not only saved the Excursion Groups from coming under the law of 8 March 1938, which banned all para-military groups, but brought financial and practical advantages to the Rovers.[2]

Besides their social service activities, the Rover Troops recruited and trained Muslim Brothers so that they would be prepared for *jihad*. Their numbers grew during the Second World War and, by 1948, they had a strong organisation and a comprehensive training programme, designed to fit members to undertake *jihad*. Their activities also extended beyond Egypt through the links forged with Rovers in other Arab countries.[3]

Military Training and the Beginning of Clandestine Activity

Until the beginning of the Second World War, military training was restricted. However, in 1940 'The Rovers and Military Training Committee' was formed. It became one of the thirteen main committees

of the Ikhwan's Cairo headquarters. Members of this committee included Abd al-Aziz Ahmad, Husayn Kamal al-Din, Mahmud al-Samahi and Ali Khalil. It met every Tuesday, and Abd al-Aziz Ahmad was charged with the task of following up on a daily basis the affairs of the Rovers and military training.[4] In 1940 the Rovers were divided into two main sections: the Rovers and the Military.[5] Towards the end of 1945 – and with the amendment of the constitution of the Society – the name of the committee was changed to the 'Military Training Committee', which was headed by Captain Mahmud Labib. The committee started work on 15 December 1945, with the submission of proposals for the reorganisation and preparation of the Egyptian army.[6]

The introduction of the term 'Military Training' to the name of the committee, and the division of the Rovers into a military wing and a Rovers' one indicated a new development regarding military preparation for *jihad*. However, this development did not abolish the Rover Troops as the Excursion Groups had been transformed earlier; rather, it kept the Rover Troops in existence as a cover for preparations which had to be clandestine. Some of the Rovers' energies were diverted towards social services and sports. In practice, the system which had been laid out for the Rovers made the transference of members from it into the Special Section a gradual and natural development. No one would be accepted as a member of the Rovers until he had sworn an oath and committed himself irrevocably to obedience, and had performed a number of exercises and tests which would qualify the applicant to go from one level of training to the next. Abd al-Majid Hasan, the assassin of al-Nuqrashi, illustrated this procedure well when he revealed during his trial that his transfer from the Rovers into the Special Section took place without his realising that there was any significance in the change, as the two organisations were similar to one another as regards training, procedures and internal relationships.[7] Ahmad Husayn said in this respect that: 'if the Special Section was the (real secret) army of the Society, the Rovers were its official army, which the government recognised, financed and allowed to stage parades.'[8]

Thus it seems that the Rovers were a front and a preparatory stage to accommodate the most sincere and loyal Muslim Brothers. The Rover Troops would polish and train them, and accustom them to total obedience. From there the more devoted and disciplined Rovers

would be transferred into the Special Section. This confirms the view that Hasan al-Banna, whilst moulding the Rovers, never doubted that there was another stage ahead which would require careful preparation and good timing for its execution.

Military Preparations During the Second World War

Through their first experience of involvement in the Palestine question, the Muslim Brothers came face to face with primary factors, some of which were related to the internal development of the Society, others to the Palestine question and the world situation. These led them to intensify their military preparations to the maximum. In this they were guided by the Qur'anic verse: 'Make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force and of horses tethered, that thereby ye may dismay the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others beside them whom ye know not. Allah knoweth them.' (Qur'an: 8/60)

One of these factors was the acute conflict which divided the Society, putting a stop to its activities for six months and causing an internal split. Another was the positive reaction to the Muslim Brothers' propaganda concerning Palestine. There was also the failure to find a diplomatic solution to the Palestine question and the ending of the 1936–39 Revolt. The outbreak of the Second World War made matters worse, since it was impossible to propose a solution to the Palestine question while the world's attention was distracted by a far greater crisis.

During the resulting lull in Palestine, Hasan al-Banna saw an opportunity for the Muslim Brothers to move into the second stage of *takwin* – of forming and sustaining an effective organisation which would embody their ideas – on which the Society had embarked shortly before the war. At the beginning of the war Hasan al-Banna had demanded that the war years should be utilised in preparation for the post-war period, urging that, 'This international conflict between European countries is the chance for us Muslims.' He appealed to the leaders of Egypt and the Islamic World to prepare themselves by building factories and by ensuring the military and economic independence of their countries, warning them that: 'This is possible for governments to do now, but after a little while it may become impossible.'[9] He was more explicit when he said that if some people were undergoing 'suffering and anxiety' because of the war, 'there are others who

are delighted by it, namely the Muslim Brothers'. He urged the Islamic peoples to seize the opportunity and prepare the means necessary for the recovery of their own freedom and independence.[10]

These factors combined to create within the Muslim Brothers the conviction that armed action alone was capable of solving the Palestine problem and avoiding the establishment of a Zionist State.[11] To the Muslim Brothers, armed action necessitated setting up a clandestine organisation, training fighters and preparing them militarily and spiritually for the battle, as well as the psychological mobilisation of the masses to support the armed action and take part in it. Referring to this stage, Hasan al-Banna said that it was one of:

> selecting the elements which are capable of shouldering the burdens of jihad and of bringing these elements together. This stage is purely a Sufi stage spiritually, and purely a military one practically. Its motto in these two aspects is always: 'You order and I obey ...' without hesitation, argument, doubt or embarrassment. The cause at this stage becomes pure, only subscribed to by those who are really prepared to bear the burdens of a long-term jihad. The first sign of preparedness here is 'complete obedience.[12]

In pursuit of this goal, Hasan al-Banna wrote his *Risalat al-Ta'alim* (the message of instructions) and directed it to the 'Mujahidin of the Muslim Brothers.' In the introduction he said: 'It is to these Brothers only that I address these few words – which are not lessons to be memorised but instructions to be carried out.'[13] This suggests that a new level of membership of the Muslim Brothers, the 'Mujahid Brother', would be granted to members of the next paramilitary unit, as the rank of 'Active Brother' had been reserved for members of Excursion Groups and then later of Rover Troops. Moreover, in accordance with the General Guidance Council's decision No. 13 of 6 January 1940, branches were divided into three categories on the basis of their success in spreading the ideas of the Muslim Brothers: Active, *amil*, for those which formed five neighbouring branches; a for those which formed ten branches; and *mukhtara* chosen for those *mujahid* which formed twenty.[14]

Foundation of the Special Section

The idea of military preparation was present from the inception of the Society, and can be traced to the environment in which Hasan al-Banna grew up. Al-Banna had considered this idea as far back as the time when the picture of the Cause took shape in his mind. He let it lie, and trusted that time and circumstances would prove capable of developing it to the stage where it could be given an outward shape. However, a question remains: When was that stage reached? When did al-Banna form what was known within the Society as 'The Special Section' and among its opponents as 'The Secret Apparatus'?

Researchers and writers differ about this. The earliest date suggested for the creation of the Special Section is 1939. It has been mentioned that in that year al-Banna opened a mosque in Ruwaq al-Arab which marked the beginning of the Special Section.[15] Anwar al-Sadat has recorded that al-Banna secretly collected arms as far back as 1940.[16] Ishaq al-Husayni says there is circumstantial evidence to support these dates, since the outbreak of the Second World War offered a chance of ending the British occupation, and al-Banna, like others, was preparing for that. Al-Husayni recalls that Khamis Humaida, during his interrogation in 1954, said that the Special Section was created in 1942 or earlier, and that its birth dated back to the time when the Muslim Brothers were involved in politics and when their Society was strong.[17] But Zakariya Bayumi – commenting on Sadat's recollection – contended that collecting arms was not sufficient proof of the creation of the Special Section, and that the arms were merely for training the Battalions or the Rover Troops. (The Battalion was not a military unit, but one for spiritual education.) Bayumi added that some officers who had joined the Society took part in buying these arms to prepare for confronting the British in Egypt.[18] On the other hand, Ahmad Shamuq agrees that the Special Section was formed in 1940.[19]

Bayumi, however, listed a number of indications which prompted him to place its creation in 1942, notably:

1. The change from the Battalion system to the Family system, the latter being more secretive and much more organised;
2. Al-Banna's exploitation of the general discontent which prevailed among the Egyptian people after the events of February 1942 to

attract some army officers to his Special Section, including Jamal Abd al-Nasir, Kamal al-Din Husayn and Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi;

3. The attempted escape of Aziz al-Masri who was trying to reach the Germans, perhaps with a plan for helping local forces, spearheaded by the Muslim Brothers, to deal a blow to the retreating British army. Bayumi referred to the testimony of Khamis Humayda, made during his trial, to the effect that help had been offered to the Germans in the early days of the Special Section and besides, al-Banna had explained that the creation of the Section was aimed at getting rid of the British army which was retreating from El-Alamein.[20]

The last allegation on which Bayumi depended can be refuted by two important testimonies. Firstly, Ahmad Husayn has recalled that in the early months of 1941 he presented to Hasan al-Banna an anti-British plan involving a comprehensive uprising to coincide with the German invasion of the British Isles. Following the discussion of the plan by al-Banna, in the presence of Mustafa al-Wakil of Young Egypt and Ahmad al-Sukkari, Hasan al-Banna realised that the plan would not work for two reasons, that they could not confront the British with sporting guns, and that it would require not less than two hundred thousand pounds. Al-Banna concluded: 'We are not after an adventure which may fail or succeed. Rather, we should prepare ourselves for a strong successful action, as failure will be a catastrophe, not only for our movement, but for the whole Islamic World.'[21] Secondly, Anwar al-Sadat claimed that he submitted to al-Banna – in the name of Sadat's officers' group – a plan aimed at attacking the British army which was retreating from El-Alamein. Sadat asked for help from the Muslim Brothers in order to carry out the plan, but according to Sadat, Hasan al-Banna cried openly and promised nothing: 'He neither embraced our plan nor did he inform me that he was going to carry out the share of the Muslim Brothers in the plan.'[22] Although, during World War II, the Society had not reached a sufficient stage of preparedness to warrant any military action, the contrary was true towards the end of the war, as shall be seen.

Mitchell, however, asserts that 1942 referred to the completion of the creation of the Special Section and not 'the inception of the idea'. He did not specify the date on which the section was created because of the scarcity of reliable information at the time when he was writing

his book.[23] As for Abd al-Azim Ramadan, he concludes that the Special Section was founded towards the end of 1941. Ramadan adds that the Muslim Brothers' Trials of 1954 revealed the fact that Mahmud Labib, as Inspector General of the Rover Troops, was the one who initially suggested the setting up of the Section. He quotes the confession made by Khamis Humaida, the Deputy to Hasan al-Hudaybi.[24] But al-Hudaybi, who was the next General Guide after al-Banna, told Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal that the Special Section was founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1946.[25]

Mahmud Abd al-Halim, however, a founder member of the Special Section, has revealed that in 1940 Hasan al-Banna invited five members of the Society and put to them the reasons which, in his view, required the preparation and setting up of a Special Section, 'and they agreed with him'. The five were Salih Ashmawi, ranked first in the hierarchy as he was assigned solely to the Section; Husayn Kamal al-Din, Mahmud Abd al-Halim, Hamid Sharait and Abd al-Aziz Ahmad, ranked in this order. These were the men whom al-Banna chose as the leaders of the Special Section. He charged them with setting up, organising and training the Section:

> ... provided that it is based on clean, strong Islamic military traditions; and provided that it is surrounded with complete secrecy, such that only its members shall know anything about it, and provided that it shall be financed by its own members, as it is an indication of the seriousness of someone who offers his life to offer his money, as a sacrifice.[26]

The review of the progress and development of military preparations, the introduction of military training for Rovers, the formation of the Military Training Committee in 1940 – a committee that included as members two who were later mentioned by Mahmud Abd al-Halim as having been amongst the leaders of the Special Section, namely Husayn Kamal al-Din and Abd al-Aziz Ahmad[27] – and the aforementioned factors which led to the foundation of the Special section, all these lead the author to believe that Abd al-Halim's account, along with those of Ishaq al-Husayni and Ahmad Shamuq, is the most accurate.

The Aims of the Special Section

Researchers and writers differ in defining the aims of the Special Section. We can divide those involved into two categories: the Muslim Brothers and their opponents. Firstly, the opinions of opponents can be summed up in their contention that the military preparations of the Muslim Brothers generally, and of the Special Section in particular, were actually preparations to mount a coup d'etat. This belief was shared by successive Egyptian governments under the monarchy after the Nuqrashi government, and by those which held power after the 23 July 1952 Revolution.[28] The same is true of some contemporary researchers like Abd al-Azim Ramadan,[29] who took as evidence for their belief certain acts of violence committed by the Secret Apparatus and the Society.

As regards the accusation that they were preparing to topple the government, Hasan al-Banna raised this question with the Fifth Conference of the Muslim Brothers which convened in February 1939: 'Is it the intention of the Muslim Brothers to use force for the attainment of their objectives and their goals? Are the Muslim Brothers thinking about preparing for a general revolution against the political and social system in Egypt?' He replied that:

> Muslim Brothers are too intelligent and far-sighted to be tempted by superficial actions and thoughts. They are not the type to become involved in these things without weighing up their results ... Has Islam – of which force was a motto – decreed the use of force under all circumstances or has it laid down conditions for its use? ... Revolution is the most violent manifestation of force and as such, the Muslim Brothers view it more deeply and accurately, especially in a country like Egypt which has tried its hand at revolutions and gained no benefit from it, as you know. The Muslim Brothers do not think of it or believe in revolutions and their benefits and results.[30]

At its tenth Annual Meeting on 29 October 1946, the General Assembly of the Muslim Brothers decided that the Muslim Brothers 'are not a party whose aim is to reach power but they are an organisation working towards a comprehensive reform centred on the teaching of Islam and covering all aspects of religious, political and social reform, adopting towards each of these aspects the legal approach, in form and in content.'[31] Following the decision to dissolve the Society

in 1948, Hasan al-Banna said

> We know not what government system is meant by the accusers. The government system is either religious, which means it is Islamic, or it is civil, which means it is democratic. Do the Muslim Brothers seek to overthrow any of these two systems? Categorically NO! The basis of the ideas of the Muslim Brothers is Islam. There is no way to protect such ideas except through the Constitution, which guarantees freedoms. How is it that the Muslim Brothers are accused of this charge? The Muslim Brothers want to reform the state of affairs; they want to improve religious and material conditions in this country through open legitimate means, namely propaganda, association, education and guidance.[32]

Even in the jeep case, the court could find no evidence that the Muslim Brothers intended to overthrow the government. During the examination of the documents put forward by the prosecution in the 'Jeep Case' on 17 March 1951 (O Case No. 1950/3249 al-Wayly 277/950 K), the court in giving its decision commented that these documents were often used out of context or were either unsigned, untraceable or unrelated to the Society. As evidence they were inadmissible. Concerning the 'plan for a revolution', the court accepted the defence's contention that it was no more than a student entry in an essay competition (the title being 'The Islamic System in Modern Times'), and was of no consequence, and that the reason why the document was found in the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers was merely that one of the adjudicators was receiving his mail there. The court noted that the prosecution had ignored the statement concerning the competition and that it took an excessively harsh view of the Society when presenting the charges. Accordingly, the court found that the 'criminal conspiracy to overthrow the government' had no foundation, and was not supported by evidence or investigations.[33]

When Hasan al-Hudaybi became General Guide, he was asked during a Muslim Brothers' meeting whether he would accept the role of president. He replied, 'I refuse to be a president. I refuse to be a prime minister. I prefer to remain to preach the Way of God.'[34] Umar al-Tilmisani, the third General Guide of the Muslim Brothers, also says, 'The principle we adopt is that any clash between the ruler and the subjects benefits only the enemies of the country.'[35] Jamal al-Din Mahmud, the Secretary General of the Supreme Council of Islamic

Affairs in Egypt said in 1982, 'The Muslim Brothers have never wanted to change the regime at all.'[36]

At the end of his research into the activities of the Muslim Brothers, Mitchell concluded with a reference to the charge that they wanted to overthrow the government. If the government had submitted all available evidence, 'then the charge levelled at the Society is not precisely true'. The 1948 documents showed no more than discontent with the general situation on the part of the Muslim Brothers. Nothing in their open or clandestine activities, or in their pattern of military training, could be taken as conclusive evidence that they sought to overthrow the government of Egypt. Mitchell adds that the accusation seems all the more improbable because Hasan al-Banna, who was well known for his caution and good sense, would have been unlikely to draw attention to himself and his movement at a time when 'the bulk of his activist followers in Palestine were away from the expected scene of action.' Mitchell reached the conclusion that, however well trained and organised these para-military troops of the Muslim Brothers might have been, they had not attained the standard necessary to be able to resist the Egyptian security forces, irrespective of whether they received help from other opposition groups or not. Furthermore, to be able to stage terror operations does not imply the capability to overthrow a government. This requires not merely adequate force to mount an insurrection, but the ability to maintain it as well. 'It is not even likely that the activists in the organisation would have so miscalculated the real power-position of the Society either in 1948 and certainly not in 1954.'[37] Zakariya Bayumi contended that al-Banna's control over the Special Section had guarded against errors which might have taken place during the conflict of the Society with al-Wafd and the Communists in the aftermath of the Second World War, besides the fact that al-Banna, who was versed in the principles of Islamic law, had ensured that the Special Section would not be used against Muslims or other Egyptians.[38]

It is hard to understand why some commentators and historians became convinced that the Muslim Brothers wanted an Islamic government to be set up under the shadow of occupation. For them it was self-evident that colonialism prevents any nation from achieving its freedom, pride and development. As their literature demonstrates, they believed that Islam has dictated that Muslims should live free and proud lives, and not allow any outsider to control their affairs. If

circumstances imposed it upon them they had the duty to wage *jihad* until the land was liberated.[39] To the Muslim Brothers themselves, the objectives of the Special Section were perfectly clear and could be divided into two:[40]

1. To liberate Egypt and the Nile Valley from occupation,as Hasan al-Banna had realised that the Society had become prominent on the Egyptian, Arab and Islamic scene and that its 'traditional enemies were the British and their lackeys, Egypt's rulers, who were under the control of the colonisers.'
2. To take military action to solve the Palestine question, especially as the British 'will not change their plan of connivance with the Jews' and as 'the British are arming Jewish bands'. So Hasan al-Banna realised that it was 'inevitable that a decisive battle between the Muslim Brothers and these bands should take place, as long as the Muslim Brothers are intent on liberating Palestine.' He was also aware of the fact that the Egyptian and Arab governments were 'weak, languid and indeed in collusion with the British', and that there was no army of any consequence in the Arab World except the Egyptian army, but the latter 'is so weak, and inexperienced' as to be incapable of confronting the trained Jewish bands which were armed with the most modern weapons, and which were fighting for a cause inspired 'by their religion'.

That these were the true objectives of the Muslim Brothers is apparent from Article 2 of Section 2 of the Constitution of the Society: 'The liberation of the Nile Valley and all Arab countries and the Islamic World from all forms of foreign domination; and to come to the aid of Islamic minorities everywhere and to give complete support to Arab unity and to the efforts to form the Islamic League.'[41] There is no doubt that the Muslim Brothers, from the very beginning, believed in the use of force to achieve a principle which they stipulated in their Constitution. It is unrealistic to think that they would set themselves this objective without agreeing on the means of realising it. For anti-imperialism is not a matter of speeches, articles and books.[42]

The court's decision in the 'Jeep Case' found the prosecution to be mistaken in describing the Special Section as a terrorist apparatus. In its sentence the court described it as a training organisation which

conformed to its declared objectives of liberating the Nile Valley and all Muslim countries; it had not incited anyone to commit any crime, nor was it to blame if some of its members had of their own accord formed a criminal conspiracy to carry out operations of murder and sabotage. As regards the publications relating to the military organisation and guerrilla warfare, which were presented by the prosecution as evidence of the Society's aim of provoking a revolution, these had not been used to train terrorists, and they were no different from other plans aiming at destroying aquaducts and means of transport and communications as part of the resistance to the British.[43]

Besides, Abd al-Majid Hasan, the assassin of al-Nuqrashi, declared before the court on 30 August 1949 that the objective of forming the Special Section was 'to fight Zionist forces in Palestine' [44] Mitchell considers that the development which took place in the Society at that time coincided with the beginning of the Muslim Brothers' interest in Palestine and their activities there. Hence Palestine, in addition to the question of the British occupation was, according to Mitchell, among the most compelling factors which led to the adoption by the Muslim Brothers of an effective, positive policy inside the Society.[45]

It can be concluded that, in the light of the needs of Palestine and the Muslim Brothers' response to them, Hasan al-Banna took the opportunity of the Second World War to found the Special Section in 1940 in order to take military action and solve the Palestine question. The evidence which supports this argument is the fact that al-Banna took the opportunity of the 1948 war in Palestine to send his battalions and arms there, and that most of the volunteers were members of the Special Section.[46] It should be remembered that it was the war in Palestine which revealed the existence of the Special Section, when 'The Jeep' was seized, together with the Special Section members who were training in the Muqattam hills to fight for Palestine. This was later taken as one of the pretexts for dissolving the Society and for sending the volunteers for Palestine to prison. Moreover, the efficiency and courage shown by the Muslim Brothers during the fighting suggests that these qualities were the result of long and careful preparation, not of last-minute improvisation. After their release from prison, the Muslim Brothers also took part in the 1951 Suez Canal battles against the British with such zeal as to surprise observers.

Secrecy of the Special Section

It may be relevant to ask whether secrecy was one of the requirements of Islamic action. If Islam is clear in its aims and objectives, its means and its history, how could a Muslim accept that he had to be led to the obvious known goals of Islam by a clandestine and mysterious movement? Why did al-Banna insist on surrounding the Section with that absolute veil of secrecy? To answer this question one needs to highlight two points:

First, for al-Banna, clandestine work was not a new experience. At the age of thirteen he joined a group of his friends in forming 'The Society for the Prevention of the Forbidden', which lasted for more than six months before being exposed. This experience may have inclined him towards secretiveness when he formed the Muslim Brothers' Society and saw that he might need to go underground. Second, from its inception until 1939 the Society went in for very little clandestine work. Its activities were openly conducted in mosques and cafés, where its members delivered lectures and preached, or took the form of organised lectures and debates conducted in the headquarters and the branches of the Society. These were not restricted to members but were open to all. Furthermore, the Society convened General Conferences and set up economic, cultural, medical and educational institutions, all of which were public, legitimate activities protected by the laws and regulations of the country. But when events pushed the Society into a more intense stage of activity, secrecy in operations became inevitable. The para-military connection, the gathering of arms supplies and the training of members[47] to confront the British in Egypt and the British and the Jews in Palestine, could not be announced publicly at a time when successive Egyptian governments were pawns in the hands of the British authorities.[48] In an important statement made by al-Banna in 1938 – but published only after the 1952 Revolution – he said that, 'secrecy is necessary at the beginning of every movement for the safety and self-preservation of that movement.'[49] To support his argument he quoted the Prophetic tradition which said: 'Pursue the attainment of your requirements with secrecy.'[50]

But could it have been possible to set up the Section without being involved in clandestine work? The question will inevitably be answered in the negative by anyone who is familiar with the ideology and principles of the Muslim Brothers. To have done otherwise would have

meant abandoning the concept of *jihad* and of the Islamic army which was to liberate Egypt and the Islamic world from colonialism. This would have called for the introduction of radical changes in the principles of the Society, and a denial of the religious legitimacy of *jihad*. Mahmud Abd al-Halim has commented that without the idea of the Special Section there would have been no need at all for the Muslim Brothers' Society. He adds that the idea of Ikhwan with no *jihad* would have made it just another Islamic organisation. What distinguished the Muslim Brothers – and gave them a particular character as an organisation, and an impact on the history of Egypt and the Islamic World – was the concept of *jihad*.[51]

Lastly, despite the fact that only very few members knew about the Section before 1948, those who later came to know about it found no reason to object to it. As an idea it was supported by all members;[52] for it was the organisation set up by al-Banna personally, and was considered a source of pride due to its role during Palestine war in 1948 and the confrontation over the Suez Canal zone in 1951.

The Muslim Brothers and the Army

The beginning of the Muslim Brothers' interests in the army coincided with the beginning of the General Strike of April 1936 in Palestine. On the 14 April in that year, al-Banna wrote an article for *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* magazine which was entitled 'Islam, Soldiery and Strength', in which he urged the nation, and the Muslim Brothers in particular, to join the army.[53] This suggests that the military preparation of the Muslim Brothers for the Palestine question started on that date, coming finally into the open during the 1948 War.

From 1936 Hasan al-Banna explored a number of different ways to establish links with the army. Personal contacts were made with individual army officers. Members of the Society attended military and police schools and some took civilian posts in the army. Further links were established when Hasan al-Banna and other Muslim Brothers lectured and preached to army units. During the Second World War, Muslim Brothers conducted a propaganda campaign inside the army through the publication and distribution of leaflets which called on army officers to be more aware of their duty towards Egypt and opposition to the British. Between 1942 and 1945 steps were taken to recruit and organise Muslim Brothers from inside the Egyptian

army. The first 'Family' of the officers was organised at the turn of the year 1943/1944. Its function was to build cells in the army, whose goals were to work for the liberation of Egypt from British occupation and prevent the setting up of a Jewish state in Palestine.[54] Working with the officers secured for the civilian special section of the Society supplies of ammunition and weapons in addition to military training. This equipped the Muslim Brothers for fighting in the battle for Palestine in 1948. It also won them the co-operation and sympathy of the army in the 1948 War, something that was never experienced again.

Military Units Department of the Muslim Brothers in the Army[55]

In the early forties al-Banna considered a new way of penetrating the rank and file of the army in order to complete the military preparation of the Society, by setting up 'The Department of Military Units of the Muslim Brothers'. This began with weekly visits paid by al-Banna to the Maintenance School, which was part of the Maintenance Corps. The visits took place every Wednesday, on the invitation of certain Muslim Brothers who trained in the school. The Society's headquarters were the meeting place for those students and others who joined them from different units. The civilians in this department were headed by Muhammad Ahmad Umara, assisted by Husayn Mustafa Sulayman; the military were headed by representatives from the Maintenance Corps, namely Abd al-Halim Amar and Abd al-Sallam Musa, with Ali Badran and Muhammad al-Shinawi from the air-force. This department had civilian Imams to preach in various army units. Their task was to acquaint the soldiers with their religion and deepen their understanding of the comprehensiveness of Islam, as well as showing them how to lead an Islamic life inside their units. There was also the opportunity to become acquainted with army officers who, if they showed interest, would be introduced to al-Banna, and through him to Mahmud Labib, who would then introduce them to Abd al-Rahman al-Sanadi, the leader of the Special Section.

In 1944 al-Banna charged Salah Shadi with the leadership of this department. He was to be assisted by Salih Abu Rafiq, Hasan Ashmawi and Abd al-Qadir Hilmi. The department was made into a separate unit from the Special Section, but coordination and consultation continued between the two. Shadi remained its leader until the

appointment of Yusif Tal'at as commander of the Special Section in 1953; from that time Shadi's responsibility was confined to the police force. The department contained both military and civilian personnel from various army corps.

Its objectives were to rally military men around Islam, to forge a bond amónst them, to work through their relationships with one another, to warn them against carrying out any act which was contrary to Islam – like spying and assaulting other people – and to deepen their belief in the concept of *jihad*. It also endeavoured to acquaint officers with their duties towards their soldiers and show them ways of treating them fairly. These topics were the subjects of cultural and educational studies inside the Families. Shadi, however, managed to recruit some officers, police constables, sergeants, non-commissioned officers and soldiers from the security forces. When, in 1946, Rashad al-Manisi, the Ikhwan's representative in the Police College, graduated, he carried out work inside the police force. This department played an active role in bringing together those who worked in the army and in the police force, despite the rivalry which traditionally prevailed between them. For this reason, there were mixed 'families' comprising both army and police personnel which could coordinate their thinking and behaviour.

When, at the end of the Second World War, Jewish terrorist activity intensified in Palestine, the members of the department demanded a strong response. The Muslim Brothers therefore collected information about British troops – whom they believed to be supportive of Zionism.[56] British army forces were moved from Egypt to Palestine, passing through Cairo in the al-Sharabia region where the train transporting them was compelled to slow down because of road works. The department devised a plan to attack one of the trains and showed it to al-Banna before it was implemented and he approved it. Ali Badran and Hasan Ubayd from the air-force and Ibrahim Barakat from the majewish maintenance unit carried baskets of *samit'*, cheese and eggs, like street traders. Inside the pile of food they hid their bombs. When the train reached al-Sharabia they threw the bombs through its windows. The operation was a success; but although the government offered a reward of E£5,000 for information leading to the arrest of those responsible, they were never found.

In 1946 the Muslim Brothers decided to frighten the British

Intelligence personnel and their agents in Ismailia, who lived in the King George Hotel. Rif'at al-Najar of the air-force was charged with carrying out this operation. He placed a file with an explosive device inside it in the hotel lobby. When a hotel guard headed towards the file, al-Najar rushed back and seized it. It exploded, injuring a few people and causing grievous wounds to himself.

These were typical of the actions mounted by the Military Units Department between the end of the Second World War and the opening of hostilities in Palestine. But its activities remained hidden even from the Egyptian government until Salah Shadi revealed some information about them in 1978.

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Support Systems

Education and Mobilisation

According to the concept of the Muslim Brothers, education meant more than teaching. They linked education with general attempts to reform behaviour along what they perceived as more Islamic lines.[1] the Society's objective was 'the formation of a new generation which understands Islam correctly, follows its teachings and directs the way to its revival.'[2] For them education was a purposeful process of guidance and refinement intended to take man to what were seen as the heights of human perfection and make him aware of his rights and obligations.[3] It was also a cooperative process which took place within the framework of the Society itself, where the member would learn the methods of the Muslim Brothers as well as perform his obligations towards society, at the same time avoiding disreputable behaviour and following the perceived path of the Qur'an and of Prophetic tradition.[4] This would secure the survival of the Society and consequently attract to it those who were seen as suitable, and equip them to achieve the goals which the Society was pursuing.

However, education according to the Society was based on principles exclusive to the Muslim Brothers.[5] What concerns us here is what the Muslim Brothers called '*jihadi*' and not 'military' education. According to them the latter meant discipline and training, whilst *Jihadi* involved something deeper and more comprehensive, for it was concerned with 'faith, morals, spirit, devotion, together with discipline and training as well.'[6] Consequently, the Society considered that military action called for cadres who were prepared, ideologically, politically and practically. For this reason, it chose to educate its followers in an Islamic nationalist fashion, as will be illustrated later. The educational process was thus geared towards providing the Mujahidin with faith and urging them towards self-denial and devotion. The Qur'an and

the Prophetic Tradition contain ample material which can be used toward this objective. And, whilst *jihadi* education was exclusively for members of the Society, mobilisation was for all and was geared towards mobilising the masses psychologically to support armed action and to take part in it.

In order to achieve *jihadi* education and reach mass mobilisation, the Society set up support systems with the aim of helping its military organisations to attain their goal. They operated on two main levels: internal and external. On the internal level, that of education, Hasan al-Banna first instituted (in 1937) the spiritual education of the Muslim Brothers, which was known as the Battalions system, *al-kata'ib*,[7] in 1943 this was transformed into the Families system, *al-usar*.[8]

The Society did not ignore children in its educational programme, seeing this stage of development as the best time for instilling the principles of Islam. The children had a department of their own called 'Friday Schools', which provided spiritual education, civics and physical education. Care was taken here to set a good example, and Islamic stories, songs and plays were used to that end.[9]

After the massive increase in membership towards the end of his life, al-Banna recognised the need for the Society to deepen the ideological awareness of its members, so he established the monthly magazine *al-Shihab* to fill this gap; but he managed to publish only five issues.

Deepening the Concept of *jihad*

Al-Banna counted understanding as the first of the ten pillars of *bay'a*.[10] He called the Muslim Brothers' concept of Islam 'the Islam of Muslim Brothers', as it represented a new understanding of Islam at the time.[11] What concerns us here about this new understanding is the concept of *jihad*, which had been almost absent from Islamic education before the foundation of the Muslim Brothers. Muslim groups of the time paid no attention to it. Political parties were involved with political struggles and mosque Imams and preachers treated *jihad* as irrelevant to their religious brief.[12] From its inception the Ikhwan gave the concept of *jihad* a prominent position in its policies. To that end the Society adopted various flexible means, which were individual, group, theoretical, practical, rational and emotional.

For al-Banna, *jihad* was the first of the twenty principles of understanding,[13] and the fourth pillar of *bay'a*.[14] He devoted a special treatise to it which he called 'The *Jihad* Treatise'.[15] The emblem of the Society was the Qur'an, surrounded by two intersecting swords embracing the first two words of the verse 'Make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force and horses tethered' (Qur'an: 8/60); and so the emblem symbolised force and the call for *jihad*. The slogan 'Truth, Force and Liberty' appeared in all the Muslim Brothers' papers and magazines.

Each member was to be trained and educated in such a way as to be consumed by the concept of *jihad* and martyrdom. It goes with out saying that the most dangerous enemy faced by modern armies is fear, which affects fighters the minute they go to battle. To drive fear out of the hearts of the troops, the willingness to die should be stronger than the urge to live. Al-Banna, therefore, attempted to transform *jihad* into a tangible concept through giving death a more familiar and acceptable meaning, and associating the concept of *jihad* with the possibility of death at any time and anywhere. In 1937, when the Palestinian Revolt was intensifying, he wrote an article in *al-Nadhir* about *jihad* which he called '*Sinna'at al-mawt*', 'The Industry of Death'. In 1946, the same article was reprinted under the title '*Fann al-Mawt*', 'The Art of Death',[16] to match the development which had taken place in the military preparation of the Society. He concluded his treatise by paragraphs which later acquired prominence, and which glorified death in the cause of God:

> To a nation that perfects the industry of death and which knows how to die nobly, God gives proud life in this world and eternal grace in the life to come. The illusion which had humiliated us is no more than the love of worldly life and the hatred of death. So, prepare yourself to do a great deed. Be keen on dying and life will be granted to you, so work towards a noble death and you will win complete happiness.[17]

Al-Nadhir also belittled the importance of death[18] and tried to free Muslims from fear by explaining that death, subsistence, gain and loss are all in the hand of God.[19]

This concept found its way into the Society's slogans, which members used to chant everywhere: '*jihad* is our course of action ... and death in the cause of God is our most precious wish.' It also mani-

fested itself in the form of songs sung by Battalions and Rovers. One was a song written by Shaykh Ahmad al-Baquri: 'We are afraid not of death but we desire it ... How wonderful death is ... Let us die in redemption for Muslims ... Bury us under an umbrageous shade ... We are contented to die as martyrs.' Abd al-Hakim Abidin wrote another song entitled The Battalion, which ran:

> It is the truth mobilising its troops, getting ready for the decisive moment. So line up Battalions like lions and with them destroy the power of evil. We are preaching the truth and we see no redemption without offering blood.[20]

Moreover, al-Banna used to tell the members that they were: 'The Salvation Army that shoulders the message of liberation' and that they were 'the Salvation Battalions who will rescue this nation from the catastrophes which have befallen it.' They were 'the troops of God'[21] and the Society would have no success without this form of *jihad*.[22] Their writings and speeches were full of quotations from the Qur'an and the Prophetic Traditions, which refer to belief in God and in the hereafter and treating this world merely as a transit stage on the way to eternal life in the hereafter. Such Qur'anic verses include: 'Lo! Allah hath bought from the believers their lives and their wealth because the Garden will be theirs: they shall fight in the way of Allah and shall slay and be slain' (Qur'an: 9/111), and 'think not of those who are slain in the way of Allah as dead. Nay, they are living. With their Lord they have provision.'[23] (Qur'an: 2/169)

For al-Banna the high point of his success was that he managed to instil in the members' hearts the idea that death in the service of Allah is the highest goal for Muslims, and that honourable death will raise a Muslim to the rank of a hero in Heaven.[24] For this reason, the Muslim Brothers used to assert that martyrdom in the way of God was the shortest and easiest step towards the Hereafter. Mitchell asserts that it was this spirit that various Egyptian governments fought, at the same time as they fought the political activities which accompanied it.[25]

Among the other means adopted by the Muslim Brothers to deepen this concept of *jihad*, was the preparation of the Families' educational programmes along the same lines. They were charged with memorising *Surat al-Anfal*, The Spoils of War,[26] and with studying the theory of Islamic *jihad* in addition to the Prophets' raids, and the history of

the Islamic conquests.[27] Furthermore, the education and the regulations to which the Muslim Brothers were subjected tended generally to develop and deepen this concept. In this way al-Banna brought the members face to face with what he called the legitimacy of *jihad*. The Palestinian arena was the first to witness the fruits of this *jihadi* education in 1948, when it demonstrated the determination of the Muslim Brothers to wage *jihad* in the Holy Land in order to win one of the two rewards: either vistory over the Jews or martyrdom in the way of God.

Mass Mobilisation

Until the beginning of the Second World War the Egyptian people were not prepared to support any struggle outside Egypt. That was because of the isolation imposed on them in relation to the Arab world generally, and to Palestine in particular. For this reason al-Banna, when he was organising his military preparation of the Society, did not neglect the mobilisation of the masses. We have already referred to al-Banna's attempts throughout 1936 to urge the Egyptian people to support and assist the Palestine Revolt.

It seems to the author that al-Banna had a socio–political view of mass mobilisation which meant that he should rally the people, or part of them, around the Islamic idea in general and around the concept of *jihad* in particular. This view was based on two main pillars: 'strong belief' in the idea and 'continuous work' towards realising it 'for belief only strengthens and develops through practice'.[28] Therefore, the relationship between these two pillars was a direct one. He believed that to rally a nation in support of principles called for great psychological strength based on:

> A strong, indefatigable will, loyalty that is not qualified by hesitation or treachery, a dear sacrifice not obstructed by ambition or greed and a knowledge of and belief in the principle and respect for it which eliminates the possibility of errors in it or deviation from it, or the compromising of it.[29]

He linked this to what God said: 'Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts' (Qur'an: 13/11). Al-Banna did not ignore the time factor in bringing about this mobilisation, and so he raised the slogan: 'Today's facts

were yesterday's dreams; and today's dreams are tomorrow's facts.'[30]

Hasan al-Banna explained the aim of mass mobilisation thus: 'We will try to work for these people and take them along the proper ways of *jihad* in order to complete their freedom and regain their glory.'[31] He clarified the idea as follows:

> We would like all the people in their various classes to realise the danger threatening us and surrounding the world and which threatens people. We would like to utilise this feeling in order that every man shall do his duty to preserve himself and his country and to escape the dangers of greedy ambitions and desire.[32]

Salih Ashmawi called such mobilisation the 'popular education' which 'requires time and effort and which should take place quietly and systematically'.[33]

The objectives of mobilisation can be summarised as strengthening 'moral' virtues, the awakening and inciting of the masses, reviving the feeling of pride in the nation and liberating it from weakness, despair and vice.[34] To these should be added the aim of reminding people of their duty to advise rulers and exert pressure on them in support of what is right,[35] increasing awareness of the necessity for Islamic unity in order to liberate the Islamic lands from colonial corruption.[36] This was to be implemented through instilling the concepts of patience and sacrifice (considered by al-Banna to be the fifth pillar of *bay'a*),[37] firmness (the seventh pillar of *bay'a*),[38] fraternity (the ninth pillar of *bay'a*),[39] hope, devotion and *jihad*.[40] The Qur'an, Prophetic Tradition and Islamic history contain much that could be quoted in this respect. Al-Banna defined the aim of mobilisation as: 'reminding the nation of its glory, nourishing the spirit, enthusing and strengthening its people, informing them of the evil effects of this enslavement in every aspect of their lives and guiding and working with them through every legal means towards this end.'[41]

The legal means referred to by al-Banna were centred on those approved by the Constitution of the Society, under the slogan of 'Call, Guidance and Action'.[42] Among these were papers and magazines. The Society managed – until 1948 – to publish six magazines and a daily newspaper. There was also publishing which included some books and publications which were printed by the Ikhwan Press, which was

run jointly by the Printing and Publishing Committee, the Section for Liaison with the Islamic World and the Propaganda Section.

Lectures and classes were another vehicle. The most important of these were regular lectures like the 'Tuesday Lesson', delivered weekly by al-Banna at the headquarters. There were also weekly lectures prepared by the Propaganda Section to be delivered in or outside mosques, political analysis of the situation in Egypt and the Arab and Islamic world – with emphasis on the Palestine question – with emphasis on the elements of Islamic unity and other Islamic causes, as well as wider international affairs.

General Conferences were yet another means. These were mass political meetings which might accompany visits paid to Branches by al-Banna, or they could take the form of receptions in honour of visiting Islamic personalities and delegates.[43] The most important of these was the commemoration of Islamic occasions, especially those of the Ascension and the major Islamic battles like Badr and the conquest of Mecca, to remind Muslims of the days of their glory 'in the hope that they wake up after their sleep and stand up after stumbling'.[44] The annual festival commemorating Badr occupied a special place. Preachers would praise the spirit of *jihad*.[45] The theme of Badr was even the subject of a play produced and performed by the Muslim Brothers' Acting Group. Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati was responsible for organising this group, which aimed at creating the Islamic Theatre – one of al-Banna's dreams – in order to show the glories of Islam and to praise the deeds of the heroes and the great occasions of Muslim history. The Acting Groups performed a number of other Islamic plays, notably 'al-Mu'iz Li-Din Allah al-Fatimi', 'The Hijra', Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi's 'The Rescue of Palestine', 'The Torture of Bilal' and 'The Conversion of Umar to Islam'. These plays were performed in the major theatres of Cairo and Alexandria and in the regions.[46]

Beside this cultural mobilisation, the Muslim Brothers emphasised through their speeches, General Conferences and letters to authorities, the need for a military mobilisation of the people through government legislation, which would permit the carrying of arms and training in their use for young government employees, mature students and the educated. They also underlined the importance for the government of strengthening the army and instilling a spirit of voluntary service in the hearts of all citizens.[47] On 5 August 1938 al-Banna admitted that 'we are trying hard to arm ourselves and all those re-

lated to us. As a matter of fact we are trying hard to arm the whole nation.'[48]

It could be said that through this mobilisation the Muslim Brothers managed to some extent to achieve a number of things, notably: contributing to the eradication of what they saw as political illiteracy among the masses, especially in the villages; involving the masses in the social and political life of the country; and encouraging them to participate in nationalist activities. They also aroused the spirit of struggle among the people, distracting people's attention from party political conflicts and acquainting them with what the Ikhwan saw as political reality.[49] The Society also contributed through that mobilisation to inciting nationalist and neighbourly religious feelings regarding the Palestine question, and arousing within the people a real awareness of the danger threatening Palestine and the implications of that danger for Egypt in the future. It also gained their sympathy for the Palestinian Arabs.[50]

The success of the Society in mobilisation showed results in 1947, when the resolution to partition Palestine was adopted. People persistently rejected the partition and called for an armed struggle against the setting up of a Zionist state in Palestine. This manifested itself in the great response shown to the call for volunteers to fight for Palestine.[51] This mass mobilisation, in which the Muslim Brothers played an important part, was not an easy matter at all. In war situations governments and politicians often have to spend a lot of time and money to convince their people of the need for war and to prepare them for it.

In achieving this result the Muslim Brothers were aided by the large number of their branches and their economic, social, medical, religious and educational institutions – which were spreading all over Egypt – and by the large number of their members, including their preachers and orators who 'used to tour towns and villages calling on people for *jihad* to save the Holy Land from the Jews.'[52] The military system set up by the Society inside the branches had its effect too, especially the military parades mounted by the Rovers in the streets. Mahmud Abd al-Halim described the effect of the Rovers on the people, saying that the Rovers 'with their masses and columns, steps, drums, chanting and militarism, inspired in the people a feeling that there was a force protecting the truth.'[53]

With these support systems, which reinforced the military systems of the Society, al-Banna managed to finalise its military preparation, and to realise in practice his image of the Islamic army. He also managed to prepare the troops in a sound military and religious fashion during the Second World War, at a time when the Palestine question was dormant, and to confuse the Egyptian government of the time by mixing the open and the underground activities of the Society. The Rovers and the Families system were the visible parts, the invisible part was the Special Section. Al-Banna designed and fashioned a military which worked with extreme precision, and his ability was manifested in every step taken by the military apparatus, particularly in its spiritual build-up, which brought numbers together and which provided an image of faith operating from within, rather than a system of instructions, orders and regulations imposed from outside.

The military apparatus rested on al-Banna, who believed in the principles of gradualism and was prepared to wait to achieve the goals for which he had set up this apparatus. The opportunity came at the end of the Second World War, when the Palestine question entered a new phase. The Society also began to move into a new stage: the implementation of its solution to the problem of Palestine.

البروفيسور الدكتور
عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي القدسي

Part Three

The Beginnings of Armed Struggle

البروفيسور الدكتور
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The Muslim Brothers in Palestine

The Beginning of *jihad*

The Muslim Brothers emerged strengthened from the Second World War, having utilised the war years for preparation and formation in their various aspects. Al-Banna summed up the situation in an address to the Heads of District and Jihad Centres at a meeting convened in Cairo on 8 September 1945, saying the war years have 'torn to pieces non-Muslim Brothers in and outside this country but these same years are treating you (Muslim Brothers) lightly and tenderly; strengthening you and not weakening you, establishing you firmly and not destabilising you; alerting you and not taking away your vigour.'[1] The Society had expanded and by 1945 its membership in Egypt was estimated at about half a million,[2] with about 1500 branches.[3] During the following two years the number was believed to have doubled or even trebled.[4]

In his 8 September address al-Banna announced that the next stage would require the Society to embark on *jihad* in order to achieve the nationalist demands of Egypt and of Islamic countries. He considered that post-war conditions provided 'an unrepeatable opportunity', and represented 'the most critical moment in our modern history'. He gave various reasons for this, including the fact that the victorious major powers were ignoring the undertakings which they had entered into with Egypt and the Islamic world. Furthermore, Egyptian political bodies had abandoned their nationalist obligations towards Egypt and the Islamic world and the people had lost confidence in their leaders, which led to national feelings being expressed in 'revolt, vigour and enthusiasm', especially among the educated youth. Another element was the willingness on the part of Arab and Islamic forces to unite and engage in joint action, and their desire to coordinate efforts and operations.[5]

Al-Banna also emphasised the impossibility of instituting a good government in Egypt or the Islamic world whilst either was still under the yoke of colonialism. Loyal Muslims should mount *jihad* for freedom and put an end to colonial rule. Al-Banna believed that any effort not directed towards liberation from colonialism at that period was a waste of time, especially after the Muslim Brothers' previous efforts to reform the ways of governments.[6] They had spent seventeen years introducing their cause and preparing the ground for it. He had 'a feeling which now amounts to a conviction that we no longer have the choice and that it is our duty to lead these lost souls, guide these rebellious feelings and take that very step[of *jihad*].'[7]

The meeting reached a number of decisions which constituted a programme for the next stage. These may be summarised as follows: it resolved to publish statements and bulletins; to hold conferences in capital cities of provinces, directorates and in important cities; to convene an Arab Islamic conference in an Arab capital to coordinate programmes for joint action among Arab and Islamic people; to send delegates from the general headquarters to negotiate with the various national Islamic bodies in those countries; and to send missions and delegations to the capital cities of the major powers to spread the 'Islamic Call' and enlighten the people and governments there on national and Islamic questions.[8]

Again, on 8 September 1945, but at another level, the General Assembly of the Muslim Brothers held a meeting at the Muslim Youth headquarters and approved a constitution for the Society. The preamble to it, which read: 'In view of the developments of 'The Call' and the growth of its activities and in the light of the experiences it has passed through,'[9] indicated that the Society wanted to keep up with the developments of the Call and to prepare for the future. In other words, it wanted to learn from its past experiences in order to be in tune with the requirements and spirit of the times and, therefore, to formulate a constitution which would define its aims and objects and the means of achieving them. Accordingly, it set out its political programme, which was based on 'liberating the Nile Valley and every part of the Arab and Islamic world from all forms of foreign domination, helping Islamic minorities everywhere, supporting Arab unity without reservation and progressing towards the Islamic Bond, al-Jami'a al-Islamia.'[10]

As regards the Palestine question, the Muslim Brothers believed that it could only be solved through *jihad* inside Palestine, and with the support lent by Arab and Islamic countries to that *jihad*.[11] In the special Palestinian issue of the weekly, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* , al-Banna wrote a famous article entitled, 'Let the Wind of Paradise Blow'. In this article he asserted that if the Jews in Palestine had made their military preparations for their 'blatant aggression and for imposing themselves by sheer force', then there were millions of Egyptians, Arabs and Muslims everywhere who were imploring God to bestow upon them martyrdom for His cause. What they had most resented until now was the fact that they had no known arena for martyrdom, but 'now that England, America and the Zionist Jews had all agreed to unite in imposing injustice on the Arabs and usurping their lands, then these millions will have found the opportunity they were looking for.'[12] A member of the Society summed up the course of action to be adopted in the next stage of the struggle for Palestine as being one not of words, articles or protests, but rather of a positive, continuous campaign built on solid foundations which would deal with economic, social and ideological fields, and would be based on the power of both reason and sentiment.[13]

In the light of the extensive preparations made and the expansion of the Society, with its open demand for liberation of Egypt and of the Arab and Islamic countries from colonialism, what was the position taken by the Society towards the Palestine question until the adoption of the Partition resolution in 1947? How did it react to events in Palestine until the time came for it to find its looked-for arena of martyrdom? Did it actually manage to implement its Palestinian programme, and to graduate from the stage of propaganda to the stage of action and *jihad*?

The Muslim Brothers' Expansion Outside Egypt

Article Two of the Constitution of the Society stipulated that the Muslim Brotherhood 'is a comprehensive Islamic body working for the achievement of the objectives originally pursued by Islam.'[14] This means that the Society was not purely Egyptian or Arab, but was indeed broadly Islamic. Hasan al-Banna expressed this notion when he said: 'The Ikhwan is not a regional movement, but it is indeed an international Islamic one, because Islam is an international religion.'[15]

Later, Mustafa al-Siba'i, the general overseer of the Muslim Brothers in Syria, emphasised this meaning by professing that 'The Call of the Muslim Brothers is not a narrow party political call. We are not a localised organisation, the function of which is restricted to narrow local or national boundaries ... But we are an international movement.'[16] Consequently, the Muslim Brothers set about their task by directing a considerable part of their activities abroad. This was done in two main stages.

First Contacts with the Arab and Islamic World

This stage began with the Society making its magazines a platform for defending Islamic causes all over the world and devoting special issues of them to discussion and treatment of those causes.[17] This coverage became even more extensive when, on 5 May 1946, they issued their daily paper *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*. The paper devoted much space to the Islamic world, and to Arab countries in particular. Its editors interviewed leading Arab and Islamic personalities who visited Cairo and question them about their countries' affairs. Ishaq al-Husayni recalled that such interviews used to be of great interest to the paper's readers in Arab countries.[18]

For some time al-Banna had spoken publicly about the Islamic world, calling for its liberation and independence,[19] and he sent numerous messages to the authorities in those countries demanding the release of political detainees. For instance, he sent one such message to the Sultan of Marakesh, and another to the French government demanding the release of Amir Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi.[20]

The Cairo headquarters of the Society afforded a base and a meeting place for Arab and Islamic personalities, where they could debate the affairs of their countries.[21] It also acted as host to the celebrations staged by the Society's headquarters in honour of delegations who visited Egypt. In June 1945, for instance, a reception was held in honour of Prince Sayf al-Islam, son of Imam Yahya of Yemen, and of the Yemeni Delegation. This was attended by Abd al-Rahman Azzam (the then Secretary General of the Arab League) Muhammad Sadiq al-Mujadidi (the Syrian Charge' d'Affaires) Shaykh Muhammad Ma'mun al-Shinawi (the *wakil* of al-Azhar) al-Habib Bourghaiba (the Tunisian leader) and Isma'il al-Azhari (the then Chairman of the Graduates' Club in Sudan) and others.[22] A member of the Society

described the headquarters as 'the Family House' of the movement for the liberation of Arab and Islamic countries.[23]

Muhammad Sabri Abidin relates that Hasan al-Banna was keen on forging 'close acquaintance and association' among Muslim leaders, scholars and thinkers from all over the world 'to work towards raising the banner of Islam and liberating Arab and Muslim countries from foreign colonialism'. To this end al-Banna used to avoid issues which were controversial among Islamic sects and to do his best to bring about rapprochement and a spirit of unity among all, irrespective of their sects. Abidin further recollected that he used to see the headquarters buzzing with the presence of Afghans, Pakistanis, Iranians, Indonesians, Palestinians, Syrians, Turkistanis, Egyptians, Iraqis, Moroccans, Chinese, Yemenis and Lebanese.[24]

The pilgrimage season was another occasion for the Muslim Brothers to show their concern with the problems of the Islamic world. For instance, in November 1945, al-Banna headed the Society's Pilgrimage Mission for that year, and in Mina the Mission held a conference in which Islamic bodies from all over the world took part. They discussed the situation in Palestine, Morocco, the Sudan, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran.[25] Al-Banna headed another Pilgrimage Mission in October 1946 which based itself in Makka, where it was frequently visited by delegations from Islamic countries. Speeches were delivered there, in English and Arabic, on the future of the Muslims and their countries. [26]

This interest was expressed in support for liberation movements in Arab and Islamic countries. Thus al-Banna claimed that the Society shared Pakistan's severe ordeal 'until the country is born', and that it sympathised with the Islamic movement in Indonesia so that 'the Islamic Party there announced its membership of the Society'. Al-Banna also claimed that the Society exerted itself side by side with national liberation movements in North Africa, in addition to drawing attention to the rights of Muslim minorities elsewhere.[27]

The clearest evidence of the help offered by the Society to liberation movements came at the time of the French aggression against Syria and Lebanon in 1945, when al-Banna sent a message to the Syrian minister plenipotentiary in Cairo informing him that '10,000 of the Muslim Brothers' Youth ask to be accepted as volunteers in the Syrian army. They are fully prepared to make their way to Syria at such time as the Syrian government may request'. [28] The Muslim

Brothers also took to the streets in support of the Syrian and Lebanese people, most prominently in the mass rally led by al-Banna in June 1945, when he delivered a speech in which he demanded that Arab countries should take prompt action against France, and asserted that the Muslim Brothers were prepared to volunteer for the fight in defence of Syria and Lebanon.[29] The General Guidance Office of the Society sent a medical mission headed by Dr Muhammad Suleiman,with Abd al-Hakim Abidin acting as its secretary, to bring relief to Syrian victims. The mission served in Syrian cities throughout the period between June and August 1945 [30] and Abd al-Rahman Azzam, the Secretary General of the Arab League, sent a congratulatory note to al-Banna praising the efforts made by the Muslim Brothers on behalf of Syria and Lebanon.[31]

Section for Liaison with the Islamic World

The instrument for these world-wide activities first took shape with the formation, in January 1940, of what was called 'The Palestine and Islamic World Committee'. The General Guidance Council nominated Salih Ashmawi to supervise and monitor its activities.[32] The name given to the committee indicates the special attention paid to the Palestine cause among other Islamic issues. The committee itself might well have been an extension of the Central Committee for Palestine, which was formed by the Muslim Brothers during the 1936 Palestinian Revolt, and which extended its activities to cover the Islamic world at large during World War Two and the period of stagnation which overtook the Palestinian question. In 1945, following the end of the war, this committee was transformed by the Society into the Section for Liaison with the Islamic world, in order to accommodate the preparations being undertaken by the Society to declare the beginning of the stage of armed action and *jihad*. Tawfiq al-Shawi, a lecturer in the Faculty of Law, was a *mandoub* (delegate) of that section[33] and Salih Abu Raqiq, who at that time was working as the head of the Arab League's North Africa Section (Libya, Tunis, Algeria and Morocco) claims that he was the *wakil* of the Section for Liaison with the Islamic world.[34]

The most important aim in establishing this section was to work towards linking Islamic countries together and unifying their attitudes through the standardisation of Islamic educational programmes

and Islamic legislation, lifting customs duties and facilitating entry to and residence within these countries. The liberation of Islamic countries from foreign domination was also to be encouraged by boosting nationalist feelings and resisting every attack, internal or external, against the rights of the people, and by adherence to Islamic customs and manifestations of Arab and Islamic unity. The ultimate aim was the institution in all these countries of independent governments in which Islam would have both religious and secular authority, and the formation of an Islamic political unity.[35]

The section for liaison comprised three main committees authorised to follow up activities in different regions of the Islamic world. These were: the Near East Committee, comprising Arab countries and other Muslim countries in Africa, as well as Turkey and Iran; the Far East Committee, comprising Afghanistan, Turkestan, China, India, Indo–China, Indonesia and Japan; and the Islam in Europe Committees.[36] The Section used to carry out formal research, hold lectures and seminars, and issue publications concerning the problems of the Islamic world and prepare a special file for each problem. It also had separate files for each country containing political, economic, social and cultural data and information on the state of affairs of the Islamic movement in each country.[37] In addition, as Mitchell observes, this Section used to act as an exchange centre for the publications issued by the various Islamic movements from all over the world.[38] Ishaq al-Husayni said that the information eventually compiled by the Section about the Islamic world was unrivalled by the data available to any other association.[39] This helped the Section Sub-Committees in conducting the necessary studies and in producing comprehensive files on each of the problems of the Islamic world.

Together with these activities the Section carried out social services for students of the Islamic world, who were sent to study in Egypt.[40] It was also a kind of refuge for those students who were influenced by the thought of the Society,[41] some of whom were even entrusted with various functions of the Section. For instance, Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawaf from Iraq, an Islamic law student who was the head of the Iraqi mission in al-Azhar, and had a scholarship awarded by Mustafa al-Sabunji, became in 1945 an active member.[42] The attention paid by the Section to students brought a useful return in terms of propaganda for the Society since, when they returned home,[43] the students

became apostles spreading the ideas of the Muslim Brothers in their own countries.

These serious endeavours to treat the problems of Arab and Islamic countries under colonial rule indicated that the Muslim Brothers were aiming at bringing about stronger links between all Islamic countries, in particular Arab ones, as a preparatory step towards bringing back the lost Caliphate, which remained the central aim of their programme. They also served to galvanize the Society's members and get them to try to work out solutions to the problems of the Islamic world, instead of being distracted by arguments about issues that were considered controversial by Muslim scholars or by exchanging personal abuse and engaging in inter-party feuding – as was to happen later when the Society had given up its serious work.

This method of handling such issues, along the lines adopted for treating the Egyptian question – to use Ishaq al-Husayni's words – had a great influence 'in attracting the attention of young people to the Muslim Brothers' movement, whether they were in their own countries, in Europe or in America'.[44] Considering that the Muslim Brothers were 'the only Egyptian organisation' which had shown a serious interest in the affairs of Arabs and Muslims abroad and took part in discussing their problems, and which supported them against 'their enemies' who are mostly one and the same group in and outside Egypt',[45] it was no surprise that the Society gained considerable sympathy and support on the Arab and Islamic scene.

Building Branches Abroad

The building of branches abroad came in two main stages, the first of which involved sending the Society's activists to neighbouring Arab countries to preach in mosques and visit Islamic organisations, to establish contacts with them and awaken their awareness. This step was carried out in accordance with a decision of the Third Consultative Council, which convened in March 1935 and passed a motion to spread the cause of the Muslim Brothers abroad.[46] The second step was the establishment of branches of the Muslim Brothers throughout the Arab and Islamic countries, and even in Europe and the Americas. Article 51 of the Society's constitution, which was passed on 8 September 1945, stipulated that:

> The Headquarters may set up Districts and Branches for the Society in any Arab, Islamic or other country, subject to the particular conditions and circumstances there. Relations between the headquarters and such Districts or Branches shall be governed by such regulations and decisions as are passed by conferences attended by representatives of the Headquarters and of such Districts and Branches.[47]

The branches that concern us here are those formed in the countries surrounding Palestine, in other words the confrontation states, in view of the role they played in the Palestine question, and because they were the first Ikhwan branches to be formed outside Egypt. There were Muslim Brothers' branches in Syria and Lebanon, and in Trans-Jordan.

The Muslim Brothers' Branches in Syria and Lebanon

At the end of their visit to Palestine in 1935, Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati and Muhammad As'ad al-Hakim, who were the first Ikhwan delegation charged with spreading the cause abroad,[48] visited Lebanon and Syria between the 6 August and the end of the month. During that period they made speeches in mosques, especially in Umayyad Mosque in Damascus. They visited leaders of the Islamic movements and offices of the Islamic press in both countries.[49] Al-Sa'ati commented on the visit by saying that they found people there appreciative of the ideas of the Muslim Brothers, though they had not encountered them before. Among them there was a great number of Muslim Brothers and 'we gave them our *bay'a* on fraternity and *jihad*'.[50] This support could perhaps be attributed to the presence of a large number of organisations there which were involved in working for Islamic causes, along lines very similar to the ideas of the Muslim Brothers.

The visit produced some results. The contact of the Delegation with Islamic Bodies in Lebanon led to a request from Jami'yat al-Maqasid al-Khayria (the Charitable Aims Association of Beirut) to the Cairo headquarters of the Ikhwan, to send a member of the Society to teach Islamic legislation, philosophy and literature in the College of al-Maqasid al-Khayria in Beirut. Muhammad al-Hadi Attia, the *shari'a* lawyer of Suez and later head of the Branch there – who was also a member of the Ikhwan's General Consultative Council – was charged in October 1935 with that task.[51] Besides teaching in the

College, he managed to spread the ideas of the Muslim Brothers among the students and members of the staff, and to set up the first cell for the Muslim Brothers in Lebanon.[52]

In Syria too, some Islamic organisations were influenced by the ideas of the Muslim Brothers. Jami'yat al-Tamaddun al-Islami, the Islamic Civilisation Organisation in Damascus – which had a magazine carrying the same name edited by Ahmad Mazhar al-Azmah – adopted for the cover of its magazine the slogan of the Society, which was *aqidatuna* 'our belief'. The magazine commented that 'in view of our goals,which are identical with those of the Muslim Brothers' Society in Cairo, and our agreement on principles, we have adopted as our own its slogan of belief.'[53] In 1937 the first Muslim Brothers' formation operated as part of the various Islamic organisations in Syria and Lebanon, forming a single body, known at the time as Shabab Muhammad, 'Muhammad's youth'.[54] It is probable that this formation had its roots among the Syrian students who had been members of the Society while they were studying in Egypt, particularly Shaykh Muhammad al-Hamid and Mustafa al-Siba'i, who, as students, shared lodgings in Cairo and who had close links with al-Banna – especially al-Hamid when he was attending al-Azhar University.[55] Cordial contacts between the Muslim Brothers of Egypt and Shabab Muhammad continued until the latter held its fifth convention in November 1945 at Aleppo,which was attended by Sa'id Ramadan as representative of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt.[56]

The Convention decided to dissolve the Aleppo head office and to form a Supreme Central Committee in Damascus, comprising a representative of each Centre, with a permanent Bureau headed by a general *muraqib*, overseer, who was Mustafa al-Siba'i.[57] Considering his close link with al-Banna and with the Society in Cairo, al-Siba'i's election as a General Overseer to the Supreme Central Committee of Shabab Muhammad in Syria and Lebanon was an advanced step, and heralded a new stage in the expansion of the Muslim Brothers in Syria and Lebanon. From that time on, contacts between the two societies increased through the exchange of missions and delegation matters, which contributed greatly to unifying work procedures and the co-ordination of views.[58] To that we can add the stance taken by the Muslim Brothers towards French aggression against Syria and Lebanon on 29 May 1945,[59] after which the Central Committee of Shabab Muhammad sent Umar Baha' al-Amiri to Egypt to contact

the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers.[60] This was followed by the visit to Syria of Ahmad al-Sukkari, the *Wakil* of the Muslim Brothers, together with Husayn Abd al-Raziq and Kamal Abd al-Ghani.[61]

These endeavours culminated in the holding of an Islamic Conference at Damascus in May 1946, for all Islamic organisations in Syria and Lebanon. The conference decided that all these organisations and branches should be unified under the name of the Muslim Brothers in Syria and Lebanon, and Mustafa al-Siba'i was elected as General Overseer, assisted by a Supreme Central Committee made up of ten members.[62] Al-Siba'i sent a message to al-Banna on the 23 May 1946 informing him of the decision to join the Society and saying:

> How wonderful it is for names to merge after goals and programmes have been united. If we could not manage, because of official obstacles and current circumstances to complete our link with the leadership and with the organisational structure, let us hope that God will bring the day when this is achieved in the near future.

He requested al-Banna to send sample copies of all forms relating to organisational and financial procedures in the organisation's internal structure.[63] For his part, al-Banna welcomed their membership of the Society in a letter to al-Siba'i, in which he said: 'As to administrative formalities, they are of no importance now that we have this close unity in form and in content. However, formalities are always conditioned by particular local circumstances more than anything else.'[64] The letter was followed by a visit paid by the Muslim Brothers of Syria and Lebanon to Egypt, in a delegation headed by Mustafa al-Siba'i, to give the oath of allegiance, *al-bay'a*, to al-Banna.[65]

Following that visit, al-Siba'i became a member of the Constituent Council of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt,[66] which was the highest authority of the Muslim Brothers, and which assumed the role of a Consultative Council (*al-shurah*). On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers of Egypt did not nominate any of their members to represent them in the Supreme Central Committee of the Muslim Brothers of Syria and Lebanon.[67] This indicates that despite the fact that the Muslim Brothers of Syria and Lebanon had stipulated in their Constitution that they were part of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt and had identical aims,[69] they remained independent as far as their leadership and decision-making were concerned. These were to be

determined by their own particular circumstances, in the spirit of the proverb which says: 'Meccans are the ones who know best about the mountain trails of Mecca.'

It is worth noting that the Muslim Brothers' branches in Lebanon were not independent of the branches and leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brothers, but were considered a part of them,[70] as the name of the organisation suggests. In 1949 however, the activities of the Muslim Brothers in Lebanon did appear to be independent of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, or at least from those of Syria, for they did not provide for a link in their Constitution and maintained a character of their own that reflected the character of Lebanon as the country of religious sectarianism. They concentrated on two aims: 'Reforming the home front and cooperation with the neighbour.'[71]

When the Shabab Muhammad merged in name and aims with the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, the Muslim Brothers of Syria and Lebanon in the period between 13 and 27 August 1946 set up a training camp in Yabrud for their para-military group which was called 'Shabab al-Futuwwa'. During that period they undertook military training, particularly in the use of firearms. During the same period, the Muslim Brothers held their first conference in the same town between 23 and 27 August 1946, under the chairmanship of the General Overseer of the Muslim Brothers in Syria and Lebanon, Mustafa al-Siba'i. One of the most important resolutions taken by that conference was to widen the base of sports and al-Futuwwa activities in preparation for 'redeeming Palestine at any cost whatsoever'. Another resolution concerned the formation of committees for attending to the affairs of the Arab and Islamic world which would monitor nationalist movements in Turkey (Iskenderun), Egypt, North Africa, Tripoli (al Gharb), India and Indonesia. There was also a Committee for Palestine.[72] These resolutions corresponded to a great extent with the efforts being made for Palestine by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.

Before passing the resolution creating a special committee for Palestine, the Muslim Brothers held a meeting on 17 June 1946 in Damascus, at which they discussed the resolutions passed by the Arab League concerning Palestine and the need for intensifying the boycott on Zionist products.[73] The Muslim Brothers in Aleppo also formed a committee for the defence of Palestine in June 1946. The committee, which was led by Umar al-Amiri, sent a message to the Secretary General of the Arab League at the Bloudan Conference asserting that

Palestine was a turning point in their lives, and that they were quite prepared to go to battle in its defence.[74] Under instructions from al-Banna, a delegation of the Muslim Brothers of Syria had a meeting towards the end of 1947 with Shukri al-Quatli, the Syrian President. They proposed to him that the Palestine question should be included as a subject in the curriculum of Syrian schools.[75] A second camp of Shabab al-Futuwwa, attended by more than 300 members, was held in August 1947 at the Agricultural School at al-Ladhiqia. There they received military and sports training in addition to the lectures delivered by Mustafa al-Siba'i and other leaders of the Muslim Brothers.[76]

The interest of the Syrian Muslim Brothers, particularly of Mustafa al-Siba'i, in the Palestine question, dated back to the time before Shabab Muhammad merged with the Muslim Brothers of Egypt. According to al-Siba'i, when he was passing through Palestine on his way to Cairo in 1943, he attended a lecture by Shaykh Nimir al-Khatib in a Jaffa mosque on the Ascension Night. He was so much moved by the lecture that when al-Khatib asked him to work to awaken Arabs and Muslims and warn them against the danger posed by what was taking place in Palestine, al-Siba'i promised to start work at once in order to achieve this aim. [77] On his return to Syria, al-Siba'i delivered his first lecture on Palestine in October 1945 at the Muslim Youth Hall. It was entitled: 'What have we prepared for Palestine?' He surveyed the history of the Palestinian problem throughout the previous twenty-five years, and outlined a programme for the rescue of Palestine. At the end of the lecture, Muhammad al-Mubarak, Chairman of the Muslim Youth Society, made a speech declaring his Society's support for the stance of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt on the Palestine problem. Afterwards, the audience staged a peaceful demonstration calling for action in order to rescue Palestine.[78] Al-Siba'i then embarked on a tour of Syrian towns explaining to people the seriousness of the situation in Palestine, with such effect that those whom he described as being 'ignorant about the state of affairs in Palestine' accused him of exaggeration in his portrayal of the situation.[79]

After the Second World War, the Muslim Brothers of Syria fought for Palestine on three different levels: On the official level they submitted memoranda to the government and to the Arab League, on the popular level they delivered lectures and held public meetings in towns and villages; and on the practical level they sent members to

visit Palestine to acquaint themselves with the situation of the Jews there. They visited Jaffa, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem and numerous Jewish settlements.[80]

Within their own country, the Muslim Brothers of Syria founded the Secondary Arab Institute and the Arab Printing and Publishing House, which published a daily newspaper of their own called *al-Manar'*. They also set up up a textile company in Aleppo. Three of their leaders were elected to the Syrian Parliament in 1947; these were Muhammad al-Mubarak, Ma'aruf al-Dawalibi and Mahmud al-Shaqfa. Sa'id Ramadan and Abd al-Hakim Abidin took part in organising the election campaign of the Muslim Brothers in Syria.[81] The Muslim Brothers' Branches of Syria were later to assume a particular importance after the confrontation between the Muslim Brothers of Egypt and Jamal Abd al-Nasir, as Syria became a centre for the Muslim Brothers' activities – and for Sa'id Ramadan in particular, who was al-Banna's son-in-law and the Secretary General of the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem.[82]

The Muslim Brothers' Branches in Trans-Jordan

Though the interest of the Ikhwan of Egypt in opening a Syrian branch had started as early as 1935, it was not until after the Second World War that they opened their branches to the east of Palestine, in Trans-Jordan. This conformed with the declaration made by the Society to start action and *jihad* in defence of Palestine. While they were eager to promote unity in name and aim between Islamic organisations in Syria and Lebanon with the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, it was incumbent on them to pay attention also to Trans-Jordan, the third country on the borders of Palestine. This reflected the wish of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt to secure the maximum aid and support before fighting on Palestinian soil.[83]

As a result of the repeated visits paid by representatives of the Muslim Brothers to Trans-Jordan on their way to Palestine and Syria, Sa'id Ramadan initiated a nucleus of the Muslim Brothers in Trans-Jordan on the 19 November 1945.[84] The formation of the first Branch of Ikhwan in Amman was announced in March 1946. The announcement stated that the Branch was 'enlisting itself in the ranks of the Muslim Brothers under the banner of Islam and working for the revival of the glory of Islam.'[85] Shaykh Abd al-Latif Abu Qura was elected

General Overseer of the Muslim Brothers in Trans-Jordan, and became a member of the Constituent Council of the Muslim Brothers in Cairo.[86] He remained in office until the 26 December 1953, when Muhammad Abd al-Rahman Khalifa was appointed as a new General Overseer.[87] During the time of Abu Qura, Trans-Jordan's branches used to take their instructions from the Ikhwan headquarters in Cairo.[88]

Amir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan gave his blessing to the Muslim Brothers' movement. He asked an envoy of the Ikhwan – when he met him in Amman on 27 May 1946 – to convey his greetings to the Muslim Brothers, hoping that 'this bond of fraternity has no aim other than dedication to seeking God's satisfaction for His sake and for the sake of the Muslim Brothers.'[89] He charged him to convey an invitation, on his behalf, to al-Banna to visit Trans-Jordan.[90] When Abd al-Hakim Abidin, the secretary-general of the Society, visited Trans-Jordan in the summer of 1947 – in response to an invitation from Amir Abdullah –[91] the Amir told Abidin that 'Trans-Jordan is in need of the efforts of the Muslim Brothers and the first step in that direction will be the appointment of Abd al-Hakim Abidin as a minister in the Trans-Jordanian government', adding that he, the Amir 'would grant Abidin and al-Banna the title of Pasha'. Mahmud Abd al-Halim says that Abidin tactfully turned down this offer; but the Amir insisted that he should defer his decision until the matter was submitted to al-Banna. For his part, al-Banna sent the Amir a message apologising for not accepting his offer 'because the unofficial action of the Islamic Call is in more need of the Muslim Brothers' efforts'.[92] *Al-Jamahir*, a left-wing newspaper published in Egypt, commented on the visit, suggesting that its purpose was to make contacts with the British,[93] but the British Foreign Office documents reveal that, in al-Banna's time, the Muslim Brothers represented for Britain 'the intransigent opposition of the extremists' to any form of cooperation with the British or with anything Western.[94]

Samir al-Rifa'i, the Prime Minister of Trans-Jordan, estimated the number of Muslim Brothers in Trans-Jordan in May 1947 at about 600 members.[95] Despite their small number, in November 1947 the Muslim Brothers of Trans-Jordan sent a memorandum to the chairman of the House of Representatives there, urging the prompt drafting of a special Act of Parliament to boycott all Zionist products and commodities and everything related to them, as a means of defending

of defending Palestine.[96] This demand conformed with the position taken by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, as will be shown later.

The Muslim Brothers of Jordan, however, admit that they had been 'progressing rather slowly' ever since their inception, especially in Abu Qura's time. They became more influential with the election of Khalifa as a new General Overseer, particularly after April 1954, when they defined their principles and policy in specific terms, emphasising that the Muslim Brothers of Jordan were part of the Islamic Movement in Egypt and that the Palestine problem was an Islamic cause for which they should mobilise all their resources, both material and spiritual, to liberate it from 'international Jewry and the crusaders'. They also published a magazine to act as their official organ, calling it *al-Kifah al-Islami*, The Islamic Struggle.[97] Nonetheless, Trans-Jordan remained, and still remains, the only Arab country where the Muslim Brothers have maintained a legitimate, open Branch, although of limited capacity and restricted by the prevailing conditions.

The Muslim Brothers' Expansion in Palestine

Palestine was the first Arab country to which the Muslim Brothers thought of spreading their movement. It was the first country to be visited between 3 and 5 August 1935, by the first external delegation of the Muslim Brothers.[98] The Muslim Brothers directed most of their activities and support to Palestine at the time of the revolt of 1936–39, and their contact with the people of Palestine never ceased throughout that period. A number of the Muslim Brothers took a small part in the revolt, compared with their role in the 1948 war.[99] Despite this, the delegation did not set up a branch of Muslim Brothers there, as they did after their subsequent visit to Syria and Lebanon.[100]

There were, it seems, fundamental reasons for the Society's decision not to establish branches in Palestine before the Second World War. The most important of these was summed up by Mahmud Abd al-Halim who says that Palestine before the Second World War was in a state of continuous revolt which did not permit or require a branch to be set up there; the purpose of establishing branches was to encourage people to be active. There was no need for this in Palestine itself, since the Palestinians were already in a state of constant activity before the Second World War.[101] On the other hand, Ishaq al-Husayni

attributes it to the fact that Palestine had been undergoing 'a violent political disturbance' which distracted it from paying attention to religious issues.[102] To that we can add the fact that the British Mandate government did not permit the formation of any Islamic societies; indeed it banned all Islamic organisations, whether charitable or otherwise.[103] Considering the open opposition of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt to the policies of the Mandate government, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for them to have a branch of the Society in Palestine at that time.

With the end of the Second World War and the declared intention of the Muslim Brothers to initiate a programme of action and *jihad* on behalf of Palestine, a new situation developed which encouraged the Society to try to set up branches in Palestine itself. An important consideration was the need to revive the Palestinian cause, which had been relegated to the sidelines during the war. At the same time, the Mandate government was preoccupied by the campaign of violence mounted against it by the Zionist groups and its authority was weaker than it had been at the time of the 1936 Revolt.[104] Even before the end of the war, a number of Palestinian religious scholars – particularly in Haifa – had managed to establish Islamic associations like Ansar al-Fadila (the Supporters of Virtue) and al-Itisam (the Refuge) which was headed by Shaykh Nimir al-Khatib,[105] so that there was clearly an opportunity for the Muslim Brothers to do the same.

So, from the middle of 1944, the Society had begun to prepare itself for this task. Its preparations took the form of sending activists to Palestine to explain the ideas of the Society and tackle the political aspect of the Palestine problem in such a way as to conform with national wishes, and urge and incite Palestinians to keep up the fight.[106] These efforts were enhanced when *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* newspaper began daily publication in May 1946, reaching Palestine full of strongly-worded articles defending the rights of the Palestinian Arabs.

At the time the Muslim Brothers believed, as Sa'id Ramadan asserted, that the first step in tackling the Palestinian problem was to form branches of the Society there which would comprise 'Pure and sincere groups who have genuine trust in one another and pursue a constructive course of action without clamour or noise'. The second step was to win the support of the Muslim Brothers abroad for the Palestinian Arabs 'in accordance with the way in which the Muslim Brothers have actually prepared for this, and of which you will soon

definitely know.'[107] This statement confirms what has been said earlier, that the aim of the Society in setting up branches in the countries surrounding Palestine was to secure the maximum support when they declared *jihad* for the rescue of Palestine.

Sa'id Ramadan and the First Ikhwan Branches in Palestine[108]

Sa'id Ramadan played an important role in setting up the first branches of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. His activities can be divided into three stages: instituting the branches, monitoring and supervising them, and his expulsion.

The first stage began in 1945, following a meeting of the heads of Districts and Jihad Centres of the Society which took place on 8 September 1945, and which launched the stage of action and *jihad*. In October 1945 the General Headquarters of the Muslim Brothers sent Sa'id Ramadan – a senior official of the Society and a law student of twenty years of age – acting as representative of the Society under clear instructions from al-Banna to persuade people to form branches of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, reminding them of the Islamic character of the issue itself.[109] After numerous lectures which Sa'id Ramadan delivered in Jerusalem, with the aid of Shukri Qutaina and Abd Allah Ghusha, he called a meeting in the family house of Qutaina in Jerusalem, which was attended by a number of religious scholars, lawyers, merchants, village shaykhs and notables. At that meeting they decided to form the first branch of the Muslim Brothers in Jerusalem.[110] The branch issued its first statement, calling upon Palestinians to support it and to resort to the Qur'an, adopting it as a Constitution 'to activate them to revive their glory and their freedom'.[111]

Ramadan held a number of meetings and discussions with Palestinian personalities with the aim of establishing branches for the Society in most main Palestinian towns. In Haifa, agreement was reached with Nimr al-Khattib (the chairman of Jam'iyyat al-Itisam) and Shaykh Taqi al-Din al-Nabahani (who was later to found Hizb al-Tahrir, the Islamic Liberation Party) to form a branch for the Muslim Brothers there. Similar agreements were reached with Abd al-Hayy Arafa in Hebron, Zafir al-Dajani in Jaffa and Zafir al-Shawwa and Shaban al-Hilu in Gaza. He also managed to form core groups, each of which was considered as the nucleus of a branch, in the houses of various

notables in Nablus, Beer-sheva, Ramallah, Lydda, Ramlah and Jericho.[112]

Ramadan met with a serious obstacle – which he managed ultimately to overcome – in the opposition of the shaykhs, who believed that they were the most qualified people to run religious societies. In response Ramadan held that the cause of Palestine was a cause for the young: 'How can you form a Youth Society', he asked, 'without provoking elderly Shaykhs against it?' Ramadan ended by choosing elderly men who were liked by both young and old, like Shaykh Abd al-Hayy Arafa, who helped him greatly in setting up the Hebron branch, accompanying him from one meeting to another.[113] In this way Ramadan managed, in three weeks of continuous work, to set up the first branches of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, leaving behind him the seeds that would mature in days to come. From there he moved to Trans-Jordan, to set up the first nucleus of the Muslim Brothers there on the 19 November 1945; and thence to Aleppo in Syria to attend the Fifth Conference of Shabab Muhammad, of which Mustafa al-Siba'i was elected General Overseer of the Central Committee of the Shabab Muhammad in Syria and Lebanon.

When Ramadan submitted his report to al-Banna on the conclusion of his tour, the latter advised that the programme of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine should be consistent with Haj Amin al-Husayni's. He should be consulted in order that no disagreement would arise between the two parties, especially as al-Husayni had great influence in Palestine and tended to attack those who opposed him with wild accusations.[114] So al-Banna, who was careful to maintain a close relationship with al-Husayni, tried to spare his newly-born Palestinian movement the burden of any disputes or conflicts with any other Islamic or political trend inside Palestine.

In the second stage of his mission, Ramadan returned to Palestine in December 1946 to monitor and supervise the branches which had been founded. He attended the public conferences held by the Muslim Brothers in Ramlah on 19 December, in Nablus on 20 December and in Jaffa on 21 December. In Jaffa he attended the meeting of the General Assembly of the branch on 24 December. He also inspected the administration of the Gaza branch[115] and took part in the celebrations mounted by the branches of Salwan on 27 December and Nablus on 28 December.[116]

On 2 January 1947, he delivered the Friday sermon at the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem which, according to *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, so alarmed the Mandate government that it banned its broadcast because of the influx of worshippers – estimated at about 10,000 who attended it. After the prayers the worshippers wanted to take to the streets, but Ramadan asked them to disperse quietly. During the Friday sermon he said:

> If the first rank is broken, it will leave a gap that cannot be bridged and open the way for the attack that cannot be fought off. Keep what is left of your blessed land! Boycott brokers and land sellers, even if they come in the guise of pious men. Any one of you who shakes hands with them should wash his hands seven times, one of them to be with dust. Fight your enemies, settle your internal disputes, do not condemn the innocent on the basis of unfounded evidence. Do not be easy on criminals and prepare yourselves for a long struggle.[114]

The two points raised by the sermon, namely holding fast to the land and settling internal disputes, were among the most important issues for the Muslim Brothers at that time, as will be shown later.

The third stage, which ended with Ramadan's escape from Palestine by sea from Haifa to Alexandria, took place in September 1947. The British authorities had given him a 72-hour visa, during which he managed to get a permit from the Supreme Islamic Council to deliver a sermon at al-Aqsa Mosque on the last Friday of Ramadan. It was the third time Sa'id Ramadan took the pulpit of al-Aqsa Mosque where, for the first time, loudspeakers were mounted. He conveyed to the worshippers – estimated to be around 80,000 – the greetings of Haj Amin al-Husayni. Ramadan believed that this was one of the reasons for the attempt to arrest him, for his words were considered at the time more dangerous than dynamite. In the evening, after Ramadan had delivered a lecture at the Muslim Brothers' house in Jerusalem, the British Chief of Police entered the premises, accompanied by some officers, to arrest him, but he made his escape.[118]

Ramadan's role in setting up the Muslim Brothers' branches in Palestine was concluded for the time being, but he returned later with the Muslim Brothers' volunteers, and took part in the battle for Jerusalem.

In May 1948 Amir Abdullah was to appoint Ramadan a presiding magistrate for the Military Tribunal in Jerusalem.[119] During the 1950s and 1960s he was the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference in Jerusalem. He died on 4 August 1995 in Geneva, where he ran the Islamic Centre. Kenneth Cragg comments:

> It is perhaps fair to see in Sa'id Ramadan some indication of how thinking elsewhere in the Ikhwan tradition has been moving since the suppression in Egypt in 1954.[120]

The Development of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers

From the inception of their first branch in October 1945 until the Partition resolution in November 1947, the Palestinian Muslim Brothers developed and expanded rapidly in comparison with the Society's branches in Trans-Jordan (which were formed in the same year). This growth can be measured in different ways:

First, numerically: their membership by February 1946 had reached 15,000,[121] and by 1947, 20,000.[122] These figures do not come as a surprise, considering that a number of leading Palestinian politicians had joined the Society, including Jamal al-Husayni (Jerusalem), vice-president of the Supreme Arab Committee in Palestine, Muhammad Ali al-Ja'bari (Hebron) and Zafir al-Dajani (Jaffa).[123] Furthermore, a number of Islamic organisations and Islamic scholars joined the Society. These included Ansar al-Fadila (Supporters of Virtue), and al-Itisam (The Refuge Organisations of Haifa).[124] The Ikhwan branches were also met with 'great encouragement by the various social classes'.[125] By the time of the adoption of the Partition resolution, the branches of the Muslim Brothers numbered between twenty and twenty-five.[126]

The second yardstick is the speed with which the branch houses were opened. The Jerusalem branch – one of the most important in Palestine – celebrated the inauguration of its house on 6 May 1946. The ceremony was attended by Abd al-Mu'iz Abd al-Satar (representing the headquarters in Cairo) and by more than two thousand people, including Jamal al-Husayni, who said in his speech that for nine years he had been hoping to see the call of the Muslim Brothers flourishing and spreading in Palestine and that his wish was coming true. He announced that he was joining the Society, and he wore their badge.

At the end of the ceremony 1,871 Palestinian pounds were raised for building a house of its own for the branch.[127] In June 1946, the Jerusalem branch opened a second house with a library.[128] Meanwhile, fund-raising reached between six and ten thousand Palestinian pounds,[129] and the branch managed to acquire a plot of land from the Islamic Endowment on which to build its own house.[130] It is probable that the conditions of the 1948 war brought to a halt the construction of that building. In most cases branch houses comprised a library, an office for administration, a room for training and for the Rovers' leadership, a restaurant and a large lecture hall,[131] as in the Gaza branch house, inaugurated at the beginning of 1946.

The third yardstick may be represented by the activities of the Ikhwan branches of Palestine in the social, economic, medical and academic fields. The Constitution of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine stipulated that among their objectives were: transmitting Islamic manners and moral behaviour, spreading Qur'anic values, attempting to achieve a high standard of living, combating poverty and illiteracy, leading a modern way of life within the framework of the spirit of Islam, and safeguarding the rights of Muslims. To reach these objectives, branches were required to present lectures, publish books and set up economic, social and academic institutions like Mosques, schools and hospitals.[132] Accordingly, the Palestinian Muslim Brothers were zealous in emphasising the importance of religious education in schools, delivering sermons in Mosques, forming literacy groups, planning to raise the living standards of the Palestinian family, and setting up clinics for the medical care of the poor.[133] Thus, the Lydda branch formed committees for education matters, propaganda, health, agriculture, and the care of graveyards and Islamic holy places. These committees were charged with supervising the various activities of the Society.[134] In Jaffa another committee was added, the Committee for Organising Labour Affairs.[135] That committee introduced 'The Piastre Project' to raise funds for the Jaffa branch projects, and launched a wide-ranging campaign to recruit into the Society a great number of the educated youth, lawyers, doctors and others.[136]

In the political sphere, following the completion of the administrative structure of the branches, the increase in the number of Muslim Brothers in Palestine and the opening of the house of the main branch in Jerusalem, the Palestinian Muslim Brothers held a conference on 18 October 1946 in Haifa. The conference reviewed the political situ-

ation in the country, and discussed the duties of the Muslim Brothers towards the Palestinian cause, especially after the publication of the report of the Anglo–American Commission of Enquiry. It also debated the Islamic issues related to the programmes and activities of the Muslim Brothers. It was attended by representatives of the Muslim Brothers from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Trans-Jordan, in addition to delegates from Ikhwan branches in Palestine. Jamal al-Husayni also attended. The conference was chaired by Mustafa Fadil al-Ghuri, the chief Shari'a judge of Haifa and the honorary president of its branch. The conference passed the following resolutions, which the Haifa branch was charged with following up and implementing:

1. The Muslim Brothers in Palestine consider the British government responsible for what is taking place in Palestine and hold it to blame for what has taken place as a result of its unjust policies towards the Arabs. They demand that the British government should define its position categorically.
2. They support the Arab League and Egypt in their demands for evacuation and for the unity of the Nile Valley.
3. They demand that the Supreme Arab Organisation should submit the problem of Palestine to the United Nations Security Council.
4. They condemn the position taken by the mandate government on 'Jewish Terrorism', to which the government has failed to put an end, and which has gone beyond acts of aggression against the Arabs to include violation of the Islamic holy places and the properties of the Islamic Endowment; and they consider this, together with what is taking place around al-Buraq Wall, as a prelude to violating the Islamic holy places, something that cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. (A special committee was formed to tackle this matter.)
5. They support the projects aimed at rescuing the land.
6. They declare that they do not recognise the rights of Jews recently arriving in Palestine.
7. They agree on building Muslim Brothers' branches everywhere in Palestine.
8. They resolve to republish the Fatawi, religious rulings, relating to the banning of land sales.
9. They demand that education in Palestine should pass into the hands of Arabs and resolve to hold a special conference on that matter.[137]

These resolutions expressed the views of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, and were influenced by the fact that their circumstances were different from those of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. It is perhaps worth noting that this conference convened on the same lines as the one which took place in Jaffa on 26 December 1945, which was called by the Arab Front in Palestine to discuss practical plans for rescuing Palestine, and was attended by representatives of organisations and parties from Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Trans-Jordan.[138]

It can also be said that the holding of this regional conference for the Muslim Brothers was an attempt by them to emphasise the importance of Palestine in their programme, and to highlight the role of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers – whose branches had been set up one year before or were at the stage of being formed – in solving the Palestinian problem in an Islamic perspective. It was also an attempt to assert the role to be played by the Muslim Brothers in the neighbouring countries in the campaign for the rescue of Palestine. The political stance adopted by the conference towards the Palestine problem was in conformity with the stance taken by the Society in Egypt.

Before the conference opened some branches tried to present their views about the conditions prevailing in Palestine. This was done with the help of Cairo headquarters' delegates. For instance, in June 1946 Abd al-Mu'iz Abd al-Satar, the Cairo headquarters' representative, while addressing the Lydda branch, referred to the existence of a practical programme for rescuing the land of Palestine. Donations for this project reached 1,500 Palestinian pounds. It was further announced that the Muslim Brothers' branches in Palestine would raise 36,000 pounds to repay a loan borrowed by the Supreme Arab Committee from 'The Arab Umma Bank' and paid to it by landowners.[139] The Muslim Brothers of Jaffa formed fund-raising committees for this purpose, and to organise the boycott of Zionist goods and products.[140] The conference was followed by the issuing of statements demanding the rescue of Arab lands and the boycott of Zionist products.[141]

In August 1946 the Muslim Brothers of Lydda sent a memorandum to the high commissioner in Palestine expressing their condolences for the loss of British lives under what they called 'the wave of Jewish terrorism'. They congratulated him on the safety of the survivors, and insisted that the handling of such an irregular situation in Palestine required the British government to 'assert its presence, authority and capability in the face of such terrorism, otherwise things

could become worse, and then we shall hold the British government and its ally, Zionism, responsible.' Furthermore, the British government should meet the demands of the Arabs of Palestine. 'This way the affairs of Palestine will be stabilised and the Arabs can maintain that stability with all possible means.'[142]

Thus, all criteria indicate that the Muslim Brothers in Palestine had grown greatly within the space of a short time. So what were the factors which helped them to achieve that growth? There were internal factors related to the Palestinian people themselves, and external factors introduced by the Muslim Brothers from Egypt.

The internal factors were represented by the fact that the great majority of the Palestinian people were Muslim. Since the Islamic conquest of Palestine, at the time of Umar Ibn al-Khattab, they have remained the gate-keepers and custodians of the Aqsa Mosque, the first of the two *qiblas* and the third holy place of Islam to which the hearts of Muslims everywhere are drawn.[143]

Most Palestinian revolts in this century have been predominantly Islamic. Their leadership was provided by Muslim religious scholars headed by Haj Amin al-Husayni, (the Grand Mufti of Palestine and the chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council there). Then again, the Palestinian people have not forgotten that the 1936 Revolt, which lasted for three years, was instigated by a Syrian scholar, Shaykh al-Qassam, and not a Palestinian Muslim scholar. So it could well be the case that the Palestinian people saw in the Ikhwan movement – which came to them from Egypt, and about whose support for their revolt they had heard – a saviour which would solve their problem and revive al-Qassam's experience at a time when the Palestinian cause had been set back by the arrest or banishment of a number of its leaders.

The external factors were introduced by the delegation from the Cairo headquarters arriving in Palestine. Most significant here was their attempt to arrange a rapprochement among Palestinians, whether families or parties, and to put an end to internal feuds.[144] The delegation asserted before the Palestinians that the cause of the Muslim Brothers was not 'a racist or a sectarian call'.[145] The role of such delegations was crystallised in this respect by the constitution of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, which stipulated that members were strictly forbidden to involve themselves in any political activities or to join any political party whatsoever.[146] The motto of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers was 'non-intervention in party politics and no ill-

feeling towards anyone, irrespective of his religion, race or nationality'.[147] To achieve this objective, the management body of the Jerusalem branch called a meeting in June 1946 of the heads of the six Palestinian parties to discuss ways of reaching a consensus.[148] The Jaffa branch called another meeting for the same purpose.[149] As a result of those efforts, and by reason of their political detachment, the Muslim Brothers' branches became meeting places for prominent Palestinians, irrespective of their parties and beliefs. They also maintained good relations with all Palestinian political parties and families.[150]

The Muslim Brothers in Palestine and the Egyptian Structure

The second external factor which influenced the growth of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine was expressed in a report written by the Ikhwan in Egypt about the situation of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers' branches, which stated that the latter were 'part of the Muslim Brothers' branches in Egypt'[151] This reflected the part played by the representatives of Egypt's Muslim Brothers (for instance, Sa'id Ramadan) in setting up the Palestinian branches. Ramadan distinguished between the Syrian and Palestinian branches of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt. The former decided to link up with the Muslim Brothers in Egypt only later, but the Palestinian branches were set up as a result of Ramadan's visit to Palestine. 'As such, Palestine's branches were totally dependent on Egypt.'[152]

In addition to the role played by Ramadan, the influence of the headquarters in Cairo in guiding the Palestinian branches can be seen through the role of other delegates and trainers sent by headquarters to Palestine, whether for training, monitoring, organising or supervising the branches, or inciting Palestinians to declare *jihad*. These activities were undertaken by senior members, such as Ramadan, Abd al-Mu'iz Abd al-Satar, Abd al-Aziz Ahmad, Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati and others.[153] Other members undertook press assignments for the Muslim Brothers' papers, including a study of the situation of the Arabs in Palestine, especially after the setting up of the Muslim Brothers' branches there. Among these was Abd al-Aziz al-Khayat, a Palestinian from Nablus who lived in Cairo and joined the Ikhwan there.[154] In addition, the Cairo headquarters used to receive comprehensive regular reports about the activities of the branches in Palestine.[155]

Guidance was also provided through the numerous visits paid by Palestinian Muslim Brothers to the Cairo headquarters,[156] like that of Zafir al-Dajani – head of the Jaffa branch and the president of the Chamber of Commerce there – in September 1946. He described the purpose of his visit as being to study the organisation and administrative experience of Egypt's Ikhwan branches, as well as to take instructions on how to utilise this experience in Palestinian branches. Another purpose of such visits was the forging of a strong link between Palestine's branches and the General headquarters. Dajani announced that he had extended an invitation to 'The General Guide' to visit Palestine and officially inaugurate the Ikhwan's house in Jaffa. He had also invited the Egyptian Ikhwan's Acting Troupe to perform the play *al-Mu'iz Li-Din Allah al-Fatimi* in Palestine.[157]

The influence of Egypt's Muslim Brothers was also represented by the guidance and leadership exercised by the Cairo headquarters over the policies of the Palestinian branches. For instance, al-Maktab al-Idari (the Administrative Bureau), a supervisory body which had twenty-one representatives chosen by their branches, was subordinate to al-Hay'a al-Markazinya Li al-Maktab al-Idari, (the Central Committee of the Administrative Bureau). The latter had seventeen members, ten of them nominated by the branches of Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, Nablus and Gaza (two from each branch). The others were appointed by the Cairo headquarters.[158] It seems that the Administrative Bureau of Palestine's branches was quite similar to the Administrative Bureau of Egypt, which was made up out of all 'the districts falling within the Directorate or the Province'. But such boundaries were flexible,[159] so that the whole of Palestine might have been taken as a Directorate, a Province or a bigger unit. The difference between them may lie in the fact that the Egyptian Bureau was formed out of districts (a district was made up of all the branches situated within one region of the country),[160] whereas in Palestine it was made out of all the branches in the country.

The Central Committee of the Administrative Bureau cannot be compared with the General Guidance Council (the supreme administrative body),[161] nor with the constituent body (the General Consultative Council and the General Assembly of the Guidance bureau[162] in Egypt). There was a clear difference between them as regards formation, conditions of membership, committees, chairmanship, duration and even function. It could, however, be considered a

collective leadership of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, as its name suggests. At the beginning of 1946, when the branches were in their formative stage, meetings were held in different branches in turn once every three months, in order for the representatives of the established branches to strengthen the bonds of fraternity between the Palestinian Muslim Brothers and to organise the affairs and activities of those branches.[163] These meetings were attended by representatives from the Cairo headquarters.[164]

Thomas Mayer believes that the power of the Cairo headquarters to expel or appoint the Central Committee members was more real than it would seem. He attributes this to the fact that all members would take their oath of allegiance, *bay'a*, to the General Guide in Cairo. He concludes that, consequently, al-Banna could enforce the appointment of anyone he wanted as a member of the central body in Palestine at any time whatsoever.[165] The first article of the constitution of the Palestine Muslim Brothers confirmed that they were subordinate to the Cairo headquarters.[166] Furthermore, the Palestine Muslim Brothers used to wear the badges of Egypt's Ikhwan, supplied to them from Egypt.[167]

A comparison between the aims, means and conditions of membership of the Muslim Brothers of the two countries[168] reveals that they were very similar to one another. The constitution of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers was largely a set of bye-laws, rather than a constitution proper. Some Egyptian branches also had special bye-laws of their own tailored to suit their particular circumstances.[169] It should be noted that Article 51 of the constitution of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, which was concerned with the branches formed outside Egypt, stipulated that the particular circumstances and conditions of such branches should be taken into consideration.[170] This was later confirmed by al-Banna, when he asserted that branches outside Egypt differed in organisation and strength according to circumstances.[171]

As to the post of general overseer, which was given to the leader or the chairman of the Muslim Brothers outside Egypt, the author believes that no such post with this name existed in Palestine. But Mayer thinks that Haj Amin al-Husayni was nominated 'as the local leader of the Ikhwan in Palestine'. However, Mayer produces no evidence to support this, except that al-Husayni was declared al-Banna's official representative and personal supervisor of the Society's activities in

Palestine.[172] This idea is not shared by Mahmud Abd al-Halim, who believes that al-Husayni was not the leader of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, though he was very close to al-Banna who used to seek his advice on numerous issues. As evidence for this, he contends that al-Banna valued al-Husayni as a symbol, but thought it wise to treat him as an independent personality, believing that this would best serve the Palestinian cause. There was a group of such Islamic dignitaries, including al-Husayni and Hasan al-Hudaybi, whom al-Banna liked to refer to as friends of al-Ikhwan, but whom he preferred to keep outside the ranks of the Society. As an expression of the good relations between al-Ikhwan and al-Husayni it is relevant to mention that Abu al-Makarim Abd al-Hayy, one of the leaders of the Sppecial Section,was married to the daughter of al-Husayni.[173]

When asked about the identity of the general overseer of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine, the leaders of the Society I met in Egypt referred me to Sa'id Ramadan, who founded the movement in Palestine and has more knowledge about it than anyone. Ramadan does not believe that al-Husayni was the general overseer; in fact he believes that no one was appointed or elected to the role.[174] What makes Ramadan's account persuasive is the fact that the branches in Palestine were part of the Egyptian structure, which would mean that they enjoyed the same status as Egypt's branches, having a head but not a general overseer. Besides, the Central Committee of the Administrative Bureau in Palestine, which the author considers to have been a collective leadership, and which was the highest authority in the Palestinian branches, could elect one of its members as a leader, but he was never known as a general overseer.

However, in the reports written by Egypt's Ikhwan on the Palestinian branches, Muhammad Ali al-Ja'bari, Mayor of Hebron, was cited in December 1945 as 'The Chief of the Ikhwan in Palestine'.[175] In February 1948, Abd al-Aziz al-Khayat was cited with the same title.[176] According to the Muslim Brothers' traditions, the holder of the post of general overseer (like the general guide)[177] would have it for life unless he resigned or became incapable of holding it. The post of branch head was a temporary one, lasting for a fixed period (two years in Egypt).[178] We have noticed that the post of chairman changed hands after the end of a two year period, which means that it was not identical with that of general overseer.

As Palestine's branches were not autonomous, unlike the branches of Syria and Lebanon, and as they were, to use Ishaq al-Husayni's words, 'branches of Egypt's Ikhwan and subject to them in methods and beliefs',[179] consequently they would share the growth and progress of the branches of al-Ikhwan in Egypt during the post-war period. Indeed, it was to be expected that such growth and progress would be more evident in Palestine because of the special place it occupied in the programme of the Muslim Brothers, and by reason of the preparations which they had made previously.

Britain and the Muslim Brothers in Palestine

The British authorities observed the expansion of the Society's activities after the Second World War and the Ikhwan's declaration of the beginning of *jihad* with growing anxiety. Particularly since the British had warned Egyptian governments as far back as the 1930s of the threat posed by the Muslim Brothers, whom they thought capable of becoming one day so strong as to make them difficult to control, for they were 'a xenophobic obscurantist Society'. Meanwhile, the British authorities had not forgotten the stance taken by the Society against British policy in Palestine, and its attempt to incite public opinion against the British during the 1936–39 revolt. British Foreign Office reports of 1945 predicted that 'tomorrow, they (the Muslim Brothers) may be dangerous in promoting agitation, particularly on religious issues such as Palestine.'[180]

British apprehension meant that efforts were made to obstruct the activities of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine. These attempts took two forms, of which the first was related to the Ikhwan coming from Egypt. The British, at first, warned a number of Palestinians against the Muslim Brothers. Sa'id Ramadan quoted Hazim Nuseibeh – the representative of the Arab News Agency (a British news agency affiliate of Reuter) – as telling him on his first visit to Palestine that the British authorities there had warned him to be on his guard against Ramadan, though at the time they were not acquainted. According to Ramadan, Hazim later told him that the warning led him to his respect and appreciation.[181]

Later, when the activities of the Muslim Brothers became more evident, the British authorities removed them from the scene, expelling delegates such as Mahmud Labib.[182] They guarded the borders

closely, with the aim of blocking entry into Palestine by Egyptian Muslim Brothers and other nationalist elements;[183] They also banned a number of Society members from even passing through Palestine.[184] Ramadan, for instance, was only allowed to enter Palestine after several attempts, and after waiting at the Palestinian border for twenty-four hours. Even then he was allowed to remain there for no more than seventy-two hours, during which a warrant for his arrest was issued and he made his escape back to Egypt, as previously related.[185]

Kamil al-Sharif recalled that he tried to enter Palestine in November 1947, and was met by many obstacles which compelled him more than once to return to Egypt. He finally had to make a very long and cautious journey on foot until he arrived at Jaffa. However, he was later arrested, together with some Palestinian members of the Society, while he was leading them on a reconnaissance patrol in the Tel-Aviv suburbs. During his interrogation, the British officer said to him: 'You Muslim Brothers are trying to stir up trouble in Palestine and you do not let any chance pass to achieve that end.' Al-Sharif also relates that he later managed to escape while the group was being led to prison.[186] Whether this account is accurate or not, there seem to be previous indications confirming that the Muslim Brothers coming from Egypt were regularly harassed by the British authorities in Palestine. When the circulation figures of *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* showed that it was being sold in most Palestinian towns, the British authorities banned its entry to the country and seized any copies they could find.[187]

The second form taken by British efforts to forestall the growth of the Muslim Brotherhood was the imposition of restrictions on the movements of Palestinian Brothers. When their numbers and popularity increased, the mandate government attempted, in December 1946, to curb them through its administrative regulations – which forbade its civil servants to join any political association – by specifically denying its Arab clerks the right to join the Society.[188] In November 1947, when the Palestine question was brought to the United Nations and the early signs of the armed struggle appeared, the mandate government once more issued instructions to its Arab employees forbidding them from joining the Society or otherwise taking any part in any of its activities. It also instructed provincial and district governors not to allow the Rover Troops of the Society to

stage any parades in towns and villages. This prompted the Muslim Brothers to send a protest delegation to the secretary-general of the government of Palestine. The delegation comprised Shaykh Umar Sawan and Nimr al-Musri. The secretary-general informed them however, that he had strict instructions to curb the undesirable activities of the Muslim Brothers:

> ... after the evidence which has proved to our satisfaction that you have an effective contact with the Ikhwan in Egypt. This contact makes us unhappy with your activities. Furthermore, the policy of having envoys sent from Egypt is a dangerous policy with which we do not agree at all.[189]

Consequently, the Palestinian press was forbidden to report the important aspects of the Muslim Brothers' activities, whether these activities were in Egypt or in Palestine.

The Muslim Brothers' Military Regiments in Palestine

Given that the Palestinian branches of the Muslim Brothers were subsumed under the Egyptian society, and recalling the military preparations mounted in Egypt by the Society for the rescue of Palestine, it can be assumed that there was serious interest in the Brothers' military activity inside Palestine itself, and that the Palestinians expected to take the major share in any military operations until reinforcements from abroad could come to their assistance.

Article 2 of the Constitution of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers stipulated that their primary goal was the liberation and rescue of Palestine from 'the injustice' imposed upon it and the safeguarding and support of Arab and Islamic unity.[190] The means adopted to arrive at this goal was the raising of the academic cultural, moral and athletic standards of the population; sports were encouraged among them so that they would become 'a nation sound in mind and body, productive and virtuous in its deeds.'[191] Just as the Society in Egypt gave serious attention to educating its members in an Islamic manner as part of its military preparations, so the society in Palestine emphasised the concept of Islamic education in the ranks of its branches.

Some Western observers are surprised that moral training received so much emphasis in a struggle that called for physical fitness and material preparedness.[192] But in placing emphasis on this aspect the

Brothers were following what they saw as a basic Islamic concern to be stressed before and during battle. This view was supported by the saying of Umar Ibn al-Khattab to Sa'd Ibn Abi Waqqas, the commander of the Muslim armies heading for the conquest of Persia:

> I instruct you and your companions to fear God and adhere to Him, whatsoever happens, for the fear of God and adherence to Him is the best equipment against the enemy and the best strategem in wars. I instruct you to beware of committing sins, more than to beware of your enemy: for the guilty deeds of an army frighten that army more than its enemy. Muslims only win through the disobedience of their enemy to God. Had it not been for that we would never have had the upper hand over them: we were not equal to them in number or in equipment, and if we commit as many sins as they, they shall have the advantage over us through their might. If we cannot defeat them through our virtues, then our strength will not overpower them.[193]

As to the military preparation of the Palestinian branches, it took the shape of Rover Troops, which were modelled on the same pattern as Egypt's Ikhwan Rovers. Most Palestinian branches, especially the main ones, had such troops. For instance, in Jaffa branch, the Rovers were led by Khamis Abu al-Layl, in Jerusalem by Sa'id Awad and in Haifa by Ibrahim al-Ramlawi.[194]

In July 1946, the Cairo headquarters sent Abd al-Aziz Ahmad, the general overseer of Egypt's Ikhwan Rovers, to organise the Rovers of Palestine. Together with some technical staff sent by the Cairo headquarters on the same mission, Abd al-Aziz played a major role in their formation, organisation and para-military training, in order to raise them to the standard of the Egyptian Ikhwan Rovers. He also tried to set up joint military training sessions involving Ikhwan Rovers and some Palestinian Youth Organisations.[195] A number of training camps were organised to serve the Muslim Brothers of Palestine, notably the first camp between 27 and 29 July 1948, which was sited south of Jaffa on the Mediterranean coast. It was attended by Abd al-Aziz Ahmad and had a programme similar to that of Egypt's Muslim Brothers' camps.[196]

In a bid to strengthen contact and communication between the Rovers of the two countries, some Palestinian Rovers, including those of Haifa and Jaffa, paid a visit to the Society's General Administration of Rovers in Cairo during April 1947. They remained there for a

week during which they met Mahmud Labib.[197] The emphasis placed on Jaffa and Haifa by the Palestinian Muslim Brothers – as far as their Rovers and their activities were concerned – may be attributed to the fact that both cities, overlooking the sea, were strategically important. Furthermore, Haifa then had a large Jewish population and the Muslim Brothers may have wanted to demonstrate their strength and preparedness to the Jews as part of the psychological war.

On a different level, the Palestinian people realised, too late, the disparity between their military capability and that of the Zionists. The Zionists of Palestine were well supplied with weapons, ammunition and military experts,whilst the Palestinian people were alone on the battlefield without any military help from Arab countries, as distinct from their political support.[198] Political support alone was not enough, as there was every indication that an armed conflict was about to erupt in Palestine. To illustrate this, the resolutions of the Council of the Arab League – especially the one relating to Arab military preparations and financial and military aid to the Palestinian people adopted at a meeting in Lebanon between 7 and 15 October 1947 – were not implemented, and were replaced by other resolutions after the start of the 1948 war.[199] This negative and hesitant Arab attitude may be attributed to clashes of personality among the heads of governments, kings and princes of the independent Arab countries at the time, and to the fact that most Arab armies were then in their formative stage, and some of them were under British control and supervision.[200]

The fact that the Palestinian people were slow to act may be attributed to many reasons, notably the restrictions imposed by the mandate government on Palestinians acquiring arms or training with them. A number of elderly Palestinians, who witnessed these events, report that the mandate government, in many instances, passed sentences of capital punishment on Palestinians who were found in possession of even a hunting gun. In addition, there was the political and familial factionalism which affected the Palestinian people.

These and other reasons[201] delayed military organisation in Palestine; but, despite this, Palestinians tried to organise themselves militarily. A para-military scout organisation was formed called Najjadah – a name borrowed from an Islamic scout organisation in Beirut – with Jaffa as its headquarters. Najjadah was led by Mohammad Nimir al-Hawari, and large numbers of Palestinian youths enlisted in it. Training sessions, parades and excursions were organised, and the

movement was greeted with satisfaction by the Palestinian people.[202] It is interesting to remember that the Muslim Brothers' Rovers in Palestine were formed shortly before the inception of this organisation.[203] This may have prompted the leaders of Najjadah to mould it on the Ikhwan Rover or Arab Scout models, especially in view of its borrowed name.

Early in July 1947 al-Banna deputed Abd al-Aziz Ahmad, the general overseer of the Ikhwan Rovers in Egypt, to attend the main parade of Najjadah in Jaffa.[204]

Shortly after the establishment of Najjadah, a rift developed between its organisers and the Arab party. This prompted the Arab party to form a similar organisation called Futuwwa, led by Muhammad Kamel Urikat. The rivalry between the two organisations was reinforced by local party politics and occasionally led to clashes, tension and verbal abuse.[205] The Muslim Brothers of Egypt got in touch with various Palestinian leaders, especially Amin al-Husayni, to mediate between the two feuding factions and bring about a reconciliation. The Ikhwan believed that such a conflict between two Palestinian forces, at such a time, represented a major threat to the Palestinian cause.[206]

These contacts led to the signing, on 25 October 1946, of an agreement between the leaders of the two organisations: Mohammed Nimir al-Hawari (the leader of Najjadah) and Amil al-Ghouri (the Secretary of the Arab Party on behalf of Futuwwa). The agreement provided for the unification of the two organisations. The Supreme Arab Committee formed a tripartite committee to draft a proposed constitution for the new organisation, which was given the name of the Arab Youth Organisation, and put under the supervision and control of the Supreme Arab Committee.[207] Following this, as a result of the efforts previously exerted by the Muslim Brothers, and also because of the close relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the Supreme Arab Committee, the latter appointed Mahmud Labib as leader of the new organisation. With the help of the Supreme Arab Committee, he worked towards unifying the youth movements, in addition to training and organising them on a military basis. This led Labib to claim that, thanks to the help given by the Supreme Arab Committee, he managed to form 'a large army of Palestinians whose task is to defend the land of Palestine.'[208] The new organisation, according to his estimate, numbered about 10,000.[209] Later, when a delegation from the

organisation visited Egypt as guests of the Ministry of Education, al-Banna visited them at their residence and the Ikhwan Rovers held a reception for them.[210]

Mayer believes that Labib's efforts constituted one of the most important initiatives for rallying the Palestinian youth to create the Arab Palestinian Army,[211] which was later to constitute a substantial obstacle to Zionist ambitions in Palestine. It is worth noting that Labib, the commander of that army, was an experienced army officer who had been involved in military operations since the turn of the century and, indeed, had led an army with Salih Harb which took over the desert area between Jaghaboub, Seiwa and Jallo.[212] He was also one of the commanders of the Muslim Brothers' military units, and particularly of the officers' department of the Special Section.

Ever since 1936, the Muslim Brothers had opposed British policy in Palestine. By taking a prominent part, if not the lead, in the prospective struggle, they now showed that they had been serious about their intention to declare *jihad* for the liberation of Palestine. The British authorities in Palestine, on learning of Labib's mission – and aware that its success could upset their plans – decided in April 1947 to expel him, despite the fact that he had entered the country legally, together with a number of technicians who had been sent in advance by the Muslim Brothers in Cairo to help establish and train the Palestinian Rovers.[213] When Labib refused to leave, the British authorities expelled him from Palestine by force.[214] The authorities at the time were fully aware of the preparations being made by Jewish organisations, and had even suffered their attacks. They were also fully aware of the presence of hundreds of officers and instructors who had entered Palestine illegally to help the Zionists. Darwaza, the Palestinian historian, described this as further evidence that there was a conspiracy against the Arabs – at a time when the Palestine question was entering a crucial stage – as well as an attempt to prevent Arabs from organising in their own defence. [215]

The expulsion of Labib had a very damaging effect on the unity of the Arab Youth Organisation. He was replaced by the commander of Futuwwa, but Najjadah leaders, who had their differences with al-Husayni, resented this appointment and feared that it would hand over control of the organisation to al-Husayni. Accordingly, they refused to co-operate with the new commander.[216] The Palestinian Muslim Brothers tried to bridge the gap created by the expulsion of

Labib. They called a meeting of the representatives of the Muslim Brothers' branches to announce the formation of the Palestinian Rovers Union,[217] but the meeting was cancelled because of the unrest and the armed clashes in most Palestinian cities and towns following the parti tion resolution of 29 November 1947.

To summarise, the rapid growth of the Society by the end of the Second World War, and the degree of military preparation it had achieved, prompted it to declare the beginning of the stage of jihad. This required a more positive approach to the struggle for the Palestinian cause, which took the form of setting up more Ikhwan branches in Palestine and neighbouring Arab countries. These branches were to be in a state of constant military alert. This was intended to produce a more effective contribution to the Palestinian cause than if Egypt's Muslim Brothers had been acting alone.

At the same time, the Society conducted mediation between Palestinian political parties and rival clans. It sent experts and technicians to help in setting up and training the Palestinian Rovers. The fact that, despite this, its efforts towards building up an Arab army in Palestine failed can be explained – in the opinion of the author – by the restrictions imposed by the British authorities, and the ban on their carrying arms and training with them. This had a negative effect on the unity and organisation of the army. The international factors which brought about the Partition decision gave the Society no chance to undertake further military preparations. The Muslim Brothers' branches in Palestine could not be expected in two years, however intensive the Society's efforts, to attain the level reached by the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, who had been in existence since 1928. Despite this, the Society did achieve the goal which it had set itself for that stage. That goal, in the words of Sa'id Ramadan, was the establishment of branches of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine.

CHAPTER NINE

The Eve of Military Action

The end of the 1930s and the beginning of the 1940s saw Egypt drawing closer to Arab issues generally and the Palestine question in particular. The policy of keeping Egypt in isolation was gradually being abandoned, partly because of the activities of the Muslim Brothers ever since 1936. With the end of the Second World War, this change in policy became more evident when the Palestine question became an inseparable part of Egyptian political and national life. It became an issue of conflict and rivalry amongst the various factions within the Egyptian nationalist movement, each of which made the Palestine question part of its policies and activities.[1]

What concerns us here is the technique adopted by the Muslim Brothers in their approach to the Palestine question until they reached the stage of the 'eruption of the volcano', a stage for which they had prepared in various ways. We shall examine the developments between the end of the Second World War and the Partition resolution of 29 November 1947, which prompted the Society to launch its stage of armed operations inside Palestine.

Jewish Immigration into Palestine

The Second World War transferred the leadership of the Western camp to the United States of America. Consequently, Zionism moved the centre of its activities from Britain to America, as the latter now became the dominant element on the scene. The United States, with a growing interest in the Arab World, especially in controlling its resources, saw its advantage in allying itself with the Zionist movement with its aim of setting up a national state for the Jews in Palestine. Accordingly, the United States government embarked on a wide-ranging campaign in favour of allowing Jewish immigration into Palestine to continue beyond the 1945 deadline provided for in the White Paper of 1939.[2] As a reaction to American support for the Zionists'

demands, the Muslim Brothers directed their attention and activities against this new policy. The Palestine question became the first direct point of conflict between the Muslim Brothers and America, the newcomer to the Arab region.

The starting point came at the beginning of 1944 when Wagner, a member of the American Senate, submitted a proposal to the House to support the continuation of Jewish immigration to Palestine as a prelude to the establishment of a Jewish national state. The Muslim Brothers reacted with a series of telegrams to the Prime Minister of Egypt,[3] the American representative in Cairo and the British ambassador.[4] When the American government – in response to protests from Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon – officially informed the Egyptian prime minister that the proposal did not actually represent its views, the Muslim Brothers took it that the American government felt obliged to take this official line for various reasons, notably the need to retain Arab support until the end of the war. However, they did not overlook the fact that the American government turned a blind eye to private initiatives to rally public opinion, to raise funds and even to recruit 'Zionist military gangs'. 'All this clearly illustrates that Zionism in America and Britain has rallied its ranks and mobilised its efforts and men, whether politicians, financiers or military, in order to reach its goals, with the influence of politicians, the magic of money and the power of the gun.'[5]

On 5 August 1944 al-Banna wrote to the American representatives in Cairo, protesting against the statements made on the Palestine question by both the Republican and the Democratic Parties in the USA, and against the encouragement of the immigration of Jews into Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state there. Al-Banna described the statements as a ploy to win over the Jewish vote in the American presidential elections, adding that they conflicted with the Atlantic Charter and with America's aim of strengthening friendly relations with oriental countries. He concluded his message by asserting:

> Maybe the fact that the soil of Palestine is still wet with the blood of the Arab martyrs is the most striking indication that such solutions as that proposed by America are not proper solutions but rather are complications and provocations.[6]

When President Roosevelt, in November 1944, made a statement in line with those made earlier by the two American parties, the Muslim Brothers demanded that Arabs and Muslims should weigh things in its light and know who were their friends and who were their enemies.[7] Following that statement, the Society went a step further in its attacks against the United States. Al-Banna, as representative of the Muslim Brothers, attended a meeting held on 18 November 1944 at the headquarters of the Muslim Youth Society. It was called by Fu'ad Abbas, the president of the Arab Union in Cairo and attended by the organisations most interested in the Arab cause. Its agenda was to discuss and consider what could be done for Palestine in the light of the declared stand of the American political parties and of President Roosevelt. At the end of the meeting a message was sent to Roosevelt protesting against his pro-Zionist declaration during the electoral campaign, and setting out the historical rights of the Arabs in Palestine [8]

When the Second World War was over, the Muslim Brothers had thought that support for Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish national state in Palestine would end with the defeat of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany.[9] They suggested that to solve the problems of the Jews who were homeless and impoverished as a result of past persecution, the Allies should confiscate the assets of Nazis and Fascists, and use them to compensate the Jews in the countries where they were born: 'Is not that a double measure of justice whereby the villain is punished and the victim compensated?' As to the Jews who were living in misery in Europe, the Muslim Brothers suggested that America and Britain should help them to emigrate to Australia, with its vast area and rich resources, a country which actually needed immigrants. Otherwise, it was asked, why could America not settle them in its own land, 'for if every one out of ten American families gave refuge to one Jew, the problems of thousands of Jews would be solved.'[10]

The Muslim Brothers launched yet another attack against America when President Truman announced that he had submitted a proposal to the Potsdam Conference (July 1945) for the three major powers (America, Russia and Britain) to allow as many Jews as possible to enter Palestine and that he had discussed with the British prime minister the establishment of a Jewish national state.[11] Though the Muslim Brothers concentrated their attacks on America after the war because

of its leading role where Palestine was concerned, Britain did not escape their wrath. They accused the British Labour government, which was elected in July 1945, of Zionist bias.[12]

On a practical level, the Muslim Brothers appealed to Arabs and Muslims 'to liberate Palestine industrially and commercially'[13] in addition to the efforts aimed at the rescue of Palestine politically. The aim of this was to stop Jewish immigration into Palestine.

They made a number of proposals in this respect, notably the imposition of an economic boycott of the Jews and an embargo to be implemented by the Arab countries, which should pass the necessary legislation; and they tried to make use of nationalist and religious feelings to achieve these aims. The same weapon was to be used against pro-Zionists all over the world.[14] In parallel, they proposed to the Arab countries that they should upgrade Arab industries and pay attention to industrial and academic research. The Economic Committee of the Arab League should hold conferences to discuss the rationalisation of their economic planning and to consider ways of developing Arab industries. The proposals also included legislation to prevent Jews from buying agricultural land in Arab countries adjacent to Palestine, as a Jewish presence there would constitute a military threat; to ban Jewish investment in any economic project involving Arab resources which – at that time – were not fully utilised, like those at al Gezira in Iraq and in the Sinai Peninsula; and to ban Jews from visiting such places without authorisation. They also included the expulsion of Jews who had come to Arab countries with the British and Allied authorities during the war. Jews who had been in those countries before the war would be treated as citizens, provided that they did not engage in any Zionist propaganda, particularly in America.[15] As to the issue of land, so crucial to the formation of any state, the Muslim Brothers proposed that Arab governments set up an Arab company to purchase land in Palestine in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of Jews. This would close the door to Zionism which depended above all on the acquisition and development of land in Palestine.[16]

The section of the Society for liaison with the Islamic World crystallised these proposals in a memorandum which it sent to Abd al-Rahman Azzam, the secretary general of the Arab League. It was signed by al-Banna in August 1945, on the occasion of the meeting of the Economic and Agricultural Committee of the Arab League.

The memorandum pointed out that the only way to rescue the land of Palestine was to make the Arab world fully aware of the serious consequences of losing it. This could be followed by the creation of an Arab real estate company: a joint venture between individual Arabs and the Arab government. The company was to be called the company for rescuing Palestinian lands. Its object would be to purchase land in Palestine on behalf of the Arab world. Any transaction concerning this land, whether of sale or lease, should be negotiated only by that company, in such a way as to make it impossible for a single *dunum* to pass into the hands of anyone other than 'trustworthy Arabs'.[17]

The Demonstrations of 2 November 1945

After the Second World War, the Muslim Brothers inaugurated their Palestinian struggle, following their declaration of the start of the stage of *jihad*, with a wave of demonstrations against Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine and against British policy there. They initiated the campaign on 2 November 1945, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. The General Headquarters of the Muslim Brothers had received a telegram from the Arab party of Palestine appealing to them to take part in the General Strike of 2 November 1945 as 'the beginning of a collective Arab and Muslim jihad', and decided to join it.[18] They also decided to print a special issue of their magazine *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* in support of the Palestine question.[19] Arab and Islamic organisations in Egypt (The Muslim Brothers, Muslim Youth, The Arab Union and Arab Unity) held a joint meeting and issued a statement calling upon the Egyptian people to stage a two-hour strike on 2 November.[20] The Muslim Brothers called upon the Jews in Arab countries to join the strike as an expression of their opposition to the Balfour Declaration, in order to test their claims that they were nationalists and that Zionism was against their interests: 'This way we will know who are the Zionists in our countries in order to take new attitudes towards them of which they shall shortly be aware.'[21]

Here a question arises: was the aim of the strike and of the demonstrations the same as that of the 1936–39 demonstrations, which corresponded with the stage of propaganda, the first stage in the Ikhwan's involvement in Palestine? The answer seems to be in the negative because the researcher believes that the aim of the 1936–

1939 demonstrations was no longer appropriate for the stage of post-war preparedness and the beginning of jihad. Tawfiq al-Shawi, the representative of the Section for Liaison with the Islamic world, said the aim of the Muslim Brothers in joining this strike was

> ... not to make an abstract protest nor was it an expression of opinions or of a demand. It was not merely a propaganda act. It was an assertion of the force that would dictate and impose Arab rights. It was a manifestation of the unity with which the Arabs would approach the struggle. It was also an indication that serious productive work was about to begin, only to end in victory.[22]

Schools and university students, mostly from the Muslim Brothers, staged their demonstrations on the first day of November, as the second was a Friday, 'a holiday'.[23] On 2 November 1945, after the Friday prayers, al-Banna led a mass demonstration in which more than 100,000 people took part. It started from al-Azhar and finished at Abidin Square after al-Banna had made a moving speech denouncing Zionist ambitions, methods and supporters. On the same day, the Muslim Brothers led similar demonstrations in all parts of Egypt. For instance, in the Amiri Oil Refineries the Muslim Brothers went on strike and so did those in the Khedive Company of Suez. There was also a demonstration by the canal workers of Port Said led by the Muslim Brothers and other demonstrations in Alexandria, Mansura and Tanta. Following these demonstrations some branches sent telegrams and memoranda to the British Embassy, the American Legation in Cairo, the Prime Minister of Egypt, and the Secretary General of the Arab League. During the demonstration in Cairo and Alexandria, some Jewish stores were looted. Cafes, hotels and night clubs in the European quarter of Alexandria were also attacked, and as a result, five people were killed and 200 sustained injuries. British property and Royal Navy vehicles sustained some damage and two naval ratings were also wounded.[24] Al- Banna condemned the looting that took place during the demonstrations and warned his followers against taking part in it.[25] Salih Ashmawi accused hooligans and some Jews of being behind the looting and asserted that the Jews were responsible for starting the attack and that they had started shooting at the demonstrators in the Jewish quarter of Cairo.[26]

It is perhaps interesting to note that these demonstrations were broadly based and involved a wide cross-section of Egyptians, which is an indication of the attachment of Egyptians to the Palestinian anti-Zionist movement. The British ambassador in Cairo reported that the 2 November demonstrations took place in various Middle Eastern countries, but 'it was only in Egypt that they had led to looting and bloodshed.'[27] The participation of different elements of the population reflected in some ways the emphasis placed by the Muslim Brothers on mass mobilisation: what took place that day was not merely an attempt by the Brothers to show their strength and preparedness over the Palestine question, but also something of a public event in Egypt, precisely what they had aimed at.

The following year the Supreme Arab Committee for Palestine made an appeal to all Arab countries to go on strike again on 2 November 1946, in solidarity with Palestine and as a protest against the Balfour Declaration. The Muslim Brothers' general headquarters invited representatives of all Arab and Muslim political parties, associations and organisations, to a meeting at the new Hilmyia headquarters of the Ikhwan on the evening of 30 October 1946. The business of that meeting was to discuss and define the Egyptian attitude to the situation in Palestine;[28] but the Egyptian government banned the meeting and the police cordoned the Ikhwan headquarters. The Muslim Brothers protested describing the government's position as 'curious' and 'tactless' and also accused it 'of being in the habit of denying civil rights and of suppressing the will of the people.' The Brothers held up the government to Arab and Islamic countries as being responsible for this attitude.'[29] The protests developed into attacks against the Egyptian government when it took the necessary measures to restore life to normal in Cairo and other Egyptian cities:

> Thus the government has revealed to the Arab world its real feeling about the meaning of Arab unity ... and just how sincere it really is about the Palestine question – at a time when it claims to be the leader of the Arab world. We are really surprised how Arab countries can interpret this curious position adopted by the government of Egypt which everyone treats as a leader and which all view with hope. We find that other Arab countries responded positively, went ahead and acted, whilst the leading country remained idle, and opposed and threatened everyone who loyally tried to answer the call of Palestine.

The Muslim Brothers described the Egyptian government as 'a colonialist and not an Arab government.'[30] Nor can there be any doubt that it was the strength of the 1945 demonstrations and the damage sustained by some foreign, and particularly British, firms that prompted the Egyptian government (which in November 1945 had promised the British Embassy to restrict similar demonstrations)[31] to ban any renewal of them in November 1946.

Despite this, the Muslim Brothers did not let the anniversary pass without reminding people of the sufferings of Palestine as a result of the Balfour Declaration. As demonstrations were banned, the Ikhwan headquarters held a public meeting on 2 November 1945, to listen to a lecture by Hamada al-Nahil, a solicitor, about the Balfour Declaration and its political and legal consequences.[32]

The Jews in Egypt

The proposals put forward by the Muslim Brothers, asking Arab governments to restrict the activities of Jews in their countries, may have been related to the increase in Zionist activities, public and clandestine, in Egypt during the first half of the 1940s. In 1943 Leon Castro decided to reorganise the branches of the Zionist organisation in Egypt under the name of the Zionist Union. At that time the Haganah had a network in Egypt which intensified its activities after 1944.[33] Despite the warning given at the beginning of July 1944 by Hasan Rifa't, the under-secretary of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior, not to allow the Zionist organisation to establish a branch in Egypt, 'Zionism continued its activities and followed its defined course, conspiring against the Arabs in Palestine and betraying the Arabs in Egypt.'[34]

This Zionist activity continued vigorously until March 1945 when Gable Sadophisci, the secretary- general of the new Zionist organisation and a member of the terrorist Stern Gang was arrested. Stern had carried out a number of terrorist operations in Egypt, notably the assassination of Lord Moyne, Britain's chief representative in the Middle East, on 6 November 1944. It had also attempted to blow up the hall where the Arab League conference was to be held in the Antonyaris Palace in Alexandria.[35] Despite Rifa't's warning about setting up branches of the Zionist organisation in Cairo, on 17 June 1944 the minister, Fu'ad Serag al-Din, gave Albert Jacob Murzahi, permission to publish a Zionist paper called *al-Tas'ira* which adopted underhand

ways of attacking anti-Zionist or anti-Jewish Egyptian papers.[36] Siham Nasar, the researcher, discovered from the reports of the Egyptian Directorate of Publications at that time that Albert Murzahi had once worked for Fu'ad Serag al-Din, to whom he had passed on information about some leaflets which led to the arrest of Makram Ubayd and some of his supporters. As his reward, Serag al-Din granted him a licence to publish *al-Tas'ira*. Though Serag al Din denied this, Albert Murzahi himself confessed that he had helped in the arrest of Makram Ubayd and his supporters.[37] Another – though perhaps less clear-cut – example of this kind of activity was the journal al-Katib al-Misri, 'The Egyptian Writer' owned by four brothers from the Jewish al-Hawarri family. First published in October 1945, its editor-in chief was Taha Husayn who, at one point, wrote expressing his sympathy with the Jews immigrating into Palestine. Among other prominent Egyptian writers who contributed to this journal was Sayyid Qutub,[38] who during the 1950s and 1960s became the philosopher of the Muslim Brothers.

In the face of these activities, in 1946 the Muslim Brothers launched an intensive campaign against Jews in Egypt. The campaign began with the demonstration of 2 November which was directly followed by the formation of a special committee comprising Arab and Islamic organisations in Egypt, in which the Muslim Brothers played a main role, to boycott Jewish products. In its statements, the committee appealed to people to support the boycott and treat the Jews of Egypt is they did the Zionists.[39] Before and after the demonstration, the Muslim Brothers engaged in a concentrated campaign against the Jews, conducted through public declarations and pamphlets.[40]

Nor did the Muslim Brothers take on board the campaign waged by a Zionist paper and by some Jewish personalities, including Renet Qatawi, the president of the Jewish Community in Egypt, whose aim was to draw a distinction between Judaism and Zionism.[41] According to Bartlett Crum, a member of the Anglo–American Commission of Enquiry of 1947, Qatawi represented a small group of anti-Zionist Jews in Egypt.[42] But the Muslim Brothers believed that the acts of the Egyptian Jews meant there was no difference between Judaism and Zionism. They accused the Jews of Egypt of setting up papers and magazines which represented the interests of Zionism and promoted it. They also referred to the attempts made by the Eastern Advertisement Company, directed by a Jew named Henry Haim, to influence

the Egyptian press through advertisements and demanded that the Arab League and the Egyptian government should check their activities. They also called for a boycott of the Zionist press in Egypt 'as it deserves to be boycotted more than the goods and products which the Arab League has decided to boycott in Arab countries.'[43]

To reinforce their demands, the Brothers accused Egyptian Jews of smuggling arms and ammunition from the Canal zone through Jewish officials who worked for the Suez Canal Company (an Anglo–French company) and of passing them to the Jews of Palestine and again demanded that the Arab Leagueand Egyptian government should put an end to these operations.[44] They also uncovered the existence of a Zionist gang in the al-Sakkakini quarter of Cairo, whose object was to persuade young Jews to go to Palestine and to smuggle them in by sea or across the desert.[45] They even attacked the role of the Jews in the field of sports, accusing them of an attempt to exclude Egyptian elements from clubs, especially al-Ma'adi Sporting Club.[46] Their newspaper, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun also revealed that the previous Egyptian government had permitted the formation of a committee headed by the Chief Rabbi in Egypt to raise funds for the Jews of Palestine. It was estimated that, up to June 1946, 3 million pounds had been collected[47] – a quite credible figure given the activities of the Zionists, the wealth of many Egyptian Jews, and the size of the Jewish community – 65,639 according to the census of 1947.[48]

The Muslim Brothers' aim was to warn the Egyptian government against what they called 'the Jewish Threat in Egypt.' They demanded that Egyptian Jews should be treated strictly and firmly alleging that they supported a Communist movement aimed at toppling the government of Egypt. They also suggested that Jewish gangs, some of whose members had been arrested on suspicion of plans to assassinate a number of Egyptian leaders, were bent on staging terrorist operations in Egypt, to distract the attention of the British from Zionist terrorism in Palestine.[49]

On 4 November 1947, the Egyptian government promulgated the companies law, which decreed that the majority of directors in any company should be Egyptian, while the number of Egyptian workers should not be less than 75 per cent and they should earn 65 per cent of the total wages. Most of those affected by this law were Jewish, a matter that led to considerable economic problems for the Jews.[50] On 29 November 1947 the Egyptian government announced measures

for the protection of Jewish assets.[51] This prompted al-Banna to send a message to Haim Nahum, the Chief Rabbi of Egypt. The message said that the best protection for Jewish assets in Egypt during the surge of nationalist pro-Palestinian feelings following the Partition resolution was for the Chief Rabbi and the dignitaries of the Israeli community to express their sympathy with the Egyptian people – materially and otherwise – in their struggle for the salvation of Palestine. Furthermore, they should send telegrams – as promptly as possible – to the United Nations, the Jewish agency and to all interested international and Zionist organisations to this effect, emphasising that all Jews in Egypt would be at the forefront of those fighting to assert the Arabism of Palestine.[52] The Muslim Brothers received many telegrams from various bodies and organisations in Egypt supporting al-Banna's initiative.[53]

After the Partition resolution, relations between the Muslim Brothers and the Jews of Egypt were to enter a new era of violence – an inevitable result, in many ways, of the intensive campaign waged by the Society against the Jews of Egypt ever since the 1936–39 Palestine Revolt.

The Anglo–American Commission of Enquiry

On 29 January 1946 the United States proposed an Anglo-American Commission of Enquiry and that in the meantime Jewish immigration should continue. In response, the 'Arab and Islamic Organisations Front' in Egypt immediately held a meeting. The Front included the Muslim Brothers, Muslim Youth, the Arab Union, the Arab Society and the Arab Palestinian Society. They issued a statement which said that by permitting the immigration of 1,500 Jews monthly into Palestine, despite the obligation to wait for the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the British government was violating the White Paper. The Front saw that in face of the 'new English inclination' to support Zionism it had to appeal to the Egyptian people to declare a general strike in solidarity with the strike in Palestine and in other Arab countries,[54] but the strike was not carried out.

The Muslim Brothers saw no point in the Commission of Enquiry for a variety of reasons, notably because it followed a number of similar endeavours and 'The Commission of Enquiry is a policy of procrastination and postponement, a big trick and a blatant lie.' Sec-

ondly, the fact that Americans would form part of the Commission meant it would support further immigration and the establishment of a Jewish national state in Palestine. Since the Jews exercised a great influence in America, where the government, people, parties and Congress had already declared their support for the setting up of a Jewish state, the Commission, they argued, was merely 'a legal device, behind which America hides, in order to sabotage the White Paper and to achieve Jewish ambitions.' There was the further consideration that the post-war British government was a Labour government which was committed to allowing immigration and setting up a Jewish state in Palestine. Furthermore, the Commission would be carrying out its task against the background of Zionist terrorism, which might prejudice its decision in favour of the Jews and against the interests of the Arabs. The executioner, the Muslim Brothers argued, was now the Judge! A further reason for the opposition of the Muslim Brothers was the Commission's refusal to hear the evidence of the Palestinian exiles, including Amin al-Husayni.[55]

The Commission was formed and consisted of six British and six American members. It started work in January 1946 in America and then moved to London, and on to Palestine and other Arab countries to hear Arab and Jewish testimonies.[56] During the Commission's visit, when the Palestinian Communist Party proposed the creation of an independent state to be shared by Arabs and Jews, the Muslim Brothers rejected the proposal, arguing that in such a state, the Jews who had more money and knowledge would take advantage of their right of citizenship to gain control of the Palestinian economy and threaten the security of neighbouring Arab countries. Instead, the Brothers suggested that the matter should be solved by giving the Jews in Palestine minority status within an Arab state.[57]

When the Commission visited Egypt, al-Banna presented his testimony to it in its last session on 5 March 1946. In it he said he had no wish to speak in detail about the problem of Palestine economically or politically. The problem had been fully discussed and there was no need to repeat what had already been said. He then announced his support for what the Arabs, their leaders and the Arab League had declared in that respect. He added: 'We strongly oppose Jewish immigration. We do so because it carries with it a political and economic danger and because it is our right to have Palestine remaining Arab.' He concluded by denouncing the Commission's refusal to hear the

testimony of Amin al-Husayni and the other Palestinian exiles. He demanded that the Commission should seek their release.[58]

The Commission's report was published on 20 April 1946. It amounted to the cancellation of the White Paper by recommending the admission to Palestine of 100,000 new Jewish immigrants, the lifting of the embargo against the transfer of land to the Jews and the continuation of the British Mandate to carry out its obligations to facilitate Jewish immigration.[59] The Muslim Brothers considered the report to be pro-Zionist and a capitulation to Jewish demands. They declared that:

> Seventy million Arabs and 400 million Muslims behind them, with the Muslim Brothers at their forefront, would make the implementation of the Report impossible. Blood would flow like rivers in Palestine which the Arabs had inherited from Umar and Salah al-Din, so that it would not fall as an easy prey to Zionist vagabonds.[60]

The General Headquarters of the Muslim Brothers announced that the Palestine Committee in the Section for Liaison with the Islamic world would continue to discuss practical steps regarding Palestine, through its contacts with Arab and Islamic organisations in Cairo.[61] The Section sent a memorandum to the secretary-general of the Arab League, in which they urged the launching of a general fund-raising campaign in all Arab and Islamic countries for no less than 20 million pounds for the salvation of Palestine and appealed in particular to the Arab kings, princes and heads of government. The memorandum proposed a conference of Arab heads of state to discuss the Palestinian problem; a tour by the secretary general of the Arab League to Britain and America in order to acquaint those two governments with the seriousness of the situation; the sending of delegations to Europe and America to explain the Palestinian problem; and the formation of a military committee as part of the Arab League to co-ordinate military plans and unify military terminology within Arab armies.[62]

Furthermore, the Muslim Brothers called on the Egyptian people to strike on 10 May 1946 in protest against the report of the Anglo–American Commission. The strike was total and orderly, prompting the Brothers to suggest that it provided conclusive evidence that 'the

call for right, strength and freedom (the motto of Ikhwan) is a strong call that has found its way to the souls of the Egyptian people.'[63]

On 28 and 29 May 1946, the conference of Arab kings, princes and heads of states convened at Inshass, Egypt, at the invitation of King Faruq. The meeting issued a communiqué rejecting the decision of the Commission regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Muslim Brothers saw the convening of the conference as a fulfilment of their hopes and an implementation of their earlier proposals made since January 1941.[64]

Before the Council of the Arab League met for its extraordinary session on 8 June 1946 in Bloudan, Syria, to discuss the Palestinian issue in the light of the Commission's report, the Muslim Brothers submitted the following proposals and urged the Council to adopt them.

1. To impose a ban on Jewish immigration into Palestine, which was intended to make the Jews a majority and the Arabs a minority.
2. To intensify pro-Palestinian propaganda, especially in America.
3. The Arab League to implement the concept set out in the Inchass Communiqué that the Palestinian problem was not that of the Arabs of Palestine alone, but of all Arabs.
4. To take a final decision concerning the return of Amin al- Husayni to Palestine.
5. To reach a decision calling for the independence of Palestine.
6. To inform the major powers of this decision and give Britain a fixed period of grace in which to agree to it.
7. In case of rejection, that the Arab League should be ready to declare jihad for Palestine.[65]

The Brothers sent another memorandum to the conference of Arab foreign ministers convened at Alexandria on 12 August 1946, to which was added the rejection of the idea of partition and of a federal government.[66] They also held conferences and meetings before and after the appearance of the report of the Anglo–American Commission of Enquiry, explaining that any solution to the Palestine question must start with putting an end to Jewish immigration and land sales to Jews, and must have as its objective the formation of an independent Arab government in Palestine.[67] They also urged that an Islamic conference should convene to look into the Palestinian question and

prescribe a final decision on it, and that it must support Palestinian demands.[68]

The Palestinian Muslim Brothers for their own part held a meeting of branch representatives in Haifa on 3 March 1946, during the visit of the Commission of Enquiry to Palestine. They decided:

1. To adhere to the Palestinian National Charter calling for Palestine to remain Arab, for the formation of an independent national government there and for the complete cessation of Jewish immigration and a ban on further sales of land to Jews.
2. To demand the return of Amin al-Husayni and all exiles and the release of political prisoners.
3. To make friendship for Britain or any other state, on the part of Arabs and Muslims, dependent on the response to the national demands of Palestinians and the return of the exiles.
4. To assert that the Muslim Brothers in Palestine would not feel bound by any recommendations passed by the Anglo–American Commission of Enquiry which were inconsistent with the National Charter of Palestine and with national aims.
5. To request the Arab League to persuade Arab governments not to allow any Palestinian who sold land to the Jews to enter their countries or permanently reside there, or to permit him to purchase land and real estate there.
6. To support the principle of boycotting Zionist products.

The meeting sent a message containing the resolutions to the High Commissioner in Palestine.[69]

At a different level, the Cairo headquarters of the Muslim Brothers sent Abd al-Mu'iz Abd al-Satar, a member of the General Guidance Council, to Palestine on 1 May 1946 just after the Report of the Commission of Enquiry had appeared. His mission was to incite the Palestinian people to jihad[70] and he toured a number of towns and cities with his call, assuring people that the Muslim Brothers of Egypt would support them so that Palestine would not become 'a second Spain'. He asserted: 'You are the custodians of this land. Alongside you we shall fight until justice prevails.'[71]

Amin al-Husayni's Political Asylum in Egypt

One of the most important reasons for the state of stagnation in which Palestine languished during the Second World War was lack of political leadership. Palestinian leaders were either in exile or in detention centres. The end of the war and the declaration of the Muslim Brothers announcing the beginning of jihad prompted them to introduce the issues of the return of exiles and the release of detainees as part of their plan for the salvation of Palestine. 'For how long,' they asked, 'do the free men of Palestine, leaders and Mujahidin have to be treated as common criminals?' They demanded their return and affirmed that they were waiting for a positive response from the authorities 'in this serious matter'.[72]

On 4 October 1945 the first Popular Conference of the Muslim Brothers passed a resolution demanding the prompt release of Palestinian exiles in Turkey, Rhodesia, Austria, France and other countries, notably Amin al-Husayni,[73] who was living in exile in a suburb of Paris. In addition, Salih Abu Raqiq, the wakil of the Section for Liaison with the Islamic World, requested Ali Rushdi, the private secretary of al-Husayni in Cairo, to convey to him the Section's fears that France would hand him over to the British. The Brothers expressed their readiness to receive him as their guest in Cairo. Al-Husayni agreed but made it a condition that his arrival in Egypt and his stay there should be kept secret; and that he should know beforehand the area where he would be accommodated, and receive a plan showing the house where he would be living. The Muslim Brothers informed him that his residence would be in Ali Abu Raqiq's village in al-Buhaira. Later, however, they had second thoughts about their ability to ensure his safety. They decided to put the matter before King Faruq, who at the time had differences with France and a political need to appear as a nationalist keen to advocate Islamic causes, so that he could offer al-Husayni political asylum.[74] The Section for Liaison with the Islamic world sent him a memorandum to King Faruq requesting him to mediate with the French government, and to intervene with the British government so that it would not oppose al-Husayni's return and would release other Palestinian exiles and detainees. The Palestinian people, the memorandum argued, had already made it clear that al-Husayni was its only spokesman and representative and that no talks would be conducted with the British or others except

after the return of al-Husayni and of other exiled leaders.[75] A number of telegrams on similar lines were sent by the Ikhwan branches in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, to King Faruq and King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud.[76]

When Britain asked the French government to hand over al-Husayni, al-Banna sent several telegrams to the Royal Court, the prime minister and the Arab ministers plenipotentiary in Cairo, demanding the return of al-Husayni from his exile. One of these telegrams was sent on 2 April 1946 to the British Ambassador in Cairo urging him to advise his government 'to follow the path of reason' and keep al-Husayni out of harm's way, and to allow him to enjoy his natural right to return to Palestine or else obtain for him a permit to stay in an Arab country.[77] When America supported Britain's application to have al-Husayni handed over, al-Banna sent a protest memorandum to the American minister plenipotentiary which read:

> We, in the name of the Muslim Brothers and all Arabs and Muslims, would like to warn your government not to continue this unjust Zionist policy as it will cost you the friendship of Arabs and Muslims. We would also like you to confirm to your government our preparedness to sacrifice ourselves for the sake of rescuing our men, whenever necessary. If your government wants to follow the course of reason, then it should seek the prompt return of al-Husayni to Palestine or to any other Arab country.[78]

Al-Banna, on learning that al-Husayni had left France, also sent telegrams to the delegates and to the secretary-general of the Arab League Council, which was then convening in Bloudan, requesting the League to announce its readiness to receive and welcome al-Husayni in any Arab country of his choice and in the manner and style consistent with his status.[79]

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun followed the rumours with extreme anxiety and reported that al-Husayni had secretly left France for an unspecified Arab country.[80] This suggests that both the leadership of the Muslim Brothers and al-Husayni himself wanted the question of Husayni's return to Cairo to remain cloaked with maximum secrecy for obvious security reasons. Yet only one day after his arrival in Cairo, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun revealed that he had left France secretly for Cairo under the name of Ma'ruf al- Dawalibi.[81] The Brothers also announced that al-Husayni was under the protection of King Faruq

and that they would spare no effort in protecting him with their own bodies, and would help him prepare the fighters and draw up plans for fighting the Zionists.[82] Their aim in having al-Husayni back in Egypt was to bring him near to the battlefield in Palestine.

On 20 June 1946, the day on which al-Husayni arrived in Cairo, the General Guidance Council met and reviewed the statement which had been issued by the Royal Palace about the political asylum granted to him. At first sight, it appears surprising, in view of the previous attitude of mutual suspicion between the Palace and the Muslim Brothers that their Council expressed 'sincere allegiance and deep gratitude' to King Faruq for granting al-Husayni political asylum. The reason for this change is clear, however. A reconciliation brought advantages for both sides: for the King to make a parade of his hospitality to al-Husayni reinforced his claim to be a supporter of the nationalist cause at the expense of the Wafd, while for the Muslim Brothers there was the prospect of gaining more freedom of action. Following the meeting at which their message to the king was drafted, Ahmad al-Sukkari, the wakil of the Muslim Brothers, deputising for al-Banna who was away, went together with the members of the General Guidance Council and the Political Bureau to Abidin Palace to deliver it.[83] The next day, after they had performed the Friday Prayers in al-Azhar, the Brothers met to welcome and receive al-Husayni. Following speeches, the meeting approved the previous resolutions of the General Guidance Council and nominated a delegation headed by Ahmed al- Sukkari, with members from the General Guidance Council, the heads of Districts and jihad centres and branches to deliver further messages to the Abidin Palace.[84] Some Muslim Brothers' branches in Egypt and Palestine sent telegrams of praise and appreciation to King Faruq, among them the Jaffa branch, who wrote that 'by inviting the Grand Mufti, King Faruq had given hospitality to the whole Arab nation.'[85]

The Muslim Brothers in addition criticised a statement issued by Isma'il Sidqi's government about the grant of political asylum, a step believed to have been taken by the king without the government's approval.[86] They were infuriated by a reference in the statement to 'the political errors alleged to have been committed by al-Husayni' and asserted that he had not committed any errors and that all he had done was to perform jihad; the government was merely trying to appease the British. They also referred to a paragraph in the government statement which said: 'It is no secret that Egypt is currently traversing

one of the most crucial stages of its political history and we all hope that it will succeed in doing so in an atmosphere of stability and order. No doubt al-Husayni appreciates this.' The government, said the Brothers, should consider the presence of al-Husayni in Egypt a good omen at a time when it was embarking on the start of its jihad. The Society would settle for nothing short of al-Husayni enjoying his full political rights in order that his knowledge, experience and status could be of benefit to Egypt to take its people together to that power and prestige aspired to by all Arab and Islamic countries.[87]

The attitude of the Sidqi government seems to have been due to the prime minister's desire not to disrupt the negotiations taking place between Egypt and Britain which resulted in the Sidqi–Bevin Treaty, rejected by seven out of a total of twelve members of the Egyptian negotiating team and also by most political parties and by the Egyptian people.[88] This very point reinforces the accusation made by the Muslim Brothers that the government statement was 'an appeasement of the British.' This criticism of the government statement, in addition to the attitude adopted as a matter of principle by the Muslim Brothers regarding the return of al-Husayni, was taken by them as an opportunity to attack the Egyptian-British negotiation which they had been opposed to since its inception.[89]

The Arab and Islamic organisations body in which the Muslim Brothers played a leading role sent a telegram to Isma'il Sidqi appealing for al-Husayni to be granted the maximum freedom to resume his activities and denouncing any attempt to undermine such freedom: 'It is unbecoming, while despicable Zionism is raising fires everywhere in Palestine, to hold as a prisoner in Egypt a Palestinian who was the leader of the Arab world. when he was completely free in France.'[90] On 27 June 1946 the Muslim Brothers of Syria sent a memorandum to King Faruq asserting that:

> ... al-Husayni and al-Husayni alone can steer the boat and direct the efforts of the people to saving Palestine. To deny him the opportunity of using his religious and personal influence will have a harmful impact on the Palestinian cause and is an insult to Arabs and Muslims everywhere.[91]

During al-Husayni's stay in Egypt, the relationship going back to 1927 between him and al-Banna strengthened. Al-Husayni was quoted after arriving in Egypt in 1946 as saying of al-Banna 'I have come to

realise the truth about this great man whom God has endowed with rare, high and honourable qualities which are rarely found in anyone.'[92] Al-Husayni added that al-Banna was:

> ... burning with zeal and enthusiasm against the colonisers who have usurped Egypt and the Arab and Islamic countries. He has worked to the best of his ability to liberate the Nile Valley and all the Arab and Islamic countries from all forms of foreign colonialism. He is also keen to unite Muslims and to hold dear the fraternity of Islam and forge links among Muslims to get them to co-operate for the public good and piety and for glory and advancement. To him his country is the wider Islamic World.[93]

In addition, during a five-hour meeting in his Alexandria house on 23 August 1946 al-Husayni said to Ahmed al-Sukkari and Mukhtar Abd al-Alim, the head of the Alexandria branch of the Muslim Brothers: 'I believe in the Muslim Brothers as they are the troops of God who shall defeat the troops of Satan.'[94]

From the end of 1946, the activities of the Supreme Arab Committee, headed by al-Husayni, increased. For instance, it opened offices in Cairo and in Palestine itself. It drew up the regulations necessary for its business, organised national committees and intensified its diplomatic and propaganda work.[95] In this way the Muslim Brothers, thanks to their continual efforts, managed to bring the Palestinian leader quite close to the battlefields in order that he might prepare the fighters and draft the plans for the approaching battle over Palestine. Despite the disastrous outcome in 1948, this was one of the most important preliminaries to military operations in Palestine.

Britain Refers the Palestine Question to the United Nations

During the second half of 1946 the Palestine question entered a crucial stage. The question was whether self-determination should be pursued through peace or through war. There was no room for a compromise. Within the space of three months the British held two conferences to decide the position of Palestine. In September 1946 a conference was held in London attended by representatives from the Arab League. The Muslim Brothers expressed their pessimism about the conference reaching any solution so long as Britain was holding fast 'to two contradictory elements',[96] (helping the Jews and the search

for peace). As a result of its failure, Britain called another conference on Palestine in London in January 1947. The Muslim Brothers rejected this second conference as 'there is no room for negotiation' between the Arabs and the British, especially after the issue had become crystal clear following the reports of a succession of commissions of enquiry. 'Hence, what is the meaning of this conference which is convening to consider the future of Palestine?' Addressing the Arab League members who agreed to take part in this conference, the Brothers wondered: 'What has Palestine gained from representation at the first conference and at the preliminaries of the second one?'[97] Arab League countries would, they argued, do better to devote part of what they spent on the conference to saving a part of the Palestinian lands. They demanded that the Arab Supreme Committee should waste no more time in such conferences; instead it should concentrate on uniting the Palestinians, staying out of party political disputes and trying to save the land; 'and so let the committee remain faithful to its first decision concerning the boycott of the conference and let it be brave enough to announce the jihad.'[98]

The Muslim Brothers were in no doubt whatsoever, thanks to Britain's policy in Palestine, 'that there was no hope of a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem.' They wanted the Palestinian leadership in Palestine to declare jihad as the only solution, after the failure of the numerous conferences and commissions of enquiry to solve the problem. At the opening of the Palestine conference in London on 27 January 1947, al-Banna sent a telegram to Attlee which read:

> All Arab and Islamic people denounce any undermining of the rights of the Arabs in Palestine. They will vigorously resist any partition which will give the Jews any rights to which they had not been entitled before your Mandate over this sacred Arab country.[99]

After the collapse of the 1947 conference al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun interviewed Fathi Radwan, General Muhammad Salih Harb (Muslim Youth Association) and Fawzi al-Qawuqji (a military commander during the 1936–39 revolt) about what the Arabs and Muslims should do at this stage. The gist of their opinion was that the solution of the Palestinian problem could only come out of jihad.[100]

With the failure of the London conference on the Palestinian question, Britain realised that any effort to bring Arabs and Jews together

was useless. So, on 8 April 1947, it decided for the first time to refer the issue to the United Nations. This development brought the Muslim Brothers' vocal volcano to the point of eruption:

> As from today we declare our condemnation of the United Nations as long as it is led by a bunch of elderly colonisers. We declare that Arab Palestine shall accept nothing short of complete independence, and with the Jews being considered a worthless minority and a complete end to immigration.[101]

On 26 April 1947, that is to say two days before the holding of an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Muslim Brothers welcomed the idea of the Palestinian leaders to form a government in exile if the Assembly should pass a decision which was inconsistent with Arab interests. At the same time, they considered the formation of such a government 'insufficient' and demanded that Palestinian leaders should immediately prepare for a confrontation, by fund raising, by spending money on worthwhile projects and by unifying Palestinians to secure a strong, single-minded front; and they should co-ordinate their political, military and economic strategy with those of the Arab countries.[102] They also urged Saudi Arabia to suspend the export of oil to the United States, in protest against the American attitude towards the Arabs of Palestine.[103]

When the General Assembly decided to nominate a Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) from the representatives of eleven states, excluding the five major powers, the Muslim Brothers considered that the United Nations had failed to solve the Palestine question, describing it as 'an organisation of injustice, not of justice; an organisation of apathetic nations. Towards what is right they are divided; against what is wrong they are not a united organisation.' The Brothers vowed: 'Today is the day of the battle. It is the day of the Youth of the Muslim Brothers – so are you prepared for the question of life or death?'[104]

After his discharge from hospital, following a surgical operation, and at the time when the commission of enquiry was in progress, al-Banna announced on 13 May 1947 in his Tuesday lecture at the general headquarters, that:

> ... our most immediate objectives are four: firstly, the Arabism of Palestine; secondly, the unity of the Nile Valley; thirdly, Tripoli; and fourthly, the rest of North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco). These issues we have known and studied. They will be achieved as we want them, if not through peace, then it will have to be through jihad: 'Lo! Allah hath bought from the believers their lives and their wealth because the Garden will be theirs.' For the West ignores every cause unless carried by the sword ... and you Muslim Brothers, in you there is hope. I know some amongst you whose only wish is martyrdom for the sake of God and whose only goal is to die defending religion. These are the pioneers. Blood is boiling in our veins, we have suffered too much. The volcano is about to erupt, it is only a mere step or a moment away. Our religion has taught us patience and wisdom. We have been patient and we have taken patience to the extreme. We shall never live in misery after this day. We shall live in Pride.[105]

In this way the Muslim Brothers put the cause of Palestine before the Egyptian question, which was lodged with the United Nations at the same time.

While the United Nations' decisions were being awaited, preparations were made. Salih Ashmawi, acting on behalf of the Muslim Brothers, invited all Arab and Islamic organisations to meet on 17 June 1947, the day of the Ascension, to form the Islamic Front for the defence of Palestine; a renewal of the call made ten years earlier by the Muslim Brothers – 'in the hope that time is at last ripe for the formation of the Islamic Front.'[106]

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun magazine carried a report on the views of various political and military personalities in the Arab world about the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOP) and what was to be done in its aftermath.[107]

When the Special Commission had concluded its work on 1 July 1947, instead of a single report it published a majority report recommending the partition of Palestine into two states with a special international status for Jerusalem, and a minority report recommending the setting up of a federation of an Arab state and a Jewish one, with Jerusalem as the capital. During the pause that followed, while the General Assembly considered the two proposals, the Muslim Brothers expressed their dissatisfaction. The United Nations and its bodies, they said:

> are no more than a way of organising international piracy and disguising the jaws of the snake and the paws of the wolf with a cover of soft silk to put at ease those people who still had illusions about the true nature of imperialism ... This is a confirmation of what we asserted earlier, namely, that western colonialism is no more than a ninth crusade to the East.[108]

As regards the attitude of the Soviet Union, it prompted the Muslim Brothers to argue that 'the difference between Russia and America, or between capitalism and communism, is no more than a difference of style and about how best to divide up the Islamic East; in reality there is an agreement at the expense of the prey itself.'[109] Al-Banna himself considered the whole United Nations intervention to be an international plot carried out by the Americans, the Russians and the British, under the influence of Zionism.[110]

On 16 September 1947 he sent a telegram to the secretary general of the United Nations denouncing the recommendations of the UNSCOP.[111] He followed that with two telegrams on 2 October 1947 to the secretary-general of the United Nations and to General Marshall, the American Secretary of State. The telegrams asserted that:

> accepting Zionist aspirations and the setting up of a Jewish state anywhere in Palestine will transform all the Orient into a charnel house, the responsibility for which shall rest on those who supported Zionist aggression against clear Arab rights. Our religion compels us to resist this colonial aggression with all our might. Jews have enjoyed security under Arab rule. The only way of establishing peace in the East is through the declaration of independence for Palestine with the withdrawal of British troops and the establishment of a democratic Arab state.[112]

On 14 October 1947, al-Banna sent a message to the secretary general of the Arab League calling for the withdrawal of all Arab governments from the United Nations.[113] It is interesting to note that, rather than directing their attacks against one state or another, the Muslim Brothers concentrated their fire on the United Nations as the focus of political activities related to the Palestinian issue, since its resolutions could, for the first time, claim international validity, unlike the decisions and recommendations of a single country or of a commission of enquiry.

Recruitment for the Defence of Palestine

With the publication of the reports of UNSCOP showing that a clear majority favoured the partition of Palestine, it became evident that Palestine was to become the scene of the martyrdom and honourable death to which al-Banna had continually referred. The time had come for the military regiments, originally set up for this goal, to start operating in pursuit of their objective.

The Muslim Brothers started their military operation for Palestine while a sub-committee of the General Assembly was studying the reports of the UNSCOP. On 1 October 1947 al-Banna sent a circular to theadministrative offices, asking them to be prepared for jihad. He also sent a message asking the minister of Religious Endowments to remind mosque imams to direct the attention of worshippers to the necessity for jihad.[114] Furthermore, on 7 October 1947, he sent a telegram to the secretary general of the Arab League, Abd al-Rahman Azzam, during the Alia meeting of the League's Council, stating that:

> ... the Muslim Brothers consider the only way to save Palestine is by force; and offering to place 10,000 young men at the disposal of the Arab League as an initial detachment which is prepared to move at the first signal.[115]

After this telegram, the Brothers set up the Recruitment Administration for the Defence of Palestine which opened offices for recruiting volunteers. For this purpose, Cairo's Brothers were divided into six zones[116] and the number of volunteers during the first two days exceeded 2,000.[117] The Ikhwan press announced on 18 October 1947 that their first battalion was ready and prepared to move to al-Arish and that the second battalion was being prepared and that those interested in volunteering should come to the Cairo office.[118] On 20 October al-Banna attended a parade of the first Ikhwan regiment, which left for al-Arish on the same day.[119] It was no surprise that the preparation of this battalion came so quickly for the members enlisting in it, and other battalions after it, had already been fully trained in the Rovers Troops and in the Special Section.

These military arrangements were followed with great concern by the British Embassy in Cairo and the High Commission in Palestine, who were in contact with each other and with their Cairo sources to obtain more information about the military dispositions of the Mus-

lim Brothers.[120] On 1 November 1947, the Palestine Committee in the Section for Liaison with the Islamic world held a meeting commemorating the Balfour Declaration. It decided to start training the volunteers who registered their names as from 2 November 1947, in addition to reminding the branches of their obligations towards Palestine and encouraging them to work continually for its sake.[121]

On 2 November 1947 the Recruitment Administration for the Defence of Palestine, whose commander was Mahmud Labib and whose secretary was Sa'd al-Din al-Walilli, sent a circular to the heads of Cairo's district informing them that the administration had started a school for military training, using the most modern techniques, and that its staff consisted of the most efficient military personnel and veterans and that its curriculum included athletic, military and cultural subjects. The school's function was to provide battalions with instructors who were qualified in all martial arts and skills. The administration said that the school would open on 9 November 1947 and that it would enrol the Muslim Brothers at the level of Amil, active, members who were not needed at the district or the branch level, and whose age and disposition would qualify them for administrative posts in the school. The circular chose four squares as places for training volunteers from Cairo between 4 and 7 November 1947 in order that the chief of staff of the school, with the help of the district head, might choose those who were fit to enrol at the school. The administration requested its nineteen branch offices in the provincial capitals to forward to it daily information on the number of volunteers, whether Muslim Brothers or otherwise. It also asked for the names and addresses of doctors to conduct the medical examination of volunteers, and the places where such examinations would be held as the medicals would start on 7 November 1947. In addition, it called for information on the names and addresses of volunteers, where they would be trained, the name of the secretary of the branch office, and the name of a candidate for the post of Secretary General of the Central Office (in the case of districts).[122]

When things settled down at the nineteen branch recruitment offices and when many non-Muslim Brothers came forward, the Supreme Command of the Recruitment Administration issued instructions to the heads of the Muslim Brothers' districts to organise eighty-three recruitment offices all over the country. Each office would provisionally comprise a secretary and a number of assistants to cope

with business as instructed, until the time when the Command would appoint commanders for those offices. The Command made it a condition that the volunteers should not be less than eighteen years old. Central offices were to start work from 21 November 1947 and medical examinations from 28 November 1947. The Command instructed the offices to send regular reports about the recruitment drive with photographs that 'highlight the interest of the people and their readiness for this divine duty.'[123] In January 1948 the Recruitment Administration was attached to the General Administration of Rovers and Husayn Kamal al-Din was appointed director of recruitment section at the headquarters.[124]

The Muslim Brothers' Medical Section, set up on 15 November 1944, was headed by Dr Muhammad Ahmed Sulaiman, and took part in the drive for recruits by carrying out medical examinations on volunteers. He was assisted by a number of doctors and by the facilities of two hospitals which were part of the Section.[125]

For some months before the adoption of the United Nations resolution Palestine had needed arms and several organisations had been active in procuring them. Al-Banna said the Egyptian authorities turned a blind eye to this, letting them pass and encouraging the Muslim Brothers to cooperate with the Supreme Arab Committee, as they were very well equipped for carrying out such tasks, in view of their presence all over Egypt.[126]

The last three days before the adoption of the UN resolution witnessed increasingly intensive activity on the part of the Muslim Brothers. They demanded that the Egyptian people, irrespective of political and religious affiliations, should meet their obligations towards Palestine by volunteering and fund raising in all possible ways. This was to be done by promptly forming a committee of organisations and political parties, headed by a member of the Royal Family, to conduct the fund raising, especially from the rich. The funds were to be directed to the Supreme Arab Committee.[127] The celebrations mounted by the Muslim Brothers on 26–28 November 1947 in commemoration of the Hijra of the Prophet were transformed into carnivals of solidarity with Palestine. Al-Banna delivered a number of impassioned speeches in which he asked the Muslim Brothers to save 'the fire of their agony for some forthcoming moment' and 'to be ready and prepared for a day of reckoning against Zionism, their primary enemy.'[128] So the Muslim Brothers' branches all over Egypt, and

the Cairo headquarters in particular, became centres of military command and cells buzzing with volunteers. In this way the Brothers took advantage of a long awaited opportunity to implement their call and ensure that their words were followed by deeds.

When the partition resolution was adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947, the headquarters of the Muslim Brothers issued a statement, signed by al-Banna, to Arabs and Muslims generally, and to the peoples of the Nile Valley in particular:

> What had been concealed is now uncovered for everyone to see! The unjust plot performed by Zionism on the stage of the United Nations, in collaboration with the representatives of countries of ambition and greed, big and small, political mercenaries and vote-mongers, is now complete. After God, there is nothing left to depend upon except yourselves. What remains for you is to work for the good of your country and to fight to obtain your rights and to expel the hateful intruder from your land. With this absurd resolution passed by the United Nations, God has granted you an opportunity to obtain success in this world and dignity in the hereafter; an opportunity which you have been missing and longing for; so why hesitate, why hold back when the breeze of paradise is blowing and carries the scent of martyrdom?[129]

He demanded that Arab and Islamic governments should immediately withdraw from the United Nations and should prepare themselves to defend Palestine, which 'is a defence of every Arab and Islamic country: for Palestine is the first defence line which, if we lose, we become doomed to losing every other line behind it, for the first blow is half the battle.' He called for the formation of 'The General Nile Valley Committee for Defending Palestine' which would declare a state of general mobilisation, co-ordinate efforts and send battalions to defend Palestine.[130] Immediately after the United Nations resolution, al-Banna sent a telegram to al-Husayni saying: 'The United Nations' absurdity will only reinforce our sincerity and our adherence to our rights, and our jihad for the sake of our countries – and God will show them what they did not expect from us.'[131]

With this statement and this telegram the Ikhwan volcano had erupted. Between them they signal the end of developments which had started as far back as the early 1930s, and they mark the beginning of a period of armed conflict, which took both the Society and the Palestine question into a new phase.

Conclusion

The relationship between Hasan al-Banna and Palestine began in 1927, the year in which he graduated from Dar al-Ulum College, before the setting up of the Muslim Brothers' Society in 1928. Although the relationship between the Society and Palestine began to take shape during the General Islamic Conference convened at Jerusalem in December 1931 – and despite the fact that it took a clear shape after the General Strike of 1936 – the conceptual approach of the Society widened the scope of this relationship and depicted its roots as stretching back to the first appearance of Islam in Mecca. This meant that the Muslim Brothers approached the Palestine question from the standpoint of what was perceived as a deep-rooted heritage, which forged their relationship with Palestine in such a way as to make it too emotive to dismantle or ignore.

This relationship passed through three main stages during the period that concerns this book: propaganda, military preparations, and preliminary indications of armed action.

Propaganda

This came in two stages, which were dictated by events in Palestine. When the Palestinians launched their general strike in 1936, the Muslim Brothers of Egypt, despite their small number, formed the Central Committee for Aid to Palestine, and succeeded to some extent in rallying Egyptian opinion around the Palestine question. At the same time they monitored the developments taking place on the Palestinian scene and submitted proposals accordingly. The second stage started with the issuing of the Peel Commission's Report, which proposed the partition of Palestine into two separate independent states. At this stage the Muslim Brothers carried the Palestine question further and brought it to the attention of more Egyptians, treating it as an international issue and, by means of propaganda, causing

annoyance to both the British and the Jewish population of Palestine. From that time on the Palestine question was always on the Muslim Brothers' political agenda, and was the principal cause of clashes between the Muslim Brothers and the Egyptian government.

The Society, in the opinion of the author, restricted itself initially to pro-Palestinian propaganda because of its belief in a gradual approach which had to take account of existing circumstances. This preliminary stage was particularly necessary in Egypt, because of the government's passive approach to the Palestine question at that time. In addition, the Society was hoping that the Arab governments would reach a peaceful solution to the problem of Palestine. The Society had a small membership at this time, which meant that by moving too fast its internal structure may have collapsed. At this stage the General Guide took the Society along the route of moderation. He refused to accept a passive, uninterested attitude towards the Palestine question, but at the same time he restrained those members whose more violent approach would have subjected the Society to unnecessary strains.

البروفيسور/ عبد الفتاح محمد العويسي

Military Preparation

The inception of the idea of military preparation can be dated from the formation of the Excursion Groups. According to the evidence produced earlier, the idea of *jihad* was already present in al-Banna's mind when he started these groups. Despite certain considerations which were examined in Chapter Six, al-Banna began to put his idea into practice by transforming the Excursion Groups into more effective formations, which could take an active part in the armed struggle whose aim was to solve the Palestine question. Researchers differ about the aim of the Special Section. The author's investigations have led to the conclusion that its objectives were twofold: to take part in the military solution to the Palestine question, and to achieve the liberation of the Nile Valley from British occupation.

The Beginnings of Armed Action

By the end of the Second World War al-Banna had already completed his military preparation of the Society. He had transformed his vision of the Islamic army into a reality. So the Society moved from the stage

of propaganda and preparation for the Palestine question into a new stage, the stage of *jihad*. It succeeded in building branches outside Egypt, especially in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, in order that the Society's contribution to the Palestine question would not be restricted merely to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Although it was not possible to start branches initially in Palestine itself – because of the special circumstances pertaining at the time – the post-*jihad* stage necessitated the setting up of such branches according to the plan laid out by the Muslim Brothers for the defence of the country. Indeed, the Muslim Brothers in Palestine grew steadily in number, and their political, social and cultural – even military – activities expanded remarkably during the period leading up to the adoption of the Partition resolution by the United Nations on 29 November 1947.

Summary

To summarise the conclusions to emerge from this book:

1. The Society, and al-Banna in particular, believed in the principles of gradualism and development in accordance with a preconceived plan: first introducing the cause, then its preparation, and finally its implementation. Al-Banna always believed that time was part of the cure and that, just as today's realities represented yesterday's dream, so today's dreams would become the realities of tomorrow. This principle of gradualism caused the relationship between the Society and the Palestine question to pass through the three stages mentioned above, which matched the progress of events in Palestine.

2. The Society recognised from the beginning the importance of Britain's role in the Palestine question, as the Zionists could not have survived in Palestine without British support. Britain, they believed, had created the Palestine question in the first place in order to implement a carefully thought-out plan to divide the Arab–Islamic world. The consequence of this policy – the Ikhwan thought – would be to uproot one people and to replace it with another. It is against this background that the Muslim Brothers came to see Britain as the only party to the dispute and, therefore – in the period covered by this book – adopted a hostile attitude towards the British, taking every opportunity to oppose them. After the Second World War, with the

emergence of the United States of America as a major world power, and as the principal apparent supporter of Zionism, the Muslim Brothers turned their attention from Britain to America.

3. The hostility of the Society to the Jews had its origins in a particular reading of the Qur'an, the Prophetic Tradition, the Prophetic Biography, Islamic history and modern history. Nevertheless, the Society emphasised the possibility of co-existing peacefully with the Jews, were it not for the events in Palestine. Their attitude was directly affected and strengthened by what was taking place there.

4. The Society never ignored the danger posed by the perceived Zionist threat. It had always been concerned with Zionist ambitions, whether in Palestine or in other Arab countries. For Zionist ambitions, as the Muslim Brothers saw them, were not restricted to gaining control of Palestine as a humble refuge for themselves; it was suspected that they wanted Palestine as a gateway to other Arab countries. The Muslim Brothers took the Zionist dream of an empire extending from the Nile to the Euphrates – with Jerusalem as its capital, in which Solomon's Temple would be rebuilt on the ruins of the Aqsa Mosque – seriously. Believing in this danger, the Muslim Brothers approached the Palestine question as an Islamic issue, the final solution of which was crucial to all the Arab countries. They considered the conflict in Palestine to be one between Islam and Judaism, and they exerted every effort to resist Zionism with all the means available to them at the time. In Egypt, irrespective of social class, and in a populist tone that was accesible to all, the Society warned Egyptians against the Zionist threat which, they argued, was about to win a foothold a stone's throw from the Egyptian borders. To those who believed in Egyptian nationalism, the Society emphasised that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would be a threat to the independence of Egypt. To Muslims, they emphasised that *jihad* in the way of God, and the defence of the Holy Land, was an inescapable religious duty. To those of neither nationalist nor religious persuasion, they emphasised that their economic interests would be threatened by the setting up of this state. Thus the approach of the Muslim Brothers to the Palestine question combined religious, political, economic and nationalist considerations.

5. The Jews in Egypt insisted that they were part of the Egyptian people. But once they began to show what was interpreted as a bias in favour of the Jews in Palestine, this led the Muslim Brothers to mount campaigns against them, and eventually to ignore the distinction between Judaism and Zionism.

6. The Muslim Brothers emphasised Islam as a basis for the solution of the Palestine question. They saw it as primarily a religious question, and Palestine as the battleground for an attack on the Islamic faith. So, even before the Partition resolution, the Muslim Brothers gave the Palestine question precedence over the question of Egypt.

7. Throughout the period with which this book is concerned, the Muslim Brothers believed that the Palestine question could be solved by stopping Jewish immigration into Palestine, and by declaring its independence as an Arab state in which the Jews would be a minority with clearly defined rights.

8. The attitude of the Society to the Palestine question became a source of controversy and conflict inside the Society. It led to the secession of a number of Muslim Brothers and to the formation of Shabab Muhammad – which accused the Society of using some of the funds originally raised for Palestine for its own activities in Egypt. Those donations were indeed not sent to Palestine, but were spent on Palestinian propaganda. This was done on the instructions of the Supreme Arab Committee, which sent funds to the Society for that purpose, which it believed to be important. Had it not been for funds sent by the Supreme Arab Committee, and those which the Society collected, propaganda campaigns of this scale could not have been financed. According to Islamic law, however, it is permissible to raise funds for one cause and spend the money on another.

However, the most severe crisis the Society faced was the deep division between two trends, one of which wanted first to concentrate the Society's efforts on Egypt rather than on Palestine, while the second thought that members should be ready at once to leave their homes and jobs to volunteer for *jihad* in Palestine. This controversy lasted for about six months, during which time the Society was threatened with extinction, and its activities completely curtailed for more than one month.

9. The Muslim Brothers society was, and remains, transnational as well as national. On the one hand, it inevitably expanded beyond its originating centre in Egypt, and, on the other hand, the invocation of the Palestine question in Egyptian politics helped to define the Muslim Brothers's differences with other groups, mainly nationalists. In this way the Ikhwan solidified and defined its base of support and appeal within Egyptian politics. The interaction between domestic and transnational politics was mutually reinforcing. In making these arguments, the author hopes to explain the ideology of the Muslim Brothers, its organisational structure, and the various means by which it disseminated its message.

10. Besides the support given to Palestine, the most important achievements of the Society in Egypt, attained through its work on the Palestine question, can be summarised as follows:

i. Contributing to ending Egypt's isolation, and linking Egypt to the Arab and Islamic world by awakening so called Islamic sentiments through appeals to the concept of the Islamic umma, and by persuading Egyptians that Egypt could not be preserved through Egyptian nationalism alone and that the Zionist threat could only be resisted by the fomation of a united Islamic front.
ii. Directing the attention of a wide cross-section of Egyptian public opinion to the Palestine question, and to the obligation to perform *jihad*, which prepared the Egyptians for the idea of war.
iii. Persuading them that the British were the enemies of Muslims and were fighting them openly – but in Palestine. Also by persuading them that Egyptian governments were no more than puppets of the British.

In short it can be said that the Society in Egypt adopted the Palestine question even before the inception of the Arab League, and that it was partly responsible for the changes that took place in Egyptian public opinion, taking it from a narrow nationalism to a wider Islamic perspective.

11. If developments within the Society before 1936 enabled it to increase its activities in response to events in Palestine, the Palestine question brought certain gains to the Society itself after 1936 which

could not have been achieved in such a short period but for its involvement with Palestine. These were reflected in the increase in the number of its members and branches inside and outside Egypt. The Palestine question also gained the Muslim Brothers a wider hearing for their ideas in the Arab world. Furthermore, the Society took advantage of the Palestine question to win support for its own aims, including the demand to dissolve all political parties in Egypt.

12. Despite the efforts made by the Muslim Brothers to set up Palestinian military branches in Palestine, they never succeeded in completing the military structure. Though the Society made what it perceived as adequate plans, these were frustrated by the British Mandate government in Palestine – which was seen as obstructing the efforts of the Ikhwan, especially by expelling Mahmud Labib, the military commander of the Muslim Brothers, from Palestine. The international developments which surrounded the Palestine question prevented the Ikhwan from finding alternative means for bringing these military units to the required standard.

13. Though this book ends with the adoption of the Partition resolution on 29 November 1947, it attempts to explain the factors which prompted the Society, in later years, to resort to armed action in Palestine. It also seeks to explain the developments that followed from this.

Finally, it can be said, on the basis of these conclusions, that the conceptual approach underlying the Society's attitude to the Palestine question was applied by the Muslim Brothers throughout the period of their involvement with the issue. After working out in advance what should be done, and making sure of their starting point, they had succeeded by November 1947 in reaching the point where they were ready to take armed action to achieve their goal. They had played an important role in widening the horizon of the Palestine question, and in formulating and pursuing what they saw as the solution to the problem. The fact that their solutions to the Palestine question never achieved implementation was largely due to factors beyond their control.

Epilogue

Hasan al-Banna planned to solve the Palestine question by establishing a Palestinian government within the country, which would recruit troops there to join with the volunteers from outside the country in a guerrilla force, thus avoiding the involvement of Arab armies. He felt that, in this way, the fighting could be contained, and that this would preclude the involvement of international bodies. Hasan al-Banna's plan envisaged that Arab and Islamic governments should supply the Palestine government with the necessary money and arms. For its part, the Palestine government was only to speak on behalf of Palestine, and not of Arab governments or the Arab League.

At a demonstration in Cairo on 14 December 1947, Hasan al-Banna, in his speech from the Continental Hotel, reaffirmed the offer he had previously made to send 10,000 volunteers to Palestine. Later the Society appealed to Nuqrashi's government to open a training camp for volunteers, but this request was at first refused. On 6 March 1948, the Muslim Brothers therefore sent their 2nd battalion, under the command of Mahmud Abduh, to train at Qatana in Syria and, eventually, to Palestine, where it arrived in May 1948. Later, when Nuqrashi's government agreed to open Huckstep camp for training, the Muslim Brothers – in co-operation with the Committee of the Nile Valley – prepared the camp and supplied volunteers. It was from these volunteers (and mainly from the Muslim Brothers among them) that the 3rd battalion was formed under the leadership of Ahmad Abd al-Aziz. The 3rd battalion also entered Palestine in May 1948.

Compared with other parts of Palestine, the southern front (Gaza Strip) was less active. As part of the Arab League plan for Palestine, Egypt had an obligation to protect this front, which it had failed to do. It was necessary, therefore, to provide leadership in this area. So, on 19 March 1948, Hasan al-Banna entered Palestine for the first time to meet the commanders of the 1st battalion of the Muslim

Brothers stationed at al-Arish, and to make plans for the entry into Palestine. He met the leaders of the Palestinian Muslim Brothers, and of the national committees for the southern front, and together they considered the most practical way to co-ordinate their efforts and prepare a plan of attack on the Jewish settlements on this front. On 20 March al-Banna met Sulayman Sabal, who came unexpectedly to Gaza. They discussed the situation on the southern front, and al-Banna asked for volunteers from Egypt. During his visit to Palestine, which ended on 22 March, al-Banna visited a number of places and made numerous speeches. While he was there he chose al-Nuseirat Camp (formerly a British military camp) as headquarters for the 1st battalion. Immediately after his return to Cairo, he flew to Syria, where he arrived on 23 March.

In Damascus – prior to the meeting of the political committee of the Arab League – al-Banna held a number of important meetings. Among those he met were Shukri al-Quwatli (the President of Syria) Abd al-Rahman Azzam (the Secretary General of the Arab League) Amin al-Husayni, Taha al-Hashimi (Inspector General of the Palestine Liberation Force) and Safwat Pasha. Al-Banna discussed with them the solution on the southern front,expressing his dissatisfaction with conditions there and asking for volunteers, arms and money to be sent immediately to Palestine. At Qatana, before he left Syria on 25 March, al-Banna reviewed the troops of the Arab volunteers' force in the army for the salvation of Palestine. The troops under training included Egyptian, Syrian and Palestinian Muslim Brothers.

In addition to the three battalions of Muslim Brothers from Egypt, the Syrian Muslim Brothers sent a battalion led by Mustafa al-Siba'i (General Overseer) which took part in the Jerusalem battle in May 1948, and the Qastal battle – together with the Palestinian forces under the command of Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni. The Muslim Brothers in Trans-Jordan also sent another battalion under the command of Abd al-Latif Abu Qura (General Overseer of the Jordanian Muslim Brothers).

From the beginning of 1948 armed action became the sole concern of the Palestinian Ikhwan branches, whose offices and houses became military command posts. Most of their branches joined in the activities of the national committees which were established in most towns and cities of Palestine. Their members joined forces on

the battlefield with the Muslim Brothers' volunteers from Egypt, Syria and Trans-Jordan.

Even before the arrival of the Arab armies, the Muslim Brothers' volunteers successfully engaged in guerrilla warfare, mainly attacking Jewish settlements in the Negev, and later cutting their supply lines (for example at Kfar-Dirum). Although the Muslim Brothers' volunteers operated independently of the Arab troops, they helped the Egyptian army, for instance in its successful attack on 24 May 1948 on Yad Mordechai, north-east of Gaza, which was one of the strongest Jewish settlements on the main route between Gaza and Jaffa, close to the village of Deir Isneid. The Muslim Brothers succeeded in capturing the village of Asloj – which the Egyptian army had previously failed to take from the Jews – on 17 July 1948. This was a major battle, because the village was of strategic importance on the Aoja, Beer-Sheba and Hebron route. When the Egyptian troops were forced to withdraw to Gaza,the Muslim Brothers covered their retreat, and rendered assistance to the Egyptians besieged in the Faluja pocket by getting supplies through to the encircled force.

The Muslim Brothers also operated on the West Bank, mainly in Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and succeeded, for instance, in capturing the Jewish settlement at Ramat Ratell – south of Jerusalem – on 20 May 1948. This settlement was subsequently retaken by the Jews on 18 August. The Muslim Brothers took part in the battle of Jabal al-Mukaber and, on 20 October, captured Tabit al-Yemen near Bethlehem, which the Egyptian army commander renamed in their honour *Tabit al-Ikhwan* (the Muslim Brothers' Hill).

The Muslim Brothers refused to accept the truce, either in June or July 1948, because they believed that it was a political manoeuvre to lull the Arabs into a false sense of security, divert their attention away from military action, internationalise the problem, and enable the Jews to get fresh supplies of arms.

Before the Society was dissolved – on 8 December 1948 – the Muslim Brothers in Egypt recruited more volunteers and organised public meetings and demonstrations. By now the weakness and disunity of the Arab governments had resulted in their humiliating failure to solve the Palestine question. Hasan al-Banna announced that he would organise a new battalion, which he himself would lead in person to Palestine. However, the dissolution of the Muslim Brothers by Nuqrashi's government brought an end to any further efforts, and the

government even asked the Egyptian commander of the army in Palestine to imprison all the Muslim Brothers' volunteers. Fuad Sadiq (the Egyptian army commander) then ordered the Muslim Brothers to withdraw from all the places that they controlled in the Negev, which were immediately occupied by Jewish forces. Al-Banna, in a letter to the volunteers after the dissolution of the Society, instructed them that they were not to allow what was happening to the Muslim Brothers in Egypt to divert them from their main task, which was that of solving the Palestine question in co-operation with the Egyptian army.

On 22 December 1948 a Jewish force attacked the Egyptian army in the Gaza Strip and occupied Hill No. 86 – south of Gaza between Deir al-Ballah and Khan Younis – with the aim of forcing the Egyptians to withdraw, and of preventing supplies from Egypt reaching the army. When the Egyptians failed to recapture the hill, they asked if the Muslim Brothers – whom they had previously imprisoned – would undertake its recovery. The Muslim Brothers succeeded in this task.

On 24 February 1949, twelve days after the assassination of Hasan al-Banna, Egypt and Israel signed the armistice agreement at Rhodes. The Muslim Brothers accused Britain of being behind the decision to dissolve the Society in 1948, and of having provoked the assassination of Hasan al-Banna in retaliation for the Muslim Brothers' participation in the 1948 war. The author tried to obtain access to the British Foreign Office documents relating to the dissolution of the Society and the assassination of al-Banna, which were due to be released in 1978, only to find that they remain classified. (See for example: FO 371/73463/J382; FO 371/73463/J1633; FO 371/73463/J1862.) Scholars may in the future be allowed access to the documents, which may help to shed some light on this matter.

Further research is needed, both to examine and assess the role of the Muslim Brothers after the partition resolution, and to answer the question raised by this book: why the Society, despite its energetic preparations for the struggle it foresaw, was ultimately unable to achieve a solution to the Palestine question.

Notes

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations have been used in these notes:
CO: Colonial Office
FO: Foreign Office
DIM: *a1-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (daily)
JIM: *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*
MIM: *Majallat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*

Chapter One

1. *JIM*, 8 Dhu al-Qa'da 1352/22 February 1934, p. 3; see also, Hasan al-Banna, *al-Salam fi al-Islam* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 12–24; *Rasa'il*, pp. 23–4, 278, 312, 318; Hasan al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa wa al-Da'iya* (Cairo, 1977); pp. 173–4; Fathi al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna Kama araftuhu* (Cairo, 1953), pp. 28–9.
2. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 4; for the same view see for example, 3 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/23 May 1939, p. 4; *JIM*, 8 Dhu al-Qa'da 1352/22 February 1934, p. 3; *MIM*, 4 November 1944, p. 10; 19 July 1947, p. 12; Rasa'il, pp. 21, 52, 142, 180, 278; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm* (Cairo, 1951), p. 23–4, 26, 81–5; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa wa'l-Da'iya*, pp. 204–5; Kamil al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin 1948-1949* (n.p., n.d.), p. 46.
3. *Rasa'il*, 119, 159, 356; *JIM*, 16 June 1936, p. 16; 3 November 1936 (last cover); *al-Nadhir*, 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 3.
4. *JIM*, 12 November 1937, p. 24.
5. *MIM*, 13 October 1945, pp. 22–7.
6. *Rasa'il*, pp. 141, 144, 278; *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, pp. 9–10; 17 Dhu al-Hijja 1357, *MIM*, 13 October 1945, p. 22.
7. *Rasa'il*, pp. 19–20.
8. *Rasa'il*, pp. 22–3.
9. *Rasa'il*, p. 180, pp. 229–30. See also, pp. 141–2.

10. *Rasa'il*, pp. 142, 230; see also for example, *JIM*, 1 Muharram 1354/ 4 April 1935, p. 3; *al-Nadhir*, 6 Rajab 1358/22 August 1939, pp. 10, 14; 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939, p. 18; *MIM*, 25 January 1947, p. 14.

11. *Rasa'il*, pp. 40, 48, 142, 144, 230–2; see also for example, *JIM* 1 Jumada al-Thani 1352/22 August 1933; 4 April 1935, p. 3; 8 September 1936, p. 1; *al-Nadhir*, 28 Jumada al-Thani 1358/15 August 1939, p. 9; 6 Rajab 1358/22 August 1939, pp. 10, 14; *MIM*, 13 October 1945, pp. 23, 25–6; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 23–4.

12. *Rasa'il*, 144; *al-Nadhir*, 22 Muharram 1358/14 March 1939, p. 18; 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939; p. 18; *MIM*, 13 October 1945, p. 26.

13. *Rasa'il*, pp. 144, 290; *al-Nadhir*, 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, p. 7; 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 5.

14. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939, p. 18.

15. *Rasa'il*, 144; *MIM*, 13 October 1945, p. 22.

16. *MIM*, 12 February 1944; pp. 3–4; see also *JIM*, 8 Dhu al-Qa'da 1352/ 22 February 1934, p. 3.

17. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, pp. 4, 10.

18. The Qur'anic verse, 'The believers are naught else than brothers' and the prophetic tradition, 'The Muslim is the brother of the Muslim' were the mottoes of their first magazine *JIM* and *al-Nadhir*. See *JIM*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1352/3 August 1933, p. 2; 20 August 1935, p. 18; *al-Nadhir*, 28 Jumada al-Thani 1358/15 August 1939, pp. 6–7; *DIM*, 20 November 1945; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna Kama arafituhu*, pp. 58–9; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, p. 112; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 173–4, *Rasa'il*, p. 313.

19. *Rasa'il*, p. 364; see also for the same view, *JIM*, 3 November 1936 (last cover); *al-Ahram*, 6 February 1947.

20. In another prophetic tradition 'None of you (truly) believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for himself'. For this view see *JIM*, 11 August 1936, pp. 3, 17–8; *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 11; 4 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/26 October 1938, pp. 7–8; Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/2 January 1939, p. 9; 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, p. 3; 28 Jumada al-Thani 1358/15 August 1939, p. 7; *MIM*, 11 September 1948, p. 21; *DIM*, 29 November 1947, *Rasa'il*, p. 24; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 20–1, 151, 154.

21. *JIM*, 11 August, 1936, p. 17; *al-Nadhir*, 28 Jumad al-Thani 1357/ 25 August 1938, p. 7; *Rasa'il*, p. 318; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 20, 147.

22. *al-Nadhir*, 28 Jumada al-Thani, 1358/15 August 1939, p. 7; 11 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/2 January 1939, p. 8; D*IM*, 20 November 1947.

23. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 76.

24. *JIM*, 8 Dhu al-Qa'da 1352/22 February 1934, p. 4.

25. *JIM*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1352/3 August 1933, p. 2.

26. *Rasa'il*, pp. 24–5; see also, pp. 22, 164, 285–6; al-Banna, *al-Salam fi al-Islam*, pp. 16–17; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 153.

27. *JIM*, 9 Ramadan 1356/13 November 1937, p. 24; for the same view see 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1352/3 August 1933, p. 3; *MIM*, 25 January 1947, p. 14; see also fn 30.

28. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 10.

29. 'Conversation with Umar al-Tilmisani', *al-Musawwar*, 22 January 1982, p. 76; see also, Shaykh Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, 'Malamih ahikrayat', *al-Muslimun*, 4 May 1985, p. 15.

30. *Qanun*, p. 58; Muhammad Shawqi Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Mujtama' al-Misri* (Cairo, 1980), p. 167.

31. *DIM*, 17 May 1946.

32. See for instance, *DIM*, 6 June 1946; 5 September 1948.

33. Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun: Kubra al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Haditha* (Beirut, 1955), p. 128; Ahmad Abd al-Rahman al-Banna et al., *al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna* (Beirut, n.d.), pp. 90–1. The Muslim Brothers directed their appeals to 'Our dear Christian citizens'. See for example, *JIM*, 19 May 1936, p. 19.

34. *al-Da'wa*, June 1979, p. 48; see also, February 1977, p. 54.

35. See for instance, Sa'id Ramadan, *Islamic Law: its Scope and Equity*, Ph.D. Thesis (Geneva 1970), especially pp. 113–70.

36. *DIM*, 5 September 1948, p. 1; see also *al-Nadhir*, 27 Safar 1358/ 18 April 1939, p. 13.

37. *JIM*, 23 June 1936, pp. 1–2; 7 July 1936, p. 16; 5 November 1937, pp. 4–5; 10 June 1938, p. 14; *al-Nadhir*, 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/ 2 August 1938, pp. 6–7; 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, p. 24; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 14–16; 25 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/ 16 January 1939, pp. 1l–2; 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, p. 20; *MIM*, 23 October 1948, p. 2.

38. *JIM*, 23 June 1936, p. 3; 1 September 1936, p. 14; 25 February 1938, p. 13; 13 May 1938, pp. 6–8; *al-Nadhir*, 39 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, pp. 10–11, 24; 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/2 August 1938, p. 10; 3 Rajab 1357/ 29 August 1938, p. 21; 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 9; 17 Rajab 1357/ 12 September 1938, pp. 22–3; 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 13; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 14; *MIM*, 5 June 1948, pp. 12–14.

39. *JIM*, 5 November 1937, p. 5.

40. *MIM*, 17 July 1948, p. 3; see also for the same view, *al-Nadhir*, 21 Jumada al-Thani 1358/8 August 1939, p. 19; *MIM*, 18 January 1947, p. 15; 25 January 1948, p. 3.

41. *MIM*, 29 May 1948, p. 3; for the same view see also, *al-Nadhir*, 30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, p. 24; 26 Jumada al-Thanl 1357/ 23 August 1938, pp. 22–4; *MIM*, 9 February 1946, p. 11; 26 March 1946, p. 19; *DIM*, 23 July 1946, p. 4.

42. *DIM*, 27 June 1946.

43. *JIM*, 16 June 1936, p. 17; for the same view see for example, 2 June 1936, p. 5; see also *al-Nadhir*, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1936, p. 5; 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 18; 23 Sha'ban 1357/ 18 October 1938, p. 4; 15

Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, p. 4; 8 Muharram 1358/28 February 1939, p. 22; 21 Jumada al-Thani 1358/ 8 August 1939, p. 20; 6 Rajab 1358/22 August 1939, p. 10; *MIM*, 14 June 1947, p. 3; *Rasa'il*, p. 150.

44. *JIM*, 5 November 1937, pp. 9,12; for the same view see for example, 5 Sha'ban 1352/23 November 1933, p. 15; 26 May 1936, pp. 2–3; 9 June 1936 p. 17; 1 September 1936, p. 22; 15 September 1936, p. 2; *al-Nadhir*, 28 Rabi' al-Thani, 1357/27 June 1938, p. 11; 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, p. 24; 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 25; 17 Rajab 1357, p. 8; 2 Sha'ban 1357/12 September 1938, p. 37; 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 4; 29 Ramadan 1357/22 November 1938, p. 23; *MIM*, 18 January 1947, p. 22.

45. See for instance, *JIM*, 8 September 1936, pp. 2–3; al-Nadhir, 3 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/3 May 1939, p. 5; 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939, p. 18; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 23, 26, 27.

46. *MIM*, 22 May 1948, p. 3.

47. *MIM*, 29 June 1946, p. 3.

48. *JIM*, 5 Sha'ban 1352/23 November 1933, pp. 15–16; 20 August 1935, p. 17; 5 November 1935, p. 12; 19 May 1936, p. 19; 25 August 1936, p. 1; 29 September 1936, p. 4; *al-Nadhir*, 30 Rabi' al-Awal 1357/30 May 1938, p. 8; 7 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/6 June 1938, p. 15, 14 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/13 June 1938, p. 21; 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/ 20 June 1938, p. 21; 28 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/27 June 1938, p. 11; 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 4; 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/2 August 1938, p. 10; 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, pp. 17–18; 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, pp. 4,6; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 6,12,16,17,18, 20,23,36,40; 30 Sha'ban 1357/25 October 1938, p. 16; 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, p. 4; 29 Ramadan 1357/22 November 1938, p. 23; 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/ 24 January 1939, p. 3; 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/13 May 1939, p. 14; 24 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/13 June 1939, p. 26; 14 Jumada al-Thani 1358/1 August 1939, p. 15, 21 Jumada al-Thani 1358/ 8 August 1939, pp. 19–20; 6 Rajab 1358/22 August 1939, p. 10; *MIM*, 20 September 1945, p.12; 3 November 1945, pp. 7, 24; 14 June 1947, p. 3; *DIM*, 27 June 1946; 2 November 1946; *al-Shihab*, 14 November 1947, p. 86; *Rasa'il*, pp. 150, 263; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 51, 66, 88, 89, 108.

49. *MIM*, 1 May 1948, p. 11.

50. *MIM*, 25 October 1947, p. 2; see also for the same view, *al-Nadhlr*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 8; 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 18; 4 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/26 October 1938, p. 23; 11 Rabi' al-Thanl 1358/31 May 1939, p. 4; *MIM*, 12 August 1944, p. 6.

51. *Hamas Charter*, article 11.

52. Ibid, article 13.

53. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, p. 19; *Rasa'il*, pp. 149–50, 431.

54. *Rasa'il*, pp. 52, 255, 421; *al-Nadhir*, 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, p. 12; *MIM*, 20 September 1945, p. 8; 15 December 1945, p. 3.

55. *Rasa'il*, p. 361.

56. Ibid., pp. 361; see also, pp. 80–4. The word *jihad* has often been translated into English as 'holy war'. However, *jihad* differs significantly from the Arabic word *qital* (fighting) and *harb* (war). Within the context of Islamic thought and practice, *jihad* indicates the act of 'self-exertion in the cause of Allah including peaceful as well as violent means', see Isma'il al-Faruqi, *Towards Islamic English* (The International Institute of Islamic Thought, Virginia, 1986), pp. 27–8.

57. al-Banna, *al-Salam fi al-Islam*, pp. 29–35; *Rasa'il*, pp. 42–3, 50–2, 279, 281, 434–5; see also, *JIM*, 29 December 1936, pp. 2–3; *al-Nadhir*, 6 Safar 1358/ 28 March 1939, pp. 14–5; 29 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/17 July 1939, pp. 21,25; *al-Ta'aruf*, 24 August 1940, p. 3; *MIM*, 12 September 1942, p. 21; 15 December 1945, p. 3.

58. al-Banna, *al-Salam fi al-Islam*, p. 44; *Rasa'il*, pp. 94, 279, 422, 431–3; *al-Nadhir*, 22 Muharram 1358/14 March 1939, p. 17; 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, p. 18; 3 Ramadan 1358/17 October 1939, p. 17; *MIM*, 15 December 1945, p. 3.

59. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 418; 6 Safar 1358/ 28 April 1939, pp. 14,16; *JIM*, 24 December 1936, pp. 1–2; *al-Ta'aruf* 13 July 1940, p. 3; *MIM*, 22 November 1947, p. 9; *Rasa'il*, pp. 50–2, 421–30.

60. *Rasa'il*, p. 279; see also for the same view, p. 42; *JIM*, 16 June 1936, p. 17; 29 December 1936, p. 1; *al-Ta'aruf*, 13 July 1940, p. 3.

61. See for instance, *JIM*, 29 December 1936, pp. 1–3; *al-Nadhir*, 6 Safar 1358/28 April 1939, p. 14; *al-Ta'aruf*, 13 July 1940, p.3; *Rasa'il*, pp. 279–80, 423.

62. Ahmad Nar, *al-Qital fi al-Islam* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 23–125; see also *JIM*, 16 June 1936, pp. 14,17; 29 December 1936, p. 2; *al-Nadhir*, 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/2 August 1938, pp. 7–8; 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 6; 22 Ramadan 1357/15 November 1938, p. 8; 28 Jumada al-Thani 1358/15 August 1939, p. 23; 3 Ramadan 1358/17 October 1939, p. 17; *MIM*, 15 December 1945, p. 4; *Rasa'il* pp. 5,421.

63. *DIM*, 17 October 1946, p. 1; see also, *JIM*, 10 December 1937, p. 2; *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, p. 21; 13 Shawal 1357/ 6 December 1938; *al-Ta'aruf*, 13 July 1940, p. 3; *Rasa'il*, pp. 44, 151.

64. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 6; see also, 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 16; *MIM*, 11 September 1948, pp. 22–3.

65. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 6; *MIM*, 22 November 1947, p. 9.

66. *MIM*, 26 June 1948, p. 19.

67. For this view see *JIM*, 5 Sha'ban 1352/19 December 1933, p. 15; 19 May 1936, p. 19; 26 May 1936, pp. 3–4; 15 April 1938, p. 15; *al-Nadhir*, 5 Jumada al-Thani, 1357/2 August 1938, p. 24; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 17, 21–2, 46–7; 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 17; 23 Sha'ban 1357/18 October 1938, p. 4; 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/31 May 1939, p. 14.

68. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 4–5; see also, *JIM*, 7 Safar 1355/29 April 1936, pp. 17–20.

69. *JIM*, 15 September 1936, p. 3; 3 November 1936, p. 1; *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1983, p. 31; 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, p. 3; 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/31 May 1939, p. 4.

70. *MIM*, 13 October 1945, p. 25.

71. *al-Nadhir*, 23 Sha'ban 1357/18 October 1938, p. 4.

72. *MIM*, 25 January 1948, p. 3.

73. al-Banna and others, *Sina' Bayna Atma' al-Isti' mariyyin wa al-Sahyuniyyin* (n.p. 1967), pp. 5, 9–12, 15–21, 25–6, 29–32; see also al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 8; *JIM*, 26 May 1936, p. 2; *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/24 September 1938, p. 16; *MIM*, 9 April 1946, pp. 6–7; Anwar al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qadaya al-Aqtar al-Islamiyya, Kifah al-Dhabihayn: Filastin wa al-Maqrib* (Cairo, 1946), p. 46.

74. al-Banna and others, *Sina'*, pp. 26–9; see also *MIM*, 9 April 1946, pp. 6–7.

75. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1983, p. 3.

76. *al-Nadhir*, 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/18 July 1938, p. 20; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 8.

77. *MIM*, 20 September 1945, p. 12; *Rasa'il*, pp. 263–4.

78. *al-Ahram*, 6 March 1946; for the same view see Mahmud Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Ahdath Sana'at al-Tarikh - Ru'ya min al-Dakhil*, vol. I (Alexandria, 1983), p. 410; *MIM*, 3 November 1945, p. 3.

79. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 24; see also 6 Jumada al-Awwal 1957/4 July 1938, pp. 19–20.

80. See for this view, *JIM*, 5 Sha'ban 1352/19 December 1933, p. 15; 23 June 1936, p. 3; 25 August 1936, p. 8; *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 5,18,20; 30 Sha'ban 1357/25 October 1938, p. 17; 15 Ramadan 1357/ 8 November 1938, p. 20; 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, p. 3; *MIM*, 25 March 1944, p. 4; 20 September 1945, p. 12; 13 October 1945, p. 25; 3 November 1945, p. 3; 14 June 1947, p. 3; *DIM*, 13 August 1946; 2 November 1946; 4 January 1947; *al-Shihab*, 14 November 1947, p. 86; *Rasa'il*, p. 263.

81. *JIM*, 11 August 1936, p. 1; *MIM*, 3 November 1945, p. 8; *DIM*, 22 December 1946; 4 January 1947.

82. *JIM*, 11 August 1936, p. 1; *al-Nadhir*, 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/ 23 August 1938, p. 22; 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 14; *MIM*, 1 December 1945, p. 7; 3 November 1945, p. 6; *DIM*, 23 July 1946; 1 September 1946; 22 December 1946.

83. *JIM*, 11 August 1936, p. 1; *al-Nadhir*, 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 14; *MIM*, 1 December 1945, p. 7; 22 February 1947, p. 14; *DIM*, 22 December 1946.

84. *JIM*, 5 November 1935, p. 13; 23 June 1936, p. 3; 11 August 1936, p. 1; *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 44; *MIM*, 13 October 1945, p. 25; 3 November 1945, pp. 5,7; 11 September 1948, p. 22; *DIM*, 6

June 1946; 13 August 1946; 1 September 1946; 4 January 1947; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, p. 67.

85. *al-Nadhir*, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1948, p. 4; 21 Jumada al-Thani 1358/18 August 1938, p. 19; *MIM*, 20 September 1945, p. 12; 3 November 1945, p. 7; 29 June 1946, p. 18; *DIM*, 27 June 1946; *Rasa'il*, p. 263.

Chapter Two

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9. *al-Muqattam*, 26 March 1925; Muhammad al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, p. 603.

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16. Frederick H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary* (London, 1938), p. 386.

17. Fathi Radwan, 'Ma al-Badil', *al-Da'wa* (February 1981), p. 25.

18. Invitations to these parties sent to Zionist leaders are in S25/7516, *Central Zionist Archives*, Jerusalem. For further details on parties and invitations during 1928–36, see File 00693, Div.65, *Israel State Archives*, Jerusalem, quoted by Mayer, *Egypt and the Palestine Question*, p. 310.

19. Muhammad al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, pp. 602–3.

20. For more information about this paper consult Nassar, *al-Yahud al-Misriyyn*, pp. 55–9.

21. Muhammad al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, pp. 602–3.

22. Mayer, *Egypt and the Palestine Question*, p. 15.

23. Hoare (Cairo) to Henderson (London), 31 August 1929, FO 371/13753/E4575.

24. *al-Siyasa*, as quoted by Khayriyya Qasimiyya, *Muhammad Ali al-Tahir*, pp. 151–2. For the neutral attitude of the government, see also *al-Siyasa*, 1 September 1929; Muhammad al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, pp. 353, 603; *Ha-Aretz*, 3, 6, 11 September 1929, quoted by Mayer, *Egypt and the Palestine Question*, p. 314.

25. Nassar, *al-Yahud*, Muhammad al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, pp. 353, 603.

26. Quoted by Abd al-Azim Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi Misr 1937–1948*, vol.2 (Beirut, i973), pp. 349–50.

27. For more information about this paper, consult, Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 63–7. According to Nassar 41 newspapers and magazines appeared in Egypt from 1877 until 1950. In her M.A. dissertation she identified most as Zionist, see pp. 45–84.

28. *al-Shams*, 3 July 1936, No.92, quoted by Nassar, *al-Yahud*, p. 44.

29. Ibid., p. 35; Muhammad al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, p. 603.

30. Khayriyya Qasimiyya, *Muhammad Ali al-Tahir*, p. 151.

31. File 3192, Div.65, *Israel State Archives*, quoted by Mayer, *Egypt and the Palestine Question*, p. 312.

32. An article by the Dutch–American reporter, Pierre Van Paassen, *Ha-Aretz*, 25 October 1929, quoted by Mayer, *Egypt and the Palestine Question*, p. 310.

33. *Filastin*, 14 October, 1936.

34. *al-Sirat al-Mustaqim*, quoted by *Ha-Aretz*, 27 March 1930, quoted by Mayer, *Egypt*, p. 314.

35. Russell, Cairo City Police, to Keown-Boyd, The Residency, Cairo, 10 September 1930; Ralph Stevenson's report, 30 October 1930, FO 141/625/808/S/30.

36. *al-Muqattam*, 25 December 1930; *al-Fath*, 12 Sha'ban 1349, p. 5.

37. *Ha-Aretz*, 7 November 1933, quoted-by Mayer, *Egypt* , p. 317.

38. *al-Muqattam*, 1–3 September 1929; *Majallat al-Shubban al-Muslimin*, vol. I, no. I, 1 October 1929, pp. 73–9, no. 2, November 1929, pp. 21–13, 224.

39. Muhammad Ali Alluba, *Filastin Wa al-Damir al-Insani* (Kitab al-Hiial, March 1964), No.156, p. 37.

40. *al-Siyasa*, 5 October 1930, *al-Muqattam*, l9 August 1930, 30 December 1939; *Filastin*, 5, 21 August 1930.

41. His memorandum dated 3 September 1929 appears in FO 371/13753/ E4860.

42. Loraine to Henderson (London), 14 September 1929, FO 371/13753/ E4860.

43. *Filastin*, 20 July 1930.

44. Muhammad Ali to High Commissioner (Jerusalem), 29 August 1929, FO 371/13746/E4557.

45. R. H. Hoare, Acting High Commissioner (Cairo) to Henderson (London), 31 August 1929, FO 371/13753/E4575.

46. For details consult Thomas Mayer, 'Egypt and the General Islamic Conference at Jerusalem in 1931', *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol.18, (1982), pp. 311–22.

47. *al-Muqattam*, 3 September 1929.

48. A. H. M. Gomaa, *The Foundation of the League of Arab States* (London,1977), pp. 31–2.

49. J. W. D. Gray, 'Abdin against the Wafd', *Middle East Forum*, vol.38, February 1962, p. 18.

50. A. H. M. Gomaa, *The Foundation of the League of Arab States*, p. 38.

51. Consult on this point Muhammad Izzat Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya al-Haditha*, vol.3 (Sidon, 1951), p. l0.For the same point of view of the Muslim Brothers, see Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. l80; *JIM*, 7 Shawal 1356/11 December 1937, p. 2; *al-Nadhir*, 24 Rajab 1357/19 October 1938, p. 4. The idea that Egypt should be isolated from Syria goes back as early as 1840. On 15 July 1840 the Four Great Powers, including Britain, signed the London Convention which effectively isolated Egypt restricting it within its boundaries and separated from Syria. In the aftermath of the First World War, Colonialist countries succeeded in dividing the Arab world into small cantons in pursuit of their policy to divide and rule.

52. Haykal, *Mudhakkarat*, vol.3, p. 15; see also for the same opinion, Ali al-Kharbutli, *al-Qawmiya al-Arabiya min al-Fajr ila al-Zuhr* (Cairo, n.d.), p. 179; Abd al-Ghani al-Bishri, *Athar Siyassat al-qawmiyat fi al-Haraka al-qawmiah al-Arabiya* (n.p., 1966), p. l93; Dufan Qaraqut, *Tatawwur al-Fikrah al-Arabiya fi Misr: 1865-1936* (Beirut, 1972), pp. 259–66.

53. Loraine (Cairo) to London, 27 February 1931, FO 371/15282/E1205.

54. Sati' Khaldun al-Husri (ed.), *Mudhakkarat Taha al-Hashmi* (Beirut, 1967), pp. 103–6.

55. Loraine (Cairo) to London, 12 June 1931, FO 371/15282/E3355.

56. Fu'ad Hubaysh, 'Fikrat al-Uruba bi-Haja Shadida ila Di'aya fi Misr', *al-Makshuf*, No.153, 20 June 1938, p. 2. Quoted by Israel Gershoni, *The Emergence of Pan-Arabism in Egypt* (Tel-Aviv, 1981), p. 13.

57. Tariq al-Bishri, *al-Haraka al-Siyasiyya fi Misr 1945–1952* (Cairo, 1972), pp. 47; 249–50; same, *al-Muslimun wa al-Aqbat fi Itar al-Jama'a al-Wataniyya* (Beirut, 1982), p. 588; see also, Haykal, *Mudhakkarar*, vol. I, p. 352; Ramadan, *Tatawwur al-Haraka*, p. 316; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, p. 132.

58. *al-Ahram*, 20 June 1938.

59. Tariq al-Bishri, *al-Muslimun wa al-Aqbat*, p. 580.

60. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 211; see also the same view, *MIM*, 18 October 1947, p. 4.

61. al-Banna et al., *al-Imam al-Shahid* (Beirut, n.d.), p. 128.

62. This view can be seen by reading his memoirs and in writings about him. See Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, *The Para-Military Units of the Muslim Brothers: 1928–1949*, (unpublished manuscript, 1997).

63. See for example, al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 84–5, 89–93, 110–11; Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London, 1969), pp. 9–10.

64. See Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, *The Para-Military Units*.

65. *DIM*, 5 September 1948.

66. Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith* (Beirut, 1973), p. 268; Naji Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya fi Filastin 1917–1948* (Beirut, 1967), pp. 72–3.

67. See for example, Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 280–3.

68. Ahmad al-Sukkari, 'Filastin al-damia', *JIM*, 5 Sha'ban 1352/ 18 January 1934, p. 15.

69. *JIM*, 27 Rajab 1352/15 November 1933, p. 19.

70. Ahmad al-Banna and others, *al-Imam al-Shahid*, p. 62.

71. al-Banna, 'Filastin al-Mujahida', *JIM*, 2 Rajab 1352/ 21 October 1933, p. 20.

72. *JIM*, 5 Sha'ban 1352/18 January 1934, p. 24.

73. See for instance, *JIM*, 1 Sha'ban 1354/29 October 1935, pp. 30–1.

74. Richard P. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 55.

75. JIM, 23 Dhu al-Hijja 1353/29 March 1935, pp. 21–2; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 192.

76. *JIM*, 7 Jumada al-Awwal 1354/7 August 1935, p. 6; 4 Jumada al-Thani 1354/3 September 1935, p. 6.

77. *JIM*, 14 Jumada al-Awwal 1354/14 August 1935, p. 33; 21 Jumada al-Awwal 1354/21 August 1935, p. 18; 28 Jumada al-Awwal 1354/ 28 August 1935, p. 5; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 202–3; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, p. 110; Amal al-Subki, *al-Tayyarat al-Siyasyyia fi Misr 1919–1952* (Cairo, 1982), p. 57. She mentions that this visit took place between 13–20 August 1935, but most references refer to 3–6 August 1935.

78. *JIM*, 21 Jumada al-Awwal 1354/21 August 1935, p. 17; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 109–10.

79. *JIM*, 21 Jumada al-Awwal, 1354/21 August 1935, p. 16; Hasan al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 203.

80. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 55.

81. *JIM*, 8 Sha'ban 1354/5 November 1935, p. 14; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, p. 70. It contained a number of articles about Palestine written during that visit.

82. *JIM*, 21 Jumada al-Awwal 1354/21 August 1935, p. 18; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, p. 111.

83. *JIM*, 8 Sha'ban 1354/5 November 1935, pp. 12–14; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, T*hawrat al-Damm*, pp. 66–8, 70.

84. See Footnote No. 83.

85. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 88–99; Ahmad Khalf Allah, *al-Fikr al-Tarbawi wa Tatbiqatuh lada jama't al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, M.A. Thesis (Cairo, 1984), p. 54; see also, *DIM*, 5 September 1948.

86. It was alleget by Kamil al-Sharif, one leader of the Muslim Brothers volunteers in the 1948 war in Palestine, that a number of the Muslim Brothers took part in the Qassam Movement. Kamil Isma'il al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filistin*, p. 47. This claim seems to be supported by what was recorded by Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, p. 116, namely that Hanifa al-Misri, an Egyptian who lived in Palestine, died with al-Qassam in the 1935 battle in the passes of Ya'bad in Jenin District. On the other hand, when this researcher consulted leaders of the Muslim Brothers in Cairo, they contradicted al-Sharif's account. They also insisted that Hanifa al-Misri had no connection with the Muslim Brothers. For the Qassam movement, which was organised to attack the British forces in Palestine and thereby provide a military solution to the Palestine question, consult: Z. I. Khan, *Tarikh al-Muqawama al-Filastinyya 1917–1935*, M.A. Thesis, unpublished, pp. 250–6; Yassin Subhi, *al-Thawra al-Arabiya al-Kubra fi Filasin 1936–1939* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 19–28; Isa al-Safari, *Filastin al-Arabiyya bayn al-Intidab wa al-Sahyuniyya* (Jaffa, 1937), vol. I, p. 238; Robert John and Sami Hadawi, *Palestine Diary*, vol. I (Beirut, 1970), p. 251; Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 292–6; 'Ma'arik wa Shuhada – al-Qassam Shahid Sadaq Ahd Allah', *Hadarat al-Islam* (December1961, January1962), pp. 109–11; Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 100–5; Nels Johnson, *Islam and the Politics of Meaning in Palestinian Nationalism* (London,1982), pp. 31–58.

Chapter Three

1. See *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 2; 7 Jumada al-Thani 1355/25 August 1936, pp. 2–3; a*l-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, pp. 22–3; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 44–5; 13 Shawal 1357/

6 December 1938, p. 22; Anwar al-Jundi al-Banna, *Kifah al-Dhabihayn Filastin wa al-Maghrib*, pp. 23–48

2. Z. I. Khan, *Tarikh al-Muqawama al-Filastinyya*, p. 260.

3. Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 102–12; for more information about this strike consult, Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, pp. 117–43; Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 290–320; John Murlow, *The Seat of Pilate* (London, 1959), p. 136; same, *Rebellion in Palestine* (London, 1946), pp. 136–7.

4. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 72–80.

5. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 162–3, 233–4.

6. 'Appeal to branches of the Society in Egypt and Muslim peoples generally and to Dear Christian Citizens', *JIM*, 28 Safar 1355/ 20 May 1936, pp. 19–20; see also, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 3; 7 Jumada al-Thani 1355/ 25 August 1936, p. 6.

7. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 211–12. *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/ 26 May 1936, p. 15; M. Lampson (Cairo) to Anthony Eden (London). Copies of this letter sent to the High Commissioner in Palestine, British Ambassador at Baghdad and British Minster at Jedda, 28 May 1936, FO 371/19980/E3153; Director General European Department – Special Section – Ministry of Interior to Oriental Secretary for Information, 18 May 1936, FO 141/536/403/12/36.

8. *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 15.

9. *al-Nadhir*, 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, p. 9.

10. See FO in footnote 7.

11. *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 15.

12. See p . ; see also, Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 73.

13. *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, pp. 15–16; 28 Safar 1355/ 20 May 1936, pp. 20–1; see also al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 212; M. Lampson (Cairo) to A. Eden (London), 28 May 1936, FO 371/ 19980/E3153, Director General European Department – Special Section – Ministry of Interior to Oriental Secretary for Information, 18 May 1936, FO 141/536/403/12/36.

14. *JIM*, 28 Safar 1355/20 May 1936, p. 20.

15. For more information on these Committees' activities and the names of the members, see *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 21; 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, pp. 6–7, 22; 4 Rabi' al-Thani 1355/24 June 1936, p. 22; 18 Rabi' al-Thani 1355/8 July 1936 pp. 13,17.

16. *JIM*, 28 Safar 1355/20 May 1936, p. 19; 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 16; see also the same view as far back as 5 Sha'ban 1352/23 November 1933, p. 17; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 213–4.

17. *JIM*, 13 Dhu al-Qa'da 1355/25 January 1937, p. 7; see also 29 Shawal 1355/12 January 1937, pp. 20–1; *al-Nadhir*, 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, p. 4; and see also Chapter One.

18. *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 17; 9 Muharram 1357/ 11 March 1938, p. 9; *al-Fath*, 14 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/4 June 1936, pp. 5–6.

19. Ahmad al-Banna and others, *al-Imam al-Shahid*, p. 62; for what the Muslim Brothers asserted about the Islamic character of the Palestine question see, for example, *JIM*, 26 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/16 June 1936, p. 20; *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939, p. 9; and see also Chapter One; for the activities of this Committee see the following issues of *al-Fath*: 14 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/4 June 1936, pp. 3–7; 21 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/11 June 1936, p. 23; 28 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/18 June 1936, pp. 3–5; 20 Sha'ban 1355/5 November 1936, pp. 6–7; 25 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/13 August 1936, pp. 16–17; 15 Rajab 1355/1 October 1936, pp. 6–7; 22 Rajab 1355/ 9 October 1936, p. 19; 14 Jumada al-Awwal 1356/23 July 1937, pp. 3–4, 16–17; 11 Rajab 1356/17 September 1937, pp. 20–1; 23 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/21 June 1938, pp. 3–4;9; 5 Sha'ban 1357/30 September 1938, pp. 6–8; 14 Rabi' al-Awwal 1358/4 May 1939, p. 44; *JIM*, 23 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/11 August 1936, pp. 9–11; 21 Safar 1357/22 April 1938, p. 11; *al-Nadhir*, 18 Rabi' al-Awwal 1358/18 May 1939, p. 22; *al-Ahram*, 13, 26 June 1936, 10 June 1937.

20. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Muharram 1358/28 February 1939, pp. 22–3; 15 Muharram 1358/7 March 1939, p. 15; 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, p. 15; 21 Jumada al-Thani, 1358/8 August 1939, p. 22; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 244–5; *Rasa'il*, p. 151; about the activities of Misr al-Fata in these committees consult, Ahmad Husayn, *Nisf Qarn ma'a al-Uruba wa Qadiyat Filastin* (Beirut; 1971), pp. 55–70.

21. *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal, 1355/2 June 1936, p. 3; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 214.

22. *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 14; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 212–13.

23. *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 8.

24. Ibid., p. 8.

25. *JIM*, 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 16; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 213–14; see also *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 8; 28,Safar 1355/20 May 1936, pp. 19–20; Special Section – Ministry of Interior (Cairo) to the Director of the European Department (Ministry of the Interior, and the Oriental Secretary (Cairo), 17 May 1936, FO 141/536/403/12/36.

26. See footnote No.90, Chapter Four.

27. *JIM*, 14 Jumada al-Thani 1355/1 September 1936, p. 22; 28 Jumada al-Thani 1355/15 September 1936, p. 21; concerning the position of the Brothers as regards their rejection of Jewish immigration, see for instance, *JIM*, 21 Safar 1357/22 April 1938, p. 8.

28. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 89–91; M. Lampson (Cairo) to Viscount Halifax (London), 19 December1938, FO 371/23219/E30; *JIM*, 23 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/11 August 1936, pp. 1–3;18; Abd al-Basit al-Banna, *Taj al-Islam wa Malhamat al-Imam* (Cairo, 1952), p. 37; Muhammad al-Adawl, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar* (Cairo, 1980), p. 10.

29. See for instance, *JIM*, 7 Safar 1355/29 April 1936, p. 20; 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 3; 7 Jumada al-Thani 1355/25 August 1936, pp. 1–8; 21 Jumada al-Thani 1355/8 September 1936, p. 3; 28 Jumada al-Thani 1355/15 September 1936, p. 4.

30. Quoted by Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 93–7.

31. Ibid., pp. 91–2.

32. *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 19; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 215–16.

33. See Footnote No.32.

34. *JIM*, 23 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/11 August 1936, p. 18.

35. *JIM*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1355/2 July 1936, p. 22.

36. *al-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 14.

37. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 173.

38. *JIM*, 23 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/21 July 1938, p. 3; *al-Fath*, 13 Safar 1357/14 April 1938, p. 8; 8 Ramadan 1358/22 October 1939, pp. 21–2; Secret report from the Ministry of the Interior (Cairo) enclosed in M. Lampson's letter (Cairo) to Arthur Wauchope, High Commissioner for Palestine (Jerusalem), 3 July 1936, FO 371/20085/E4415; Thomas Mayer, 'The Military Force of Islam: the Society of the Muslim Brethren and the Palestine Question, 1945–1948' in E. Kedourie and S. Haim, (eds), *Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel* (London, 1982), p. 101.

39. *JIM*, 26 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/16 June 1936, p. 20.

40. For more information aboutthese sub-committees and the names of members of them, see the following issues of *JIM*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1355/2 July 1936, p. 21; 18 Rabi' al-Thanl 1355/8 July 1936, pp. 13–14; 20–1; 2 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/21 July 1936, p. 19; FO 371/20085/E4415.

41. See for example, *JIM*, 2 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/21 July 1936, p. 16.

42. *JIM*, 8 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/27 July 1936, p. 20.

43. For more details about this decision, the division of these committees and the names of members, see *JIM*, 26 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/16 June 1936, pp. 18–19; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 216–20.

44. See p 36.

45. *JIM*, 26 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/16 June 1936, p. 18; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 216–19.

46. *JIM*, 28 Jumada al-Thani 1355/15 September 1936, p. 3; Hasan al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 216, 220–1.

47. Concerning these measures and contacts to put an end to the situation in Palestine, see Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 316–20; Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 112–14.

48. *JIM*, 14 Jumada al-Thani 1355/1 September 1936, p. 16.

49. Ibid., p. 17.

50. Ibid., p. 17.

51. Consult *al-Nadhir*, 17 Jumada al-Awwal 1357, p. 21; Abd al-Mut' al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna* (Cairo, 1977), p. 44.

52. *JIM*, 13 Rajab 1355/29 September 1936, pp. 13–15.
53. *JIM*, 13 Rajab 1355/29 September 1936, pp. 1–4; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 40–50.
54. See Footnote No.53.
55. Abd al-Latif Hamza, 'Adab al-Maqala al-Sahafiyya fi Misr – vol. 8 – Abd al-Qadir al-Hamza fi Jaridatay al-Ahali wal-Balagh', p. 366, quoted by Tariq al-Bishrl, *al-Haraka al-Siyasiyya*, p. 244.
56. For the background of the Appeal of Arab Kings and Princes, and concerning the preceding efforts and reasons of acceptance of the Higher Arab Committee of that appeal, see for example, Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, pp. 135–8; Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 320–2; Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 113–15.
57. al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 35.
58. For this view, see for instance, Ibid; Muhammad al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 10; *JIM*, 16 Ramadan 1356/20 November 1937, p. 3.
59. *JIM*, 16 Ramadan 1356/20 November 1937, p. 3.
60. Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East – A Political and Economic Survey* (London, 1954), p. 6.
61. Muhammad al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, pp. 10, 51–2.
62. About the support, the praise and the defence extended by Muslim Brothers to the stance of Ibn Sa'ud as regards Palestine, see *JIM*, 16 Ramadan 1356/20 November 1937, p. 3; *al-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, pp. 11–12; 13 Rajab 1357/8 September 1938, p. 20. For a view which is opposed to Ibn Sa'ud's position regarding Palestine and his role in aborting the Palestinian resistance, especially in the period 1936–39, see Muhammad Ali Sa'id, *Biritanya wa Ibn Sa'ud: al-Ilaqat al-Siyasiyya wa Ta'thiruha ala al-Mushkila al-Filistiniya* (London, 1982), pp. 107–217.
63. *JIM*, 9 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/8 June 1938, pp. 11–12; *al-Nadhir*, 17 Jumada al-Thani 1357/14 August 1938, p. 20; 3 Rajab 1357 29 August 1938, p. 20.
64. *JIM*, 6 Rajab 1355/22 September 1936, p. 21.
65. Ibid., p. 21.
66. Ibid, p. 21.
67. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 17.
68. al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 34.

Chapter Four

1. For the stages taken by the Peel Committee before issuing its report and the subsequent measures which led to the outbreak of the Revolt and the consequences of that revolt, see Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 322–54; Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 115–33; Muh,ammad Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, pp. 145–58, 183–215, 251.

2. This letter was the first official correspondence between the General Guidance Council and the British Embassy in Cairo, see this letter in JIM, 2 Ramadan 1356/6 November 1937, p. 3; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 229; see also, *al-Nadhir*, 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/18 July 1938, p. 20; 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, pp. 22–3.

3. *al-Nadhir*, 14 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/13 June 1938, pp. 19–20.

4. *al-Nadhir*, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 5.

5. See the first chapter.

6. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, p. 20.

7. *al-Nadhir*, 13 Shawal 1357/6 December 1938, p. 6.

8. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, pp. 20–1; see for the same view, 14 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/13 June 1938, p. 20; see also *JIM*, 6 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/5 June 1938, pp. 11–12.

9. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 17.

10. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 173; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 140; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 47.

11. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 144, 148; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 185,187; see also *al-Da'wa*, March 1978, p. 12; *JIM*, 28 Jumada al-Thani 1355/15 September 1936, pp. 1–3; Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 114.

12. *al-Nadhir*, 30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, see also 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 6.

13. *al-Nadhir*, 30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, p. 8.

14. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/20 June 1938, p. 18.

15. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 115.

16. Muhammad al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, p. 61; see also *al-Da'wa* (February 1978), p. 34.

17. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 17.

18. For the Muslim Brothers' view about Britain and its policy in Palestine, see Anwar al-Jundi al-Banna, *Kifah al-Dhabihayn*, pp. 23, 37–8; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, pp. 21–30; *al-Nadhir*, 14 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/13 June 1938, pp. 19–20; 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, pp. 4,19; 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 17; 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 44; 13 Shawal 1357/6 December 1938, pp. 22–3; 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, pp. 4–5; 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 14.

19. *al-Nadhir*, 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, p. 19.

20. *al-Nadhir*, 14 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/13 June 1938, p. 21.

21. Muhammad al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 9; *JIM*, 27 Shaban 1357/22 October 1938, pp. 6,9; *al-Nadhir*, 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/18 July 1938, pp. 11,16,43; 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, pp. 20–1.

22. *JIM*, 26 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/16 June 1936, p. 10; 7 Jumada al-Thani 1355/25 August 1936, p. 1; 14 Safar 1357/15 April 1938, p. 10; al-Nadhir, 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 14.

23. Ali al-Nashar, 'The British and Islam', al-Nadhir, 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/18 July 1938, pp. 9–10; 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/2 August 1938, pp. 7–10; 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, pp. 9–10.

24. *al-Nadhir*, 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/2 August 1938, p. 9.

25. Ibid., p. 9.

26. Ibid., p. 9.

27. Ibid., p. 10.

28. *al-Nadhir*, 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, p. 10.

29. Ibid., p. 10.

30. See for example, *al-Nadhir*, 25 Rabi' al-Awwal 1358/15 May 1939, p. 24; 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/8 July 1939, p. 19; 22 Muharram 1358/14 March 1939, p. 26; 21 Jumada al-Thani 1358/8 August 1939, p. 20.

31. See these issues of *al-Nadhir*, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 8; 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 28–9,47; 25 Rabi' al-Awwal 1358/15 May 1938, p. 24; 22 Ramadan 1357/15 November 1938, p. 26; 17 Rajab 1357/12 September 1938, pp. 24–5; 30 Shaban 1357/ 25 October 1938 pp. 24–5; 18 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/9 January 1939, pp. 25–6; 16 Shaban 1357/11 October 1938, p. 23; 11 Rabi' al-Awwal 1358/1 May 1939, p. 23; 29 Ramadan 1357/22 November 1938, p. 19; 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, p. 19.

32. a*l-Nadhir*, 3 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/23 May 1939.

33. See for this view, *al-Nadhir*, 11 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/2 January 1939, pp. 17–19; 9 Shaban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 13; *JIM*, 9 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/8 June 1938, p. 13; 25 Rabi' al-Thani 357/24 June 1938, pp. 1–2; 7 Jumada al-Thani 1355/25 August 1936, pp. 3–5; 14 Rajab 1357/9 September 1938, p. 1; *al-Nadhir*, 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/18 July 1938, p. 22; see also, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 20.

34. *al-Nadhir*, 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, pp. 15–16,18; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 9.

35. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/9 July 1939, p. 25; see also 8 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/26 June 1939, p. 25; 15 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/3 July 1939, p. 26.

36. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 7.

38. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 11–12; also Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 86–7. See also, *al-Nadhir*, 9 Shaban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 13.

39. *al-Nadhir*, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 5.

40. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/l November 1938, p. 17; 2 Sha'ban 1357/ 27 September 1938, pp. 39–41.

41. *al-Nadhir*, 13 Shawal 1357/6 December 1938, p. 23; 28 Rabi' al-Thanl 1357/27 June 1938, p. 19; 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 14; the magazine considered the humiliation experienced by the British at the hand of the Japanese in East China a revenge from God for the Arabs of Palestine. 28Jumada al-Awwal 1358/ 26 July 1939, p. 6.

42. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 12,41; see also for the same view, 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/2 August 1938, p. 24; 9 Shaban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 13; *JIM*, 2 Ramadan 1356/6 November 1937, p. 3; see also al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 230; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, p. 88.

43. Zakariya Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Jama'at al-Islamiyya fi al-Hayat al-Siyasiyya al-Misriyya: 1928-1948* (Cairo, 1978), pp. 194–5.

44. On the position of the Muslim Brothers as regards France, see the message of commendation written by al-Banna to the French Ambassador in Cairo in *JIM*, 25 Ramadan 1356/29 November 1937, p. 23; *al-Nadhir*, 28 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/27 June 1938, p. 21; on their protest see also, *al-Nadhir*, 17 Rajab 1357/12 September 1938, p. 26.

45. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 17; 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, p. 19.

46. Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, pp. 160–1, about the position of the Arab governments and people and Indian Muslims, see pp. 131–3, 160–3.

47. About the position of Iraq as goverment and as people on the Palestine question, see Abbas Jabar, *al-Iraq wa al-Qadiya al-Filastiniyya 1932–1941*, Ph.D. Thesis (Baghdad, 1983).

48. These letters came as part of a statement published in March 1938, entitled 'Along what axis should parliamentary elections in the Egyptian kingdom revolve?' in the election campaign for the 1938 Parliament.

49. Ibid.

50. *JIM*, 2 Ramadan 1356/6 November 1937, p. 3; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 230.

51. al-Nadhir, 14 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/13 June 1938, p. 19.

52. See Chapter One.

53. *al-Nadhir*, 7 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/6 June 1938, p. 15; see also, 30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, p. 18.

54. *al-Ahram*, 20 June 1938.

55. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, pp. 6–7; in this article the writer believed that Mahmud's statement was like the Partition scheme; see also, 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 8–9.

56. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, pp. 11–12; see also 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 13; see also Chapter One.

57. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 12.

58. *al-Nadhir*, 5 Jumada al-Thani, 1357/2 August 1938, p. 2.

59. *al-Nadhir*, 29 Ramadan 1357/22 November 1938, pp. 23–4.

60. Muhammad al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, pp. 10; Abbas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna: Mawaqif fi al Da'wa wa al-Tarbiyya* (Alexandria, 1981), p. 183; Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya wa Madrasat Hasan al-Banna* (Cairo, 1979), p. 55; Anwar al-Jundi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Mizan al-Haq* (Cairo, 1946), p. 62.

61. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 20.
62. Interview in Alexandria on 16 May 1984.
63. Muhmud Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 89.
64. *al-Nadhir*, 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, p. 26.
65. Ibid., pp. 7–8.
66. One of the *fatwas* of Iraq's Ulama, see Abbas Jabar, *al-Iraq*, pp. 510–12, and about the position of Islamic societies in Iraq regarding the Palestine question, see pp. 485–514.
67. *al-Nadhir*, 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, pp. 19–24.
68. *al-Nadhir*, 28 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/27 June 1938, p. 11; 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/18 July 1938, p. 15; 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, p. 19; 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, pp. 25–6; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 15.
69. Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi' i, *Fi A'qab al-Thawra al-Misriyya*, vol.3, (Cairo, 1951), p. 34.
70. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 4.
71. *al-Nadhir*, 28 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/27 June 1938, p. 14; 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, pp. 19–24; 27 Jumda al-Awwal 1357/ 25 July 1938, p. 11.
72. There are many articles in *al-Nadhir* about banning political parties. See for example, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 15; 17 Rajab 1357/12 September 1938, p. 16; on the link between this demand and the Palestine question, see 13 Shawal 1357/6 December 1938, pp. 3–5; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 8,41; 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, pp. 8,18.
73. *al-Nadhir*, 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, p. 6.
74. Amal al-Subki, *al-Tayyarat al-Siyasyyia*, p. 64.
75. See the first chapter.
76. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 146.
77. Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 95.
78. Mahmud Abu al-Sa'ud, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, (Indiana, USA, 1980), p. 148.
79. *al-Nadhir*, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 7, and see Chapter One.
80. Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 59.
81. al-Bishri, *al-Muslimun wa al-Aqbat*, p. 545.
82. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 173.
83. *al-Nadhir*, 18 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/9 January 1939, p. 9.
84. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 173.
85. Most issues of *al-Nadhir* and *JIM* from, 20 Rajab 1355/6 October 1936, to 2 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/1 June 1938, especially this issue of *al-Nadhir*, 15 Muharram 1358/7 March 1939, pp. 24–6; 22 Ramadan 1357/15 November 1938, pp. 25–6; 6 Safar 1358/28 March 1939, pp. 21–2; 4 Rabi' al-Awwal 1358/ 24 April 1938, pp. 21–2; 7 Jumada al-Thani 1358/25 July 1939, pp. 24–5; 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 47–8; 17 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/15 July 1938, pp. 19–20; *JIM*, 7 Jumada al-Thani 1355/25 August 1936, pp. 6–8; 6

Rajab 1355/ 2 September 1936, pp. 9–10; 15 Shawal 1355/ 29 December 1936, pp. 17–19; and the special issue about Palestine 2 Ramadan 1356/6 November 1937.

86. See Chapter One.

87. *al-Nadhir*, 29 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/17 July 1939, pp. 21,25.

88. See El-Awaisi, *Para-Military Units.*

89. Jamal Abidin, 'Id al-dumw'wa al-*DIM*ma', *al-Nadhir*, 20 Shawal 1357/ 13 December 1938, pp. 20–1; Muhammad al-Shafi'i, 'Hal Hadha huwa al-Id? Bi Misr Afrah tuqam wa ma'atim Fi al-Sham?', *JIM*, 7 Shawal 1356/11 December 1937, p. 2.

90. *JIM*, 7 Safar 1355/29 April 1936, p. 20; 28 Safar 1355/20 May 1936, p. 19; see also, 8 Shaban 1354/5 November 1935, pp. 13–14; *al-Nadhir*, 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, p. 18; 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 9; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 68–9; see also footnote No.26, Chapter Three.

91. *al-Nadhir*, 23 Sha'ban 1357/18 October 1938, p. 4; see also 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, p. 20.

92. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 23.

93. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 18. About other poems on Palestine published in al-Nadhir, see for instance, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 13; 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, pp. 15–16; 16 Sha'ban 1357/11 October 1938, pp. 15,18; 27 Safar 1358/18 April 1939, p. 20.

94. *JIM*, 30 June 1936, p. 16.

95. *al-Nadhir*, 29 Ramadan 1357/22 November 1938, p. 19.

96. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, p. 15.

97. *al-Nadhir*, 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, pp. 13–14.

98. See for example the special issue of *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/ 27 September 1938, pp. 10, 11, 19, 22, 28, 30, 40, 46, 49.

99. See for example the following issues of *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 7; 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938; 9 Shaban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 4.

100. *JIM*, 20 Rajab 1355/6 October 1936; 27 Rajab 1355/13 October 1936; 25 Sha'ban 1355/10 November 1936; on the front or back cover of the magazine.

101. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 173; on the campaign launched by the Muslim Brothers against Britain because of Palestine, see Christina P. Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt – the role of the Muslim Brotherhood* (London, 1981), p. 180; *al-Masri*, 9 December 1946, quoted the *Times* as admitting such a fact.

102. M. Lampson (Cairo) to (London) (Telegram), 1 April 1939, FO 371/ 23232/E2444.

103. Interview with Jamal al-Banna, London, 31 May 1984.

104. *Nizam*, p. 6.

105. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 175.

106. Interview with Jamal al-Banna (London, 31 May 1984). The following references confirm al-Banna's accounts: Abd al-Basit al-Banna, *Taj al-Islam*, p. 38; Muhammad al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 10.

107. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 176–7; see also *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, pp. 3–4; 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, p. 18.

108. Abd al-Basit al-Banna, *Taj al-Islam*, p. 38; Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 175; *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 3; 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, p. 18.

109. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 176.

110. Ibid., p. 176; see also *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 5.

111. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 176; *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/ 25 July 1938, p. 5.

112. See for example, M. Lampson (Cairo) to Anthony Eden (London), 24 December 1942, FO 371/35578/J245/158/16, which included a review of the history of the Muslim Brothers, which was included in the Security Summary Middle East No.103 of 10 December 1942, FO 371/23232/E2444, 1 April 1939.

113. M. Lampson (Cairo) to (London), 8 June 1938, FO 371/21877/E3389.

114. FO 371/35578/J245/ 158/16.

115. M. Lampson (Cairo) to London, 8 June 1938, FO 371/21877/E3389.

116. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 4; see also, Anwar al-Jundi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 63; Muhammad al-Adawi, op. cit., p. 11.

117. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, pp. 4–5; Anwar al-Jundi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 32.

118. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 5.

119. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, p. 5; see also 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, p. 26.

120. al-Bishri, *al-Muslimun wa al-Aqbat*, p. 545.

121. Ahmad Muhammad Ghunaym and Ahmad Abu Kaff, *al-Yahud wa al-Haraka al-Sahyuniyyya fi Misr 1897-1947* (Cairo, 1969), pp. 27–43, 51–80; see also, Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 14,.

122. Ghunaym and Abu Kaff, *al-Yahud*, pp. 82–172; Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 21–7.

123. Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 20, 23.

124. Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 20, 34–5, 54–5.

125. David Tidhar, *be-Madim u-be-lo Madim* (Tel-Aviv 1938), p. 193; same, *be-Sherut ha-Umma* (Tel-Aviv, 1960/61), p. 215, quoted by Mayer, *Egypt* , p. 311.

126. Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 9, 34–7.

127. A copy of the letter dated 2 August 1922 is in S30/2493d, Central Zionist Archives, *Ha-Aretz*, 5 September 1922, quoted by Mayer, *Egypt* , p. 310.

128. Frederick H. Kisch, *Palestine Diary* (London, 1938), pp. 109–10.

129. Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 38–44; see also Muhammad Haykal, *Mudhakkarat*, vol.3, p. 13.

130. Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. l24, 150, 153; on the start, the development and the impact of the Jewish Press on Egypt, see pp. 45–84, 114–30.

131. See for example, *al-Nadhir*, 30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, pp. 10–11, 23–4; 6 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/4 July 1938, pp. 19–20; 27 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/25 July 1938, pp. 17–18; 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, pp. 22–4; 17 Rajab 1357/12 September 1938, pp. 22–3.

132. *al-Nadhir*, 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, pp. 4–6. See also Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 315; see also the same demands being put forward by a Muslim Brother to Egyptian Jews, *al-Nadhir*, 27 Safar 1358/18 April 1939, p. 13.

133. *al-Nadhir*, 4 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/26 December 1938, pp. 18–19; also Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 40–4; Muhammad Haykal, *Mudhakkarat*, vol.3, p. 13.

134. *al-Nadhir*, 11 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/2 January 1939, pp. 14–15; 18 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/9 January 1939, p. 16; 25 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/16 January 1939, pp. 15,21; 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, p. 21.

135. *al-Nadhir*, 1,8,15,22 Muharram, 20 Safar 1358/21,28 February 7,14 March 1939, pp. 9, 9–10, 9–10 (11,18), 17–19.

136. *al-Nadhir*, 18 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/9 January 1939, pp. 16–17; 25 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/16 January 1939, pp. 21–2.

137. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, pp. 20–1; see also Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 189; *JIM*, 1 Muharram 1357/3 March 1938, p. 15.

138. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Jumada al-Thani 1358/8 August 1939, pp. 14–15.

139. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, p. 22.

140. *JIM*, 14 Jumada al-Thani 1355/1 September 1936, pp. 14–15.

141. *JIM*, 28 Jumada al-Thani 1355/15 September 1936, p. 4.

142. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, pp. 21–2.

143. *al-Nadhir*, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 9.

144. *al-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, p. 23.

145. Abd al-Halim Ahmad, 'Ma Qalla wa dalla fi (ma Kalla wa dalla) ila al-Ustadh Ahmad al-Shawi Muhammad', *al-Nadhir*, 27 Safar 1358/18 April 1939, p. 13, see also Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 164.

146. Umar al-Tilmisani 'Iuha al-Yahud ma ma' na hadha?' *al-Nadhir*, 14 Jumada al-Thani 1358/1 August 1939, p. 15.

147. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Jumada al-Thani 1358/8 August 1939, pp. 20–1.

148. 'Aliman min al-Azhir Yarudan ala Karim Thabit, al-Yahud fi Misr laysu ila al-an min al-Misriyyan'. *al-Nadhir*, 13 Rajab 1358/29 August 1939, pp. 23–4 and 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939, pp. 19–20.

149. M. Lampson (Cairo) to Viccount Halifax (London), 17 May 1938, FO 371/21877/E3 172.

150. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 173–4.

151. Ibid., p. 174.

152. *JIM*, 14 Rajab 1357/9 September 1939, p. 16.

153. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/20 June 1938, p. 21; 28 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/27 June 1938, p. 19; 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/31 May 1939, p. 15; see also Chapter One.

154. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 173–4.

155. M. Lampson (Cairo) to Viscount Halifax (London), 17 May 1938, FO 371/21877/E3172.

156. Ibid.

157. G. Kramer, 'Radical nationalists, fundamentalists and the Jews in Egypt, or who is a real Egyptian?' in G. Warburg and U. Kapferschmidt, (ed.), *Islam, Nationalism and Radicalism in Egypt* (New York, 1938), pp. 354–71.

158. al-Nadhir, 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/20 June 1938, pp. 13–15; 6 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/4 July 1938, pp. 11–12; *al-Da'wa* (March 1978), pp. 13–14.

159. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/20 June 1938, p. 18.

160. *al-Nadhir*, 5 Jumada al-Thani 1357/2 August 1938, p. 8; 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, pp. 21–4; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, p. 216; *Nizam*, p. 6.

161. Ahmad al-Sharbasi, Mudhaktarat Wa'ith Assir, quoted by *al-Da'wa* (November 1976), p. 5; see also (February 1978), p. 34; *al-Nadhir*, 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, pp. 18, 22–6.

162. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 177–9.

163. *al-Nadhir*, 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, p. 22.

164. Abas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 61.

165. *al-Nadhir*, 30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, pp. 4–5.

166. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 178.

167. Ahmad Anwar al-Jundi, *Qa'id al Da'wa, Hayat Rajul wa Tarikh Madrasatihi - Hasan al-Banna* (cover title), *Hasan al-Banna, Hayat Rajul wa Tarikh Madrasa* (inside) (Cairo, 1946), p. 152.

168. Consult: Richard P. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 16,55; Abd al-Muta al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, p. 44.

169. *al-Nadhir*, 12 Jumada al-Thani 1357/9 August 1938, p. 26.

170. Ibid., p. 26; see also, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 13; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 89–90.

171. al-Nadhir, 2 Shaban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 5.

172. Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 343–4.

173. *al-Nadhir*, 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, pp. 20–1.

174. *al-Nadhir*, 26 Jumada al-Thani 1357/23 August 1938, p. 26. .

175. *al-Nadhir*, 17 Rajab 1357/12 September 1938, p. 25; see about the preparations of the Muslim Brother branches, 10 Rajab 1357/ 5 September 1938, pp. 6,10; 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, pp. 20,22.

176. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 38.

177. *al-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, pp. 12,16,18,22–3; see also 23 Sha'ban 1357/18 October 1938, p. 17.

178. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 18.

179. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 13,45; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 91; Abd al-Basit al-Banna, *Taj al-Islam*, p. 37.

180. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 50; 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 19.

181. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 181. Details of the conference, including when it was held, are not recorded anywhere. Abd al-Halim and other Muslim Brothers' leaders who were approached by the researcher for further information had no other knowledge that they could give.

182. Ibid., p. 181.

183. a*l-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, pp. 3–4; 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 13,20; 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, p. 8; see also the correspondence between al-Banna and the Palace Director in Yemen, Muhammad Ibn Muhammad Zibarah al-Husayni in this respect, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 42.

184. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, pp. 25–7.

185. On this Parliamentary Committee, see Darwaza, op. cit., p. 215; for the Brothers' support for this committee see al-Nadhir, 7 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/6 June 1938, p. 19; 14 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/13 June 1938, pp. 10,13; 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/20 June 1938, p. 16; 20 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/18 July 1938, pp. 15,16.

186. Muhammad Haykal, *Mudhakkarat*, vol.3, p. 16.

187. Interview with Mahmud Abd al-Halim (Alexandria, 16 May 1984).

188. For more information about this conference see, *al-Fath*, 12 Sha'ban 1357/7 October 1938, pp. 15–6; 13 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/3 February 1939, p. 17; 4 Ramadan 1357/28 October 1938, pp. 14–7; 16 Jumada al-Awwal 1357/14 July 1938, p. 22; 19 Sha'ban 1357/ 14 October 1938, pp. 3–19; *al-Risala*, 10 October 1938, pp. 1642–3; *al-Ahram*, 6,7,8,18 October 1938; see also Anis Sayigh, *al-Fikra al-Arabiyya fi Misr*, pp. 242–3; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, p. 215; al-Bishri, *al-Haraka al-Siyasiyya*, p. 246; Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 182.

189. *al-Nadhir*, 16 Sha'ban 1357/11 October 1938, p. 10. Ahmad Husayn, the President of the Young Egyptian Party, *Misr al-Fatat*, objected to the chanting of the Muslim Brothers at those receptions, seeing it as an attempt to compete *with Misr al-Fatat*. The Muslim Brothers replied by saying that the slogan God is the Greatest, Thanks be to God' was current before the foundation of *Misr al-Fatat*, and that it would be tactless to shout before Islamic delegations the slogan of *Misr al-Fatat* 'God is the Greatest and Glory be to Egypt'. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 9.

190. *al-Nadhir*, 16 Sha'ban 1357/11 October 1938, pp. 6–7.

191. Muhammad Ali al-Tahir, *Zalam al-Sijn*, pp. 60–1; Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun Kubra al-Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Haditha*; *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939, p. 18.

192. *al-Nadhir*, 16 Sha'ban 1357/11 October 1938, p. 10; 23 Sha'ban 1357/18 October 1938, pp. 4,10,19,22,26; 8 Ramadan 1357, pp. 6,9.

193. *al-Nadhir*, 30 Sha'ban 1357/25 October 1938, pp. 16–18; 8 Ramadan 1357/1 November 1938, p. 20.
194. Haykal, *Mudhakkarat*, vol.2, p. 132.
195. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rajab 1358/6 September 1939, p. 19.
196. See for example, *al-Nadhir*, 15 Ramadan 1357/8 November 1938, p. 5.
197. For more information see Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya* p. 224; Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 348–9.
198. *al-Nadhir*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/31 May 1939, p. 4; Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 182; *Rasa'il*, p. 150.
199. *al-Nadhir*, 13 Shawal 1357/6 December 1938, p. 6; see also *Rasa'il*, p. 150.
200. *al-Nadhir*, 20 Shawal 1357/13 December 1938, p. 4.
201. Ibid., p. 4.
202. *al-Nadhir*, 18 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/9 January 1939.
203. *al-Nadhir*, 20 Shawal 1357/13 December 1938, p. 4; see also al-Bishri,*al-Haraka al-Siyasiyya*, p. 247.
204. *al-Nadhir*, 4 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/26 December 1938, p. 23.
205. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, pp. 3–4; see also 29 Muharram 1358/21 November 1939, p. 5.
206. *Rasa'il*, pp. 144–5.
207. *al-Nadhir*, 1 Muharram 1358/21 February 1939; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 243; Abbas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 131–2; *Rasa'il*, p. 150.
208. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 182, 401.
209. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Muharram 1358/28 February 1939, pp. 5–6.
210. *al-Nadhir*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/31 May 1939, pp. 4–10.
211. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 182.
212. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 17; see also Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Great Britain and Egypt 1914–1951* (London 1952), pp. 56–47.
213. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 267; see also, Shaykh al-Baquri, *al-Muslimun*, 8 June 1985, p. 8.
214. Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 356–9, 399–410.
215. *al-Nadhir*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/31 May 1939, pp. 3–4, 10; see also Anwar al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qa'id al-Da'wa*, pp. 27–8, 36.
216. See Footnote No.215.
217. *al-Nadhir*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/31 May 1939, pp. 14–15.
218. Ibid, p. 5.
219. *al-Nadhir*, 24 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/13 June 1939, pp. 11,26.
220. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 267.
221. Ibid., pp. 268–9.
222. *al-Nadhir*, 7 Jumada al-Thani 1358/25 July 1939, p. 25; 14 Jumada al-Thani 1358/1 August 1939, pp. 20–2.
223. *al-Nadhir*, 18 Dhu al-Qa'da 1357/9 January 1939, p. 9.

224. On this party and its link with Prince Abdullah, the Prince of Trans-Jordan and with the British, see Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 120–3, 131–2; Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, pp. 331–2.

225. Interview with Mahmud Abd al-Halim (Alexandria, 16 May 1984).

226. Abd al-Muta'al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, p. 44.

Chapter Five

1. *al-Nadhir*, 19 Jumada al-Thani 1357/16 August 1938, p. 17.
2. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rajab 1357/29 August 1938, p. 19; see also, 10 Rajab 1357/5 September 1938, p. 9.
3. *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/20 June 1938, p. 13.
4. *al-Nadhir*, 17 Rajab 1357/12 September 1938, pp. 8–9, 26; Bateman, British Embassy (Alexandria) to viscount Halifax (London), 26 September 1938, F0 371/21881/E5898.
5. *al-Nadhir*, 24 Rajab 1357/19 September 1938, p. 22.
6. On the Jewish promotion inside Egypt of Jewish products manufactured in Palestine, see Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 38–9
7. *al-Nadhir*, 1 Muharram 1358/21 February 1939, p. 26.
8. *al-Nadhir*, 22 Muharram 1358/14 March 1939, pp. 17–18.
9. *al-Nadhir*, 11 Rabi' al-Awwal 1358/1 May 1939, p. 23.
10. *al-Nadhir*, 29 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/17 July 1939, p. 25.
11. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 5; this decision was supported by a number of articles and poems, see pp. 15–18, 21, 23, 44.
12. *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938, p. 6.
13. Fathi Abd al-Hamid, *Qadiyat al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, (Cairo, n.d.), p. 46; Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 144; Ahmad Kalf Allah, *Fikrat al-Tarbiyya*, p. 54; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 47; N. Lorch, *Korot Milhemet ha'Atzmaut* (Tel-Aviv, 1973), p. 238, qouted by Mayer, 'The Military Force of Islam,' p. 101; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 55; *al-Mabahith*, 26 December 1950, p. 9; *al-Da'wa*, February 1978, p. 34, April 1980, p. 44; Haj Amin al-Husayni testified to the truth of that before the court, see: *Qadaya al-Ikhwan – Qadiyat sayyarat al Jib – Aqwal kibar al-Shuhud wa Hawadith al-Ta'dhib* (Cairo, 1951), p. 5.
14. Mahmud Abu al-Sa'ud, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 29.
15. Interview with Mahmud Abdu in Cairo, 5 May 1984; for help to the Palestinians to buy arms see Muhammad al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 10; Abd al-Muta'al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, p. 44; *Nizam*, p. 6; Ahmad al-Banna and others, *al-Imam al-Shahid*, p. 128; interview with Ahmad Labib al-Turjuman, Cairo, 14 May 1984.
18. *JIM*, 2 Ramadan 1356/6 November 1937, pp. 12–13; many Muslim Brothers, according to Ahmad Jalal (a Muslim Brother living in Exeter at that time), were asking al-Banna to fight it out in Egypt but al-Banna continued to

restrain them, see for that al-Nadhir, 28 Rabi' *al-Thani* 1357/27 June 1938, p. 13.

19. *JIM*, 9 Ramadan 1356/13 November 1937, pp. 1–2.
20. *al-Nadhir*, 30 Rabi' al-Awwal 1357/30 May 1938, pp. 3–4.
21. Mahmud Abu al-Sa' ud, op. cit., p. 28.
22. *JIM*, 9 Ramadan 1356/13 November 1937, pp. 1–2.
23. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 203.
24. Ibid., pp. 192–4, 202–3.
25. Ibid., p. 204; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 214–15; see the text of Husayni's message in *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 4.
26. Interview with Mahmud Abd al-Halim (Alexandria, 16 May 1984).
27. See his message to Palestinian leaders, *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 5; see also 5 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/26 May 1936, p. 16; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 213–14; and his messages to Muhammad Mahmud, *al-Nadhir*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/ 1 June 1939, p 14; what Ashmawi had confessed, *al-Nadhir*, 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, p. 5; and what *JIM* confessed, 28 Jumada al-Thani 1355/15 September 1936, pp. 2–3.
28. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, pp. 11–12. Ishaq al-Husayni believes that the Brothers' aims were modified by circumstances, and that al-Banna used to set out the aim and refer to it from time to time according to the development of the Society and its stage of preparedness. al-Banna used to keep the hope alive for those zealous youths implying that whosoever reached the stage of preparedness would join the struggle. al-Husayni believes that all that was achieved by the Brothers indicated that they were like 'the high jumper who raises the pole whenever he feels confident to surmount'. That is why their goals continued to develop and progress.
29. Message from Hasan al-Banna to Muhammad Mahmud in *al-Nadhir*, 11 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/1 June 1939, p. 14.
30. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 209; see also *al-Nadhir*, 3 Dhu al-Hijja 1357/24 January 1939, p. 26.
31. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 200–13. It is worth noting that Muhammad Izat Hasan,who advocated the first opposing opinion, supported Ahmad Rif'at on his position on other matters, though the two opinions regarding Palestine remained obviously contradictory.
32. Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 132–7; J. Heyworth-Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt* (Washington, 1950), p. 23; Note on the *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* ENC 'D' FO 371/ 53251/J1324/24/16.
33. Tariq al-Bishri, a modern historian, admits that his reading of the political literature of the nationalist movement in Egypt in the thirties and forties indicates that the prevailing political culture had not yet come to terms with the historical experience of settled colonisation. The truth, he asserts, is that the Muslim Brotherhood was the most popular Egyptian organisation which understood settled colonisation and was capable of opposing it. The Society derived from the thought of the Islamic bond compensation for the narrowness

of the pan-Arab idea and in default of theoretical political thoughts surrounding the Zionist scheme. Besides, they were, thanks to their popular formation, their fine organisations and ideology, capable of reaching the level of armed action in 1948. al-Bishri, *al-Muslimun wa al-Aqbat*, 1982, pp. 580, 582, 585, 587. See also, Ahmad Kalf Allah, *Fikrat al-Tarbiyya*, pp. 53–5; Ramadan, *Tatawar al-Haraka* , pp. 351–7; Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, 1961, p. 200.

34. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 89–90, 92–3, 179–81.

35. For the number 800 see Public Security Department (Cairo), 18 May 1936, FO 141/536/403/12/36. A copy of this note was enclosed in Lampson's report to Anthony Eden (London), 28 May 1936, FO 371/19980/E3153; for the number 200,000, see *al-Nadhir*, 5 Jumada al-Thani/2 August 1938, p. 8.

36. al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 148–9; Muhammad al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 14; Abd al-Azim Ramadan, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Tanzim al-Sirri* (Cairo, 1982), pp. 31, 33; Rif'at al-Sa'id, *Hasan al-Banna: Mata ... Kayfa ... wa Limadha?* (Cairo, 1977), p. 80; Heyworth- Dunne, *Religious and Political Trends*, p. 17, mentiions that in 1939 there were 500 branches; Abd al-Basit al-Banna in *JIM*, 25 Rabi' al-Thani 1355/ 15 June 1936, p. 9, says there were 150 branches; see also Carlson's report, pp. 22–3, in ENC No. 1 of S. Pinkney Tuck, American Ambassador (Cairo) to the Secretary of State (Washington, D.C.), 29 March 1948; Recorded group 59, 883, 60/3–2948 quoted by Mayer, 'The Military Force', p. 102 in which Ahmad al-Sukkari mentioned in March 1938 that the total number of branches in 1939 was 400; see also *al-Ta'aruf*, 18 May 1980, pp. 3–11, which includes Lists of all Muslim Brothers in Egypt up until January 1940 (264 branches).

37. *JIM*, 26 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/16 June 1936, pp. 18–19; see also al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 216–20.

38. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 79–80. For some of the names of these branches, see *JIM*, 8 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/27 July 1936, pp. 21–2; for other branches, as in Hush Isa, opened as a result of their efforts in support of Palestine, see *JIM*, 18 Rabi' al-Thani 1355/8 July 1936, pp. 13–14. And al-Samana Sharqia branch collected donations for Palestine while explaining the principles of the Muslim Brothers. This led the Muslim Brothers to commend the branch by writing 'We do hope that Muslim Brothers will follow this example m all their various branches'. *JIM*, 21 Jumada al-Thani 1355/8 September 1936, p. 21.

39. When they managed to do this they suggested that Hasan al-Banna should visit them as they represented a fertile soil. Muhammad Hilmi Nur al-Din, a member of one of those missions, said 'though our tours were intended to be for the benefit of the *Mujahidin* they have benefited all of us tremendously'. See for example, *JIM*, 8 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/27 July 1936, pp. 21,23; 23 Jumada al-Awal 1355/11 August 1936, pp. 3–4; 7 Jumada al-Thani 1355/25 August 1936, pp. 16–17.

40. *JIM*, 21 Jumada al-Thani 1355/8 August 1936, p. 2; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, p. 25.

41. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 177–8.
42. *al-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, pp. 18,23.
43. *al-Nadhir*, 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, pp. 21–2.
44. *Nizam*, p. 6.
45. Ishaq Musa al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 120.
46. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 93, 174; see also, *al-Nadhir*, 21 Rabi' al-Thani 1357/20 June 1938, p. 13; 17 Rajab 1357/12 September 1938, p. 20; *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 18–19 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/9 June 1936, pp. 3–4; 2 Jumada al-Awwal 1355/21 July 1936, p. 16; the Arab Palestinian Club in Cairo was fiercely criticised by the Muslim Brothers for raising funds through a dance and music show in aid of the victims of Palestine. *al-Nadhir*, 8 Muharram 1358/28 February 1939, p. 15.
47. The accounts are incomplete, but *Jaridat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* records that between 2 June 1936 and 12 October 1936 donations reached E£436.580. There is some evidence that part of this sum was transferred through the Bank of Egypt, *Bank Misr*, to the Palestinians, while according to *al-Nadhir*, in the period from 12 Jumada al-Thani/9 August to 24 Rajan 1357/19 September 1938 and before Palestine Week, as reported in various subsequent issues, the donations reached E£ 178.580. These details were obtained by the researcher from the Brothers' Press.
48. *al-Nadhir*, mouthpiece of Muhammad youth, 9 February 1940, p. 3; see also Abas al-Sisi, *hasan al-Banna*, pp. 152–3.
49. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 17; Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al Muslimun*, pp. 278–9.
50. See the text of this special bulletin in Abas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 157–8.
51. See for example, *JIM*, 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1355/2 June 1936, p. 6.
52. See for instance, *JIM*, 18 Rabi' al-Thani 1355/8 July 1936, p. 13.
53. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 174–5.
54. Interview with Mahmud Abd al-Halim in Alexandria on 16 May 1984.
55. Abd al-Wahab al-Kayyali, *Tarikh Filastin al-Hadith*, p. 340; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, p. 127.
56. See pp. 54–5.

Chapter Six

1. For more details about Hasan al-Banna's background for military preparation, see El-Awaisi, *The Para-Military Units*.
2. For more details about the Excursion Groups, see Ibid.
3. For more details about the Rover Troops, see Ibid.
4. *al-Ta'aruf*, 25 May 1940, p. 9.
5. *al-Ta'aruf*, 11 May 1940, p. 12.
6. *MIM*, 15 December 1945, pp. 1–24.

7. *Murafa'at Ahmad Husayn al-Muhami fi Qadiyat Iqhtiyal al-Marhum Mahmud Fahml al-Nuqrashl* (Cairo, 1949), pp. 45–6.
8. Ibid., p. 46.
9. *al-Nadhir*, 27 Safar 1358/18 April 1939, pp. 3–4.
10. *al-Nadhir*, 3 Rabi' al-Thani 1358/23 May 1939, pp. 3–5.
11. *al-Nadhir*, 22 Ramadan 1357/15 November 1938, pp. 9–10; see also, 13 Shawal 1357/6 December 1938, p. 4; 20 Shawal 1357/13 December 1938, p. 4; 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, p. 5; 1 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/19 June 1939, p. 10.
12. *Rasa'il*, p. 362.
13. Ibid., p. 355.
14. *al-Ta'aruf*, 18 May 1940, p. 2.
15. *al-Tahrir*, 22 November 1954, p. 10.
16. Anwar al-Sadat, *Safahat Majhula* (Cairo, 1956?), p. 115.
17. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 248–9.
18. Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 127.
19. Ahmad Muhammad Shamuq, *Kayfa Yufakkir al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (Khartoum; 1981), p. 130.
20. Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 127–8.
21. Ahmad Husayn, *al-Daktur Khalid*, (Cairo, 1964), pp. 152–67.
22. al-Sadat, *Safahat Majhula*, pp. 80–1
23. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 30, 205.
24. Ramadan, *Tatawur al-Haraka al-Wataniyya fi Misr: 1937–1948*, vol. 2, p. 128; Ramadan, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Tanzim al-Sirri*, pp. 42–4.
25. *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 6 November 1954.
26. Interview with Mahmud Abd al-Halim on 16 May 1984 in Alexandria; same, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 258; Salah Shadi, *Safahat min al-Tarikh* (Kuwait, 1981), pp. 84–5.
27. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 252, mentioned Husayn Kamal al-Din and Salih Ashmawi as being among the first leaders of the Special Section.
28. *Qadaya*, pp. 17–60; *Jara'im Isabat al-Ikhwan* (Cairo, 1965).
29. Ramadan, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Tanzim al-Sirri.*
30. *Rasa'il*, pp. 134–6.
31. *DIM*, 1 September 1946.
32. Fahmi Abu Ghadir, *Qadiyatuna* (Cairo, 1978), pp. 36–8.
33. *Qadaya*, pp. 71,74; see also, Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 76,78; Fahml Abu Ghadir, *Qadiyatuna*, pp. 12, 13–16; for the same view of the Court, see Abd al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, *Fi A'qab al-Thawra*, vol.3, p. 264.
34. Abd al-Muta'al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 73–4.
35. 'Conversation with Umar al-Tilmisani', *al-Musawwar*, 22 January 1982, p. 15.
36. Ibid., p. 17.
37. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 307–8.

38. Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 130–1.

39. See for example, *DIM*, 15 October 1946.

40. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 258; the same two objectives referred to in interviews with: Salah Shadi (Cairo, 28 April 1984); Abd al-Halim (Alexandria, 16 May 1984); Jamal al-Banna (London, 31 May 1984); see also Abd al-Muta'al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, p. 72; *al-Musawwar*, 22 January 1982, p. 15, Salah Shadi, *Safahat min al-Tarikh*, pp. 31–2, 84, 117; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 249; see also, *MIM*, 12 September 1942, p. 21; Mahmud Abu al-Sa'ud, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 108 ; Shaykh Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, 'Malamih dhikryat'; a*l-Muslimun*, 18 May 1985, p. 18.

41. *Qanun*, p. 10; see also, *Rasa'il*, p. 107; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 120, 171–3; *MIM*, 20 September 1945, p. 19; *DIM*, 15 October 1946.

42. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 81, 110; *Qadaya al-Ikhwan: Qadiyat Sayyarat al-Jib, al-Murafa'at* (Cairo, n.d.), pp. 22–5.

43. *Qadaya*, pp. 67–9.

44. Ahmad Tal'at, *Qira'a fi Malaff al-Irhab* (Cairo, 1981), p. 31.

45. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 31.

46. Interview with Abd al-Halim in Alexandria, 16 May 1984; same, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 259. The Muslim Brothers confirmed this point in their books; see also Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 131.

47. For the developments of the Special Section, especially the events of 1948 which illustrated the aims of the Section, and the organisational structure of it see El-Awaisi, *The Para-Military Units*.

48. For how the Egyptian governments, especially from 1940–1943, submitted to the British and became tools in their hands against the Muslim Brothers, see Ibid.

49. Ahmad Anas al-Hajjaji, *al-Rajul alladhi ash'al al-Thawra* (Cairo, 1952), pp. 16–19, 22–3, 33–5.

50. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 109.

51. Interview with Abd al-Halim in Alexandria, 16 May 1984; see for the same view, al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 137, 247.

52. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 205.

53. *JIM*, 14 April 1936, pp. 2–4; 29 December 1936, pp. 3–5.

54. For more details about the Muslim Brothers' interest in the Army and the Special Section officer's department, see El-Awaisi, *The Para-Military Units*.

55. This sub-section based on Salah Shadi, *Safahat min al-Tarikh*, pp. 29–34, 49–53, 118–19 and Shadi's commentary in Ramadan, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Tanzim al-Sirri*, pp. 247, 384–7. It is very difficult to be certain about the accuracy of this information in these references because of the secrecy surrounding the subject. Moreover, Shadi is the only Muslim Brother to reveal this information.

56. Lampson (Cairo) to Eden (London), 24 December 1942, FO 371/35578/J245 includes review of the history of the *Ikhwan al-Muslimun*.

Chapter Seven

1. *MIM*, 15 July 1944, p. 5; Umar al-Tilmisani, *al-Mulham al-Mawhub: Hasan al-Banna - Ustadh al-Jil* (Cairo, 1981), p. 52.
2. *Qanun*, p. 11; *al-Ta'aruf*, 18 May 1940, p. 3.
3. *Majalat al-Shubban al-Muslimin*, vol. 2, November 1930.
4. Muhammad Abd al-Hakim Khayyal, *Min Distur al-Wihda al-Aqa'idyya wa al-fikriyya Li du'at al-Islam* (Alexandria, 1981), p. 124; see also, Sa'id Hawa, *al-Madkhal ila da'wat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (Jordan, 1979), pp. 176–7.
5. Khalf Allah, *al-Fikr al-*Tarbawi, p. 131.
6. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, p. 39.
7. For more details about the Battalions system, see Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, *The Para-Military Units*.
8. For more details about the Families system, see Ibid.
9. *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Mudhakara Tafsiriyya An Minhaj Madaris al-Jum'a*, pp. 6–52.
10. *Rasa'il*, pp. 356–9.
11. *Rasa'il*, pp. 118–21.
12. See for example, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, pp. 39–46; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 16–19.
13. *Rasa'il*, p. 356.
14. *Rasa'il*, p. 361.
15. *Rasa'il*, pp. 321–437.
16. *DIM*, 16 August 1946; see also, Muhammad al-Ghazali, *Fi Mawkab al-Da'wa* (Cairo, 1954), pp. 143–5.
17. *Rasa'il*, p. 437.
18. See for example, Hasan al-Banna, "Sina'at al-Mawt', *al-Nadhir*, 2 Sha'ban 1357/27 September 1938; Abd al-Mun'im Khallaf, 'Filastin tulqi darsan rai'an ala al-Muslimin, same issue, p. 31.
19. See for instance, *al-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1357/4 October 1938, pp. 13–14.
20. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 165–6; see also, Shaykh Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, 'Malamih dhikryat', *al-Muslimun*, 27 April 1985, p. 9.
21. See for example, *DIM*, 1 September 1946; 14 September 1946; *Rasa'il*, p. 356.
22. Abd al-Mun'im Ahmad Talib, *al-Bay'a: Sharh Risalat al-Ta'alm Li al-Imam al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna* (Cairo, 1952), p. 56.
23. See for example, *MIM*, 15 December 1945, pp. 4–5.
24. Muhammad Labib al-Buhi, *Ma'a Shuhada' al-Ikhwan* (Cairo, 1952).
25. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers.*, p. 208.

26. Interview with Hasan Duh in Cairo, 2 May 1984; see also, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, p. 40.
27. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, p. 40; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 208.
28. *Rasa'il*, p. 108.
29. *Rasa'il*, p. 45.
30. *Rasa'il*, pp. 40, 53.
31. *al-Nadhir*, 13 Shawal 1357/6 December 1938, p. 4.
32. *al-Nadhir*, 20 Shawal 1357/13 December 1938, p. 4.
33. *al-Nadhir*, 1 Jumada al-Awwal 1358/19 June 1939, p. 10.
34. *al-Ta'aruf*, 18 May 1940, p. 3.
35. See for example, *al-Da'wa*, March 1978, p. 13.
36. *al-Ta'aruf*, 18 May 1940, p. 4; *Rasa'il*, pp. 107, 141–5; see also Chapter One.
37. *Rasa'il*, pp. 361–2.
38. *Rasa'il*, p. 363.
39. *Rasa'il*, p. 364.
40. Yusuf al-Qarrdawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, pp. 33–7; see also, *MIM*, 15 December 1945, pp. 5–7; *DIM*, 7 May 1946.
41. *DIM*, 15 October 1946.
42. *Qanun*, pp. 10–11; *al-Ta'aruf*, 18 May 1940, p. 11.
43. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 184–5; Muhammad Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 138–51, 164–92, 208–16; Rasa'il, pp. 113–77, 199–223, 243, 271; Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 102; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 40, 167–9.
44. Yusuf al-Qardawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, p. 4; *al-Nadhir*, 9 Sha'ban 1957/4 October 1938, p. 22.
45. See for example, *al-Nadhir*, 29 Muharram 1358/21 March 1939, p. 21; *MIM*, 17 August, 1946. p. 3.
46. *MIM*, 30 August 1945, p. 14, 19 March 1946, p. 21; *DIM*, 9 August 1946; 1 October 1946; 5 September 1948.
47. *al-Ta'aruf*, 8 June 1940, p. 2; 13 July 1949, p. 3.
48. *al-Ta'aruf*, 13 July 1940, p. 3.
49. Muhammad Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 165–6; Yusuf al-Qardawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, pp 51–65; al-Banna et al., *al-Imam al-Shahid*, pp. 85–8.
50. See Chapter One.
51. al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, pp. 51–3.
52. Ibid., p. 52.
53. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 163.

Chapter Eight

1. *MIM*, 20 September 1945, pp. 8–9; *Rasa'il*, p. 255.

2. *MIM*, 4 October 1945, p. 4; see also, 26 July 1945, p. 3, 27 July 1946; p. 4;Rif'at al-Sa'id, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 80; Muhammad Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 30; *Akhir Sa'a*, 15 March 1946; *DIM*, 12 December 1946; Fahmi Abu Ghadir,*Qadiyatuna*, p. 51; *al-Da'wa*, 15 April 1952, p. 7; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 39–40; Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, *Mudhakkarat Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi* (Cairo, 1977), pp. 13–17, who estimated the membership of the Society at the beginning of the 1940s as a quarter of a million; see also, for an estimate of between 100,000 and 500,000 members a 'Security Summary', Middle East, No.103, 10 December 1942, FO 371/35578/J245; Smart (Cairo), 1 November 1945, FO 371/45928/J3955; Robertson (Khartoum) to all Governors in the Sudan, 20 February 1946, Enc. 'D', FO 371/53251/J1324.

3. *Akhir Sa'a*, 15 March 1946; *MIM*, 27 July 1946, p. 4; Rif'at al-Sa'id, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 81; Fahmi Abu-Ghadir, *Qadiyatuna*, p. 44; Abd al-Basit al-Banna, T*aj al-Islam*, p. 27; *al-Da'wa*, 15 April 1952, p. 7; Muhammad Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 30; see also, Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, pp. 12–1h3; Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution*, pp.157–60.

4. Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 102, 112; for the factors which attributed to this growth as seen by western observers, see for example, H. A. R. Gibbs' report 'The Political Force in Egypt', 25 February 1943 (Foreign Research and Press Service), FO 371/ 35530/J1407; J. Heyworth-Dunne's report on Islamic organisations in Egypt received in FO 18 November 1943, FO 371/ 35539/J4741; Walter Smart's report (Cairo), 1 November 1945, FO 371/45928/ J3955; for Hasan al-Banna's view of factors which attributed to this growth, see al-Banna, *al-Salam fi al-Islam*, pp. 5–10.

5. *MIM*, 20 September 1945, pp. 9–lO; *Rasa'il*, pp. 255, 257–9.

6. *DIM*, 15 October 1946; *MIM*, 20 September 1945, pp. 9–10; *Rasa'il*, pp. 257–8, 260.

7. *MIM*, 20 September 1945, p. 9; *Rasa'il*, p. 257.

8. *MIM*, 20 September 1945, pp. 15, 20; see also, 27 October 1945, p.13; *Rasa'il*, pp. 269–70; Bowker (Cairo) to Bevin (London), 3 October 1945, FO 371/45926/J3402.

9. *MIM*, 5 June 1948, p.17; *Qanun*, p. 7; Muhammad Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 25.

10. *MIM*, 5 June 1948, pp.17–18; *Qanun*, p. 10.

11. See for example, *MIM*, 31 May 1945, p. 4; 27 September 1945, pp. 18–19.

12. *MIM*, 3 November 1945, p. 3;see also Anwar al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qadaya al-Aqtar al-Islamiyya: Kifah al-Dhabihayn – Filastin wa al-Maqrib*, p. 43.

13. Anwar al-Jundi al-Banna, *Kifah al-Dhabihayn*, pp. 43–4.

14. *Qanun*, p. 9.

15. *DIM*, 5 September 1948.

16. Mustafa al-Sibai'i, *Durws fi Da'wa al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*, pp. 21–2; quoted by Muhammad Ali Dinawi, *Kubra al-Harakat al-Islamiyya fi al-Asr al-Hadith* (Cairo, 1978), pp.136–7.

17. There were special editions of their magazines on Arabic and Islamic issues, see for example, *al-Nadhir* 23 Sha'ban 1357/18 October 1938, on North Africa; *MIM*, 18 April 1933, on Morocco; 1 July 1944, on Algeria; 26 July 1945, on North Africa, 16 April 1946, on Morocco.

18. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p.155.

19. *Rasa'il*, pp. 52, 99–101, 261–7; see also, al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p.135.

20. *DIM*, 22 October 1946; see also, *MIM*, 16 August 1945, pp.15,18; 27 September 1945, p.16; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 242.

21. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p.155; Abd al-Muta'al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, 80; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 173; Shaykh al-Baqwri, 'Malamih Dhikrayat' *al-Muslimun*, 4 May 1985, p. 15.

22. *MIM*, 28 June 1945, p. 14.

23. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, *al-Tarbiyya al-Islamiyya*, p. 56.

24. al-Banna et al., *al-Imam al-Shahid*, pp. 62–3.

25. Anwar al-Jundi, *Ma'a bi'thit al-Haj: Mudhakkarat an Rihlat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin ila al-Hijjaz Am 1364 A.H.* (Cairo, 1946), pp. 54–64.

26. *DIM*, 13 November 1946; see also, al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 151.

27. Fahmi Abu Ghadir, *Qadiyatuna*, p. 46; see for an attempted demonstration by the Muslim Brothers against French policy in North Africa, Farquhar (Cairo) to Winston Churchill (London), 4 July 1945, FO 371/45922/J2297.

28. *MIM*, 28 July 1945, p. 11; see also, *al-Da'wa*, June 1979, p. 49; Abbas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 231–3.

29. *MIM*, 28 June 1945, pp. 11–13; see also, Farquhar (Cairo) to Winston Churchill (London), 29 June 1945, F0 371/45922/J2096; same to same, 4 July 1945, FO 371/45922/J2263.

30. *MIM*, 28 June 1945, p. 13; 9 August 1945, p. 13; *DIM*, 5 September 1948; Abbas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 232.

31. *MIM*, 28 June 1945, p. 13.

32. *al-Ta'aruf*, 18 May 1940, p. 11; 25 May 1940, p. 9.

33. The first indication of this section appeared in the Muslim Brothers' press in *MIM*, 28 June 1945, p. 14; see also, al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 154.

34. Mahmud Abu al-Sa'ud, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 310.

35. *Qanun*, Section for Liaison with the Islamic World, Article 73, p. 55; for the other purposes which were added by 1953, *see Qism al-Ittisal: al-La'iha al-dakhiliyya li Qism al-Ittisal* (Cairo, 1953), pp. 4–5

36. *Qanun*, Section for Liaison with the Islamic World, Article 74, p. 55; by 1953 the Section expanded to comprise nine committees, see *Qism al-Ittisal: al-La'iha al-dakhiliyya li Qism al-Ittisal*, pp. 5–10; Shaykh al-Baquri, 'Malamih Dhikrayat', *al-Muslimun*, 8 June 1985, p. 8.

37. *Qanun*, Section for Liaison with the Islamic World, Article 75, p. 55; see al-Baqwri, 'Malamih Dhikrayat', *al-Muslimun*, 8 June 1985, p. 8.

38. See the list of these publications in Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 174.

39. See al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 154.

40. Muhammad Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp.148–9; after instituting the 'overseas' students' section according to a decree of the General Guidance Council in April 1954, the supervision over students abroad was transferred to it. Salih Abu Raqiq claims that he was the head of that section. The 'overseas' students' section was however divided into various departments, each one concerned with the students of a particular country. Abu Raqiq further claims that while Yassir Arafat was a student heading the Palestine department, the 'overseas' students' section had actually helped to win him the presidency of the Palestinian Students' Club. Mahmud Abu al-Sa'ud, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 300–1.

41. Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 173.

42. *MIM*, 26 June 1945, p. 23; regarding the activities of al-Sawaf when he returned to Iraq see, Muhammad Mahmud al-Sawaf, 'Safahat min Daftar Dhikrayati'. *al-Muslimun*, especially 12 October 1985, pp. 10–11.

43. Muhammad Zaki, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p.149; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers.*, pp. 173–4; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 136.

44. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 153–4.

45. See for example, Ibid., pp. 155, 271.

46. *JIM*, 23 Dhu al-Hijja 1353/29 March 1935, pp. 11, 21–2; Hasan al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 192; see also Chapter Two pp. 31–2.

47. *Qanun*, p. 27.

48. See Chapter Two, pp. 31–2.

49. *JIM*, 6 August 1935, p. 6; 13 August 1935, p. 33; 27 August 1935, p. 5; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 202–3.

50. For their tour in Syria see the following issues of *JIM*, articles written by Abd al-Rahman al-Sa'ati: 27 August 1935, pp. 3–5; 2 September 1935, pp. 5–7; 10 September 1935, pp. 5–6; Abd al-Rahman al-Banna, *Thawrat al-Damm*, pp. 81–5, 113 and after that; see also al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, pp. 204–5.

51. *JIM*, 1 Sha'ban 1354/29 October 1935, p. 31; al-Banna, *Mudhakkarat al-Da'wa*, p. 207.

52. *JIM*, 26 May 1936, p. 7; Christina Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 160 who mentioned that the Muslim Brothers opened branches in Beirut and Tripoli.

53. *JIM*, 16 June 1936, p. 7.

54. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 137, who mentioned that this formation of the Muslim Brothers appeared in Hamah; see also *DIM*, 5 September 1948; Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 160 mentions that branches opened in 1937 in Damascus, Aleppo, Deir al-Zor and Lathiqia.

55. Jabir Rizq, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa al-Mu'amara ala Suriyya* (Cairo, 1980), pp. 128–9; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 135–6.

56. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p.138; *MIM*, 1 December 1945, p. 13.
57. Ibid., p. 138; *DIM*, 5 September 1948.
58. *DIM*, 5 September 1948.
59. See pp. 139–40.
60. *DIM*, 5 September 1948; Abbas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 233.
61. *DIM*, 29 May 1946.
62. *DIM*, 5 September 1948; see also Abbas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 233; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 138; Jabir Rizq, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 129; *al-Da'wa*, March 1978, p. 25.
63. *DIM*, 29 May 1946.
64. *DIM*, 29 May 1946.
65. Abbas al-Sisi, *Hasan al-Banna*, pp. 233–4.
66. Jabir Rizq, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 130.
67. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985.
68. Jabir Rizq, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 129–30.
69. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 139.
70. A memorandum on 'Youth Movements in the Middle East' (Research Department, Foreign Office), 12 February 1947, FO 371/61542/ E2 130.
71. See al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 148, 293; for more information see Christina Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 161.
72. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 138–9; see also, FO in footnote No.70; *MIM*, 28 September 1946, p. 13.
73. *DIM*, 18 June 1946.
74. *DIM*, 26 June 1946.
75. al-Banna et al., *al-Imam al-Shahid*, p. 42.
76. *MIM*, 6 September 1946, p. 19.
77. *Hadarat al-Islam*, December 1961–January 1962, pp. 774–5.
78. Ibid., p. 775; see also *MIM*, 20 October 1945, p. 14.
79. *Hadarat al-Islam*, December 1961–January 1962, p. 776.
80. Ibid., p. 776.
81. See about the Muslim Brothers in Syria, Mustafa al-Siba'i, *al-Ahzab al-Siyasiyya* (Damascus, 1954), pp. 11–41; see also, al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 136, 138, 141–4; *DIM*, 5 September 1948, p. 31; *MIM*, 19 July 1947, pp. 12–13; 6 September 1947, p. 19.
82. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; see also Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution*, p. 236.
83. See for example, al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 61.
84. *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Sutur* (Jordan, 1978), p. 32; see also *MIM*, 1 December 1945, p. 13.
85. *MIM*, 5 March 1936, p. 15.
86. *al-Da'wa*, October 1980, p. 31.
87. *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Sutur*, p. 33.
88. *MIM*, 6 September 1947, p. 12.

89. *DIM*, 28 May 1946.
90. *DIM*, 30 November 1946; see also al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 146–7; Mayer, 'The Military Force', p. 113.
91. al-Adawi, *Haqa'iq wa Asrar*, p. 61; Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 205–6.
92. Abd al-Halim, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 323–4.
93. *al-Jamahir*, 23 June 1947.
94. British Embassy (Cairo) to African Department Foreign Office (London), 19 February 1954, FO 371/108373/JE1054; see also Sir M. Lampson (Cairo) to Anthony Eden (London), 24 December 1942, FO 371/35578/J245; J. W. R. Robertson, Civil Secretary (Khartoum) to all Governors in the Sudan, 20 February 1946, FO 371/53251/J1324.
95. See A. Kirkbridge (Amman) to E. Bevin (London), 29 May 1947, FO 371/62231/E4677.
96. *DIM*, 25 November 1947.
97. *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Sutur*, pp. 32–52, an official booklet; the most important reference for the activities of the Muslim Brothers in Jordan.
98. See Chapter Two, pp. 31–3.
99. See Part One.
100. See pp. 103–4.
101. Interview with Abd al-Halim, in Alexandria, 16 May 1984.
102. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 144.
103. Interview with Abd al-Halim, in Alexandria, 16 May 1984; see also *MIM* 21 September 1946, p. 10.
104. Interview with Salah Shadi (Cairo, 28 April 1984); Abd al-Halim (Alexandria, 16 May 1984); Sa'id Ramadan (Geneva, 17 February 1985).
105. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 144.
106. Ibid., p. 144; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 48; see also M. Lampson (Cairo) to (London), 8 August 1944, FO 371/40137/E5287; Jerusalem Secretariat (Goverment of Palestine) to the Chancery, British Embassy (Cairo), 20 August 1945, FO 141/1011/32/204/45; Mayer 'The Military Force', p. 102.
107. *MIM*, 25 January 1947, p. 14.
108. This sub-section is based on the interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva.
109. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; see also *DIM*, 3 June 1947; Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 102–3.
110. *al-Difa'* 31 October 1945; *MIM*, 4 October 1945, p. 4; 20 October 1945, p. 14; see also Mayer, 'The Military Force', p. 103 who mentioned that Sa'id Ramadan opened the first Jerusalem branch on 26 October 1945.
111. *MIM*, 22 December 1945, p. 13.
112. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; see also *MIM*, 22 December 1945, p. 13; 21 September 1946, p. 10; 19 October 1946, p. 12; *al-Difa'* 9, 11, 18, 19, 24, 30 December 1945; *al-Sirat al-Mustaqim*, 20

December 1945; *Filastin*, 17 December 1945; Research Department, Foreign Office, 12 February 1947, FO 371/61542/E2130.

113. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985.

114. Ibid.

115. *DIM*, 24 December 1946.

116. *DIM*, 29 December 1946.

117. *MIM*, 18 January 1946, pp. 16–17, 22.

118. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; see also *MIM*, 6 September 1947, pp. 19; 11 October 1947, p. 9.

119. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; see also *MIM*, 29 May 1948 (first cover); Abd al-Muta'al al-Jabri, *Limadha Ughtila al-Shahid Hasan al-Banna*, p. 70. The role of Sa'id Ramadan in the Palestine question after 1947 calls for special research, see Abd al-Fattah El-Awaisi, *al-Mu'tamar al-Islami al-am li Bait al-Maqdis: 1962–1953* (Hebron, 1990).

120. Kenneth Cragg, *Counsels in Contemporary Islam* (Edinburgh, 1965), pp. 119–20.

121. *MIM*, 2 February 1946, p. 5.

122. Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 103, 113.

123. See for example, *al-Difa'*, 6 May 1946; *MIM*, 7 May 1946, p. 4; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.

124. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 146; *MIM*, 26 October 1946, p. 6; 2 November 1946, p. 20.

125. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.

126. The first figure was Hasan al-Banna's estimation in Fahmi Abu Ghadir, *Qadiyatuna*, p. 67; the second was the estimation in the Consulate's Report, R659,883.00/3–2448, pp. 4–5, quoted by Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 103, 113.

127. *DIM*, 7 May 1946; *al-Difa'* 3, 6–7 May 1946; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.

128. *MIM*, 8 June 1946, p. 10; *DIM*, 4 June 1946; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.

129. The first number mentioned by al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145; and *DIM*, 30 May 1946; the second one mentioned by Abd al-Aziz Ahmad in *MIM*, 19 October 1946, p. 2.

130. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.

131. See for example, *MIM*, 24 April 1948, p. 13; about Gaza branch see 5 October 1946, p. 19; 17 April 1948, p. 13.

132. Articles 2–4 *in al-Qanun al-Asasi Li Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Filastin* (Jerusalem, 1946), pp. 2–4; see also, *MIM*, 20 October 1945, p. 14.

133. *Filastin*, 12 January 1946; *al-Sha'b*, 30 December 1946; *al-Wahda*, 18 October 1946, 15, 17, 22 December 1946; 7 January 1947; 15 February 1947; *al-Difa'* 20 January 1946; 2,3 February 1946; 24, 30 January 1947, 1 July 1947; see also, al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145; *MIM*, 19 October 1946, p. 13, 26 October 1946, p. 6.

134. *DIM*, 4 June 1946.
135. *MIM*, 21 September 1946, p. 9.
136. *DIM*, 22 April 1947.
137. For more details on this conference, see *DIM*, 17, 19, 20 October 1946; *Filastin*, 2, 17–20 October 1946; *al-Difa'*, 16–19 October 1946; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 146.
138. See for example, *MIM*, 3 November 1945, p. 20.
139. *DIM*, 24 June 1946, see also, 6–7 May 1946.
140. *DIM*, 26 June 1946.
141. *al-Difa'* 20 October 1946, 18 December 1946, 7 July 1947; *al-Sha'b*, 17 December 1946; *al-Wahda*, 17 December 1946, 22 April 1947; *Filastin*, 3 February 1946.
142. *DIM*, 11 August 1946; for the same attitude of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, see *MIM*, 9 September 1944, p. 19; Anwar al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qadaya al-Aqtar al-Islamiyya*, p. 33.
143. See chapter one.
144. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 17; *MIM*, 6 September 1945, p. 7; see also Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 102, 113, and footnote No. 153 of the Palestine Press.
145. See for example, *DIM*, 7 May 1946; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.
146. Article 5 *in al-Qanun al-Asasi Li Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Filastine*, p. 4.
147. See *MIM*, 8 June 1946, pp. 10, 22; 19 October 1946, p. 13.
148. *DIM*, 6 June 1946.
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150. *MIM*, 21 September 1946, p. 9; 2 November 1946, p. 20; *DIM*, 30 May 1946.
151. *DIM*, 17 October 1946; see also Research Department, Foreign Office, 12 February 1947, FO 371/61542/E2 130.
152. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; see also the same view in al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.
153. See *MIM*, 16 February 1946, p. 12; 21 September 1946, p. 9; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, pp. 47–8; *al-Sha'b*, 17, 23, 30–1 December 1946; *al-Difa'* 16 May 1946; 7 August 1946; 9, 14, 18–9, 21, 23, 30 December 1946; *Filastin*, 27 December 1945, 14 January 1946, 12, 20–1, 25–6 December 1946; *al-Wahda*, 1 November 1946.
154. See the reports of Abd al-Aziz al-Khayat in the following issues of *MIM*, 21 September 1946, pp. 10–11; 28 September 1946, pp. 10, 20; 5 October 1946, p. 19; 12 October 1946, pp. 10, 22; 19 October 1946, pp. 8, 22; 26 October 1946, pp. 15, 18; 2 November 1946, p. 20; 23 November 1946, pp. 8–9; 14 December 1946, pp. 20–1; Abd al-Aziz started his journey on 15 July 1946.
155. See for example, *DIM*, 4 June 1946; *MIM*, 19 October 1946, p. 22.

156. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985; see also Mayer, 'The Military Force', p. 104.

157. *MIM*, 21 September 1946, p. 9.

158. *al-Wahda*, 29 December 1946; *al-Difa'* and *Filastin*, 19 January 1947; the branches' dependency on the Cairo headquarters was even greater and according to the American Consulate's report, p. 3, the committee was composed of thirteen members of whom seven were nominated by the Cairo headquarters; quoted by Thomas Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 103, 113.

159. *Qanun*, Article 50, p. 27 and Article 28, p. 40.

160. *Qanun*, Article 50, p. 27 and Article 24, p. 39.

161. *Qanun*, Articles 19–32, pp. 16–20 and articles 30–52, pp. 41–8.

162. *Qanun*, Articles 33–9, pp. 20–3.

163. See for example, *MIM*, 19 March 1946, p. 16.

164. Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 104, 113; see also footnote No.153, the Palestine Press.

165. Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 104, 113; the local members had to swear an oath of allegiance to the General Guide, see *al-Difa'*, 13 December 1945.

166. *al-Qanun al-Asasi Li Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Filastin*, p. 2.

167. See *MIM*, 26 October 1946, p. 6.

168. For the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, see *Qanun*; and for the Muslim Brothers in Palestine see, *al-Qanun al-Asasi Li Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Filastin*; see also, *MIM*, 20 October 1945, p. 14; 22 December 1945, p. 13; 8 June 1946, p. 10.

169. See for example, *al-La'iha al-Dakkhiliyya Li al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin – Shu'bit Ra's Gharib* (Cairo, 1943?).

170. *Qanun*, p. 27.

171. *DIM*, 5 September 1948.

172. Mayer, 'The Military Force', p. 103.

173. Interview with Mahmud Abd al-Halim in Alexandria, 16 May 1984.

174. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985.

175. *MIM*, 1 December 1945, p. 14.

176. *MIM*, 21 February 1948, p. 9.

177. *Qanun*, Article 18, p. 16.

178. *Qanun*, Article 44, p. 25.

179. al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 145.

180. See a minute by the Oriental Minister, Sir W. Smart, in a report on the role which the Muslim Brothers had been playing, from British Embassy (Cairo) to Bevin (London), 9 November 1945, FO 371/45928/J3955; see also, Lampson to Oliphant, 20 July 1938, FO 371/21881/E5898; Kellar (London) to Loxley (London), 19 July 1943, FO 371/ 35536/J3177; C. Middle East to War Office, 30 August 1943, FO 371/35537/J3778; Shone (Cairo) to Scrivener (London), 10 October 1943, FO 371/35538/J4382.

181. Interview with Sa'id Ramadan in Geneva, 17 February 1985.

182. See pp. 170–1.

183. al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 60; *DIM*, 13 January 1946, 24 February 1947.
184. See *MIM*, 19 July 1947, p. 13; *DIM*, 16 November 1947.
185. See p. 154; *DIM*, 4 November 1947.
186. al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, pp. 60–1; Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 205.
187. *MIM*, 21 September 1946, p. 15.
188. *al-Difa'* 17 January 1947; *al-Wahda*, 17 December 1946.
189. See *DIM*, 4 November 1947.
190. *al-Qanun al-Asasi Li Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Filastin*, p. 2. Mayer, 'The Military Force', p. 104 believed that 'The Society idolised the struggle for Palestine's liberation as a sacred mission imposed on all Muslims'; see also, *MIM*, 19 October 1947, p. 13.
191. *al-Qanun al-Asasi Li Jama'at al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin fi Filastin*, pp. 2–4; see also, *MIM*, 8 June 1946, p. 10.
192. See e.g., Mayer, 'The Military Force', p. 104.
193. Abd Allah Ulwan, *al-Islam wa al-Qadia al-Filistiniyya* (Jordan, 1982), pp. 48–52.
194. *MIM*, 19 October 1947, p. 13.
195. *MIM*, 21 September 1946, p. 9, 19 October 1946, p. 12; 14 December 1946, p. 20; see also, *al-Difa'* 12 June 1946; *al-Sha'b*, 17 December 1946; *al-Wahda*, 18 November 1946; 12, 22 December 1946; *al-Sirat al-Mustaqim*, 6 July 1946.
196. *MIM*, 14 December 1946, pp. 20–1; see also, 24 August 1946, p. 5.
197. See e.g., *MIM*, 12 April 1947, p. 22; 26 April 1947, p. 17.
198. Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 139–42.
199. Ibid., pp. 142–5.
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201. Ibid., p. 40.
202. Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, vol.4, p. 95; Arif al-Arif, *al-Nakba: bi al-Suwar* (Sidon, 1962), p. 99.
203. See p. 167; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 40.
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205. Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, pp. 95–6; Arif al-Arif, *al-Nakba: bi al-Suwar*, pp. 98, 100.
206. al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 51; *al-Da'wa*, July 1977, p. 52.
207. *DIM*, 26 October 1946; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, p. 96.
208. *Qadaya al-Ikhwan: Qadiyat Sayyarat al-Jib; aqwal Kibar al-Shuh-ud wa Hawadith al-Ta'dhib* (Cairo, 1952), p. 30; see also, *al-Da'wa*, July 1977, p. 2; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 51; Subhi Yasin, *Tariq al-Awda ila Filastin* (Cairo, 1961), p. 15; *al-Difa'*, 14 July 1947; 6, 12, 14 August 1947; *MIM*, 4 October 1947, p. 13; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, p. 96; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 56; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna*, p. 43; *DIM*, 12 May, 14 June,

11 August; 17, 23 October, 15, 24 December 1946; Khalf Allah, *al-Fikr al-Tarbawi*, p. 54; Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, pp. 115–16; al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qa'id al-Da'wa*, p. 46.

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212. For more information about Labib, see *MIM*, 4 October 1947, p. 13; *al-Da'wa*, 25 December 1951, p. 9; al-Sadat, *Safahat Majhula*, p. 156; al-Husayni, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 301.

213. See Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 56; Khalf Allah, *al-Fikr al-Tarbawi*, p. 54; al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 47.

214. *Qadaya al-Ikhwan: Qadiyat Sayyart al-Jib: Aqwal Kibar al-Shuhud wa Hawadith al-Ta'dhib*, p. 30; see also, *MIM*, 4 October 1947, p. 13, al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, p. 51; *al-Da'wa*, July 1977, p. 25; *al-Difa'* 21 August 1947; Mayer, 'The Military Force', pp. 105, 114; Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka al-Arabiyya*, p. 96; Mitchell, *Muslim Brothers*, p. 56; al-Asal, *Hasan al-Banna*, p 43; Khalf Allah, *al-Fikr al-Tarbawi*, p. 55; Bayumi, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun*, p. 116.

215. Darwaza, *Hawla al-Haraka*, p. 96; see for the same view, al-Sharif, *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fi Harb Filastin*, pp. 62–3.

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Chapter Nine

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2. *al-Misri*, 19 October 1947; Allush, *al-Muqawama al-Arabiyya*, pp. 135, 152–3.

3. *MIM*, 11 March 1944, p. 2.

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8. Killearn (Cairo) to Eden (London), 1 December 1944, FO 371/40138/E7793.

9. See *MIM*, 9 August 1945, p. 11.

10. *MIM*, 3 November 1945, p. 7.
11. *MIM*, 23 August 1945, p. 12.
12. al-Ta'aruf, 2 March 1940, p. 6; see also, *MIM*, 31 May 1945, p. 4; 9 August 1945, p. 11; 13 October 1945, p. 25; 20 October 1945, p. 13.
13. See *MIM*, 25 March 1944, p. 16.
14. *MIM*, 29 July 1944 (last cover); 13 October 1945, p. 26; 3 November 1945, p. 5; see also, al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qa'id al-Da'wa*, p. 35.
15. *DIM*, 22 December 1946; al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qa'id al-Da'wa*, p. 31.
16. *MIM*, 12 August 1944, p. 5; al-Jundi al-Banna, *Qa'id al-Da'wa*, pp. 35–6.
17. *MIM*, 23 August 1945, p. 13.
18. *MIM*, 27 October 1945, p. 14.
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35. Ibid., p. 113.
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42. Nassar, *al-Yahud*, pp. 29–30.

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70. *DIM*, 5 May 1946.
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97. *MIM*, 18 January 1947, p. 14.
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100. See *MIM*, 22 February 1947, p. 7; 8 March 1947, p. 9.
101. *MIM*, 12 April 1947, p. 23.
102. *MIM*, 26 April 1947, p. 2.
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